SEP Michael Adam
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Transcript SEP Michael Adam
Standards and competition law
Michael Adam
DG Competition, European Commission
(speaking in a personal capacity - the views expressed are not
necessarily those of the European Commission)
IP and competition law have the same goals
■ No inherent conflict between IP and competition
law
■ Both share the same objective
Consumer welfare and efficient resource allocation
Both necessary to promote innovation
Antitrust intervention is rare
■ Standardisation creates a specific context at the
intersection of IP and competition law
Standards bring benefits
■ Globalising, knowledge-based economy
■ More and more products have to work together
■ Of particular importance in IT/communications
■ Interoperability: avoids lock-in
■ Follow-on innovation
■ Enable competing implementations by multiple
vendors
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But there is an antitrust risk
■ Group of companies decide on commonly agreed
specifications (generally in a standards body)
■ Can be a choice of one technology over another
■ Technologies often covered by patents
■ Different to how competition occurs ‘traditionally’
■ One-off choice between different technologies
■ The technology that is chosen is the standard
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May mean market power
■ Depends on importance of standard in market
i.e. is it commercially indispensable to comply?
■ Depends on lock-in
sunk costs
network effects
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May mean market power which would
not have existed
■ Depends on ex ante alternatives
■ Relevance of «but for» scenario
■ What would have happened ex ante is a good
benchmark
Strips out the ability to charge resulting from the
standard
Good indication of what a FRAND price is
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How do you keep the benefits but
protect against the risks?
■ Ex ante disclosure of essential patents
Allows informed decision by participants
Protects against "patent ambush"
■ Commitment to license on FRAND terms
Access to standard for all
Quid pro quo for being included in the standard
Designed to constrain ex post exercise of market
power resulting from standard (pricing, other terms)
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Injunctions
■ SEP-based injunctions potentially anti-competitive
Standardisation context: commitment to license (FRAND)
The patent has been included in the standard on that basis
The company has chosen to provide access to all in
exchange for monetisation - not to exclude
■ Effects
May exclude products from the market
May lead to other harmful terms through a distortion of
negotiations (e.g. royalty level, other clauses)
■ There should be a willing licensee
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Google/MMI merger decision (para 107)
• "Depending on the circumstances, it may be that
the threat of injunction, the seeking of an
injunction or indeed the actual enforcement of
an injunction granted against a good faith
potential licensee, may significantly impede
effective competition by, for example, forcing the
potential licensee into agreeing to potentially
onerous licensing terms which it would
otherwise not have agreed to."
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Google/MMI merger decision (para 126)
• "The seeking or enforcement of injunctions on
the basis of SEPs is also not, of itself, anticompetitive. In particular, and depending on the
circumstances, it may be legitimate for the
holder of SEPs to seek an injunction against a
potential licensee which is not willing to
negotiate in good faith on FRAND terms."
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Injunctions
■ Proceedings opened in 3 cases in 2012
Samsung
Motorola/Apple
Motorola/Microsoft
■ Statements of Objections relating to the
seeking and enforcement of SEP-based
injunctions issued in the first two cases
December 2012 and May 2013 respectively
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Vice-President Almunia (Sep 2012)
"The fact that we have received many complaints related to
standards-essential patents also shows that there is a great
need for guidance. I want to tell you that I am willing to
provide clarity to the market through our enforcement.
Having said that, I am also convinced that the industry
needs to do its homework too. I expect the leading
companies in the sector not to misuse their intellectual
property rights. It is high time they look for negotiated
solutions - I am tempted to call them ‘peace talks’ – that
would put an end to the patent wars."
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