Transcript Segregation and Ethnic Stratification. Institutional Completeness and the Ethnic Mobility Trap

Hartmut Esser
Segregation and Ethnic Stratification.
Institutional Completeness and the Ethnic Mobility Trap
University of Mannheim
Faculty of Social Sciences
Mannheim Center for European Social Research
Hartmut Esser
Segregation and ethnische Schichtung.
Institutionelle Vollständigkeit und die ethnische Mobilitätsfalle
Universität Mannheim
Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
Research
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The Problem
Breton & Wiley
A General Model
Four Special Cases
Empirical Evidence?
Conclusions
1. The Problem
Background
Labor market performance as a necessary prerequisite of
any social integration into functionally differentiated
market societies
Ethnic stratification as a possible alternative outcome to
„structural assimilation“ (segmented assimilation)
Function(s) of ethnic segregation?
Segregation
???
?
really true?
?
if yes: why?
?
if not: why not?
Ethnic Stratification
Two propositions ...
Segregation as an obstacle
Mechanisms: missing opportunities, discrimination, stress ...
Segregation as support
Mechanisms: solidarity, self-esteem, own institutions ...
... and a third one:
Segregation as support serving (unintendedly) as an obstacle
Two (classic) references:
Raymond Breton (AJS 1964): Institutional Completeness
of Ethnic Communities
Norbert F. Wiley (SF 1967):
The Ethnic Mobility Trap
Topic:
• Elaborating and combining the arguments
• Modelling the mechanism(s)
• Application to some special constellations
2. Breton & Wiley
Raymond Breton: Institutional Completeness
Guiding idea
Institutionally complete ethnic communities allow
and motivate the (exclusive) preservation of ingroup relations.
Main propositions:
„ ... that the direction of the immigrants´ integration will to a
large extent result from the forces of attraction (positive or
negative) stemming from the various communities.“
and
„These forces are generated by the social organization of the
communities.“
What is „Institutional Completeness“?
„Institutional completeness would be at its extreme
whenever the ethnic community could perform all the
services required by its members.“
Emergence of IC:
• (cultural and/or social) „distances“
• the „level of resources among the members of the ethnic group“
• activities of „social entrepreneurs“
• the „number of immigrants“
• migration as an „individual or a group phenomenon“
In sum:
demand: migrants with problems of easy integration in rc
supply: ethnic entrepreneurs (actors with special abilities:
business experience, bilingual abilities, social capital)
Consequence(s) of IC:
Institutional completeness creates ingroup opportunities
with chances for economic success, prestige and mobility
within the boundaries of the ethnic group.
„Members would never have to make use of native institutions
for the satisfaction of their needs, such as education, work,
food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance.“
Summary Breton (+):
resources
distances
embeddedness
group size
Segregation
*
chain-migration/
cumulative causation
Organization
*
ethnic entrepreneurs/
organizational investments
Inst. Completeness
Norbert F. Wiley: The Ethnic Mobility Trap
Guiding Idea
Ethnic opportunities for social mobility have in most cases
a relatively low ceiling, but are more attractive, because the
probability of success is higher.
What is an „Ethnic Mobility Trap“?
„Briefly, a mobility trap is an opportunity for mobility
which offers a good deal less than it seems to, and, once
pursued, permits release only at the cost of some
downward mobility.“
The EMT-Mechanism:
• Mobility is a consequence of investment decisions.
• Choice between two alternative routes of investment:
- safe and comfortable, but with a low ceiling
- unsafe and uncomfortable, but with a high ceiling
The „trap“:
If there are ingroup opportunities, they will be preferred, just
because the probability of success is very much higher.
Once off to a „wrong“ start, the decision is almost
irreversible.
Other examples:
age-grade-trap:
cultivation of age-specific behavior
overspecialization trap: concentration on only one
sociological paradigm/ field
localité trap:
investment in local prestige
minority group trap:
„... not only ethnic and racial roups, but,
under some conditions, religious, female,
radical political and other ...groups which
offer advancement within their ghettos.“
Consequence(s) of EMT:
• Underinvestment in efficient and generalized capital
• Low chances of placement on central positions
• Status differentials between ethnic group and natives
• Emergence of ethnic stratification ...
... by „voluntary“ decisions
Summary Wiley:
Ingroup
Opportunities
Ethnic Stratification
EMT
*
*
migrants/
mobility investments
Combination of Breton &Wiley:
Ethnic segregations can motivate ethnic entrepreneurs to
create ethnic organizations up to institutional completeness ...
... which offers (internal) safe, but limited opportunities for
vertical mobility for other members of the ethnic group...
... and the structural result of this mobility trap is an ethnic
stratification.
resources
distances
embeddedness
group size
Segregation
*
chain-migration/
cumulative causation
Inst.Compl.
Organization
Int. Opport.
*
entrepreneurs/
organizational investments
*
Ethnic
Stratification
*
migrants/
mobility investments
3. A General Model
Three Steps:
1.
2.
3.
The general (micro-)mechanism: investments
Structural (and other) conditions: demand and supply
Aggregations and processes
: explaining the links
Step 1: Investment Strategies
Two types of actors/activities:
1.
2.
entrepreneurs: (eg-)organizational investments
migrants
: (rc-)mobility investments
Question: how to explain differences in investment behavior?
Alternatives:
• no investment (ni)
• investment (in)
Components:
U(sq)
U(in)
p
C
value status quo without investment
value investment return
probability of success
investment costs
following standard-investment-theory we derive
for the decision to invest (EU(in) > EU(ni)):
U(in) – U(sq)
> C/p
Investment Motive
> Investment Risk
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C/p
investment
in
C´
U+
2
4
increase
of costs
C
increase of
incentives
U-
increase of
opportunities
1
3
ni
p
p-
p+
1
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C´/p
no
investment
in
C´
U+
2
4
increase
of costs
C
increase of
incentives
U-
increase of
opportunities
1
3
ni
p
p-
p+
1
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C/p
in
C´
U+
2
4
decrease
of costs
C
increase of
incentives
U-
increase of
opportunities
1
3
ni
p
p-
p+
1
Investment Strategies: Basic Model
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C/p
investment
in
C´
U+
2
4
C
increase of
incentives
U-
increase of
opportunities
1
3
ni
p
p-
p+
1
Step 2: Structural Conditions
Application of the general model to the two types
of investments:
1.
2.
(eg-)organizational investment (ethnic business)
(rc-)mobility investments
(language, education)
(eg-)ethnic organization & IC
U(in)-U(ni)=U
C/p
IC
or
C´
4
U+
ethnic
social capital
group
size
C
organizational skills
U-
1
no
p
p-
p+
1
(rc-)mobility investments, IC & EMT
rc
C/p
U(in)-U(ni)=U
structural
assimilation
ethnic
mobilty trap
C´
4
U+
decreasing
distance
rc-labor
market
U-
institutional
completeness
C
rc-ressources
1
3
eg
p
p-
p+
1
(rc-)mobility investments: Segregation&Stress
rc
C/p
U(in)-U(ni)=U
prevented
investment
possible
investment
C´
U+
2
4
decreasing
distance
C
stress
U-
eg
p
p-
p+
1
Step 3: Aggregations and processes
so far: structured decisions of individual actors
now: interdependencies and collective consequences
Variables:
EU-weights for eg- versus rc-investments
varying with:
group size
ressources/distances
ethnic organization
The Basic Model
EU (rc)
EU (eg)
high resources
low distances
EU(rc)
ethnic organization
with „critical mass“
low resources
high distances
EU(eg)
„individualistic“
aggregation
group size
4. Four Special Cases
1.
2.
3.
4.
„Normal“ migrants
Intergenerational Integration
IC and EMT
Segmented Assimilation
Model 1: „normal“ migrants
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
high resources
low distances
(straight) assimilation
no embeddeness
no organization
group size
Model 2a: Intergenerational Integration (RRC)
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
competition/
distances
follow-up generations:
exposure&acceptance
ethnic organization
Contact
Conflict
(chain)immigration
Accommodation
Assimilation
group size
Model 2b: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
dissolution
of ethnic
community
group size
Model 2c: Intergenerational Integration (De-Institutionalization)
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
group size
Model 2d: Intergenerational Integration (absorption)
EU(rc)
EU(eg)
absorption
(structural)
assimilation
group size
„leaving the colony“
Model 3: Institutional Completeness&Ethnic Mobility Trap
EUrc)
EUeg)
IC
EMT
follow-up generations
further
increase of eg-opportunities
ethnic
organization
increase of eg-opportunities
„individualistic“ segregation
(net-)replenishment
group size
Model 4: Segmented Assimilation : rc-Subculture Mobility Trap
EUin)
EUni)
rc-core culture
exposure/values
subcultural
status system
rc-subculture
exposure/values
segmented
assimilation
group size rc-subculture
5. Empirical Evidence?
Is there really such an effect of institutional completeness on
the emergence of an ethnic stratification?
Three References:
1.
2.
3.
Breton 1964
Fong and Ooka 2001
Portes and Rumbaut 2001
Breton (1964: 197): IC and ingroup relations
degree of institutional completeness
proportion
of mainly
ingroup
relations*
low
medium
high
.21
(62)
.54
(28)
.89
(83)
•*„The relationship held under all ... controls“
(group size, residential concentration, proportion of
professionals). Exception: language; reduction „by
as much as one-third“.
Fong & Ooka (2002: 140): Ethnic economy and outgroup relations
Odds
education
language
length of stay
single migrant
family migration
perception of own group
2.10
2.23
1.03 (ns)
4.34
2.62
3.61
participation in
ethnic economy
0.55*
* „The result indicates
that, controlling for
other factors, working
in the Chinese ethnic
economy significantly
reduces the level of
participation in the
wider society“
Portes & Rumbaut (2001: 266f.): School achievement of latecoming Cuban-Americans
„ ... Cuban-American students are also affected by an unexpected
consequence of the successful economic performance of the
earlier exile generation. By creating such opportunities, the Cuban
ethnic economy paradoxically facilitated school attrition,
especially among children whose families confronted a more
difficult situation“ (266/7)
6. Conclusions
• There are relations between IC and ES by EMT, but they
are conditional.
• The interplay of the various factors and processes is
not uncomplicated, therefore explicit theoretical modelling
is necessary.
• Other factors, like discrimination, legal restrictions or
stress, are still possible and could easily be included
(via bridge hypotheses on the U-, p- or C-terms for
investment).
• Main aspect: solving the „problem of incompleteness“ of
integration-theory