Unmasking the Enemy Through Biometrics

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Transcript Unmasking the Enemy Through Biometrics

Bombing of Dining Facility in
Mosul, Iraq, in Dec 2004
Murder of US Contractors in March
2004 led to 2 major operations for
control of Fallujah, Iraq.
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Something intrinsic to you (cannot be shared without
complicated surgery)
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Something that is unique (more or less)
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Something that cannot be repudiated (beware the dark side)
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Something that can tie you to places and activities you wish to
hide
Not 100% accurate nor a panacea
Something that is or should be an integral part of any identity
management program
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Physical Modalities: fingerprint, face, iris, hand
geometry, palm print, DNA, voice, retina, vein
pattern
Behavioral: gait, hand writing/signature,
keystroke
“Soft biometrics”: hair color, sex, age, ethnicity
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Depends on the operational environment, available
technology and the mission
Each modality is different in terms of universality,
uniqueness, permanence, collectability, acceptability,
etc.
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Many are highly effected by factors such as ethnicity,
employment, sex, etc
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Identification: Who are you (or who you are
not)?
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Typically 1 to many
Can also involve re-identification
Uses: personnel vetting (access, hiring, training, intel sources),
targeting, screening, force protection, human terrain mapping,
detention decision making)
Verification: Are you who you say you are?
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Typically 1 to 1 usually against an enrollment sample
Often matching against a template held by the claimant (e.g. on a
smart card)
Uses: access control, population management, detainee/prisoner
management, resource management (aid, benefits, etc)
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Overt/Covert
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Cooperative/uncooperative
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Face to face/stand off
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Data Sharing
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Forensics
A probability that we have seen you before
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Score(S) compared to predetermined Threshold value
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Accuracy determined by quality of database and algorithm(s)
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Most commonly based upon two sets of the same modality
(e.g. fingerprint to fingerprint)
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Accuracy can be enhanced via fusion of matches from
multiple sets of the same modality, multiple modalities,
multiple algorithms
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May require human intervention/analysis (“Yellow Resolves”
and latent print matching)
Threshold setting
FAR and FRR vs. Threshold
Multi-modal biometric fusion (currently DoD ABIS only) results in:
• More matches through the correlation of other modalities
• More auto-identification, with lower number of manual examinations
required
• Improved overall system accuracy and performance
Prints: Inconclusive
Face: Non-IDENT
FUSION
Iris: Inconclusive
MATCH!
The fusion algorithm combined
near matches to identify the
individual.
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The same biometric is in our database
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That’s it--may have value if done for verification purposes
only
Analysis required to link the biometric to other
information (e.g. intelligence, criminal, civil,
financial, etc)
Not intrinsically good or bad—depends on mission
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“Good” Match: against an approved access roster
“Bad” Match: against a terrorist watchlist
Subject is enrolled
• Biometrics collected
(may include biographic,
soft biometrics and
contextual data)
• Biometrics stored
Match results are reported
• Match/No Match
• Additional guidance may be
provided
Subject is Encountered
• At access point
• In the field
• At computer terminal
• At a crime scene
Encounter collection
compared to enrollment
collection
• On a card
• On the collection system
(stored enrollments and/or
watchlist)
• Against a centralized
database
• Against remote database(s)
Operational Decision Made
• Allow/deny access
• Detain/Arrest
• Provide/deny resources
Name: XXX21 July 2011 – SOCOM Enrollment
DOB: XXX
HT: 5’ 06”
WT: 133
Eyes: BROWN
Hair: BLACK
Unsolved Latent Files
Latent Case: ######
Priority Code: Green
• 120 IED Related Latents
• 34 Distinct IED Cases Links
• Two (2) DoD Enrollments
• Two (2) Interagency Enrollments
• One (1) DoD Detainee Enrollment
Background
March 2011: IED related evidence was received
and processed by multiple agencies between
May 2010 and July 2011. The latent prints were
submitted with no significant identifications and
added to the DoD ABIS Unsolved Latent File.
21 July 2011: The subject was encountered and
enrolled by DoD elements due to suspicion of
terrorist activities resulting in multiple unsolved
latent matches confirmed by BIMA’s Biometric
Examination Services Team.
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Put thousands of biometrics kits into the hands of military and
contract personnel around the world
Built database of over 6 million unique
identities
Developed most advanced large-scale
multi-modal/fusion matching system in the world
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Enabled military operations (e.g. SOF and
CIED), intelligence analysis, access control,
detainee management
Shared data across the USG (i.e. the TRIAD)
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Successfully denied access to US by numerous foreign nationals
Shared data with select foreign governments
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Leadership awareness/support
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Development of a holistic operational concept
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No DoD or USG integrated IdM vision
Uncertain future of biometrics “force structure”
Not part of the Joint or Services institutional frameworks
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“Triad” not fully implemented or automated
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Policy gaps
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Keeping pace with technological developments
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Senior leader education
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Rapid acquisition (GOTS/COTS) and institutionalization capability
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Stand-off collection
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Improved data management (quality, structure)
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Improved data movement (compression, transmission, architecture)
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Disassociation of biometrics from all data not required for matching
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Link identity data across numerous databases and security domains
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Improved security and privacy (technology and procedures)
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A USG identity management leadership, strategy and roadmap