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PPPs and Water: International Experiences
Hyderabad
May 17, 2008
Water & Sanitation Sector
PPP Experiences
2
Water & Sanitation Sector – The Challenge
Annual investment required to meet MDGs* - $25-30 billion
At present, $15 bn, of which 75% public, 14% ODA**, 11% private
Public spending on water and sanitation halved between 1980s and
1990s. ODA has declined since the mid 1990s
Private investment did not compensate as expected. Current
private investment is only about $1-2 billion per year
Extensive need for support of private investment
in the water industry
*UN Millennium Development Goals - http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
**Official Development Assistance. The term applies to aid from the members of Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD to developing countries.
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Complexities of the water and sanitation “market”
Politically sensitive tariffs – “profit is bad”
Capital intensive, slow asset turnover requiring long-term
finance
Local and disaggregated resource
Unreliable base line information
Local currency revenues
Sub-national and regulatory risks
Higher than anticipated operating risks
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Need to build on key lessons learned
Depoliticizing tariffs - affordability, willingness to pay and cost
recovery
Smart risk allocation between private investors, government
and end-users
Public money support to PPPs - managing the contingent
liabilities
Building adequate institutional capacities
Decentralization of service provision
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Water & Sanitation Sector
PPP Experiences
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Investments in water and sewerage in middle and low
income countries
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Selected management and lease/ affermage contracts
Country
Period
Years
Status
Type
Amman
Jordan
2000/05
6
Extended twice,
soon to be
completed
M
Antalya
Turkey
1996/01
6
Terminated
A
Baranquilla
Colombia
1990/05
16
Ongoing
L/A
Cartagena
Colombia
1995/05
11
Ongoing
L/A
Gaza
West Bank
1995/05
11
Ongoing
M
Gdansk
Poland
1992/05
14
Ongoing
A
Dakar + 55 towns
Senegal
1996/05
10
Completed,
recently
extended
A
Mining townships
Zambia
2000/04
5
Completed, not
extended
M
Source: World Bank, 2006
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Why management and lease/affermage contracts?
Well adapted to address main problems most South Asian
Water Sewerage & Sanitation (“WSS”) utilities are faced
with:
Poor quality of service and inefficiency of operations
Private operators less willing to take the risk of financing
extension of WSS infrastructure
Within the framework of long term concessions
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Conclusion 1: coverage and quality of service have
generally improved
Connection ratios have improved
Benefiting the poor (Cartagena, Senegal…)
Per capita consumptions have usually increased
Permanence of water distribution has always improved
But Gdansk still supplies 24/7 water with half the quantity
of water
Bacterial quality of water has usually improved
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Conclusion 2: efficiency has always improved
NRW have decreased
Not always in a spectacular manner
Metering ratios have always increased
Staffing ratios have usually become optimal…
Staff reduced only in 1 utility – Barranquilla (where the
operator is jointly owned by municipality and private
company)
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Conclusion 3: sustainability has always improved
Collection ratios have always increased
Working ratios have always improved
Tariffs (always set by public authorities) have
Increased in 2 cases
Increased moderately in 2 cases
Decreased in 3 cases!
Financial efficiency gains for the owner of the contract
have often been substantial
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Learning from Concessions
Manila - Objectives
Reduction of system leakages
Improve service delivery
Expansion of service to low income residents
Investment in the water and Sanitation system
Deliver international standard water quality to the users
Improve Public Health by providing Sanitation
Change in the management approach
Establish a water regulatory authority
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Manila- Lessons Learned
There was no national water / concession law but, with diligent legal
work, it was possible to proceed with a PPP / PSP transaction without
prior national sector reform
Two concessions provide benchmarking of one concession vs. another,
easing monopoly concerns and facilitating regulatory oversight
The Regulator frequently ignored/delayed their responsibilities in the
contract. Failure to provide penalties for ignoring contract provisions
on the part of the public sector can lead to failure of the concession /
transaction
Interface of public / private investments, project timing, and
infrastructure connections should be anticipated and appropriate
penalties applied
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