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INPO Update Operational Excellence Outcomes and Configuration Management Glenn J. Neises, INPO Sr. Evaluator June 2004 CMBG Session Content • • • • • • INPO Mission and Cornerstones Operational Excellence Outcomes Overview Configuration Management Overview INPO Perspectives Configuration Management Current Themes Future INPO’s Mission To promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote excellence – in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants INPO Cornerstones Evaluations Accreditation and Training Assistance Analysis Evaluations Plant Evaluation Areas Organizational Effectiveness Equipment Reliability Operational Focus Performance Improvement Configuration Management Radiological Protection Work Management Maintenance Engineering Operations Chemistry Analysis Analysis Analysis of industry trends and data Detect emerging industry trends Predict future performance issues Evaluation focus areas Operational Excellence Outcomes Why OEO? • • • • • • Changed industry High levels of safety and reliability A few stations unable to keep pace Events revealed increased effort needed in several areas A few activities important to operational excellence not evaluated Robust self-assessment and corrective action programs Sustainable, High Levels of Plant Performance Sustainable, Event-Free Operations Avoidance of Unplanned, Long-Duration Shutdowns Operationa l Excellence Highly-Skilled, Knowledgeable , and Collaborative Workforce High Levels of Plant Worker Safety Well-Managed and Understood Safety, Design, and Operational Margins CM.1 Maintaining Margins Consistent with Design Requirements CM.2 Operational Configuration Control Well-Managed and Understood Safety, Design, and Operational Margins CM.3 Design Change Processes Configuration Management Overview Why Configuration Management? • Plant safety degraded, long-term shutdowns caused by problems with: • Operating and design margins • Design basis validity • Plant status and configuration control • Design product quality • Quality and oversight of engineering programs Evaluating Configuration Management CM.5 Reactor Cores Designed & Operated within Performance Limits CM.3 CM Processes Clearly Defined & Implemented Well Managed Margins CM.2 Activities Maintain Configuration, Operating & Design Margins CM.1 Performance & Configuration Consistent with Design Requirements CM.4 Engineering Provides Technical Information & Support Evaluating Configuration Management Quality Design Requirements Documented & Retrievable Approved Programs For Fuel Movement & Storage Rigorous Programs For Core Design, Reactivity Mgmt, & Core Monitoring Design Authority is Clear FME Controls Temp Mods Controlled CM.3 CM Processes Clearly Defined & Implemented Field Changes Evaluated Reactor Engineers Provide Support Process Controls Maintain D &L Limits Margins Verified Thru Testing CM.4 Engineering Provides Technical Information & Support Physical Plant Matches Documentation PM & PdM Validates Margins CM.2 Activities Maintain Configuration, Operating, & Design Margins Degraded Conditions Resolved Aggressively Emergent Issues Promptly Investigated SSCs Meet Requirements CM.1 Performance & Configuration Consistent with Design Requirements Design &Operating Margins Documented Degraded Conditions Evaluated Good Craft Workmanship CM.5 Reactor Cores Designed & Operated within Performance Limits Well Managed Margins EOP and AOP Bases Documented Sound Engineering Programs Defect Free Fuel Operation Vulnerabilities Identified Sound Parts Evaluations Training Addresses Roles Contingencies Planned Quality Engineering Products Extent of Condition Investigated Comprehensive Testing & Engineering Programs Evaluating Configuration Management • Advance Screening (analysis) • Historical or present issues and initiatives • Preliminary Evaluation Plan (3-4 weeks prior) • General focus areas • Specific document reviews • Refined Evaluation Plan (1 week prior) • Interview schedule • Specific focus areas • In-field activities / observations (on-site weeks) • dialogue on impacts, causes, extent of condition INPO Perspectives Performance Indicator Index 100 85.4 Median Index Value 90 80 75.1 74.3 89.4 95.1 95 96.5 95.6 93.5 79 70 60 50 40 30 20 *2004 values as of March 31, 2004 10 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* Performance Indicator Index All components of the index have declined slightly • Unit capability factor • Forced loss rate • Unplanned automatic scrams • Safety system performance • Fuel reliability • Chemistry performance • Collective radiation exposure • Industrial safety Why? • • • • • Equipment performance has declined Grid and switchyard problems are challenging operations Non-station personnel not well trained or supervised Senior managers are less focused on operations Short-term and long-term needs are out of balance Declining Equipment Performance Safety System Performance Percentage of Systems Achieving 2005 Industry Goal Each Year *2004 values as of March 31, 2004 100 92 94 95 96 94 97 95 94 84 90 80 94 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 20 04 * 20 03 20 02 20 01 20 00 19 99 19 97 19 95 19 93 19 91 0 19 89 percent 70 Declining Equipment Performance Fuel Reliability Percentage of Units Reporting Zero Defects *2004 values as of March 31, 2004 100 90 83 80 71 83 85 84 77 76 74 73 60 50 46 50 40 30 20 10 20 04 * 20 03 20 02 20 01 20 00 19 99 19 97 19 95 19 93 19 91 0 19 89 percent 70 Configuration Management Current Themes CM Areas for Improvement 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Engineering Product Quality Operational Margin Management Configuration Control Reactor Engineering / Engineering Programs Fuels Engineering Product Quality • Examples: • Engineering results not supported with • • • • rigorous documentation Modification delays Vendor errors Temporary modification control Calculation errors Engineering Product Quality • Causes: • Supervisor engagement • Lack of operating experience use • Preparation & verification not thorough • Lack of human performance tool use • Inadequate modification review meetings • Inadequate vendor oversight • Insufficient verification or testing for vendor-supplied designs Operational Configuration Control • Examples: • Changes to the plant without approved • • • • • • engineering documents Uncontrolled temp power / temp mods Long term open operability determinations Mispositionings resulting in equipment damage Uncontrolled equipment and setpoint changes Blocking of protective equipment trips Protective doors locked open Operational Configuration Control • Causes: • Personnel lack an understanding of the design • • • • • change process Indicators limited to component mispositionings Human performance weaknesses Inadequate engineering management oversight Tolerance of temporary, unauthorized changes CM viewed by station personnel as a design engineering role as opposed to a station role Margin Management • Examples: • Low operational margin on safety-related components • Safety-related heat exchanger tube blockage • Design documents & calcs not updated • Errors in operability determinations • Modifications don’t consider all operating regimes • Modifications cause significantly reduced operational margins Margin Management • Causes: • Lack of operating margin focus • Inadequate testing and monitoring programs • Insufficient understanding of design information • Station management did not challenge and question • power uprate evaluations Power uprate was a fast-track project, and time pressure contributed to insufficient reviews Reactor Engineering & Fuel • Examples: • Fuel Failures • Reactor engineering support & communication with • operations Incorrect values entered into computer calculations • Causes: • • • • High localized power due to control rod movement No long-term, integrated plan to achieve zero fuel defects Unclear expectations for reactor engineering support Inadequate human performance tool use Engineering Programs • Examples: • • Program results not verified or in error Testing not adequately performed • Causes: • • • • Inadequate management oversight Insufficient coordination between modification & testing program Inadequate program and component health monitoring Turnover of program engineers Recurring Causes • Management oversight • Human performance • Oversight of non-station personnel • Procedure / process adherence or adequacy Future What else is out there Emerging Transformers Grid Margins / Power Uprate Fuel Actions • Evaluations • • Margin Focus Programs Review • • • • Nuclear Fuel Engineering Work Management Non-station Personnel Transformers and Switchyards • Engineering Program Excellence Guidelines • Initiatives Good News! • Many strengths continue to be written (31) • CM steering committee used to raise awareness on low • • • • • margin components Improved procurement process for critical station components Calculation simplification to reduce the probability design errors Benchmarking to improve configuration management activities Effective fleet communications to implement notable CM improvements Operation without fuel defects for ten years Good News! • Improved evaluation process • • • • • • Pre-evaluation activities leading to better core team preparation Improved counterpart dialog Better developed causes, contributors, and insights Higher-level, vulnerability AFIs More issues related to manager and supervisor performance Improved cross-functional evaluation process is being well received Margins • “By decreasing our margins, we are relying more and more heavily on our operators, engineers, and managers to make the right decisions, and to make them in a timely manner.” Zack T. Pate WANO Biennial General Meeting March 2002 Discussion