Transcript PPT
Implementing Security without Inhibiting Research: Mission Impossible? ( http://www.esp.org/briite/meetings ) Robert J. Robbins [email protected] (206) 667 4778 © 2007, BRIITE Biomedical Research Institutions Information Technology Exchange 3-5 October 2007 Implementing Security without Inhibiting Research: Mission Impossible? ( http://www.esp.org/briite/meetings ) Robert J. Robbins [email protected] (206) 667 4778 © 2007, BRIITE Biomedical Research Institutions Information Technology Exchange 3-5 October 2007 Implementing Security without Inhibiting Research: Mission Impossible? Impossible? ( http://www.esp.org/rjr/briite-RJR-salk-2005.pdf) Maybe not. Robert J. Robbins But it is very hard. [email protected] (206) 667 4778 © 2007, BRIITE Biomedical Research Institutions Information Technology Exchange 3-5 October 2007 Implementing Security without The challenge is real, yet we all Research: need toInhibiting figure out how to implement some kind of solution anyway. Mission Impossible? Impossible? ( http://www.esp.org/rjr/briite-RJR-salk-2005.pdf) Maybe not. Robert J. Robbins But it is very hard. [email protected] (206) 667 4778 © 2007, BRIITE Biomedical Research Institutions Information Technology Exchange 3-5 October 2007 Implementing Security without The challenge is real, yet we all Research: need toInhibiting figure out how to implement some kind of solution anyway. Mission Impossible? Impossible? ( http://www.esp.org/rjr/briite-RJR-salk-2005.pdf) And, we had better be prepared to Maybe not. replace our solution with a better Robert J. Robbins solution every few years for the next [email protected] But it (206) is very hard. decade. 667 4778 © 2007, BRIITE Biomedical Research Institutions Information Technology Exchange http://www.briite.org 3-5 October 2007 5 The Problem • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. http://www.briite.org 6 The Problem • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. http://www.briite.org 7 The Problem • • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. Work occurs across institutional boundaries. http://www.briite.org 8 The Problem • • • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. Work occurs across institutional boundaries. Problem keeps changing. http://www.briite.org 9 The Problem • • • • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. Work occurs across institutional boundaries. Problem keeps changing. Rules keep changing. http://www.briite.org 10 The Problem • • • • • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. Work occurs across institutional boundaries. Problem keeps changing. Rules keep changing. Solution keeps changing. http://www.briite.org 11 The Problem • • • • • • • © 2007, BRIITE Culture clash between research and security. Work occurs within decentralized organizations. Work occurs across institutional boundaries. Problem keeps changing. Rules keep changing. Solution keeps changing. Human-subjects work is especially challenging. http://www.briite.org 12 Culture Clash Culture Clash RESEARCH open © 2007, BRIITE SECURITY closed http://www.briite.org 14 Culture Clash RESEARCH open opportunistic © 2007, BRIITE SECURITY closed planned http://www.briite.org 15 Culture Clash RESEARCH open opportunistic creative © 2007, BRIITE SECURITY closed planned structured http://www.briite.org 16 Culture Clash RESEARCH open opportunistic creative challenge authority © 2007, BRIITE SECURITY closed planned structured respect authority http://www.briite.org 17 Culture Clash RESEARCH open opportunistic creative challenge authority one-off mentality ... © 2007, BRIITE SECURITY closed planned structured respect authority process driven ... http://www.briite.org 18 Decentralized Organizations Decentralized Organizations Would this work in your organization: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 20 Decentralized Organizations Would this work in your organization: Your convenience is no reason for me to sacrifice the security of my network… © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 21 Decentralized Organizations Would this work in your organization: Your convenience is no reason for me to sacrifice the security of my network… But it does work in the military, where this quote originates. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 22 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 23 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): N: These changes will improve the security of our network. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 24 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): N: These changes will improve the security of our network. F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 25 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): N: These changes will improve the security of our network. F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 26 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): N: These changes will improve the security of our network. F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there is no work-around for us. However, we have determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 27 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): N: These changes will improve the security of our network. F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there is no work-around for us. However, we have determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. N: What do you know about network security? You’re just an end user. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 28 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): Yes, but this end user also had a Nobel F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. Prize and about two attractive job offers N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. a month from other institutions. N: These changes will improve the security of our network. F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there is no work-around for us. However, we have determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. N: What do you know about network security? You’re just an end user. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 29 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): Yes, but this end user also had a Nobel F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. Prize and about two attractive job offers N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. a month from other institutions. N: These changes will improve the security of our network. POP QUIZ F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there is no work-around for us. However, we have determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. N: What do you know about network security. You’re just an end user. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 30 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): The most likely outcome was: N: These changes will improve the security of our network. Yes, but this end user also had a Nobel F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. Prize and about two attractive job offers N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. a month from other institutions. F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there is no work-around for us. However, we have determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. N: What do you know about network security. You’re just an end user. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 31 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): The most likely outcome was: N: These changes will improve the security of our network. Yes, but this end user also had a Nobel F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. Prize and researcher about two attractive job offers 1. The totally changed his N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. a month from other institutions. research program to meet the new F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there isstandards, no work-around or for us. we have security . .However, . determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out our research. N: What do you know about network security. You’re just an end user. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 32 True Story Conversation between network administrator (N) and faculty member (F): The most likely outcome was: N: These changes will improve the security of our network. Yes, but this end user also had a Nobel F: But they will make it impossible for my lab to carry out its research. Prize and researcher about two attractive job offers 1. The totally changed his N: With a little effort you should be able to find a work-around. a month from other institutions. research program to meet the new F: My staff and I have already devoted substantial effort to the problem and there isstandards, no work-around or for us. we have security . .However, . determined that a relatively minor change in your security plan would meet your security needs while still allowing us to carry out 2.research. The network administrator found our himself the opportunity to an end user. N: What do you knowwith about network security. You’re just spend more time with his family. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 33 Work Spans Institutional Boundaries Work Spans Institutions Much biomedical research is now conducted by teams of collaborators, often spanning multiple institutions. Research that starts at one institution segues into multi-institutional work as students graduate, post-docs move on, and other changes occur. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 35 Work Spans Institutions Research often is accomplished by INFORMAL teams of workers, spanning multiple organizations. These teams dynamically come into existence to meet a research need, then disband. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 36 Work Spans Institutions Portions of tens (or hundreds) of such teams exist at any one time within any research organization. These teams are often not based on any formal relationships between the home institutions of the researchers. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 37 Work Spans Institutions Delivering high quality security across such teams either involves: a proliferation of accounts across institutions, or a security system designed for a totally decentralized federation © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 38 Work Spans Institutions Delivering high quality security across such teams either involves: No currently available security a proliferation of accounts across system is designed to meet the institutions, or needs of a totally decentralized a security system designed for a federation. totally decentralized federation © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 39 Problem Keeps Changing Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 41 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 42 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 43 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs across departments © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 44 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs across departments across campuses © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 45 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs across departments across campuses across institutions © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 46 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs across departments across campuses across institutions across state boundaries © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 47 Changes in Problem Scope Achieving security of research systems: within labs across labs across departments across campuses across institutions across state boundaries across national boundaries © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 48 Changes in Problem Domain New problems keep arising: financial system confidential data on lost laptops web site break-ins student music downloads termination policies HIPAA ... © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 49 Changes in Logical Status Some change is so profound that jokes become reality. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 50 Changes in Logical Status Some change is so profound that jokes become reality. Sarcastic comment: DNA is inherently identifiable. Pretty soon we’ll have to start putting deliberate errors into DNA sequences before we can share them… © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 51 Changes in Logical Status Some change is so profound that jokes become reality. Sarcastic comment: DNA is inherently identifiable. Pretty soon we’ll have to start putting deliberate errors into DNA sequences before we can share them… Recent article in Science © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 52 Changes in Logical Status Page 2: Tactics for de-identifying genomic data: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 53 Changes in Logical Status Page 2: Tactics for de-identifying genomic data: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 54 Changes in Logical Status Page 2: Tactics for de-identifying genomic data: When reality starts to resemble parody, things are getting too complex for comfort. © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 55 Rules Keep Changing Rules Keep Changing HIPAA Sarbanes Oxley News stories of lost laptops Internal audit departments Non-research savvy auditors Engaged boards of directors ... © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 57 Solution Keeps Changing Solution Keeps Changing We need comprehensive support for implementing security in a totally decentralized federation. No such solution exists. So we keep implementing the approximation du jour (or maybe de jure). © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 59 Human Subjects Research What is Human Subjects Research? Certain activities are obviously human subjects research, appropriately covered by IRB rules and procedures. But, where are the limits? What activities are covered and what are not? Effect of food additive? Price of popcorn in movie theaters? Production of recipe book? © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 61 HSR Criteria Project: MBA student wants to interview theater managers about price of popcorn at different times and for different features. Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? Answer: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 62 HSR Criteria Project: MBA student wants to interview theater managers about price of popcorn at different times and for different features. Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? Answer: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 63 HSR Criteria Project: MBA student wants to interview theater managers about price of popcorn at different times and for different features. Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? Answer: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 64 HSR Criteria Project: MBA student wants to interview theater managers about price of popcorn at different times and for different features. Problem: ? Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? Answer: © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 65 HSR Criteria Project: Research team wants to interview IRB heads, security officers, other institutional leaders to determine the policy requirements governing the deployment of multi-site digital security systems. Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 66 HSR Criteria Project: Research team wants to interview IRB heads, security officers, other institutional leaders to determine the policy requirements governing the deployment of multi-site digital security systems. Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 67 HSR Criteria Project: Research team wants to interview IRB heads, security officers, other institutional leaders to determine the policy requirements governing the deployment of multi-site digital security systems. ? Problem: Should this activity be considered research involving human subjects covered by 45 CFR part 46? © 2007, BRIITE http://www.briite.org 68 END