Transcript INPO Perspective on CM Performance

INPO Update CMBG
Meeting June 2012
EN/CM Department Staff
Engineering and Configuration Management
Organizational Chart
Liaison Engineers
Bob Gambrill
Manager
Alexis Yost
Admin Asst II
Scott Hawn
Assistant Manager
Kris Mertens
(Electrabel)
Ralph Kothe
(Bruce Power)
Ivan Hwang
(Taiwan Power)
Loaned Employees
Debbie Williams
Section Manager
Digital Systems
Permanent Employees
Bill Nowicki
Gary Garrett
Bob Burnham
?
Ralph Schwartzbeck
Shawn Simon
Mark Fowler
Start Date:
June 18
Chris Dickey
Craig Faulkner
Ben Huck
John Titrington
Keith Mills
Gary Modzelewski
Mike Smith
Liang Zhao
Terry Schuster
?
Sr. Evaluator
2012 Focus Areas
• Engineering Fundamentals and Technical
Conscience
• Fuel Reliability
• TSG and NATF Coordination
• Seismic Preparedness
• Digital Project Upgrades
2012 Ongoing Work Efforts
• Principles, Objectives, and Criteria Revision
• Preparing for Evaluating Cyber Security
• Preparing to Evaluate Extended Plant Life
• Investigate Increase in Part 21 Reports
• INPO Document Updates
• Vendor Product Quality
Fuel Reliability
 Long term forecast remains the same:
o PWR performance will slowly improve as fuel designs are
replaced to eliminate grid-to-rod fretting (target ~ 2015)
o BWR performance stable to slightly declining because of
debris failures
 Continued implementation of improved debris filters is in progress
 INPO performing common cause/review of recent (~last 2 years)
BWR fuel failures to determine any additional actions
 End of 2012 performance estimate remains 90-95%
failure free.
o 3 plants currently have failures that will be present at the
end of the year.
5
New Fuel Reliability Indicator
© 2012 Institute of
Nuclear Power
Operations
6
Seismic Event Preparedness
 Seismic Instrumentation
 Event Response Procedures
• Short-term
• Post-event Walkdown
Ralph
Schwartzbeck
 Vertical Spent Fuel Storage Cask Margins
Digital Upgrade Projects
 Digital Project Guidance
 Modification Testing
 FMEA Analysis
 Integration of Digital Equipment
Debbie Williams
Bill Nowicki
Vendor Product Quality
 Working Meeting in April
 Collecting Attributes of High Performance
 Develop Industry Best Practices and incorporate in
INPO 90-009 – Conduct of Design Engineering
Terry Schuster
Ralph
Schwartzbeck
Temporary
Configuration Changes
Temporary Configuration Changes
 INPO Updating Good Practice INPO 85-016,
Temporary Modification Control
 Based on current industry practices, and lessons
learned from OE and evaluations
 Draft is in review with INPO and industry
 Issue in late 2012
 Exelon, Entergy, Dominion, Progress are part of
the revision team
11
Temporary Configuration Changes
 Events
• LOOP – Contributed to a Loss of Fire Protection for 9 hours (IER
L2-12-27)
• IER L4-12-13 Inappropriate Temporary Connection of Non-Seismic
Systems/Components to Seismically Qualified Systems
• Electrical shocks, fires from temporary power installations
• Numerous equipment issues due to problems with temporary
equipment cooling
 4 AFIs in last Six Months
• TCCs with inadequate technical evaluation or not evaluated at all
• Staff not aware what constitutes a TCC or the process
 Engineering staff is the guardian of the plant
design
12
Temporary Configuration Changes
 Temporary Modifications Standards
•
•
•
•
Equivalent controls as permanent modifications
Detailed training
Document updates as needed for short-term installation
Removal/restoration
 Procedurally Controlled TCCs
• Scaffold, shielding, leak catch/containment
• Must have technical evaluation
13
1OCFR21 TRENDS
PART 21 NOTIFICATION TREND
15
INPO TREND REVIEW
 All Part 21s from 2008 to present reviewed
 Elements captured/compiled including:
•
•
•
•
Problem (Defect)
Type of Error (Design, Manufacture, other/unknown)
Error sub-category
How the error was discovered
 Error sub-category created to identify where error
occurred or factors influential to the error
 Non-US Plant Issues (e.g. MOX) removed
16
PART 21 ERROR CATEGORY RESULTS
17
DESIGN ERROR SUBCATEGORY RESULTS
18
CONCLUSIONS
 Comprehensive plans to prevent equipment failures from
Part 21 defects:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Review vendor documentation for conformity to requirements
Understand how vendors control subvendor performance
Inspect vendor and subvendor shops
Inspect component against drawings
Bench testing components simulating failure modes
Perform rigorous post-installation testing under normal and
abnormal conditions
• Perform routine inspections/testing to confirm desired
performance
19
Open Phase Event
Big Picture on the Open Phase Event
 January 30, 2012
 Large two unit PWR
 Mechanical failure of 345 kV
under-hung porcelain insulator on SAT A-frame
structure
 Open phase condition
 Reactor trip
 8 Minutes without many safety systems
 Unusual Event
 Manual separation of ESF buses
21
Single Line Diagram
22
Insulator Failure
Unit 2
Failed
Insulator
Stack
Collapsed
C-Phase Bus
Fallen
Insulators
23
Bus Insulator Fractures
24
Why Was This a Big Deal
 A nonsafety system failed which caused safety
systems to not respond
 Charging lost to RCP seals
 Almost every US nuclear plant is affected.
 This event had not previously been considered as
a likely failure mechanism even though a very
similar event – that did not result in a plant trip occurred in 2007
2007 Open Phase Event
The IER Recs
 IER Recommendations Include:
• Ensure the protection scheme has sufficient sensitivity
to detect and automatically respond
• If the review identifies vulnerabilities:
 Determine the interim compensatory actions needed
 Verify/provide operating procedures to help
operators promptly diagnose and respond
• Identify long-term corrective actions to provide
automatic protection from single-phase open circuit
conditions
• Issued a 30 day extension to respond.
27