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公司理財研討
MA0A0204王詩婷
MA0A0205許睿烜
497A0009陳欣妤
3.6 RELUCTANCE TO TERMINATE LOSING PROJECTS
勉強終止失敗的計劃
Once projects are adopted , managers face
subsequent decisions about whether to continue
these projects or terminate them.What makes the
follow-on decision especially important is the
presence of excessive optimism.
一旦計劃被採用,經理隨後面臨的決定關於是否繼續或者結束這
項計劃。後續的決定特別重要是存在過度的樂觀。
If excessive optimism is systematically at work in
capital budgeting, then managers will undertake
more negative net-present-value projects than
they anticipate.As a result, they will have to face
the question of whether to abandon failing projects
more frequently than they anticipated.
如果過度的樂觀是有系統在資本預算中的工作，然後經理比他們
預期將承擔更多負面的淨現值計劃。因此，他們比他們預期將必
須面臨是否放棄失敗計劃的問題。
Interestingly, although survey evidence shows that
97 percent of firms use cost-of-capital techniques
to evaluate new projects, the same survey shows
that only 73 percent do so when deciding whether or
not to abandon existing projects.
有趣的是，雖然調查證據顯示97%公司利用成本資本技術對新計
劃評價，同樣的調查顯示只有73%公司這樣做時決定是否放棄現
行的計劃。
However, the issue here is not whether firms use
cost-of-capital techniques when deciding whether
or not to abandon projects. The issue is whether
firms make negative net-present-value decisions by
delaying the decision to abandon failing projects.
然而，不管怎樣當決定放棄計劃時，這裡的問題並不是公司是否
使用成本資本技術。問題是公司是否通過負淨現值的決定延緩決
定放棄失敗的計劃。
Aversion to a Sure Loss
對確定損失的厭惡
As in the discussion about project adoption,
avoiding DCF and NPV analysis means that capital
budgeting decisions involve subjective judgment.
在討論關於計劃的採用，資本預算決策意味著主觀的看法，以避
免DCF(現金流量折現法)與NPV(淨現值)分析方法。
And subjective judgment leads managers to be
vulnerable to behavioral biases. In the case of
project termination decisions, the most important
bias is aversion to a sure loss.
主觀的看法導致經理易受到行為的偏見。在計劃結束的情況下，
最重要的偏見是對確定損失的厭惡。
As discussed in Chapter 1, breaking even is a key
issue. In Concept Preview Question 3.2, part 1, both
the risk-free alternative and the risky alternative
are framed in the domain of losses. Most people are
averse to accepting a sure loss and therefore
choose the risky alternative in this situation.
如第1章所述，收支平衡是一個關鍵問題。在概念預習問題3.2第
1部份，無風險替代和風險替代都是損失範圍。在這情況下，大
多數人反對接受確定損失因此選擇風險替代。
However, suppose that the person who faces the
choice described in Concept Preview Question 3.2,
part 1, could come to terms with that loss.Coming to
terms with the loss, psychologically, means that he
or she treats the $7,400 as an irrelevant sunk cost.
然而，假設面臨選擇的人描述概念預習問題3.2第1部份，可能
與損失達成協議。與損失達成協議，心理學上意味著他或她對
待$7,400當作是無相關的沉沒成本。
Having done so, he or she then frames the question
as between choosing a risk-free $0, or facing a 25
percent probability of a $7,400 gain and a 75
probability of a $2,600 loss.
完成的話，他或她之間選擇無風險$0或面臨有25%可能性獲利
$7,400和75%可能性損失$2,600。
Notice that this choice is exactly what Concept
Preview Question 3.2, part 2, offers and that
almost everyone rejects the risky alternative. Loss
aversion typically leads people to choose a risk-free
$0 over an expected loss of $100 (=0.25*7,4000.75*2,600). However, aversion to a sure loss leads
them to choose an expected loss of $7,500 (=0.75
*10,000+0.25*0) over a sure loss of $7,400.
提到這個選擇是確切地在概念預習問題3.2第2部份提供。損失厭
惡通常引導人們選擇無風險$0超過預期損失$100
(=0.25*7,400-0.75*2,600)。然而，厭惡確定損失引導他們選擇
一個預期損失$7,500超過確定損失$7,400。
People who accept losses reset their reference
point so that they no longer perceive the status quo
to be in the domain of losses.
接受損失的人們重置參考點使他們不再察覺現狀是損失的範圍。
As a result, loss aversion typically induces them to
reject the actuarially unfair alternative, whereas
aversion to a sure loss leads them to choose the
actuarially unfair alternative.
因此，厭惡損失通常引誘他們拒絕不公平的替代，反之，厭惡確
定損失引導他們選擇不公平的替代。
Behavioral Pitfalls
行為陷阱
In 1946,Masaru Ibuka and Akio Morita founded
Sony.In 1961,Sony began to develop a color
television receiver based on the Chromatron
picture tube.
在1946年，Masaru Ibuka 和 Akio Morita成立Sony。在1961年，
Sony開始發展彩色電視接收器的色標管(一種彩色電視顯像管)。
Ibuka led a two-year effort to develop a
commercial prototype and process technology. By
September 1964, Ibuka’s team had succeeded in
developing a prototype.However, they had not
developed a commercially viable manufacturing
process.
Ibuka經過兩年努力發展一套商業的標準過程技術。在1964年9
月，Ibuka團隊成功地發展出一套標準。然而，他們沒有發展出
商業可實行的製造過程。
Ibuka committed Sony to mass-produce color
television sets before his engineers had developed a
cost-effective mass-production process.A
chronicler of the events indicated that Ibuka alone
was confident. He had the product announced and
displayed in Sony’s showroom.Consumer reaction
was enthusiastic.
Ibuka致力於Sony大量生產彩色電視機之前，他的工程師發展有
成本效益的大量生產過程。一位記錄者針對此事件指出Ibuka只
有信心。他發佈的產品陳列在Sony展覽室。消費者的反應十分
熱烈。
Sony invested in a new facility to house the
production assembly. Ibuka announced that the
color television would be Sony’s top priority. He
placed 150 people on its assembly line.
Sony投資新設施以生產配件。Ibuka宣佈彩色電視機將是Sony
首要任務。他安排150名在配件生產線上。
To Ibuka’s chagrin, the production process yielded
only two or three usable picture tubes per thousand
produced. The retail price of Sony’s color television
set was$550, but the cost of production was more
than double that amount. There was a sharp
difference of opinion within the Sony leadership
about the appropriate course of action. Morita
wanted to terminate the project. However, Ibuka
refused.
Ibuka的懊惱，生產過程中每1,000個只有2或3個可用的顯像管。
Sony彩色電視機零售價$550，但產品的成本是總額的雙倍。明
顯的差異意見不超過Sony領導者關於適當的行動方向。Morita
想要終止此計劃然而Ibuka拒絕。
Sony continued to produce and sell chromatron sets,
eventually selling 13,000 sets, each one at a loss. In
November 1966, Sony’s financial managers
announced that Sony was close to ruin. Only then
did Ibuka agree to terminate the project.
Sony繼續生產和銷售色標管(一種彩色電視顯像管)最後銷售
13,000個。在1966年11月，Sony的財務經理宣佈Sony已接近
毀滅。此時 Ibuka同意終止此項計劃。