Transcript Slide 1
INPO Update
Operational Excellence Outcomes
and
Configuration Management
Glenn J. Neises, INPO Sr. Evaluator
June 2004 CMBG
Session Content
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INPO Mission and Cornerstones
Operational Excellence Outcomes Overview
Configuration Management Overview
INPO Perspectives
Configuration Management Current Themes
Future
INPO’s
Mission
To promote the
highest levels of
safety and reliability
– to promote
excellence –
in the operation of
nuclear electric
generating plants
INPO Cornerstones
Evaluations
Accreditation
and Training
Assistance
Analysis
Evaluations
Plant Evaluation
Areas
Organizational
Effectiveness
Equipment Reliability
Operational Focus
Performance
Improvement
Configuration
Management
Radiological
Protection
Work Management
Maintenance
Engineering
Operations
Chemistry
Analysis
Analysis
Analysis of industry trends and data
Detect emerging industry trends
Predict future performance issues
Evaluation focus areas
Operational Excellence
Outcomes
Why OEO?
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Changed industry
High levels of safety and reliability
A few stations unable to keep pace
Events revealed increased effort needed in
several areas
A few activities important to operational
excellence not evaluated
Robust self-assessment and corrective action
programs
Sustainable,
High Levels of
Plant
Performance
Sustainable,
Event-Free
Operations
Avoidance of
Unplanned,
Long-Duration
Shutdowns
Operationa
l
Excellence
Highly-Skilled,
Knowledgeable
, and
Collaborative
Workforce
High Levels of
Plant Worker
Safety
Well-Managed
and Understood
Safety, Design,
and Operational
Margins
CM.1
Maintaining
Margins Consistent
with Design
Requirements
CM.2
Operational
Configuration
Control
Well-Managed
and Understood
Safety, Design,
and Operational
Margins
CM.3
Design Change
Processes
Configuration Management
Overview
Why Configuration Management?
• Plant safety degraded, long-term
shutdowns caused by problems with:
• Operating and design margins
• Design basis validity
• Plant status and configuration control
• Design product quality
• Quality and oversight of engineering
programs
Evaluating Configuration Management
CM.5
Reactor Cores Designed
& Operated within
Performance Limits
CM.3
CM Processes Clearly
Defined & Implemented
Well Managed
Margins
CM.2
Activities Maintain
Configuration,
Operating & Design
Margins
CM.1
Performance &
Configuration
Consistent with Design
Requirements
CM.4
Engineering Provides
Technical Information
& Support
Evaluating Configuration Management
Quality Design
Requirements
Documented
& Retrievable
Approved Programs
For Fuel Movement &
Storage
Rigorous Programs
For Core Design,
Reactivity Mgmt,
& Core Monitoring
Design
Authority
is Clear
FME
Controls
Temp Mods
Controlled
CM.3
CM Processes
Clearly Defined &
Implemented
Field Changes
Evaluated
Reactor Engineers
Provide Support
Process Controls
Maintain D &L Limits
Margins Verified
Thru
Testing
CM.4
Engineering Provides
Technical Information
& Support
Physical
Plant Matches
Documentation
PM & PdM
Validates Margins
CM.2
Activities Maintain
Configuration, Operating, &
Design Margins
Degraded Conditions
Resolved Aggressively
Emergent Issues
Promptly Investigated
SSCs
Meet
Requirements
CM.1
Performance &
Configuration
Consistent
with Design
Requirements
Design &Operating
Margins
Documented
Degraded
Conditions
Evaluated
Good Craft
Workmanship
CM.5
Reactor Cores Designed
& Operated within
Performance Limits
Well Managed
Margins
EOP and AOP
Bases Documented
Sound
Engineering
Programs
Defect Free
Fuel Operation
Vulnerabilities
Identified
Sound Parts
Evaluations
Training
Addresses
Roles
Contingencies
Planned
Quality Engineering
Products
Extent of
Condition
Investigated
Comprehensive
Testing & Engineering
Programs
Evaluating Configuration Management
• Advance Screening (analysis)
• Historical or present issues and initiatives
• Preliminary Evaluation Plan (3-4 weeks prior)
• General focus areas
• Specific document reviews
• Refined Evaluation Plan (1 week prior)
• Interview schedule
• Specific focus areas
• In-field activities / observations (on-site weeks)
• dialogue on impacts, causes, extent of condition
INPO Perspectives
Performance Indicator Index
100
85.4
Median Index Value
90
80
75.1 74.3
89.4
95.1
95
96.5 95.6 93.5
79
70
60
50
40
30
20
*2004 values as
of March 31,
2004
10
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*
Performance Indicator Index
All components of the index have declined slightly
• Unit capability factor
• Forced loss rate
• Unplanned automatic scrams
• Safety system performance
• Fuel reliability
• Chemistry performance
• Collective radiation exposure
• Industrial safety
Why?
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Equipment performance has declined
Grid and switchyard problems are
challenging operations
Non-station personnel not well trained or
supervised
Senior managers are less focused on
operations
Short-term and long-term needs are out
of balance
Declining Equipment Performance
Safety System Performance
Percentage of Systems Achieving 2005 Industry Goal Each Year
*2004 values as of March 31, 2004
100
92
94
95
96
94
97
95
94
84
90
80
94
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
20
04
*
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
0
19
89
percent
70
Declining Equipment Performance
Fuel Reliability
Percentage of Units Reporting Zero Defects
*2004 values as of March 31, 2004
100
90
83
80
71
83
85
84
77
76
74
73
60
50
46
50
40
30
20
10
20
04
*
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
0
19
89
percent
70
Configuration Management
Current Themes
CM Areas for Improvement
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Engineering Product
Quality
Operational
Margin Management
Configuration Control
Reactor Engineering / Engineering Programs
Fuels
Engineering Product Quality
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Examples:
• Engineering results not supported with
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rigorous documentation
Modification delays
Vendor errors
Temporary modification control
Calculation errors
Engineering Product Quality
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Causes:
• Supervisor engagement
• Lack of operating experience use
• Preparation & verification not thorough
• Lack of human performance tool use
• Inadequate modification review meetings
• Inadequate vendor oversight
• Insufficient verification or testing for vendor-supplied
designs
Operational Configuration Control
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Examples:
• Changes to the plant without approved
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engineering documents
Uncontrolled temp power / temp mods
Long term open operability determinations
Mispositionings resulting in equipment
damage
Uncontrolled equipment and setpoint changes
Blocking of protective equipment trips
Protective doors locked open
Operational Configuration Control
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Causes:
• Personnel lack an understanding of the design
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change process
Indicators limited to component mispositionings
Human performance weaknesses
Inadequate engineering management oversight
Tolerance of temporary, unauthorized changes
CM viewed by station personnel as a design
engineering role as opposed to a station role
Margin Management
• Examples:
• Low operational margin on safety-related components
• Safety-related heat exchanger tube blockage
• Design documents & calcs not updated
• Errors in operability determinations
• Modifications don’t consider all operating regimes
• Modifications cause significantly reduced operational
margins
Margin Management
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Causes:
• Lack of operating margin focus
• Inadequate testing and monitoring programs
• Insufficient understanding of design information
• Station management did not challenge and question
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power uprate evaluations
Power uprate was a fast-track project, and time
pressure contributed to insufficient reviews
Reactor Engineering & Fuel
• Examples:
• Fuel Failures
• Reactor engineering support & communication with
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operations
Incorrect values entered into computer calculations
• Causes:
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High localized power due to control rod movement
No long-term, integrated plan to achieve zero fuel
defects
Unclear expectations for reactor engineering support
Inadequate human performance tool use
Engineering Programs
• Examples:
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Program results not verified or in error
Testing not adequately performed
• Causes:
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Inadequate management oversight
Insufficient coordination between modification &
testing program
Inadequate program and component health
monitoring
Turnover of program engineers
Recurring Causes
• Management oversight
• Human performance
• Oversight of non-station personnel
• Procedure / process adherence or
adequacy
Future
What else is out there
Emerging
Transformers
Grid
Margins /
Power Uprate
Fuel
Actions
• Evaluations
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Margin Focus
Programs Review
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Nuclear Fuel
Engineering Work Management
Non-station Personnel
Transformers and Switchyards
• Engineering Program Excellence Guidelines
• Initiatives
Good News!
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Many strengths continue to be written (31)
• CM steering committee used to raise awareness on low
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margin components
Improved procurement process for critical station
components
Calculation simplification to reduce the probability design
errors
Benchmarking to improve configuration management
activities
Effective fleet communications to implement notable CM
improvements
Operation without fuel defects for ten years
Good News!
• Improved evaluation process
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Pre-evaluation activities leading to better core team
preparation
Improved counterpart dialog
Better developed causes, contributors, and insights
Higher-level, vulnerability AFIs
More issues related to manager and supervisor
performance
Improved cross-functional evaluation process is being
well received
Margins
• “By decreasing our margins, we are
relying more and more heavily on our
operators, engineers, and managers to
make the right decisions, and to make
them in a timely manner.”
Zack T. Pate
WANO Biennial General Meeting
March 2002
Discussion