Transcript International Atomic Energy Agency Disposal Facility & Engineered Barrier System (EBS) Design PRISM: Practical Illustration and use of the Safety Case Concept in the Management.

International Atomic Energy Agency
Disposal Facility &
Engineered Barrier System (EBS)
Design
PRISM: Practical Illustration and use
of the Safety Case Concept in the Management of
Near-surface Disposal
David Bennett
2 April 2009
Design Working Group
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David Bennett
Nadja Zeleznik
Bernhard Großmnn
Gyula Dankó
Sandi Virsek
Michael Tichauer
Peter Salzer
Janez Perko
Dody Ivan
Marija Kališnik
Stasys Motiejunas
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
International Atomic Energy Agency
Working Group Objective
• To share information and communicate good
practice on:
• How decisions on the design, extension and
improvement of near-surface waste disposal facilities
can be informed by, and justified using the Safety Case
• How the Safety Case can be used on an ongoing basis
to support management decisions on facility design and
modification
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We will also acknowledge the role of the EIA process in the
early stages of facility design and implementation
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Proposed Work Areas
1) Designing and upgrading near-surface
radioactive waste disposal facilities using the
safety case:
1a) Review of past and current practice on design
• Will take examples from near-surface facilities in the WG’s
experience
• Will also seek information to cover a wider range of facilities and
waste types
• Will actively seek assistance from other project participants
and relevant organisations
• Have developed some terms of reference for this ‘data gathering’
• Will also review relevant IAEA and NEA documents
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Proposed Work Areas
1b) Analysis of review findings to identify lessons
on good practice in facility design
• Have begun to identify and consider the many factors
that affect facility design
• Will describe expectations of facility design
information at different stages of facility development
• Will describe relationships between facility and EBS
design and the safety case at different stages
• Will discuss optimisation of EBS (ALARA)
• e.g., iterative schemes
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Terms of Reference for Data Gathering
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Safety / design philosophy
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Both for operations and post-closure
General description of facility development history, e.g:
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Waste type and inventory
Influence of regulations/guidance
Commentary on reasons for the design of each engineered
component (e.g., package, backfill, walls, cap, drains etc)
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e.g., size, shape, material, monitoring
History of any design changes and their rationale
Functions assigned to engineered components (if any)
Treatment of barriers and barrier degradation in the safety
case / assessment
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Facilities Covered by Working Group
• Dessel, Belgium
• CSM, CSA, Morvilliers, France
• Konrad, Germany
• Püspökszilágy & Pecs, Hungary
• Maišiagala & new prototype near-surface
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repository, Lithuania
Mochovce, Slovakia
Slovenian silo concept
LLWR, UK
International Atomic Energy Agency
Broadening Our Scope
• Borehole facilities
• Previous IAEA projects
• South Africa, Russia, US
• Mine tailings
• Previous IAEA projects
• Wismut?
• Forsmark, Olkiluoto type facilities
• Swedish/Finnish input
• Cavern type facilities
• Richard – Czech Republic?
• ‘Deeper’ concepts for LLW/ILW?
• France, Canada?
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Requirements & Constraints on Design
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Safety requirements (e.g., dose constraint, ALARA)
Design philosophy (passive safety, isolation, containment….)
Waste type / characteristics
Stakeholders (public, local communities, scientific community and committees,
others)
Past practice / experience
Operational factors (e.g., infrastructure, waste handling, waste QA checking)
Site characteristics
Monitoring
Knowledge of any pre-existing facilities on the site (disposal and other)
Safety assessors, facility operators
Availability of barrier materials & technology
Barrier performance/degradation
Safety assessment assumptions and results, existing WAC
Project timescales and feasibility
Allowing for flexibility and iterations of the safety case
Costs vs benefits (of alternatives)
Regulations
Government & Policy
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Design in the Facility Lifecycle
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Stages (will vary by country
and site)
Design & assessment
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Site screening,
investigation,
characterisation, selection
Design options and
concept selection
Detailed design
Construction
Operational phase
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Refinement of design
Upgrading if necessary
Closure
Institutional Control
overlap, iteration, variation in stages
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Plan to discuss the design
and related safety case
activities for each stage
Will consider a range of
facility types
Will consider the relative
importance of various
factors & influences on
design at each stage
Will work closely with
Group 1 on timeline
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Planning
• Roles and responsibilities of group members
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defined and agreed
Provisional schedule outlined
Deliverables identified
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Provisional Schedule
• Terms of reference for data gathering
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(drafted Apr 2009)
Data gathering (by Oct 2009)
Working group meeting to discuss findings
and begin drafting report (Nov-Dec 2009)
Improve report draft of report (Spring 2010)
Presentations to next plenary in Spring 2010
• Workshop style day
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Main Deliverables
• Terms of reference for data gathering
• Notes on relevance to the group’s work of
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existing IAEA and NEA documents
Papers on various disposal facilities
Table of contents for report
• 2 part structure as described above
• Detail to be developed
• 1st Draft of report
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Issues List
• Project website
• Project newsletter
• Draft IAEA safety guides
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Interfaces with other WGs
• Generic WAC
• Design changes to manage uncertainties
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Roles & Responsibilities
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Review of ISAM, ASAM documents and other IAEA
documents on engineered barriers, facility closure and
design
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Put relevant documents on website (all)
TR433, upgrading of NS repositories, SR35,surveillance and
monitoring of NS repositories, ASAM cross-cutting report on
engineered barriers
Be aware of draft safety guides (DS334, 354, 355, 357)
(SM / all)
Close cooperation with Group 1 at early stage (DB)
Data gathering on our facilities (all)
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Send results to DB by 30 September, copy to others in group
Everyone to read before group meeting
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Roles & Responsibilities
• Arrange next group meeting (DB, DI?)
• IAEA funding support (DB,JR)
• 2 or 3 days to discuss findings and lessons
• Prepare 1st draft of report (DB, GD, JP, PS)
• Begin drafting at the meeting and continue after
• Rest of group will review
• Presentations to next plenary (all data
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gatherers, authors)
Ongoing communication with other groups via
plenarys and Coordinating Committee
International Atomic Energy Agency