Transcript Principles for effective donor engagement in Somalia

Fragile states
fragile states and failed states need to be viewed
and treated as a specific category of least
developed countries if they are to emerge from
economic and political insecurity and if they are to
have a chance of achieving MDGs.
Fragile states
• Are unable and/or unwilling to develop and
implement pro-poor policies;
• Are prone to violent conflict and may lack
effective territorial control.
• Can experience high levels of corruption; human
rights violations and political repression.
• Represent environments where international
agencies are unable use preferred aid
effectiveness modalities and fully align behind
nationally-owned strategies.
International interest in fragile
states is based on:
• a recognition that the instruments commonly used in least
developed countries are insufficient for tackling poverty, conflict,
political instability and good governance.
• an understanding that whilst better performing countries are
benefiting from development assistance, fragile states are often
isolated, leading to a further worsening of their development
indicators.
• a belief that the human and financial costs of fragility are
unacceptably high.
• The impact of state frailty has implications for international security.
The inability of failed states to deal with their own national security
creates knock-on effects for the security of neighbouring countries,
and also globally.
costs of fragility
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It is estimated that fragile states have received 43% less aid when
compared with other, more stable states suffering from similar
levels of poverty.
Fragile states receive insufficient amounts of aid, delivered at the
wrong time and often in ineffective ways.
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The World Bank estimates that In Somalia the costs of the civil
strife have been high -as implied by income per capita -which
could have been a third higher than the $226 estimated for 2002.
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UNDP estimates that 22 of the 34 countries that are furthest away
from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are affected by
current or recent conflicts.
International responses
The OECD-DAC has deepened its
commitment to fragile states and its
members have agreed a draft series of
principles for working with fragile states.
The 12 principles enshrine lessons learnt
and best practice stemming from the work
of a range of development, diplomatic and
security sector actors in fragile states over
recent years. The principles cover key
topics for engagement such as: priority
interventions, alignment, donor coherence
and coordination, aid instruments and aid
allocations.
The principles
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Take context as a starting point
Move from reaction to prevention
Focus on state building as the central objective
Align with local priorities
Recognise the political security, development nexus
Promote coherence between donor government and international
agencies
Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between
international actors
Do no harm
Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context.
Act fast
Stay long enough to give success a chance.
Avoid pockets of exclusion.
General findings
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State building as a central objective emerged as the most important principle but
there was significant dissent on how this could be best achieved.
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The possibility of divergent interpretations of the principles, as well as the lack of
mechanisms available for implementing principles caused some concern.
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interviewees almost unanimously agreed that all principles were relevant and that it
may not be helpful to have a ‘cherry picking’ approach to them.
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No clear picture on how far donors had gone in implementing the principles emerged
Most respondents felt it was too early to assess if principles were having impact.
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The need for clear monitoring and compliance mechanisms was suggested. Indeed
scepticism around the principles, where it existed it was in relation to an apparent
weakness in commitment and to the absence of adherence mechanisms.
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Several respondents regretted the lack of international commitment to Somalia which
often meant absence of significant funds at vital moments, and more particularly, of
under- staffed embassies and institutions.
Principle 1: start with the context
• There is a need for more sophisticated,
comprehensive and continuous political –social
analysis in Somalia and the regions;
• a comprehensive understanding of context
could inform strategic decision-making across
the donor community;
• if the context is understood differently by
different stakeholders, it is inevitable that harm
will be done;
• good analysis will not of itself lead to improved
and coordinated decision-making, but it is a key
element;
3. Focus on state building as the central
objective
• Unified diplomatic efforts are required to find
the most appropriate and effective ways to
engage with emerging Somali institutions;
• the international community was urged to be
strategic but pragmatic in its approach;
• support regulatory frameworks over heavy
service delivery models of government;
• donors can support both bottom-up and topdown approaches but cannot put the onus
on civil society to create a democracy.
7. Agree on practical coordination
mechanisms between international
actors
• The international community appears fragmented and this is
understood by other development and humanitarian actors as
well as by Somali authorities;
• the lack of effective coordination on strategic issues means
that some actors are ‘going their own way’. A common voice
would have some influence;
• the issue of coordination needs to be addressed in the context
of joint plans and activities;
• coordination around development and humanitarian assistance
is vital, but should be matched by coordination at the political
level;
mechanisms which bring stakeholders together, such as the
CMC and JPC smf JNA , need to consider approaches which
promote unified positions and cooperation.
8. Do no harm
• The consequences of ill-advised or uniformed
decisions can be renewed levels violence, mistrust
and fear;
• move beyond the concept of ‘do no harm’ and
propose positive benefits;
• all external actions and decisions can be perceived
as political;
• the presence of risk should not lead to inaction, but
to a better understanding of context;
• use tools and approaches which mitigate both the
intended and unintended consequences of
decisions.