Thailand’s experience with financial services liberalisation
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Transcript Thailand’s experience with financial services liberalisation
Thailand’s experience with financial
services liberalisation
WBI Trade in Services Course in Hanoi, Vietnam,
May 23-27 2005.
Jutamas Arunanondchai*
Fiscal Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Bangkok,
Thailand
*The content is drawn from various sources: Mullineux, Murinde &
Pinijkulviwat (200-); FTA Monitoring (2005); TDRI (2005); Sathirathai (2004);
and Euromonitor (2004).
1
3 types of financial service liberalisation
Financial service openings => market access by
foreigners
Financial deregulation, e.g. lifting controls on
interest rates and on activities of FSP
Capital account liberalisation => allow freer flows
of capital
2
Thailand’s financial services
Divided into 4 groups
Banking
Securities and asset management
Insurance
Non-bank
3
Thailand’s financial liberalisation
2 Phases
Between 1990-1997 (focused on banking)
Post-1997 financial crisis
Scope of liberalisation in the early 1990s
Scope of liberalisation post-1997
4
Scope of liberalisation in the early 1990s
5
Capital account liberalisation
Exchange control deregulation (IMF Art. 9)
1990, Phase I: commercial banks can trade in foreign
currencies for trade-related transactions
1991, Phase II:
All exchange controls abolished and new ones introduced for
reporting purposes only;
USD 10 m limit per annum for investment by individuals
Foreign funds can move in and out freely
1992, Phase III:
Exporters can receive and make payment in Baht in addition
to foreign currencies
Exporters can transfer foreign currency deposits for overseas
debt payment
6
Financial service opening - BIBFs
In 1993, BIBFs were introduced to encourage capital
inflows to finance domestic investment and throughout
Indo-China region
46 BIBF licenses granted
Income tax reduced from 30% to 10%
Permitted activities of BIBFs:
licensed banks use foreign funds raised overseas to lend locally
(out-in) or to lend overseas (out-out)
Cross currency trading
Trade finacing on out-out
Loan syndication arrangements
Arranging issue of debt instruments
7
Engage in underwriting in foreign currencies
Financial service opening – BIBFs cont.
Prudential regulations relaxed, e.g. capital
adequacy ratio, single lending limit (in view that
BIBFs were supervised by authorities of the
home countries).
ST debts increased markedly, most are rolled
over for long term use
8
Financial deregulation - Interest rate
Until 1990, all deposit rates were capped
In 1989, deposit ceiling for >12 m increased from 9.5%
to 10.5-11.0% to mobilise savings
3-yr interest rate liberalisation plan (1990-93)
1992, Ceilings on all bank deposits were abolished
Competition for deposits
1992, Ceiling on lending rates for banks, finance etc.
removed
Lower interest rates by BIBF led to stiff competition
and borrowers can acquire cheaper loans.
9
Exchange rate system reforms
1963-1977,
1978,
1981-1984,
1984,
Baht fixed to gold
Basket peg ($ weight = 0.85)
Fixed to USD 1:23.
Basket peg
10
Further deregulations for banks
FDI abroad
Local banks were encouraged to open branches or
form JVs (Mode 3)
In Indochina to channel BIBF funds towards
In financial centres to tap funds into BIBFs
1992-1998, increased scope of activities
Allowed to establish mutual fund management
companies with foreign analysts;
Arranging, selling and trading debt instruments
Etc.
11
1997 Financial crisis
1997-1998, Baht floated => volatile exchange rate
Huge capital outflows (non-renewal and repayment of
ST loans)
Net outflows in 1997 USD 8.4 bill and on 1998 USD
16.0 bill
Mostly from the banking sector
1999-present, net foreign exchange position
limits imposed (15% limit for commercial banks)
due to surging volume of foreign exchange activities
and derivatives trading
12
1997 Financial crisis cont
In 1997, 12-14% deposit ceiling imposed to
maintain stability.
1997-1999, High interest rate policy to
support Baht and FIDF.
Since 1998, restrictions on deposit rates
reduced.
13
What went wrong?
Various factors are thought to have
contributed to the crisis
Inappropriate government policies
Inherently unstable financial market
Herd behaviour of private agents =>
manias, panics and crashes
(Kindleberger)
14
Inappropriate government policies
BIBF operations
Entry of foreign BIBF branches intensified competition =>
banks took excessive risks in borrowings and lending.
Moral hazard induced by fixed exchange rate (no hedging)
No restrictions from lending to domestic borrowers in USD
Mismatch in loan durations
Poor supervision of commercial banks and finance
companies
Collaterals not properly valued
15
Perceived need to strengthen financial
supervision and regulation in Thailand
before further liberalisation.
“Crisis prevention” measures
16
Two-prong:
ex ante discipline and ex post safety net
Ex ante discipline: emphasis on compliance
to pre-set standards and codes +
surveillance/monitoring mechanisms
Ex post safety net: emphasis on creating new
safety net scheme
Trade-offs: moral hazard
Complementary
17
Current initiatives
International: emphasis on the first type
(ROSCs, FSAP, Basle II, etc.)
Domestic: reforms to strengthen market
discipline (new deposit insurance system, credit
bureau, new asset classifications, new banking
regulations, etc.)
Regional: surveillance (ASP, ASEAN+3 ERPD),
regional safety net scheme (AMF/ CMI), and
other types (ABMI).
18
Post-1997
Further banking service opening
Allow 100% foreign ownership for 10 years
Foreign equity participation <49% in all financial
sectors
Financial Master Plan (2004)
One full branch limit (minimum capital of Bt 3 billion)
Foreign bank subsidiaries allowed to open 4
branches (Bt 4 billion minimum capital)
IBFs (out-out; out-in) – no tax benefits for out-in
transactions post-crisis (linked to mode 1)
19
Impact on banking industry so far
• Increased foreign share ownership in top 4
banks (foreign ownership >40% for 3 of 4)
• DBS, ABN AMRO, Standard Chartered and
UOB became majority shareholders of 4
domestic banks
• DBS divested in 2004
20
Commercial bank industry:
Top 5 firms (2002)
12 banks
Market share
Foreign
ownership
Bangkok bank
21.53%
48.34%
Krung Thai
bank
18.31%
17.09%
Kasikorn bank
13.16%
48.98%
SCB
11.67%
43.54%
SCIB
8.46%
8.54%
21
Other impacts on banking industry …
• Foreign banks and branches focus on:
– retail banking, e.g. credit card services (decline
in income threshold)
– Institutional clients
– Individuals with high net worth
• Brought in technology and know-how ...
• Personnel from various foreign banks have
been head hunted by Thai banks (tech
transfer);
22
Post-1997 policies and existing situation
for credit cards
• Credit cards
– In 2002, minimum income restriction reduced to Bt
7,500 from Bt 15,000
• Rapid expansion of credit cards (before 2002, only 10% of
population owned credit cards)
• Strong growth amongst lower income consumers
• Heavy competition => a move towards lower to middle
income group to sustain growth
• Deteriorating credit quality and higher risk of credit
delinquencies
23
• BOT raised concern over credit risk
Existing policies and situation for credit
cards
New regulatory measures
3% interest on cash advance fee
Minimum monthly income requirement at Bt 15,000
18% interest limit on revolving credit (some foreign FSPs
were charging 27%)
Next?
Voluntary consolidation to strengthen portfolio?
Increased market segmentation; focus on niche market,
e.g. young generation
24
Insurance service opening
Post-crisis,
DOI eased restrictions on joint-ventures, <49%
25 additional licenses issued
Increased quota to 25 for life; 76 for non-life
Following restrictions remain
Cross-border service allowed for re-insurance, not
direct insurance.
One branch limit
25
Highly regulated non-life insurance market
Non-life insurance activities are heavily regulated
through:
Prescribed range of insurance premium for most policies, e.g.
for auto insurance
Investment eligibility conditions
Applications for new insurance products etc.
Lots of market distortions
Lots of competition (76 firms – most with <1% of market
share and less than Bt 300 mill capital)
Direct price competition and product differentiation not
possible
26
Impact on insurance industry
Post-crisis, increased participation of foreign entities in
the form of JV led to greater product variety, e.g. bank
assurances.
Foreign providers have not entered auto-insurance
industry in general because the complexity of local
market and require network of garages.
AIA entered in 1950s before foreign ownership
restriction came into place. First mover advantage =>
AIA enjoys 50% market share in life insurance industry
27
Life insurance industry:
Top 5 firms (Sept, 2004)
25 in total
Market share
Foreign
ownership
AIA
49.31%
US branch
Thai Life
15.90%
0%
AACP
8.55%
21.06%
Thai Samut
6.16%
0%
Muang Thai
5.87%
0%
28
Non-life insurance industry:
top 5 firms (Sept, 2004)
76 in total
Market share
Foreign
ownership
Viriya
13.79%
0%
Tipaya
6.76%
7.74%
Bangkok
6.72%
25.92%
Samphan
4.19%
0%
Sinmunkong
3.75%
22.99%
29
Securities and asset management services
opening
Market access
License is required
Need commercial presence
Investment banking
De facto liberalised in mode 4, e.g. Morgan
Stanley in HK fly their agents into Thailand to
prepare deals (need to comply with local
regulations wherever securities are sold)
30
Securities and asset management – cross
border regulations
Cross listing of Thai securities not yet possible
(although talks with Singapore etc.)
Sales of foreign financial assets in Thailand is heavily
restricted (in-out)
Retail Thai investors can invest in mutual fund units (FIF)
managed by AMCOs
Institutions may
invest in securities issued by Thai residents up to USD
50 mill, else seek approval from BOT
Foreign investors may invest in Thai securities under
relatively free environment (out-in)
Ownership per company < 49%
NVDR sidesteps 49% restriction
31
Other regulations on securities…
AMCOs face limited scope of investment due to
Thai SEC’s restrictions (not helped by lack of product variety in
Thai financial market)
Cap on investment abroad (not helped by lack of experience in
global market and lack of demand by Thais)
Minimum brokerage fee of 0.25%
Deregulation in 1999-2000 led to price war
Thai retail and institutional investors ratio is 70:7
New product offering must be approved by SEC Thailand
32
Securities and asset management:
top 5 firms (2002)
39 in total
Market share
Foreign
ownership
Seamico
6.11%
50.16%
SCB
4.02%
0%
Phatra
3.91%
49.93%
Bualuang
3.32%
19.17%
Krungsri
2.89%
0%
33
Impact on securities and asset management
industry so far
Foreign investors account for 23% of SET
More competition in business for
Institutional clients
High net worth individuals
FIF allows greater portfolio diversity for Thai
residents; familiarise Thai service providers with
global markets
Local AMCOs do not use up all their annual FIF
quota, but foreign ones do.
34
Summary of the lessons
Highlighted the importance of policy flexibility
For macro management
In capital account
etc.
At the minimum, comprehensive and effective
safeguard measures must be included in trade
agreements.
Safeguard measures could be revised as new
information becomes available?
35
Lessons …
Local market environment or condition
dictates the outcome of liberalisation
E.g. deregulation of brokerage fees led to price
war due to very elastic demand.
Educating retail investors to look long term
and encouraging consolidation of service
providers are important as first steps.
36
Lessons …
Benefits of market opening and capital account
liberalisation so far
Increased choice, lower prices
Technology transfers (but to what degree?)
Greater competition (particularly for high income group)
Increased market access to finance by lower to middle income
group
Costs
Financial crisis (if do not sequence properly) => recession,
burden on tax payers
Increased competition leads to more risky behaviour which must
be contained.
Increased debt level for lower to middle income group
Many lack the knowledge of financial planning
37
Thank you
38