Transcript CHINA

CHINA
“ There lies a sleeping giant. Let him
sleep, for when he wakes, he will shake
the world.
- Napoleon Bonaparte
INTRODUCTION
AIM
To Suggest Strategies to
Counter and Contain China’s
Influence and Incursion into
the Indian Ocean
SCOPE
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China’s Grand Strategy
Chinese Maritime Strategy
PLAN:
As Evolved Thus Far
 Expansion Plans and Future Shape
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Implications for India and Indian Navy
Counter Strategies
Chinese
Grand
Strategy
Political
Interests
GRAND
STRATEGY
Geo-Strategic
Environment
Historical
Experience
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Preservation of domestic order and well
being
Defence against persistent external threats
Attainment of geopolitical influence as a
major state.
Orientation of Security
Strategy
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Maintenance of Internal Stability and
Prosperity
Attainment of Chinese Pre-Eminence
Along a Far Flung and Vulnerable
Geographic Periphery
Historical Context

Imperial Era
Tribes, Kingdoms,
States
 Political Entities in
Japan, Taiwan, and
SE Asia
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Modern Era
Aggressive
Imperial Powers
 Highly
Industrialized
States
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CHINESE HEARTLAND
CHINESE PERIPHERY
Chinese Grand Strategy in Modern Era
 ‘Strong
Hybrid
‘Weak-Strong’
Strategy
State’ :
Efforts through
Mil and Pol
Means
 ‘Weak State’ :
High Level of
Diplomatic
Balance and
Maneouvre
Chinese Grand Strategy in Modern Era
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‘Calculative’
Strategy
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Market-led economic growth
Amicable international
political relations
Restraint in use of force
Modernize and incrementally
streamline Chinese military
Expanded involvement in
regional and global
interstate politics and
various international,
multilateral fora
Will the Calculative
Strategy Survive?
Chinese Economy
Chinese Political System
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
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PERSONALISTIC
PATTERN OF RULE
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Derives from Power
and Beliefs of
Leaders
Legal and Orgn
Norms and Processes
not much of a role

RESOLUTION
OFLEADERSHIP
CONFLICT AND
SUCCESSION

Informal Process Of
Contention among
complex PatronClient Alliances
NEW REGIME
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Election Of Hu Jintao
In Mid Mar 03 As
President In Place Of
Jiang Zemin
Orderly transition of
power
Role of Jiang -Chief of
the Central Military
Commission supervision
of defence and foreign
policy
Pre-eminence Of Jiang
Not Same As Deng
Hu's brief limited to
domestic matters?
IMPACT ON STABILITY?
 No
doubts on Deng’s control
 Real division of power
 Hu to resent constraints ?
 Lack of congruence between
responsibility and actual power
POLICY-TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES
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Pursues a good-neighbour policy
Peripheral areas important for Chinese
security
Incapable of altering structure of
relations without further increase in
relative power
POLICY-TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES
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Disputes with Russia,
Japan, Vietnam, and
India
Date back to colonial
era
Current disputed
territories
insignificant
compared to
historic holdings
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Central Asia,
Vietnam, Mongolia
and large portions of
the Russian far east
Acceptance of
borders inherited in
1949
Current Disputes
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Russia- border area
West of Mongolia
India- Aksai chin,
status of McMahon
line and Arunachal
Pradesh in East
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South China SeaSouthEast Asian
states have claims
on the Spratly
islands
Japan, over the
Senkakus
Taiwan
Settling boundary disputes
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Two-pronged
approach
Resolve it amicably
to pursue its larger
goals
Border disputes
settled to facilitate
pol/ mil reqts
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Indefinite
postponement of
the basic issue
India, Japan, and
ASEAN states.
May change in
future ?
Threat Appreciation – Calculative
Strategy
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Natural longevity of strategy largely a
function of long-term economic, military,
and domestic political developments
As per present trends by 2015-2020 China
could work towards a new security strategy
Can China Survive the Calculative
Strategy?
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Collapse of China?
Unlikely that
China's political,
economic, and social
order will
disintegrate into
chaos
Unlikely that a
more cooperative
China will emerge
during this period
An Assertive
China seems
almost
imminent
Elements of An Assertive China
•
•
•
Augment its military
commensurate with its
increased power
Develop sphere of
influence
• Acquiring new allies
• Underwriting
protection of others
Acquire new or reclaim
old territory for
China's resources
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Redress past wrongs it
believes it may have
suffered
Attempt to rewrite
prevailing "rules of the
game" to better
reflect own interests
READY ITSELF TO
THWART
PREVENTIVE WAR OR
TO LAUNCH
PREDATORY ATTACKS
ON ITS FOES.
CHINAS
MARITIME
STRATEGY
EVOLUTION
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LAND AS PRIMARY
SEA AS SECONDARY
EQUAL
CONSIDERATION TO
LAND & SEA
STRATEGIC FOCUS TO
SEA
COASTAL DEFENCE TO
ACTIVE OFFSHORE
DEFENCE
PLAN STRATEGY
(1949 – 1960)
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YOUNG SCHOOL SOVIET NAVAL
ADVISORS & GEN
XIAO
COASTAL DEFENCE –
SMALL SURFACE CRFT
& SUBMARINES
DEFENSIVE,
INEXPENSIVE,
QUICKLY MANNED &
TRAINED
BROWN WATER
DEFENSIVE
STRATEGY
NUCLEAR WEAPONE &
SUBMARINES
PLAN STRATEGY
(1960 – 1976)
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RELATIONS WITH
SOVIETS & US
LARGE GROUND
FORCES
SUPPLEMENTED BY
COASTAL NAVY
GORSHKOV’S
THINKING
SEABORNE
NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
PLAN STRATEGY
(1980 – 2050)
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LIU HUAQING’S VISION
 OFFSHORE ACTIVE
DEFENCE
 STUBBORN DEFENCE
 MOBILE WARFERE
 GUERILLA ATTACKS
FIRST ISLAND CHAIN –
150 TO 500 NM BY 2000
SECOND ISLAND CHAIN –
1350 TO 1500 NM BY 2020
GLOBAL MARITIME FORCE
BY 2050
CHINAS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
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REUNIFICATION OF
TAIWAN
CLAIMS ON SOUTH
CHINA SEA
SEABASED DETERRENCE
AGAINST US, RUSSIA,
JAPAN & INDIA
PROTECTION OF SLOCS
DIPLOMATIC FORCE
EMERGING PLAN
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IMPROVED MR, PRECISE
TARGETTING &
WEAPON-SENSOR
INTEGRATION
INCREASED LETHALITY
INCREASED MOBILITY
IMPROVED PROTECTIVE
& SURVIVAL
EW
ALL DIMENSIONAL
NAVAL WARFARE
MAJOR HURDLES
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US WITHDRAWAL
JAPANESE MARITIME
SUPERIORTY
BUDGETITARY CONSTRAINTS
TECHNOLOGICAL &
INDUSTRIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
OVERALL GRAND STRATEGY
AIRCOVER AT SEA
ASW & AAW
LOGISTIC BACKUP
AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
HOW DOES CHINA MEASURE UP?
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INCREASED ATTENTION TO
TRAINING
MODERNISATION FOCUS
NATIONMAL SCIENTIC &
INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
DOCTRINE & TACTICS – JOINT
OPS
INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
CHINA’S INTEREST IN
INDIAN OCEAN
Quest For Oil
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Oil Catalyst for conflict
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Early 1980s predictions of China as potential oil power?
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Could meet needs of its rapidly expanding market ?
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Could export surplus to neighbors, especially Japan?
Quest For Oil
1989 reports 130 billion barrels (bb)
in the Spratly island region
 Compares with 112 bb in Iraq
 Yet to be independently confirmed
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Quest for Oil
1990 Production
672 MTOE
Consumption 677 MTOE
12
10
8
Consumption
50 %
6
4
67%
36%
Demand
2
0
0 92 94 96 98 0 2
4
6
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Energy Security
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Bulk oil imports from Middle East and
SE Asia
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Iran
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Iraq
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Saudi Arabia
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Syria
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Libya
Middle East
Safety of SLOCs and choke points
paramount
South East
Energy Security
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Strategic Choke points
 Straits of Malacca and
Hormuz
 Gulf of Aden and Suez
canal
 Islands in South China
Sea
15% of world trade through
Malacca strait
Suez
Hormuz
Gulf of Aden
Islands
S China Sea
Malacca
• 50% of world oil through Hormuz to West via Suez canal.
Large vessels of of 160000 DWT transit through Hormuz
Energy Security
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Accords strategic importance
to Myanmar, Maldives and
Pakistan
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Consolidates position in region
by close ties with Iran, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh
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Strategic encirclement of India
IRAN
Pakistan
Maldives
Saudi Arabia
Bangladesh
Iraq
Myanmar
Myanmar
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Developed
 Roads
 Communication &
intelligence network
 Military bases
 Reconnaissance/Elect
ronic Surveillance in
Great Coco Island
Ability to mount maritime
contingency affecting
SLOCs
Maldives
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New entrant in Chinese
security calculations
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Acquired basing facility at
Marao
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Strategic interest to
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Monitor US activities at
Diego Garcia
Indian Naval activities
Pakistan
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Building Gwadar deep draft
port
EDC Mar 05
Cost $ 248 million
$ 178 mill aid by China
Accommodate 100,000 &
200,000 DWT oil & cargo
vessels respectively
Transshipment of cargo/gas
from/to CAR & Xingjian
province in China
Pakistan
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Strategic aim of
Gwadar:
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Watching SLOCs
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Monitoring US Naval
activities in Persian
gulf
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Monitoring Indian
naval activities in
Arabian Sea
Iran
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Supplied Weapons of
Mass Destruction
including Silkworm
missiles
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Foot hold in Iranian
port Bandar Abbas
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Could assist Iran
develop nuclear
capability
Saudi Arabia/
Gulf Countries
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Exploiting
deteriorating US –
Saudi relations post
11 Sep
Branded `` Kernel of
Evil’’ by Rand Corp ,
American think tank
Consolidating position
in Gulf & Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia/
Gulf Countries
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Trade increased
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from $ 5 billion in
1995
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to $ 10.2 billion in
2000
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Saudi Arabia a major
investor in China
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China Supplied 120 units
of DF-3 ballistic missiles
to Saudis
Bangladesh
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Signed cooperation in
defense on 27 Dec 02
Seen as opening
Eastern Front with
India
Exported relatively
small number of anti
ship cruise missiles to
Bangladesh
INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
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Indian Ocean dominates the commercial and
economic lifelines of the Asia-Pacific region.
Strategic plans to consolidate control over the Indian
Ocean under the doctrine of ‘high sea defence.
Aggressive strategy aimed at assisting Myanmar,
Maldives, Pakistan and Iran build naval facilities.
Concentrated along the sea-lane from Malacca to
Hormuz.
Likely use of these facilities in support of PLA Navy’s
surge into the Indian Ocean.
Beginning of long-term Chinese interest in Indian
Ocean.
Sino-Indian Relations Post-Independence
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Differing Ideological Perceptions
Foreign Policy Issues
Recognition of PRC
TIBET – 1950
Zhou En Lai’s 1954 Visit – Recognition of
Chinese Suzerainty Over Tibet
DISPUTES AND DISSENSIONS IN
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
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1962 Conflict
Disputed Areas Post-62
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Western Sector Aksai Chin ceded by Pakistan
Eastern Sector – Whole of Arunachal Claimed
Minor disputes in UP sector
Sino-Pak Strategic Equation
Nuclear Proliferation
Tibet
Sino-Myanmar Relations
Chinese Support to Insurgency in NE India
•PLAN-FLEETS
,
PLAN HQ
North Sea Fleet
East Sea Fleet
Sothe Sea Fleet
QIngadao
Ningbo
Zhanjiang
SSF
North Sea Fleet
East Sea Fleet
South Sea Fleet
Submarine Arm
Coast Guard
Naval Air Force
Marine Corps
Force Modernisation - PLAN
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Core Development Areas
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ASW
Ship borne AAW
Aircraft Carriers
Capability to Conduct Sustained Naval Ops
Amphibious Warfare
First Phase Completion 2010-2015
Power Projection
Warship Building Capabilities
Acquisitions from Russia
What Does the Future Hold?
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Imports from Russia
High Performance
Microwave Weapons
Robotics and
Unmanned Vehicles
Arsenal Ships
Tactical LASER wpns
for Anti Ship
Defence
Submarine Launched
AD Weapons
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LASER, Particle
Beams and
Microwave for
Precision Strikes
Plasma Weaponry
Electromagnetic
Pulse Systems
IW Capabilities
What Does the Future Hold?
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Qualitative Improvements in Wpn Systems,
Platforms, Command and Control Facilities
Doctrinal Changes to Allow for Integrated
Joint Force War fighting Capabilities
Stealth Ships and Aircraft
Quiet Stealthy Nuclear Powered Ballistic and
Attack Submarines
Joint Force Ops
Use of Network Centric Warfare
Operational Doctrine
Doctrine vs Capabilities
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Innovation as a Force Multiplier
Lessons from Desert Storm and Kosovo
demonstrated asymmetry vis a vis US
Forces
Reliance on Speed, Mobility, Initiative,
Pre-Emption
Seek Initiative at Time of Naval
Weakness of Adversary
Innovation in Operational
Capabilities?
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Op Capabilities as a Driver of Doctrine
Future Maritime Conflict Scenarios
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Three Theatres of Future Conflicts: Space, Undersea,
Electromagnetic
“Land-based arms against formations at sea”
EW and Precision Strikes in “Sea-Air” Combat
UW Aircraft Carriers?
Undersea Minelaying Robots?
Sea-bed Military Bases??
Space-based methods and forces??
Concepts at the Strategic Level
Initiative
Refine People’s War Strategies &
Tactics
High
Tech
Guerrilla Warfare
Warfare
Exploiting RMA
 High
Tech Systems Acquisition
 Improvements to Personnel
Education and Training
 Fleet Exercises towards
Exploiting RMA
“Combined Campaigns”
Tactics
Op Art
Science
Technology
Doctrine
Strategy
Joint Precepts
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“Unified Combat Ideology to Include
Trg and Tactics”
Methods to Apply in Single Service and
Jt Combat Ops
Clear-cut Combat Regulations for Naval
units
Combat Ideologies for Different Types
and Levels of Ops
Concepts at the
Operational Level
The Future PLAN?
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‘Optimised; Weapon
Development
Offensive Means as
a Deterrent
Tackle PLA weaponry
and eqpt towards
increased combat
effectiveness
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Intense Advanced
operational Trg
PLAN R&D
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Green Water Maritime Strategy?
Suffers view Poor Scientific and
Educational Base
Capabilities Sound but Obsolete?
Acquisitions
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Determination to Speed Up Naval
Modernisation
Emphasis Main Naval Fighting Force
Three Dimensional Abilities?
PLAN-USN ASSYMETRY
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USN Overwhelming Superiority
Submarine Launched ICBMs
Fleet Air Defence
Planning and Providing for SLOC
Defences
Counter Measures
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SLOC Defence
PLAN/PLANAF Bases astride vital
routes/areas
PLAN demonstrates intent to be a
Major Player in the next decade
Operational Implications
to the PLAN of the
Strategic and Operational
Vision
Towards the Required
Capabilities…..
Sealift Capabilities
Under Combat
Conditions
Towards the Required
Capabilities…..
Capabilities Towards
Enforcing Maritime
Laws Drawn Up by
Chinese State
Towards the Required
Capabilities…..
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Strengthened "Research on Naval Strategies“
"Vigorous Development of High-tech Eqpt”
Train Personnel 'With Modern And Scientific And
Technological Qualities" to Operate 'Modern Eqpt'
Effective ‘medium and long-term' plans
"Modernization of the Main Equipment of the Navy"
Innovative Operational Doctrine
High Tech War Exploiting
Air Power and Integrated
Operations
Towards the RMA..
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Financial, Industrial and Technological
Limitations
Nuclear Deterrence
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Xia Class – CSS-N-3 IRBM (1700 kms)
Project 094 – JL-2 ICBM (Target
Continental US?)
Naval Air Power
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Aircraft Carriers
Long Range Power Projection
 Saturation of Taiwanese AD in conjunction
with shore-based air
 As a Political Instrument
 An Operationally Effective Carrier Force
with sustainability for Operations
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Countering US Sea Power
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Mission Capability Under US Opposition
Carrier Acquisition
Shore Based Air Power in the interim
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Reach
Control
Limited Capabilities beyond Brown Waters
Embarked Aviation for Blue Water Reach
Carrier Aviation – A Distant
Dream?
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Budgetary Limitations
Effect on Diplomatic Standing
Not Essential in Current Security
Strategies
Conclusion
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Grand Strategy
Maritime Strategy
Indian Ocean Interests
Sino-India Relationships
since Independence
Disputes and
Dissensions
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PLAN
Counter Strategies
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Strategic
Tactical