Transcript State Fragility”, “Resilience” and the Challenge of

Distinguishing “State Fragility” and
“State Resilience” in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Addis Ababa February 2011
James Putzel
Crisis States Research Centre
London School of Economics
www.crisisstates.com
How did “fragile states” emerge on the
agenda?
• “Failed states” became a topic in the 1990s – heavily
ideologically laden
• September 11, 2001 attack on World Trade Centre brought a
new security concern to the international development
community
• DFID shifted terms from “problematic partners” and the
World Bank shifted terms from “Low income countries under
stress” (LICUS)
OECD Definition of “state fragility”
“States are fragile when state structures lack political will
and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for
poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the
security and human rights of their populations”
(OECD “Principles for Good International Engagement”
2007)
Why the adoption of “fragile states” has been
positive
1) has led to a significant increase in official development
assistance to the most vulnerable and poverty stricken
countries;
- A break with the “good governance” edict of channelling
most aid as a reward for “good performance”, which was part
of the reason for a sharp decline in aid to Sub-Saharan Africa
in the 1990s
60
50
Per capita aid to “fragile” and “non-fragile”
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2008
40
30
20
10
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
0
Percap aid to "fragile" SSA
Percap Aid to non-fragile SSA
Source:
OECD.stat for
data on bilateral
aid in constant
$. UN
Populations
statistics for per
capita
calculations.
Fragile and
non-fragile are
Sub-Saharan
African
countries below
and above 3.2
respectively on
World Bank’s
CPIA index
2009.
2) Has put “state-building” at the top of international
development community agenda
- after decades of rolling back the state, new attention to the
need for developing capacity
(Capacity to do what, however, remains a debate)
3) Recognise “context” as central, so no “one size fits all”.
- While seeming self-evident, in international aid circles this
was a big step forward.
Three Problems with the OECD
definition of fragility
1. The OECD definition is not anchored in a theory of the state
2. No differentiation between poor countries that have
achieved peace and those that have not.
3. No differentiation between fragile and resilient states on the
one hand and developmental states on the other
1. The OECD definition is not anchored
in a theory of the state
The OECD definition:
- is based in normative prescriptions of donors (countries need
exercise “political will”, reduce poverty and defend human
rights)
- mixes definition with causes and consequences
- leads to ludicrous efforts to quantify or measure state fragility
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA) Index
‘‘Fragile states is the term used for
countries facing particularly
severe development challenges
such as weak institutional
capacity, poor governance,
political instability, and
frequently on-going violence or
the legacy effects of past severe
conflict’. (World Bank 2007: 2).
Definitional
dimensions
of fragility
•
•
•
•
CPIA is used to allocate IDA grants.
Any country that scores less than
3.2 or has no CPIA rating is
considered as fragile by the
Bank.
Weak
Institutional
capacity
Poor
Governance
Political
Instability
Ongoing
violence or the
legacy effects
of past severe
conflict
Operational
dimensions
of fragility
vrs
•
•
•
•
Economic
Management
Structural
Policies
Policies for
Social
Inclusion/
Equity
Public Sector
Management
and
Institutions
The problem of definition
also in academic research
Stewart and Brown (2010) include as characteristics of fragile
states:
• failures in service delivery (health, education, water and
sanitation, transport and energy infrastructure, reduction in
poverty)
• legitimacy failures, including no democracy, where military
plays a strong role, where power is acquired by force, where
opposition is suppressed, where government controls the
media, where significant groups of the population are
excluded from power, where there is an absence of civil and
political liberties.
2. No differentiation between poor countries that
have achieved peace and those that have not
A definition of fragile states must start from the quantifiably
demonstrated proposition that among the least developed
countries there is markedly differential performance in terms
of :
- achieving stability,
- securing peace and
- establishing basic state functions.
Many poor countries in SSA have avoided
major conflict
Human Development Index ranking out of 182 countries:
Tanzania (151)
Zambia (164)
Countries that ranked lower than Tanzania and Zambia on the
HDI, but which have avoided major conflict:
Ghana (152),
Lesotho (156),
Malawi (160)
Gambia (168),
Cameroon (153),
Togo (159),
Benin (161),
Burkina Faso (177)
Niger (182)
The question of state fragility MUST BE about why SOME
countries at the bottom of the income ladder have spiralled
into conflict and state collapse while others have not
Half of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
have avoided civil war
“Resilient states”
• Identifying “fragility” requires a category of “state
resilience”
- State may preside over economic stagnation, poverty and
only imperfectly defend human rights
- “Buying in” elites and their social constituencies
- State as site of decision-making
•
-
State resilience creates the space for state-building
National identity and institutions of citizenship
Intercommunity communication
Territorial boundaries are accepted
National laws largely are recognised
The difference between Tanzania and the
Democratic Republic of Congo
• Tanzania is a relatively stable and resilient state, surrounded
by a sea of warfare and constant host to huge communities of
refugees, but has nevertheless enjoyed peaceful social
reproduction
• The DRC where internecine warfare between 1998 and 2004
led to the deaths of 3.9 million people and today the killing
continues with soldiers of the state among the worst
perpetrators of violence and rape.
Instead of asking “Why is Tanzania so poor?” it is enlightening to
ask “Why has Tanzania maintained peace despite its poverty?”
3. No differentiation between
Fragile & Resilient States
Developmental States
China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia (or even those that have
shown developmental impulses like Botswana and Rwanda
today)
• Actions launching accelerated growth require shifts in
political settlement and elite bargains
• Accelerated development can bring new sources of conflict
Summary on fragility
• Donor and mainstream definitions are based on
a bifurcation of states between:
- developed liberal democracies
- developing states without political will to achieve poverty
reduction and the defence of human rights
• False notion that “all good things go together”
- MISSES THE POINT OF WHAT MAKES FRAGILE STATES
DISTINCT FROM ALL POOR STATES
• “State Fragility is NOT principally about development
• Donors must adopt a category of “resilient states”
- As important for understanding “fragility” as it is for
understanding “developmental states”
CSRC Alternative:
Defining characteristics of
fragility-resilience spectrum
State fragility
 Armed challenges threaten
state power
 State territorial reach
limited
 Non-state taxation
 Institutional multiplicity
(CSRC)
State Resilience
 Monopoly of legitimate
violence
 State reaches significant
territory
 Monopoly of taxation
 Institutional hegemony
Unlike the reigning definitions
this definition is
anchored in theories about the state
- Role of security: Weberian and Tillian understanding of the
role of security (Interestingly taken another step by North et
al Violence and Social Orders, 2009)
- The territorial reach of the state also in Weberian terms
- Taxation: North (1982): state = an organisation with
comparative advantage in violence extending over geographic
area whose boundaries are determined by power to tax
constituents; Burke: “revenue IS the state” (Di John 2011):
- Institutional multiplicity: When rules of state consistently
over-ridden by non-state rules: traditional, warlords, religious
• PARSIMONIOUS AND POSSIBLE TO MEASURE (and least first
three dimensions)
An appropriate definition
highlights particular policy objectives for
“fragile states”
• If the category of “state fragility” is meaningful at all, it needs
to highlight what is different about states vulnerable to
conflict and what are the SPECIFIC interventions and policies
that are appropriate
• Adopting a clearer definition of state fragility not only allows
the identification of countries particularly at risk of collapse
but also suggests priority areas of action that can stabilise
states.
Legitimate Security is a precondition for all
other governance reforms
• When the state’s security forces are either incapable of
defeating non-state armed challengers or where the state
cannot maintain power without unleashing violence on the
population, priority must be given to:
- Establishing a unified chain of command,
- Ending abusive practices against citizens,
- Paying salaries of officers and enlisted personnel
- Ensuring security forces have a basic capacity to provide
protection to elites and non-elites.
- Delaying Demobilisation until there are opportunities for
gainful employment and armed forces deployed in socially
constructive ways.
• A precondition for security sector reform AND governance
reforms like competitive elections, decentralisation and
devolution.
State Monopoly Over Taxation
• Taxation is a key indicator for measuring resilience and
fragility and state performance more generally
• In terms of state fragility what is most important is that NO
rival organisations control significant taxation
• A state’s taxation capacity can provide an objective means to
assess the power, authority and legitimacy the state has to
mobilise resources
• The degree to which the state monopolises tax collection, and
the level, diversity and manner of collection of taxes all
provide indications of a state’s position on the fragility to
resilience spectrum.
Territorial reach of state organisations
• Reach of the state’s organisations into “significant” territory is
a central indicator of fragility and resilience
• Territory is significant when it is a site of major human
settlement, economic resource mobilization or borders on
neighbouring zones of conflict.
• Programmes that aim to decentralize or devolve power in
areas where the state is hardly present can aggravate fragility,
• programmes that promote economic and social integration of
the state’s territory, even if economically “inefficient”, may
be important to establishing state resilience.
Institutional hegemony of state rules
• Establishing the dominance of the state’s institutions is
central to resilience
• A state must either incorporate or subordinate rival rule
systems whether anchored among regional, ethnic,
traditional, religious or warlord actors in rural or urban areas
• Non-state institutions can act as important sources of
legitimacy to those who mount violent challenges to the
state.
• Assessing this can guide the design of programmes promoting
participation, decentralisation, devolution, the use of private
and NGOs to deliver services.
Some Implications for economic policies
• Pay attention to horizontal inequalities
- In conditions of state fragility, access to wealth and incomes
tends to be exclusionary and unequal, so economic
interventions and planning need to aim to reduce “horizontal
inequalities.
• Pay attention to internal economic integration
- Most prescriptions for economic reform aim at integrating
economies into world systems of trade and investment
without attention to developing internal linkages crucial to
state resilience and development
• Formalise informal economic activities
- Informal economy is a site of exclusion and the raising of
resources to challenge the state
• Recognise that rents may be central to peace building
External Drivers of Violent Conflict and Fragility
and Policy Implications
• Military Interventions
- asymmetric power of invading forces
- Justifications: “mission civilisatrice”, safeguard security,
protect human rights
- Make democracy less likely (Gutierrez et al)
• Trans-border armed groups and refugees
- war “next door” (de Waal, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
- refugees from “wars next door” (Lischer, 2005)
• Externally imposed structural reforms
- Structural Adjustment/Democratisation with no attention to
“political settlements” (Di John and Putzel 2009)
“Deadly Sequence”
Democratic Republic of Congo
GDP, Structural Adjustment, Violence
• Development aid promoting a “dual public sector”
- Aid delivered outside state systems can create alternative
sites of decision making and patronage and undermine or
pre-empt the consolidation of state organisations (OECD,
2010)
• Illicit trade in drugs, arms and minerals
- markets for illegal drugs (Gambetta, 1993) sources of
finance for violent challenges to states
– the “war on drugs” ineffective – Recent stance of Colombian
President
- arms trade: receiving almost no international attention
- minerals exploitation and informalisation of the mining
sector finance violent challenges (Mitchell and Garrett, 2009)
• Establishing state resilience can insulate states against both
external crises and the disruptive and violence- provoking
characteristics of future economic development.
Why does this make a difference?
Security:
• Becomes a first order issue - DRC
• Value achievements of Rwanda and worry about
Uganda
Governance
• Ensure reforms do not undermine elite bargain that
buys peace
• Very different approach on speed, prioritisation of
electoral reforms
• Very different attitude toward “traditional
authorities” – reject idealism of its role
Economic policy
• - Deadly sequence in DRC and Rwanda in past.
• Recognise state role in changing incentive structures elites
face:
- Rwanda – state and business