Transcript 2G Scam

The Dragon
Breathes Fire
Nyayapati Gautam
Triumphant Institute of
Management Education P Ltd
www.time4education.com
India & China - A
Background
The Indo-China conflict of 1962 - Interpretations
– Competition for status and influence in Asia
– Domestic political issues pushed the two leaderships
to be more assertive and that a spiral of
assertiveness followed, until Jawaharlal Nehru
initiated the “Forward Policy” which proved to be
the final trigger.
– Nehru and Mao took the issue of territory seriously
India & China - A
Background
• Fear of Chinese interference in domestic
politics
– Beijing would support Indian communists
– it would help separatists in the northeastern states
of India. On the Chinese side
• The Pakistani Connect
– As China’s relations with India worsened in the
1950s, its appreciation of Pakistan grew apace.
– Pakistan stands strategically located at the mouth
of the energy-rich Gulf.
– China’s partner in the Islamic world.
– Islamabad was a key ally against the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan.
– Islamic extremists operating from Pakistan are a
String of Pearls
String of Pearls
• No formal definition of the String of Pearls
but these could be considered:
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Maldives and Coco Islands
A container shipping facility in Chittagong.
A deep-water port in Sittwe, Myanmar.
A navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan
The ‘pearls’ extend from:
• the coast of mainland China
• through the littorals of the South China Sea,
• the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to
the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf
String of Pearls
• Upgrading the radar facilities on the Coco
Islands.
– The Coco Islands lie North of the northern tip of the
Andaman Island chain. The radar facility would
definitely accord the Chinese surveillance inputs in
monitoring activities around the northern Andaman
Islands.
• Development of Kyaukpyu deep water port.
– The port of Kyaukpyu in the Northeast of the Bay
of Bengal would give the Chinese greater leverage
in the Bay of Bengal especially the waters
surrounding the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
• A position to influence events in the Malacca
Straits, which is one of the major choke points
of the IOR
String of Pearls
• The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, under
development with Chinese assistance, would
be a major facility for refueling and resupply
for Chinese vessels .
String of Pearls
The problems for the Chinese:
– Overseas bases are not staging points, they also
need to be secured and supplied.
– Other than Gwadar, all other ports have the same
vulnerability of relying on sea supplies where the
Indian Navy will have a significant disruptive
capability arising out of its closer proximity and
deployable assets.
– What if supplies are pre-positioned?
• Securing them against air and missile attacks from Indian
territory would be difficult.
String of Pearls
• The Problems … for China
– The Chinese Air force (PLAAF) is also unlikely to
come into serious play.
– Airfields in the Tibetan plateau are located at
heights of 7000 to 9000 feet.
– In that rarefied atmosphere, aircraft can take off
with only very limited fuel and ordnance.
– If PLAAF does use the Tibetan airfields for fighter
operations, the time on station and the ordnance
load carried by the fighters will be severely
compromised.
– The IAF, on the other hand, will be taking off from
the north Indian plains and be capable of reaching
the theatre within 20 to 30 minutes.
String of Pearls
• The Problems … for China
– India commands the entry into the Indian Ocean
from the east.
– International trade contributes more than 30 per
cent to the Chinese economy.
– A substantial part of this shipping as well as 60 per
cent of China’s energy supplies transit the Indian
Ocean.
– Though the Chinese Navy (PLAN) is far bigger than
the Indian Navy, but geography favours India and
China cannot have an asymmetric advantage.
– The Indian Navy can disrupt Chinese shipping right
from the Gulf of Aden to the Malacca Straits (which
is particularly well covered from the Andaman &
Nicobar Islands and the Bay of Bengal.)
Theatres of Conflict Arunachal Pradesh
• Instances of Visa denial to Indian officials.
• Incursions into Indian territory by the Chinese
army.
• Damage to property in Arunachal Pradesh.
Theatres of Conflict Arunachal Pradesh
• There could be three plausible reasons behind
China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh.
– Balancing India.
– Tibet Factor and ‘Lost’ Territories Argument.
– Quest for Resources.
Theatres of Conflict Arunachal Pradesh
• Arunachal has recently entered China’s ‘Core
Interests’ list.
• Tawang is a tremendous prize.
• If the Chinese get an opportunity to ‘teach
India a lesson’ in the Eastern portion, they may
be tempted to give it a shot provided the
gains outweigh the costs.
Tibet and the Dalai Lama
• Closely tied to China’s claim on Arunachal
Pradesh, is the presence of the Dalai Lama.
– The Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh was
the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th
century
– It is the second largest Tibetan monastery after the
one in Lhasa.
– The 14th Dalai Lama may choose his successor from
the Tawang monastery.
– If this were to happen, the international questioning
of China’s legitimacy over Tibet will continue.
– Consequently, China perhaps believes that its
aggressive posture on Arunachal Pradesh will deter
India from overplaying its Tibet card,
– 120,000 Tibetan refugees live in India.
Militarization in Tibet
• According to a 2010 US Department of
Defense report:
– China has replaced its old liquid fuelled, nuclear
capable CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missile
with “more advanced CSS-5 MRBMs”
– Improved its border roads in the eastern sector
bordering India to enhance PLA movement.
– Intercontinental missiles have also been deployed
by China at Delingha, north of Tibet.
– China has deployed 13 Border Defence Regiments
totalling around 300,000 troops on the border.
– Airfields have also been established at Hoping,
Pangta and Kong Ka, which are in addition to the
existing six airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous
Region, for supporting fighter aircraft.
Possible Indian response
• Our response could include:
– Strengthen surveillance capability, remote sensing,
SIGINT and HUMINT. Denial of surprise is crucial.
– Deny the Chinese the advantage of their superior
infrastructure.
• The Chinese infrastructure can be used for replenishment of
supplies and quick rotation of troops to exploit
breakthroughs.
• India’s raising of two additional regiments of BrahMos and
positioning them in the northeast will neutralize this Chinese
advantage.
• BrahMos employed in the steep diving mode and with a
290 km range can degrade the Chinese infrastructure
advantage in the opening hours of the conflict.
Possible Indian response
– Expedite the deployment of ‘Nirbhay’— the 700
km range, terrain following, cruise missile under
development — must be given high priority and
brought under deployment as soon as possible.
– This range can bring Chinese infrastructure even
deep within Tibet including the Qinghai-Tibet
Railway into attack range. Such an enlargement of
the attack bubble will nullify a large part of the
infrastructural advantage that the Chinese have
built up.
– Match the Chinese capability of logistics through
airlift capability till India’s own ground
infrastructure is developed.
Theatres of Conflict The North West:
• There is Increasing Chinese Footprint in India's
North West
• The Indian Army Chief`s statement about the
presence of 3000 to 4000 Chinese, including
troops, in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) has
been widely reported.
• The statement is significant coming as it does
after the statement of the Northern Army
Commander, Lt. Gen. K.T. Parnaik, in April
2011 that, “not only they are in the
neighbourhood but the fact is that they are
actually present and stationed near the LoC.”
Implications for India
• The presence of Chinese troops in such close
proximity, on a permanent basis, only
exacerbates the threat of two fronts opening
up.
• The widening of the KKH and its increased
load capacity will improve mobility in
switching forces and the movement of heavy
equipment and stores across borders.
• Once the US-led ISAF de-inducts from
Afghanistan, the focus of the Mujahideen will
shift away from Afghanistan.
– The presence of the Chinese in North Afghanistan
and PoK will prevent them from entering Xinjiang.
– Then would J&K be the target?
Theatres of Conflict – The
Water Front?
• Tibetan plateau happens to be the largest
water tank in the world.
– All the 10 major river systems of Asia including the
Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Irrawady, Salween and
Mekong originate in the Tibetan plateau.
– Of the world’s 6.92 billion people, for nearly 2
billion (29 per cent) living in South Asia from
Afghanistan to the Ganga-Meghna-Brahmaputra
basin and in Southeast Asia the rivers flowing from
Tibet constitute the lifeline.
Theatres of Conflict – The
Water Front?
• According to media reports, China has:
– built a barrage on the Sutlej river.
– Since November 2010, it has started construction
work for damming/diversion of the Tsangpo
(Brahmaputra) in Tibet
• It might want to develop hydropower …
– partly to reduce the development gap between its
eastern and western provinces
– And also to sell the electricity generated to
neighbours and thus promote cross-border
integration of economies.
– The energy produced in Tibet might also be used to
tap the region’s rich mineral reserves including
uranium, borax, lithium, copper, zinc and iron.
Theatres of Conflict – The
Water Front?
• Any diversion of waters from Nepalese rivers
originating in Tibet would directly affect the
flow of water of the Ganga, the soul of the
people living
• China started work on the Brahmaputra river
in November 2010 without sharing any
information about it with the lower riparian
countries.
• This is only 30 km north of the border.
• China is likely to use the Brahmaputra waters
as a leverage to arm twist its riparian
neighbours.
• Mekong river
Theatres of Conflict – The
Water Front?
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of
Non-Navigation Uses of International
Watercourses does not allow any country to
bar the natural flow of water of an
international river.
• However, China is not a signatory to this
Convention.
• According to the National Remote Sensing
Centre in Hyderabad, satellite pictures show
Chinese construction on 28 power stations at
the Great Bend and downstream. This is
where the river makes its journey into India.
Theatre of Conflict The South China Sea
• China reasserted China’s “indisputable
sovereignty” over the South China Sea and
warned us against investment in the region.
– These are seen as signs of Chinese aggressiveness
that would inevitably precipitate conflict.
– “It's not worthwhile for Vietnam and India to
damage the greater interests of the peace, stability
and economic development between China and
Vietnam, China and India, and in the whole region,
for the sake of these small interests in the South
China Sea,“
– "Any foreign company that engages in oilexploration activity in waters under China's
jurisdiction without the agreement of China has
violated China's sovereignty, rights and interests.
"This is illegal and invalid."
Theatre of Conflict The South China Sea
• Options:
– Should India revise its policy on the South China
Sea?
– It is unclear how far Vietnam would be a willing
partner in escalation of conflict with China.
– Given that escalation is not in China’s interests
either, it remains unlikely that China will use military
force to disrupt OVL’s operations (others such as
ExonnMobil have continued to operate in areas
China claims).
– In any case, India’s military relations with Vietnam
should deter any such occurrence. There is no need
for India to take positions on territorial disputes in
which it is not involved.