Transcript Likely to cause” …

Ageing workforce?
“Likely to cause” …
…a difference of opinion?
Howard Watson
Stating the obvious?
History
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1994 Railtrack Safety & Standards Directorate
2001 Hatfield accident – RSSB formed
RSSB controlled by railway stakeholders
Many Railway Group Standards
Strategy for standards management
– Devolve
– Concentrate on “interfaces”
BR Medical Standards
Drivers
Train Working
Signallers
Personal Track Safety
Current medical standard
Train Movement
Code of practice &
Guidance
Signallers & PTS devolved to
Network Rail
General health requirement
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Unchanged
No medical condition “likely to cause…”
Non-prescriptive
Future-proof
Allow evolution of guidance
Problems
– Fragmented OH
– Risk averse culture
Acceptable risk for the railway?
• CAA 1%
• DVLA
– Group 1 20%
– Group 2 2%
• RSSB research project T663
– “Managing the risk associated with incapacity in
safety critical occupations”
T663
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Consultations
UK data
International and intermodal comparisons
Event tree analysis
Event tree
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Onset of unavoidable impairment
Engaged in safety critical task
Engineering controls unable to prevent
Hazardous event
Fatality/weighted injury
• Current rate of FWI
Assumptions
• Fatality / weighted injury (FWI)
– Tolerated = tolerable?
• RSSB risk model: 125 types of hazardous event
– Not all have human precursor
– Probability of FWI estimated
• Human Error v medial impairment
– 2% due to medical impairment
Results
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Driver – 43%
Signaller 16%
Track worker 15%
Crossing keeper 4%
PICOP 0.4%
• Acceptable risk to system safety only
Implications for train driving
• “F1: FIT NORMAL DUTIES”
• 43% annual risk of incapacity?
– 68% chance of an event in 2 years
– 94% chance of an event within 5 years?
• Would a TOC be happy?
Train driver:
additional considerations for employer
• Safety of the driver - lone worker
• Service interruption
– Safety of passengers and other staff
– Compensation to customers
– Reputational damage to TOC
• Network disruption
– Delay penalties
– Reputational damage to Rail
Inquiry begins into train ordeal
Train company GNER has launched an inquiry into how hundreds of
passengers became stranded for hours in stifling heat due to a power
failure.
Some travellers broke carriage windows to escape temperatures of over
37C on its 1555 BST Newcastle to London Kings Cross service on Thursday
evening.
Acceptable risk to TOC?
• Likelihood of event in 5 years
– “unlikely” (<50%)?
– 5% (CAA)?
– In between?
• TOC view?
• “UK rail” view?
– Mutual interest?
Australian Standards
New draft 2011
Category 1 SCW
5 yr risk >25% – unfit
<5% - fit
5-24% risk assessment
(split at 10%)
“Fit subject to review”
UK DVLA
5 year risks:
Group I – 66%
Group II – 9%
Suggestion
Fails group I – unfit.
Meets group II – fit’
In between = risk assessment
• OH: risk of relevant impairment; suggested controls
• Operator: ?safe system of work
• Fit with limitations
ANY CASES?
Case
• Freight Train Driver, 4 months post MI
– Well
– Inferior infarct
– 2 vessels stented
– Moderate LV impairment
– No ETT
– Diabetic type 2
– Probably still smoking
Relevant requirements
DVLA II
– 6/52 post-MI
– Exercise test
– Repeat 3 yearly
Australia
– 4/52 post-MI
– Exercise test
– Repeat 2 yearly
Consensus?
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Fitness category?
Further information?
Drive meantime?
Future management?
– Review frequency?
Discussion and other cases?