Transcript Document 7542906

Norms and Development:
Interdisciplinary Approach
Week 11
Social Norms in Dynamic Interactions II:
Cooperation and Trust
A Message Raised in the Last Seminar
Because of two fallacies (i.e., fundamental
attribution error and aggregation fallacy),
the mere snapshots of dynamic systems MAY
provide erroneous conclusions about
psychological characteristics of individuals
embedded in a system.
H. C. Triandis (2001):
Characteristics of Collectivist Culture
(a) Individuals define themselves as aspects of a
collective, interdependent with some ingroup…
(b) They give priority to the goals of that
collective rather than to their personal goals.
(c) Their behavior is determined more often by
the norms, roles and the goals of the collective
rather than by their personal attitudes….
(d) They stay in relationships even when the costs
of staying in these relationships exceed the
advantages of remaining.
H. C. Triandis (2001):
Characteristics of Collectivist Culture
(a) Individuals define themselves as aspects of a
collective, interdependent with some ingroup…
(b) They give priority to the goals of that
collective rather than to their personal goals.
(c) Their behavior is determined more often by
the norms, roles and the goals of the collective
rather than by their personal attitudes….
(d) They stay in relationships even when the costs
of staying in these relationships exceed the
advantages of remaining.
Individualistic View of Collectivist Culture
 People want to stay in relationships because
they give priority to the goals of the other people
(bd).
 People give priority to the others' goal because
they identify themselves with the others (?social
identity? a  b).
 People identify with the others because it is
culturally transmitted or because they stay in
the relationships longer (aa or da).
 All factors are chained. It looks like a self-fulfilling
dynamic system…
Anatomy of Cooperation
Goal/Expectation Theory (Pruitt &
Kimmel, 1977)
Expectation
Goal
“The other will
cooperate”
“The other will
defect”
Mutual
Cooperation
Cooperate
Defect
Unilateral
Exploitation
Defect
Defect
Direct Evidence Supporting G/E Theory:
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
1. The first player makes decision (C/D) and his
decision is informed to the second player.
2. The second player then makes a decision (C/D)
“ First player decided to cooperate (or,
defect) to you. Do you cooperate or
defect? Remember that this is one-shot
game and you will never interact with the
first player in future.“
 When the first player defected, almost no
second players select cooperation (Hayashi et al.,
1999).
 When the first player cooperated, about 6070% of the second players select cooperation
(Hayashi, et al., 1999; Kiyonari et al., 2000).
 On cooperative tendency in one-shot and
anonymous situations, there seems to be
life-long stable individual differences.
 Studies on social value orientation showed
about 60% of individuals are cooperative.
 Takezawa & McElreath (2004) showed that
cooperative people on SVO scale are very likely
to be reciprocal second players in the
sequential PD game.
 Let’s call this characteristic trustworthiness
Are Japanese More Trustworthy to
Unknowns than Americans?
No difference exists.
Kiyonari & Yamagishi (1999): U.S. = Japan
Buchan et al. (2002):
U.S. = Japan
Takezawa et al. (SVO: in progress):
U.S. = Japan
How About the First Player?
When the proportions of trustworthy people are
identical between two different cultures, is it
possible that the proportion of cooperative
first player is larger in one culture?
 Yes. If people are more trustful to unknowns,
the proportion of cooperation by the first
players increases (=A proposition theoretically
derived from G/E theory).
Are Japanese More Trustful to
Unknowns than Americans?
Behavioral data (e.g., first player in SPD):
U.S. >> Japan
Kiyonari & Yamagishi (1999)
Buchan et al. (2002)
Social survey
(w/wo representative sample):
U.S. >> Japan
Hayashi et al. (1982)
Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994)
Institutional View of Collectivist Culture
– Partial Version
(a) People don’t trust unknown people.
(b) Because of (a), people don’t cooperate with
unknown people.
(c) Distrustful people cooperate only when they
are “assured” that the other will cooperate.
Assurance (but not trust!) is provided under
institutions which make cooperation rational.
(d) If such an institution does not exist, people are
less cooperative than those in individualistic
culture.
Questions Remains to be Solved
(b)They give priority to the goals of that collective
rather than to their personal goals.
 If sanctioning system is so common in Japan,
casual observations of the Japanese’ life may
give an impression that they are much more
cooperative than Americans.
Q1. But, why are Americans more trustful than
Japanese? Americans seem to have an
illusion about benevolence of people…
Questions Remains to be Solved (cont’d)
(a) They stay in relationships even when the costs
of staying in these relationships exceed the
advantages of remaining.
 We will see that this conclusion is clearly wrong
in Yamagishi (1988).
Q2. But, Yamagishi(1988)’s finding clearly
contradicts with our casual observation.
How can we solve this paradox?
Wait for the next seminar for completing
an institutional view of collectivist culture
as a dynamic system…