THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS

OSU Climate Change Webinar Series, June 12, 2012 Alex Thompson Department of Political Science Ohio State University

Cooperation over Climate

• A global public good • • The “free riding” problem (Olson) “What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own; they care less for what is common; or at any rate they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned .” – Aristotle,

Politics

• A tragedy of the (global) commons?

Solutions to the Climate Tragedy?

•

Top-down regulation

• Hobbes: A Leviathan • Hardin: “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” •

International level: Binding rules with a mechanism to monitor and enforce

My Arguments

• Binding rules and a top-down approach difficult to implement in the relative “anarchy” of international politics • The “hard law” approach can be counter-productive: deters participation and constrains policymaking • The future of the global climate regime is likely to be more flexible, more decentralized, and more fragmented …and this is okay for now.

Copenhagen 2009

• Stakes: The future of the climate regime • New round of “Annex 1” commitments under Kyoto • A new and broader long-term agreement • Months of preparatory work and two weeks of negotiations, including heads of state

Copenhagen 2009

• Outcome: Copenhagen Accord • • 2.5 pages!

Limit warming to +2⁰ C • • Increase technology and $$ to developing world “Pledges” to be decided on a national basis (bottom-up) • No specific commitments and not legally binding • Delegates agreed only to “take note” of it

Copenhagen Assessments

• • • Generally negative • • Geenpeace : “The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight.” Swedish Environment Minister: The summit was a “disaster” and a “great failure” Main criticism: No binding agreement on emissions reductions • • Gordon Brown: “I know what we really need is a legally binding treaty as quickly as possible.” WWF: “The Copenhagen Accord is far from the fair, ambitious and binding deal the world needs.” Reflects a bias in favor of hard law solutions • Implicit or explicit comparison to the Kyoto Protocol

Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol (1997)

• The hard law follow-up to the 1992 Framework Convention • Main problem: Limited participation • Sovereignty concerns, especially for developing countries • Result: commitments only for 38 industrialized countries • Ratification hurdles • John Kerry on Kyoto: “What we have here is not ratifiable in the Senate.” • Entry into force delayed until 2005 • No upside in terms of compliance/action • Narrow policy incentives • • Binding targets and timetable→quick fixes Measurable, “project-based” approach

Largest GHG Emitters

8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 no Kyoto commitments (47% of global emissions)

Country

Canada EU-15 Germany Italy Japan Norway Portugal Spain Sweden U.K.

Kyoto Target and Actual Emissions

Kyoto Target (1990 baseline)

-6% -8% -21% -6.5% -6% 1% 27% 15% 4% 12.5%

Change 1990-2007

26.2% -4.3% -21.2% 7.1% 8.2% 10.8% 38.1% 53.5% -9.1% -17.3%

Kyoto: The Cart before the Horse

Binding rules without political will to reduce GHG emissions Too much weight on hard law solution (binding, top-down)

The “Softer” Alternative

Climate Politics: three defining features 1. Public good (tragedy, free-riding) 2. Uncertainty • Impacts • Policy alternatives • Humans ↔ Nature IPCC (2007): “In all cases, policy decisions will have to be made with incomplete understanding of the magnitude and timing of climate change, of its likely consequences, and of the costs and benefits of response measures” 3. Heterogeneity across countries • Uneven impacts • Costs of abatement • Political constraints on governments

Value of Flexibility and Decentralization

• Flexibility as a response to uncertainty • So policies and obligations can be adjusted over time • Decentralization as a response to heterogeneity • Like a federal political system • Combination promotes “adaptive management” • • Multi-level policy experiments Updating and learning • Example: U.S. versus Canada • More activity and creativity among states

Copenhagen and Beyond

• Copenhagen reconsidered: • 82 countries have submitted targets or actions (80% of global emissions) • Developing countries have made mitigation pledges for first time • More flexible approach to mitigation policy • E.g., REDD+, sectoral & programmatic approaches, longer time horizon • Looking beyond mitigation • Adaptation and capacity building • Reliance on a wide variety of actors and organizations • Regional efforts and public-private partnerships

“-(C) French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop the notion of a legally binding treaty in favor of a system of national commitments.

-Borloo argued that the key to implementing the "

equilibrium

" revealed at Copenhagen was an arrangement that would be voluntary…”

-Paris to Washington, 2/17/2010

(Wikileaks)

Questions?

Copenhagen/Cancun Pledges: % Change in Emissions from 2005 levels in 2020 * Pledges take the form of a reduction from BAU in 2020.

Post-Copenhagen Pledges (Annex 1)

Country

Australia Belarus Canada Croatia EU (27) Iceland Japan Kazakhstan Liechtenstein Monaco New Zealand Norway Russia Switzerland United States

Emissions Reduction (by 2020)

-5% up to -15% or -25% -5% to -10% -17% -5% -20% or -30% -30% -25% -15% -20% -30% between -10% and -20% -30 to -40% -15 to -25% -20% or -30% -17%

Baseline Year

2000 1990 2005 1990 1990 1990 1990 1992 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 2005

Average Size of Delegation, Major Climate Conferences

60 50 40 30 20 10 7 0 COP 1 1995 9 10 18 Kyoto 1997 Marrakesh 2001

Event

Bali 2007 54 Copenhagen 2009

700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Distribution of Delegation Size, Copenhagen 2009 Top ten (200+): Brazil, Denmark, China, EC, Indonesia, USA, France, S. Korea, Nigeria, Sweden, Canada Fewer than 10: Afghanistan, Antingua & Barbuda, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, DR Korea, El Salvador, Haiti, Kyrgystan, Libya, Lichtenstein, Moldova, Myanmar, Nieu, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia, Togo, Tonga, Yemen

Size of Delegations

Kyoto 1997 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • United States: 99 France: 30 Australia: 37 Norway: 23 Canada: 63 China: 18 Brazil: 14 Indonesia: 10 Mexico: 16 S. Korea: 25 Ghana: 5 Panama: 6 Jordan: 6 Mozambique: 3 Turkmenistan: 2 Copenhagen 2009 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • United States: 273 France: 264 Australia: 98 Norway: 161 Canada: 207 China: 333 Brazil: 572 Indonesia: 303 Mexico: 30 S. Korea: 261 Ghana: 60 Panama: 12 Jordan: 22 Mozambique: 28 Turkmenistan: 3

Kyoto Targets

EU 15 (“bubble”), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland United States Canada, Hungry, Japan, Poland Croatia New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine Norway Australia Iceland - 8% - 7% - 6% - 5% 0 + 1% + 8% + 10%

Alternative methods to estimate national-level forest carbon stocks Gibbs, et al. 2007 Identifying feasible and uniform approaches to measurement is the “foremost challenge” for deforestation based climate policy.