Transcript Slide 1

Summary of COP15/CMP5 and
evaluating the climate negotiations
from a biological diversity perspective
John Costenbader, IUCN Environmental Law Centre
Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung / Deutscher
Naturschutzring (DNR)
28. Januar 2010, Bonn
INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE
AGENDA
1. Road to Copenhagen
2. Copenhagen: LCA & KP outcomes
3. Copenhagen Accord
4. Legal Nature of CPH Accord
5. Perspectives on climate post-CPH
6. Biodiversity conservation post-CPH
7. Conclusions
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I. Road to Copenhagen
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Road to Copenhagen
• Bangkok, Oct 2009: US proposes new regime
– replaces Kyoto Protocol
– based on bottom-up pledges from countries (developed and
developing), as part of low carbon strategies, to be reviewed at
[2?] year intervals
– substitutes compliance with core MRV: ‘peer review’
assessment of CC results, with economic considerations
• Barcelona, Nov 2009: Low expectations for CPH
– still no agreement on US proposal vs. keeping Kyoto
– still no usable text(s) from LCA or KP processes
– “I don’t think we can get a legally binding agreement by
Copenhagen. I think that we can get that within a year after
Copenhagen” - Yvo de Boer, 9 Nov 2009
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II. Copenhagen:
Developments in Working
Groups & COP/CMP
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Issues in Copenhagen Negotiations
• ‘Background noise’ adds tension to process
– Southern mistrust of North
 “Leak” of a draft text from COP Presidency in first days
– Northern mistrust of South
 US unlikely to pass climate bill without Chinese agreeing to caps
– Top down vs. Bottom Up Strategies
 ‘Kyoto II’ or schedules for domestic actions and commitments
– Confusion over non/legally-binding outcomes at Copenhagen
 Barcelona agreed none, but Tuvalu legal proposals under LCA and KP
 Chinese refusal to mention ‘legally-binding’ in CPH Accord text
– NGO and outsider impatience with the process
 Huge crowds inside & out; protests (resembling WTO & IMF processes)
– Rift among the G-77
 AOSIS, LDCs, Africa & Vulnerable States disagree with BASIC & OPEC
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– China joins USA as heavyweight Party
Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-LCA: REDD+
• SBSTA decision adopted by COP:
– Promotion of co-benefits (including biodiversity)
– Requests Parties to identify drivers of
deforestation and forest degradation
– Encourages guidance on engaging local and
indigenous communities
– National circumstances to be considered in
emissions and forest reference levels
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Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-LCA: REDD+
• LCA draft text further developed:
– Safeguards included
– Scope of REDD+ includes scope of Bali Action Plan
• But important issues remain…
– prior informed consent for indigenous peoples;
– predictable, secure long-term finance commitment;
– adequate measures to address leakage
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Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-LCA: Adaptation (& Ecosystem-based Adaptation)
• Continued work on draft text
– Scope defined somewhat, though still vague:
 country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory
approaches to adaptation, based on science and
traditional knowledge and on the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities.
– Adaptation action:
 “building resilience of socio-economic and
ecological systems, including through economic
diversification and sustainable management of
natural resources”.
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Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-KP: Flexibility Mechanisms
• Some progress in emissions reductions pledges, but still far
below IPCC-recommended 25-40% aggregate level
• Uncertainty regarding use of the three Kyoto flexibility
mechanisms (Joint Implementation, Clean Development
Mechanism, International Emissions Trading) complicates
aggregating individual A1 pledges
– Lack of transparency from Parties re: to what degree their
pledges reflect use of mechanisms (and internal LULUCF)
results in difficulty in capturing pledges as final ‘QELRO’s
– Discussion around requiring supplementarity for use of
flexibility mechanisms (either a % cap or text urging
domestic action only)
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Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-KP: Clean Development Mechanism
• Agreement on improving baselines, monitoring,
additionality
– Executive Board to work on improved methodologies
– Simplified additionality procedures for small-scale
renewable energy
• CMP Decision on improving regional distribution of CDM
– Countries with <10 projects get fees waived,
simplified financing;
– Executive Board to devise top-down methodologies
• SBSTA to assess forests in exhaustion in 2010
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Copenhagen: Limited progress in LCA & KP groups
AWG-KP: Land Use, Land Use Change & Forestry
(LULUCF)
• The importance of LULUCF:
– Bad: Current LULUCF rules would add 2.3 GT CO2 to
total A1
– Potentially worse: Proposed amendments could add ~710 GT
• Draft decision on LULUCF presented to CMP requests
SBSTA to begin review of land-based approaches
• KP group refined options in draft text, including reference
levels or caps on forest management accounting
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CMP & COP Architectural Proposals
• CMP: Proposals to modify or subsume Kyoto
– China (BASIC et al): no revision to Kyoto, only update pledges
– Tuvalu (AOSIS et al): Revise Kyoto legal structure and update pledges
– NZ, JAP (Umbrella Group): Subsume Kyoto into new Protocol
– Result: no agreement
 Proposals to be included in COP-16 agenda
• COP: Proposals for new protocol under Convention
– Tuvalu, Costa Rica: New Protocol (for newcomers) and keep Kyoto
– AUS, JAP, USA: New Protocol from LCA text, to subsume Kyoto
– Result: no agreement
 Proposals to be included in COP-16 agenda
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III.
The Copenhagen Accord
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Copenhagen Accord
• In the last 48 hours, a rush to forge a deal:
– Heads of State are now in CPH and want ‘results, now!’
– A group, deemed ‘representative’, of 20 HoS plus 9 HoD
negotiates an agreement, in parallel to wider
negotiations (Group represents 80% of global emissions)
– Bilateral and smaller meetings in margins
– Endgame is between US and BASIC countries, mainly
China
– EU sidelined (‘not in the room’ when deal was done)
– Chinese concede on transparency - US drops long term
global goal, legally-binding agreement, and offers money
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CPH Accord on Mitigation
• Accord agrees to keep temperature increase below 2o
C, with a review by 2015 including that of a 1.5o C goal
– No mention of carbon ppm concentration
• Annex 1 (developed countries) to commit to “economywide” emissions targets for 2020 and to present
commitments by 31 Jan.
• Non-Annex I (developing) to list mitigation actions
(NAMAS – national appropriate mitigations actions) by
31 Jan.
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CPH Accord on Mitigation, cont.
• Accord refers to REDD+, implying broader definition of
REDD since Bali has been accepted
• Par. 6 asks for the immediate establishment of a
mechanism including REDD+
• Par. 7 leaves open possible market-based mitigation
funding (including REDD+)
• Par. 8 mentions “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” (to
include REDD+) and developed countries as providing:
– 30B USD for 2010-12 for adaptation and mitigation
– 100 billion USD/year by 2020 for mitigation only.
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CPH Accord on Adaptation
• Par. 3 refers to adaptation very generally:
– Adaptation definition includes potential impacts of
response measures (e.g. to OPEC countries)
– Most vulnerable countries defined as: LDCs, SIDS
and Africa.
– General reference is made to the provision of
finance, technology and capacity building to support
adaptation.
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III. Legal Nature of
Copenhagen Accord
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Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord
• Why ‘taking note’ & not a COP decision?
– Draft COP Rules of Procedure require consensus for COP
decisions (here, four Parties spoke against Accord)
• What does ‘Take note of…’ mean?
– Less than ‘endorse’ or ‘decide’ but more than an ‘INF’ or
‘MISC’ from a few parties
– “a way of recognizing that something is there, but not
going so far as to associate yourself with it.” - Yvo de Boer
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Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont.
• Accord endorses continued work under LCA and KP,
but neither Decision formally recognized Accord
– No formal link between processes: can’t assume either
body will elaborate the details of Accord in 2010
 Lack of formality means Parties’ outside actions
under Accord could provide more chances for
‘hütchenspeile’ in KP and LCA negotiations
• Look for references to Convention Article 7.2 (c) as
mandate to implement Accord in 2010 – (but unclear text)
7.2 (c) [the COP shall] Facilitate, at the request of two or more
Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to
address climate change and its effects . . .
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Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont.
• “Immediately operational”: not so ‘immediate’ after all…
– Accord is not an official UNFCCC document;
– Institutions foreseen lack UNFCCC legal status
• Countries can only operationalize parts of Accord not
requiring COP decisions (i.e. domestic actions, with
GEF, et al. coordination)
– Appendix I “economy-wide emissions targets” (Annex I)
– Appendix II “mitigation actions” (non-Annex I)
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Legal nature of Copenhagen Accord, cont.
• Parts of other elements likely must wait for COP-16
Decision:
– High Level Panel (par. 9 “. . . under the guidance of and
accountable to the Conference of the Parties . . .”)
– Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (par. 10 “. . . as an
operating entity of the financial mechanism of the
Convention . . .”)
– Financing promises (par. 8, to extent coordinated by
UNFCCC)
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II. Perspectives on Climate
Post-Copenhagen
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• What may the CPH Accord achieve?
Provided:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Accord is signed by a majority of countries, esp.
developed and major emerging economies ...
Developed country targets/ developing country action are
sufficiently ‘strong’ ...
US legislation is passed in 2010 ...
Financial promises are fulfilled and are ‘new and
additional’ (e.g. to development aid) ...
Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
... Accord may be a first step towards global climate
response.
1.
2.
The Accord could begin to harness the potential of
developed and developing countries to address climate
change.
It may leverage substantial finance for developing
countries, including for halting deforestation and protecting
forests.
Yvo de Boer, 20 Jan: ‘Political tool that has broad support at highest political
level’
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
BUT… Slim chances for US climate legislation in 2010:
• Massachusetts elects Republican Senator to replace Ted Kennedy
– Ends Obama’s majority needed to pass a long list of legislation
• U.S. Supreme Court decides lawmakers may not stop corporations
from spending money to influence elections (Jan. 21)
– Expected effect: help Republican Party with richest lobbyist
friends, many likely opposed to climate legislation
 Contentious November 2010 Congressional elections and
focus on health care could detract from climate legislation
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
The CPH Accord does not achieve sufficient and rapid
response to the climate crisis...
In addition:
• Business lacks regulatory certainty to drive low-carbon investment
• CPH confirmed the ‘new bipolar order’ whereby the US has to share
hegemony w China
• EU, India, Russia, Japan relegated to ‘second league’ players and lost
the initiative
• The ‘multilateralist’ approach to climate change and the credibility of
the UNFCCC process are damaged ...
– What next for climate regime and negotiations?
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• Until CPH, UNFCCC was seen as the main means of
addressing climate impacts on biodiversity conservation.
Now, UNFCCC may have lost that ability somewhat.
– CPH Accord resembles more a political statement than a
multilateral, negotiated agreement based on science.
– Although intersessionals expected to resume in 2010 in
preparation for COP-16, Accord will exist as a “3rd wheel”.
– Key question whether Accord will integrate with negotiation
tracks, or dominate them and take on life of its own.
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• Potential effects of Accord on REDD+ and Adaptation:
– CPH Accord envisions biannual pledges of emissions
reductions subject only to MRV: this undercuts a long-term
global carbon cap and international carbon market.
– Some potential outcomes:
 smaller C-markets would occur with multiple C-prices
 ‘race to bottom’ could hamper carbon trading, as
businesses could move where no/lower carbon price
 without stable prices, REDD+ initiatives would lack
predictable, high-volume, long-term financing
– Similarly, adaptation programs may not see the volume of
financing needed from intermittent pledges.
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• Legal form of commitments: Top-down v. bottom-up
– Kyoto is top-down: parties agree to binding actions (e.g.
emissions targets) at international negotiations, locked in for
agreed time period.
– Under USA proposed bottom-up structure, now in CPH Accord:
general framework agreed at top, later parties submit actions and
commitments to include in global registry.
• Consequences of Legal Form Decisions:
– How to ensure environmental integrity if pledges not connected to
science?
– What role for UNFCCC in bottom-up / MRV system?
– Will 2-year ad-hoc funding and reduction pledges be predictable
enough for adaptation activities and carbon market?
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• Future of compliance regime: Compliance vs. MRV
– Traditional for MEAs to use compliance system – carrots
and sticks for compelling each other to complete agreed
targets and actions.
 Compliance not actually legally-binding (since only
passed by COP decision), but has strong political
force and doubtful Parties would ignore it.
– MRV is largely a ‘peer review’-type process with no
sanctions foreseen.
 How to know if Parties will fulfill pledges under MRV?
 What if any future remains for compliance after MRV?
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Perspectives on Climate Post-Copenhagen
• What future for Kyoto and its work to date?
– Push to bring on new Parties (USA and China), but USA won’t
ratify Kyoto or a Kyoto-clone
– A two-protocol system would be complicated, but one-protocol
bottom-up/MRV system has environmental integrity concerns
 Without Kyoto, no way to ensure USA et al. will ratify a new
agreement: progress under KP could be lost despite a
weaker system in the end
• How to integrate work across Kyoto and LCA tracks:
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– REDD+ and LULUCF
 Architectural relation to NAMAs?
– Mechanisms
 Opened up to developing countries?
 Any place in penalties in a future MRV system?
IV. Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen
REDD+
EbA
CDM
Reform
Biodiversity Considerations
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LULUCF
Reform
Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen
• Given difficulties of post-Copenhagen situation, potential to
look for climate solutions for biodiversity from other MEAs,
inter alia:
 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands
 Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD)
• In theory, strong scientific basis for biodiversity-climate connections
 Impacts, feedbacks, synergies
 Ecosystem-based Adaptation
 Carbon sequestration
• In practice, weak connections to date between biodiversity and
climate MEAs and institutions
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–
Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen
• UNFCCC
– UNFCCC has been far too busy with its own issues and
negotiations to assimilate biodiversity concerns to date:
 Climate is a universal issue, cross-cutting economic
development sectors (energy, transport, industry, housing)
as well as human survival issues (water, food security)
 Addressing climate will impose deep economic costs (far
greater than ozone et al. single-pollutant issues) in shortand long-term (even if far less than costs of inaction), and
require societies to reshape infrastructure and lifestyles
 By including use of market-based mechanisms, low-carbon
energy, new technologies, and large financing streams,
climate draws far greater public attention and special
interests than biodiversity MEAs
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Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen
• CBD:
– Since COP 9 (2008) CBD has assembled working groups to
assess biodiversity and climate connections, and begun
integrating climate considerations into all of its work
programmes:
 Ensuring sound scientific basis before Parties implement
ocean fertilization to sequester carbon
 Co-benefits for biodiversity in REDD+ activities
 Ad-Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and
Climate Change
 More work expected on addressing conservation of
wetlands and peatlands especially
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Biodiversity Conservation post-Copenhagen
• Ramsar:
– Ramsar has begun providing guidance on climate concerns in
wetlands management. High potential for linking wetlands
biodiversity conservation with forest carbon mitigation (e.g.
peatlands) as well as climate adaptation activities (e.g.
mangrove forests).
• UNCCD:
– UNCCD work may help fine-tune climate mitigation and
response measures in dry lands, as temperature increases
and feedbacks are likely to severely impact dry areas and
exacerbate pre-existing water shortages, food security and
biodiversity losses (Africa in particular).
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Conclusions
• China & USA: new power dynamic
– Greatest power to influence rests with newcomers
• Accord has uncertain status; a small step but also
potential to complicate and detract from future talks
• Future legal architecture likely to be complicated or only
politically-binding
• Unclear whether Copenhagen Accord provided a ‘net
benefit’ for climate and biodiversity
• Need to analyze the conservation and livelihood
implications of proposed new climate regime structures
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THANKS FOR LISTENING!
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