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How to build up a research project?
98學年度第一學期國際企業所專題研討
報告人：朱美琴
南台科技大學國際企業系
2016/7/13
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簡 報 內 容
個人背景(學經歷、研究領域)
計畫源起與目的
背景說明
水患治理之經濟效益評估
 結語與建議
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學經歷、研究領域

密西根州立大學農業經濟系博士
 專長：環境資源經濟學、成本效益分析

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經歷：台灣經濟研究院、國際合作發展基金會
過去研究計畫：
 生產契約與非點源污染
 廢容器回收處理(費率訂定、成本估算)
 綠色國民所得帳、環境支出帳、環境會計帳
 生態效益指標的建立
 生態旅遊
 綠色行銷、行銷等方面
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How to Build Up a Research Project？
10/7/2009
Mei-chin Chu, Assistant Professor
Department of International Business
Southern Taiwan University
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Designing Production Contracts to
Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution
What are the natures of Nonpoint source
pollution (NPSP)?
 What are the features of business structures?
 How might production contracts be designed
to combat NPSP?— a case study in Michigan
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Research Objecctives
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Identify the relationships among contract specifications,
nitrogen use, yield and nitrate leaching.
Identify production practices that can reduce nitrate leaching.
Identity contractual terms that could reduce nitrate leaching.
Structure a theoretical framework to analyze alternative
“green” contract.
Formulate an empirical framework to examine and evaluate
the impacts of alternative contract.
Theoretical Framework—Principalagent Model

Model:
 v( -s(y))f(y;a)dy
subject to  u(s(y)-c(a))f(y;a)dy  u
 u(s(y)-c(a))f(y;a)dy   u(s(y)-c(a
Max s,a
(1)
0
(2)
a
))f(y;a a )dy
where y: observable outcome,
y=y(a, ), a is the action of agent,  disturbance
s(y): payment to agents, depending on y
eq(2): participation constraint
eq(3): incentive compatibility constraint
(3)
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Empirical Principal-Agent model

Crop growth simulation model—DSSAT
 Nitrogen
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vs Crop yield and nitrate leaching
Mathematical programming model:
 Payment:
s(y)=[α(y-y0)+Q] βp’=a+by
 Objective function of the principal and agent:
principal: maxa,b,n E(y-s(y)]=(1-b)y-a
agent: E u(w)=E u(s(y)-c(n,z))
= a+by-(λ/2)b2σ2-pn-z
 Production function: y=f(n,z)+ε, ε~N(0, σ2)
 Leaching function: L=g(n,z,y(n))+η , η~N(0, ψ2)
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yield
Yield versus nitrate leaching
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0
20
40
nitrate leaching
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60
80
Empirical Principal-model (cont.)

basic empirical principal-agent model:
maxa,b,n E(y-s(y)]=(1-b)y-a
sub. to a+by-(λ/2)b2σ2-pn-z≧u0
byn=p
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Alternative contract designs:
 Restriction
the level of nitrate leaching
 Restriction the level of nitrogen applied
 Charge a fee on nitrate leaching or nitrogen
 change the payment scheme
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Evaluation Criteria
The ability to reduce nitrate leaching.
 The magnitude as well as incidence of
abatement costs.
 Contract acceptability dominance
 Cost efficiency dominance.
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Conclusions and Implications

Review of research objectives
 Identify the relationships among contract specifications,
nitrogen use, yield and nitrate leaching.
using a crop simulation model, Payment based on yield
performance encourage the grower to use high N
 Identify production practices that can reduce nitrate leaching.
 Crop rotation and applications of N
 Identity contractual terms that could reduce nitrate leaching.
 Output/inputs/production practice/emission/ambient level
 Structure a theoretical framework to analyze alternative “green”
contract.
 principal-agent model
 Formulate an empirical framework to examine and evaluate the
impacts of alternative contract.
 a whole-farm math programming model
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Conclusions and Implications (cont.)

Major Findings
 Corn might be responsible for much less NL than other
crops
 Relative prices among N and various crops are important
in determine NL
 The grower’s risk preference level is important
 Imposing a fee on N is not effective in reducing NL.
 Changing payment scheme might not be effective to
reduce NL.
 NL reduction could reduce the processor’s gross margins
and the grower’s expected utility. Risk-averse grower will
bear more than risk-neutral.
 Targeting only one crop might not reduce NL for the whole
farm.
 Enforceability and efficiency are keys to contract designs.
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Conclusions and Implications (cont.)

Conclusions:
Instrument for contract
design
Targetability
Enforceabili
ty
Correlatio
n w/
water
quality
1 Yield
L
H
L
2 Nitrogen
Restriction
charging a fee
L
M
M
L
L
M
H
H
M
H
M
L
L
M
M
L
H
3 Agronomic (rotation)
practice
4 NL from crop
restriction
charging a fee
5 Restriction the wholefarm NL
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