Transcript Click to edit Master title PBC Lessons Learned style A Contractor’s Perspective

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Master
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PBC Lessons Learned
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A Contractor’s Perspective
June 29, 2005
Tusharto
Talele
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ARCADIS GFPR Program Manager
Lessons Learned – Some Impressions
Not everyone within the DOD or within key stakeholder
organizations are comfortable with / supportive of a GFPR
– PBC approach
DoD’s interest in PBC has prompted “interesting”
responses from the marketplace:
– Qualified staff are the brunt of recruiting frenzy (both in commercial and
federal sectors)
– Substantial amount of “mis-information” being spread to raise unnecessary
concerns
– Insurance markets (liability transfer indemnification) limited due to growing
demand
Lessons Learned – Varying Perspectives
Varying levels of understanding in client organizations which limit full
value of GFPR – PBC offerings. Examples:
Decision Documents (lack of standardized approach is adding time in
some cases)
– What is the review process (who reviews and what are their roles) – Said differently,
who has what authority to say what?
– How long should it take?
Milestone Payments (who defines performance / decides
acceptability)?
– Varying groups with highly different backgrounds (reference frames) called upon to fill
role of COR
– When is a regulator-issued NFA NOT a contractually acceptable NFA?
– Are milestones realized upon document submissions or approvals? (who must
approve?)
– Do interim remedies count as remedy implementation if approved by regulators and
likely to serve as final remediation approach?
Regulator Considerations
Sites selected for PBC generally not discussed with regulatory agencies
in advance to assess agencies assessment of priority for action
Limited, if any, involvement in PBC proposal evaluations / awards
(no opportunity to temper expectations or impact flawed approaches)
Changes in key personnel (eg. concerns over perception of dramatically
increased work-load) will impact aggressive schedules for RC and / or
RIP
Regulatory community (often understaffed) not “thrilled” with concept of
DESMOA funding as an opportunity for them to enhance capabilities
True partnering concept not routinely or effectively employed between
the DOD and regulatory community
Process efficiencies need to be established - meet both regulatory
needs but also enhance ability to process information
A Shift in Paradigm
PBC approach can be a tough paradigm shift for the
existing team working on an installation
– This is especially true for DoD personnel who may not have sufficient
guidance to know how much latitude they can and should extend to
contractors
– Regulators wary as to motives for change in contracting approach
“Is DoD looking to shirk their responsibilities and abandon sites to contractors
and regulators?”
Transition from previous contractors can be tenuous at
best
– Delays in the timely completion of work by the previous contractor (no
incentive to accelerate / facilitate transition)
Decision Documents et al
Land Use Controls
– Out of step with private sector, but getting better…
– Delays closure, especially at RCRA sites as document reviewers
struggle with issues that have been open and “debated” amongst
other stakeholders for extended periods of time
Review of Decision Documents
– Review comments not always consistent with intent of PBC
contract
– What $$$ to show as cost for remedy?
– Delayed reviews impact RC and/or RIP date
Insurance Considerations
Is meaningful and value-added insurance really available to Small
Businesses attempting to take lead PBC responsibilities at some
sites?
Why require insurance limits in the amount of 1X bid price? (Where is
the value in this “default” requirement?)
Why require insurance and bonding?
Available limits and insurance protection durations dramatically
reduced by withdrawal of re-insurers and questions over the viability of
long-term insurance policies
Policy terms and conditions are an excellent indicator of the strength
of a contractors proposal
Higher premiums and greater attachment points (large buffers) are
indicative of greater risks and likely flaws in technical approaches and
contingency measures
The Challenge of Measuring Progress and Value
How is PBC – GFPR progress best measured?
– Activities complete (sites closed) vs. milestones achieved (may not always
be consistent)
How will the DoD define value going forward?
– Is it best value OR technically acceptable – low cost?
– If best value  how does one objectively evaluate and compare a broad
spectrum of value offerings (with potentially highly variable components)?
– If technically acceptable  low cost; how does one best establish minimum
technically acceptable performance thresholds?
Other Issues of Interest
Potential changes in incremental funding constraints – what kind
of challenge might such changes pose?
Additional costs likely to be born by the contracting entitities
response to:
– Decentralization of USACE contracting vehicles designed to
accommodate PBC-GFPR projects (more IDIQ proposal submission
required)
– USACE seemingly looking to include PBC contracting terms in
broader IDIQ solicitations – for contracts that would address a
broader suite of needs
The temptation to compromise on the technical adequacy of a
proposal because it may offer a dramatic price reduction.