Transcript Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)

Certification of the
Wide Area
Augmentation
System (WAAS)
Dan Hanlon
WAAS Program
Manager
Presented to: SBAS Technical Interoperability
Working Group
Date: 21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
A New Paradigm
• WAAS was the first navigation aid to be
certified nationally
• As such, many of FAA’s standard
certification criteria had to be tailored to fit
the program
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Steps to Certification
• FAA Administrator Directs Establishment of
an Independent Review Board (IRB)
– Role: Perform an Independent Assessment of the
Need for a Satellite Based Augmentation System
and to Independently Review the Technical Solution
Proposed by the WIPP
– Reported Findings to the Administrator
• WAAS Program Office Establishes a WAAS
Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP)
– Role is to Establish Technical Approach and Solution
for Meeting Integrity
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Steps to Certification
• WIPP Comprised of WAAS Experts……(FAA,
Academia, Industry)
• WIPP Meetings with Contractor Held
Monthly to Review and Evaluate
Contractor’s Progress
• FAA Briefed Status of WIPP Activities to IRB
who then Reported Back to Administrator
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Role of the WAAS Integrity
Performance Panel (WIPP)
• Provided The Needed Expertise To Help Define The
Actual Threats Or Threat Models That WAAS Would
Have To Be Designed To Protect Against
• WIPP Was Charged With Defining The Extent Of
The Threats Including Their Description And
Likelihood
• WIPP Judged The Completeness Of A Monitor’s
Design
• WIPP Insured That The Threat Models Generated
Fully Spanned All Feared Events
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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FAA Certification
In-Service Decision
JRC
Safety Certification
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Safety Assurance Process
P(HMI) Integrity Analysis
FMECA
Fault Tree Analysis
Performance Analysis
Test & Validation
Operational Certification
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In Service Review (ISR)
Checklist
Human Factors
Logistics & Support
ATC Procedures &
Training
IAP Procedures
Maintenance Procedures &
Training
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Security Certification
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Security Assurance
Process
Vulnerability Analysis
Risk Assessment
Security Plan
Security Certification
Accreditation Plan (SCAP)
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Certification by Program Phase
• System Development
– System Owned by Contractor
• Contractor Must Prove System Meets Safety Certification Criteria
Prior to FAA Acceptance
• Contractor Acceptance Inspection (CAI)
– Program Office Formally Accepts Ownership of System
• Operational and Security Certification Period Begins
• Joint Acceptance Inspection (JAI)
– Field Satisfied That System is Functioning and All Support
Material Is in Place
• Commissioning
– Requires JRC In Service Decision
– System Becomes Part of National Airspace System
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Types of Certification
• Safety Certification
– Performed By the Product Team Prior to Acceptance From the
Contractor
– Design Assurance Process Used to Provide Sufficient Proof
That The Integrity Requirements Are Achieved
• Operational Certification
– Performed by Airways Facilities
• Validation that WAAS is Working Properly Within the NAS
Infrastructure
• Equipment is Functioning Within Limits
• Operators and Maintainers Are Trained
• Procedures Are in Place and Being Followed
• Security Certification
– Compliance With Security Requirements, Procedures &
Training
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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WAAS Integrity Issue
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WAAS Integrity Design Did Not Provide Proof of Compliance For
Integrity Requirement
– Traditional Testing Methods Showed That the Design “Did Not Fail”
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Complete Definition of the Potential Threat Models Was Not
Performed
– Standards In Place At That Time Did Not Require This Level of Assurance
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Integrity Monitoring Algorithms Were Not Designed To Support This
Type Of Analysis
In Response
– WAAS Program Office Formed WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP)
– FAA Administrator Requested Independent Review Board (IRB)
•
WIPP Activities Were Integrated With System Engineering and
Development Activities
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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Summary
• Complex Architecture Requires Detailed
Process and Documentation for Capturing
and Assuring WAAS Safety
• FAA efforts to involve many stakeholders
was crucial in resolving the integrity risk
• Future Changes to WAAS must undergo the
same safety assessment activities to ensure
continued system safety
Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
21 June 2005
Federal Aviation
Administration
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