Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case Date 11 April 2006 Introduction Seminar One is a basic introduction to Safety Case and the MHF Regulations.
Download ReportTranscript Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case Date 11 April 2006 Introduction Seminar One is a basic introduction to Safety Case and the MHF Regulations.
Seminar One Introduction to Safety Case Date 11 April 2006 Introduction Seminar One is a basic introduction to Safety Case and the MHF Regulations 2000. Its timing has been triggered by the commencement of Round 2 Licencing activity 2 It has been developed for the following purposes: -To provide a brief and simple overview of the main parts of a safety case -To be suitable for new MHF Operators -Examples of incidents -Context of MHF Regulations -Outlines the reason for a safety case Why is a Safety Case Needed? Port Kembla Ethanol Tank Fire, NSW, Australia, 28th January 2004 3 Why is a Safety Case Needed? Coode Island, Australia – storage terminal fire, August 1991, no injury. 4 Why is a Safety Case Needed? Longford, Australia – explosion and fire, September 1998, 2 dead, led to the development of Victorian MHF legislation 5 Why is a Safety Case Needed? Texas City, USA – fire and explosion, March 2005, 15 dead, over 170 injured 6 Why is a Safety Case Needed? • Entschede, Holland – fireworks factory explosion, May 2000, 22 dead, 947 injured 7 Why is a Safety Case Needed? 8 Tosco Avon Refinery •23rd February,1999. •Crude Unit, Tosco Corporation’s Avon oil refinery, Martinez, California. •Workers were attempting to replace piping attached to an online 150-foot-tall distillation column •Piping released naphtha which ignited. The flames engulfed fire workers who were located at different heights on the column • Four men were killed and one seriously injured. Why is a Safety Case Needed? Tosco Avon Ref. – Contributing Causes 1. Tosco Avon refinery management did not conduct an MOC review of operational changes that led to excessive corrosion rates in the naphtha piping. • Above design rates • Feed contained high water levels • Prolonged operation on LV bypass valve caused ineffective line isolation 9 2. The crude unit corrosion control program was inadequate. Why is a Safety Case Needed? Bhopal, India – Dec 1984 Toxic release – methyl isocyanate 10 3000 to 8000 deaths, $0.3b to $3b Why is a Safety Case Needed? Buncefield Incident – 11th December 2005 (Currently under investigation by UK HSE) 40 injured, no fatalities 11 Why is a Safety Case Needed? 12 • There is a need for specific control of major hazards due to: - Changing scale and complexity of specific facilities - Housing encroachment into MHF buffer zones - Changing community perceptions - Loss of Corporate Knowledge associated with ageing plant and mobile workforce - Range of major accidents that have occurred - Prescriptive approach has proven inappropriate Why do we need a Safety Case? • This has led to Regulations where: - the Operator is expected to know what technical and human activities occur - The Operator decides on the appropriate means of major hazard control for the facility, and prepares a SC explaining this - The Regulator assesses and audits performance adequacy against the SC 13 Background - The MHF Regulations Safety Case Submissions Rd 2 2007 Safety Case Submissions Rd 1 2002 Introduction of MHF Regulations Jul 00 Longford Royal Commission Report Jul 99 Longford Explosion Sep 98 Australian National Standard for Control of MHFs 96 Coode Island Fire 91 14 Flixborough 74, Seveso 76, Bhopal 84, Piper Alpha 88 Overview - Key Principles of MHF Regs • Focus on major hazards (catastrophic events involving Sched 1 materials i.e. high consequence and low frequency) • Proactive risk based approach • Places the responsibility on the facility Operator • Facility Operator actively has to demonstrate safe operation 15 Overview - Key Principles of MHF Regs • Consultation with different parties required at all critical stages • Addresses both on-site and off-site safety • Regulator ‘ review’ of this, tied to a licence 16 Overview - Focus of MHF Regulations Relative Frequency of Occurrence 17 Increasing risk Minor Risks OHS risks already regulated Very high risks should already be eliminated after risk assessment within SC process Focus of MHF Regulations is high consequence (catastrophic) but low frequency incidents Consequence - Severity Victorian Acts/Regulations Main Parts Manual Handling Asbestos Regulations OH&S Act Certification Regulations Confined Spaces Regulations Issue Resolution Noise Regulations Incident Notification Haz Substances Regulations Plant Regulations DG Act 18 Dangerous Goods (S&H) Regulations Explosive Regulations Major Hazard Facility Regulations HCDG Regulations Overview – MHF Regulations Objective of the Regulations To provide for safe operation of major hazard facilities in order to reduce the likelihood of a major incident (MI) occurring and to reduce the consequences to health and safety and damage to property 19 Overview – MHF Regulations Specific parts of the MHF Regulations for this seminar series are: • • • • • • • 20 Safety management system (R301) Hazard identification (R302) Safety assessment (R303) Control measures (R304) Emergency planning (R305) Review of risk controls (R306, R404) Consultation - HSRs, employees, community (R501, R505, OHS Act) What is the Safety Case? The SC must address all hazardous events that could result in: • An uncontrolled incident that involves schedule 1 materials; and • Poses a serious and immediate risk to health and safety 21 What is the Safety Case? A Safety Case is a detailed document that outlines: • hazard identification and control mechanisms in place to prevent and mitigate all MIs for the facility • the types of safety studies undertaken • the results obtained from such studies • the management arrangements in place to ensure the continued safety of the facility, its people and the surrounding community 22 What must the Safety Case do? • Document the state of safety arrangements for the facility • Demonstrate to the satisfaction of WorkSafe, through content and supporting material, that: the operator knows what technical and human activities occur how hazards are managed how safety will be managed in the event of an emergency 23 What must the Safety Case do? (cont’d) 24 Identify methods to be used for monitoring and reviewing all activities for continuous improvement of the safety arrangements of the facility over its lifetime. Safety Case Content? 25 Main Components of a Safety Case • Summary of the SMS prepared under R301 • Documentation of the Safety Assessment outcome R302, R303 • Schedule 4 Information - Facility Description - Safety Information 26 Main Components of a Safety Case Summary of SMS prepared under R301 27 The Safety Case must contain a summary of the SMS elements including: >Safety policy and objectives >Organisation and structure >Operational controls >Means to achieve Part 3 (Safety Duties) and 5 (Consulting, Informing) compliance >Management of change >Principles and standards >Performance monitoring >Audit Ref Sched 2 Main Components of a Safety Case Documentation of the Safety Assessment – R302, R303 • Identification of all the major incidents which could occur. • Identification of all the hazards that could cause or contribute to causing a major incident. • Risk Assessments. • Methods and criteria for identifying and 28 assessing the above. Main Components of a Safety Case Schedule 4 Information - Facility Description • Process or activity description • Schedule 1 and Dangerous Goods materials and their characteristics • Facility layout drawings • Future facility changes 29 • Plan of facility and surrounding area. Main Components of a Safety Case Schedule 4 Information - Safety Information • Control measures that prevent or limit consequences of MI’s • Performance monitoring • Safety Management System cross reference • Incorporation of safety and reliability into design and construction • Incident history – last 5 years 30 Break More on Safety Assessment follows….. 31 Safety Assessment Main Components of Safety Assessment • • • • • 32 Hazard identification – for determining MIs Risk reduction studies – for determining controls Emergency scenarios– for training and controls Risk evaluation - for determining risk acceptability Recommendations and review – for continuous improvement Safety Assessment Hazard Identification • Using Hazop/What If, RA and specialist reviews, the MI’s and their causes (of MIs) are determined 33 Process Hazard Identification (HAZOP/What If) Risk Assessment (RA) Process Major Incident Event Grouping Unit Technical Review Input (Specialist Review) Safety Assessment Risk Assessment -Analysis and Assessment of the hazards and potential MIs on site using LOPA Risk matrix FTA/ETA QRA -Provides a more detailed analysis of causes/frequency/outcomes/controls for each identified MI -Can enable risk offsite to be assessed 34 -Enables comparison of risk reduction options Safety Assessment Layer of Protection Analysis • Analysing the safety measures and controls that are between an uncontrolled release and the worst potential consequence risk reduction study 35 COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHYSICAL PROTECTION & MITIGATION SYSTEMS AUTOMATIC SIS CRITICAL ALARMS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES BPCS PROCESS DESIGN Safety Assessment The information for assessment can be presented as a bow-tie diagram. Causes MI Hazards 36 Outcomes Mitigative Controls Preventative Controls Controls Controls Consequences Safety Assessment Hazards Mitigative Controls Outcomes Causes Preventative Controls MI Controls •Corrosion - •Vessel vessel wall design/ const thinning •Inspection •Process control (eg pH) 37 MI •Vessel rupture -LoC Controls •Bunding •Ignition controls •Deluge •Emerg Plan Consequences •Fire •Injury •Plant damage •Loss of business Emergency Plans • Promote preparation for response to emergencies • Ensure necessary equipment available and maintained • Ensure personnel are trained and prepared to respond • Identify communication methods required • Identify community resources required 38 • Consultation with emergency services and local council Emergency Incident Scenario Plans • Analysis of the explosion, heat flux for the pool fires or jet fires or toxic consequence levels to determine fire fighting access and to identify affected impact areas • Determination of the fire water and foam requirements for extinguishing the fire and/or protecting affected equipment • Available as a resource for training in specific scenarios 39 What Else is in a Safety Case Report? Occupied Buildings Risk Assessment -Analysis of the impact of MIs on occupied buildings -Mainly risks (due to flame impingement, explosions, toxic gas) from other buildings/operations 40 Plastics Factory 2004 41 What Else is in a Safety Case Report? Continuous Improvement -Opportunities to reduce risk are identified -Recommendations are assessed and prioritised -An action plan is developed and implemented SFARP 42 SC Review & Revise • Operators must review (and revise) hazard identifications, risk assessments and control measures to ensure risks remain reduced to SFARP: -at the direction of the Authority -prior to modification -after a major incident -when a control measure is found to be deficient -Upon licence renewal or at least every 5 years -New information becomes available regarding 43 possible MI hazards previously unknown Summary • The SC must demonstrate adequacy of all Safety Duties required by the MHF regulations • Safety Duties are ongoing requirements • An Operator of a major hazard facility who fails to comply with the MHF regulations could jeopardise the continuation of their licence. 44 Safety Case Seminar Series 2006 Seminar 2 HAZID, MI and Safety Assessment 26 April 2006S Seminar 3 Control Measures and Adequacy 9 May 2006 Seminar 4 Emergency Response and Consultation 23 May 2006 Seminar 5 Safety Management Systems 6 June 2006 Seminar 6 Preparing and Managing a Safety Case 20 June 2006 45 Sources of Additional Information • Occupational Health and Safety (Major Hazard Facilities) Regulations 2000, Victoria • Major Hazard Facilities Regulations – Guidance Notes, WorkSafe • WorkSafe Victoria www.workcover.vic.gov.au • NSW Major Industry Hazard Advisory Papers 1 to 9 • Centre for Chemical Process Safety • UK Health and Safety Executive, www.hse.gov/comah 46 Seminar 1 Questions ??????? 47