Transcript Document 7182163

SCO & IRAN:
Iranian Security Dream
Abbas Maleki
The 14h International Conference on
Central Asia and the Caucasus
" Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
Prospects and Opportunities"
Tehran, October 30-31, 2006
SCO and its successes
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War against Terrorism
Ethnic Violence
Narcotics
Border Conflicts
Challenges to unipolar system
SCO and its failures
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Disability on playing world class role
 Lack of consensus on political development
 Strengthening of authoritarian regimes
 Expansion of radicalism, separatism
What is Iran’s goal to join SCO?
 Islamic
Revolution’s perception on
convergent activities
 Strengthening Iran’s geopolitical role
 Looking to the East
 Reduce US treats against Iran
 More economic ties with Russia, China
and India
 Integrated Energy Market in Asia
Islamic Revolution’s perception
on convergent activities
Mahdaviat: Doctrine of Hope in Shi’ia,
United World Order in Future
 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic makes
clear Iran’s preferences in foreign policy.
(1) Iran’s neighbours;
(2) Muslim countries;
(3) Third World countries;
(4) countries that furnish political, economic,
social and/or military needs of Iran.
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Islamic Revolution’s perception
on convergent activities (2)
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In search of ways to expand its interests,
Tehran looked towards cooperation with
neighbors, with other nearby and Muslim states
 Iran became a major player in regional and
International organizations as
ECO
OIC
OPEC
SCO
D8
Iran and Initiated Regional
Organization
 Persian
States Countries:
Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan
 Caspian
Cooperation Organization:
Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan
 Shi’a
Nations Rim:
1-Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain
2-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Afghanistan
Strengthening Iran’s geopolitical
role
Iran’s Subregions:
 Middle East
 Persian Gulf
 South West Asia
 Central Asia,
Caucasus, and
Afghanistan
 Caspian Basin
Middle East Sub Region
Asian Identity
Iran’s advantages
Iran’s geographical position,
 culture
 Political hierarchy
 Economic stature
 Military muscle
give it the potential to play a leading or pivotal role
in a number of regional configurations:
-Persian Gulf
-Central Asia
-Caspian Basin
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What can Iran do?
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Critical tools:
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Dialogue with other nations
Economic and technological advancement;
Regional positioning;
Iran‘s response in foreign relations has mainly
focused on 3 levels;
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Consolidating Iran‘s regional position and
relations In Middle East
Deepening the relations with the European
Union as a leverage against potential future US
domination in the region;
Seeking a new strategic relationship with Asian
Countries
Looking to the East
Iran has
 1% of the world’s population,
 7% of the world’s natural reserves
including
-10% of the global proven oil reserves
-16% of the world’s natural gas
resources.
130 b barrel oil (17 billion tons)
27 trillion cm gas
which means $3000 billions
Energy resource
periphery
Energy demand
heartland
Reduce US treats against Iran
Iran’s Neighbors in the day of
event
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US full control:
 Russian group:
-Afghanistan
-Russia
-Azerbaijan
-Turkmenistan
-Qatar
-Armenia
-Bahrain
 US semi control:
-Iraq
-Saudi Arabia
-Kuwait
-UAE
-Oman
-Pakistan
-Turkey
-Kazakhstan
US Pressures
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Iran was using the game of showing to shift from one super
power to another during bipolar system
US did not desire to see Iran as Iranistan
After US-Iraq war in 1991 and collapse of Soviet Union in
1992, US shifted its policy against Iran:
Dual Containment
ILSA
Rogue States
Axis of evils
Nuclear Pariah
UNSC Sanctions
Can SCO help Iran
to manage its challenges?
Conceptual Challenges in Iran’s Foreign Relations:
 Iran-US Relations
 Iran-EU Relations
 Oil price
 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and Iraq (1975)
 Iran’s share of Hirmand River
 3 Iranian Islands in Persian Gulf
 Caspian legal regime
Iranian “Allies” in US-Iran
Context
 China
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Economic not political relations; not bought
and paid for
As a mater of general policy, opposes
sanctions, but…
Believes Iran should not ‘push’ the issue
 Russia
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Opportunism
Iranian mistrust
SCO and Lonely Iran
 Iran
is a unique state in this region with
“Strategic Loneliness”.
 This fact is encouraging Iran to think how
would be more secure in individual
manner.
SCO and Middle East security
 No
common understanding or framework
of security, divergent interests
 US strategic presence in Asia and its
impact:
- Historically polarising
- US military umbrella for GCC
- From indirect to direct hegemony
- Containment (encirclement) of Iran
Potential future Scenarios, Can
SCO support Iran?
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1.
2.
Iraq instability continues
US-Iran confrontation escalates into
conflict
Unpredicted radical change in a GCC
state
US withdraws from Iraq:
Civil war erupts, violence spreads in the
region, or
International community steps in to help
stabilise Iraq
Thank you
[email protected]
Four Iran Historic Compromises
with its Neighbors
 Iran-Soviet
Russia Friendship Treaty, 1921
 Iran-UK MOU on situation of Abu Musa
Island in Persian Gulf, 1971
 Iran-Iraq Treaty on Friendship and
Governmental Borders, 1975
 Iran-Afghanistan Agreement on the portion of
Hirmand Waters, 1976
Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy
Regional Challenge:
Historical Compromise:
 Caspian Sea Legal  Iran-Soviet Russia Friendship
Regime
Treaty, 1921
 Persian Gulf
 Iran-UK MOU on situation of
States
Abu Musa Island in Persian
Gulf, 1971
 Iran-Iraq Treaty on Friendship
 Iraq
and Governmental Borders,
1975
 Iran-Afghanistan Agreement
 Afghanistan
on the portion of Hirmand
Waters, 1976