Chancellerie fédérale

Section des droits politiques

Voting observation

in the context of the

Swiss internet voting projects

Workshop on the "Observation of e-enabled elections“ Oslo, 18-19 March 2010

I. Context II. International guidelines on i-voting observation III. Regulatory framework IV. I-voting observation in practice V. Conclusions

• • Switzerland: a

federal state

(

cantons have big cst’l autonomy with respect to political rights

) and a (semi-)

direct democracy

(

frequent votes at communal, cantonal and federal level

)

Three voting channels

at federal level:

postal voting

(fully liberalized),

i-voting polling station

, (currently available to a part of the electorate in 4 cantons: three of them have developed their own i-voting system) • A

fourth channel

at cantonal, communal level:

Landsgemeinde

• • Switzerland is the only country to have

fully liberalized distant postal voting

: at federal level some 90% of voters vote (~4 times a year) and elect (each 4 years) through this channel

I-voting

is being tested ~10 years with the aim of meeting existing needs (

ex. Swiss abroad

) and to gain experience : currently

~5% of the federal electorate

are being involved in internet voting tests

•

Control procedures vary

depending on the voting channel* • • • • Landsgemeinde (only cantonal and communal level): each voter can

see

the result and “estimation of results”

hear

the Polling station vote:

democratic control

(of

voting

,

counting

,

establishing

and

transmission

exercised by

voters’ representatives

of results) is :

jurés and electoral commissions

Postal vote :

same control as

vote at

polling station

i-voting : the

impossibility to see

needs be

compensated

* Andreas Auer, Nicolas von Arx, „La légitimité des procédures de vote: les défis du e-voting“: http://www.geneve.ch/evoting/doc/rapports/legitimite_e-vote.pdf

I. Context

II. International guidelines on i-voting observation

III. Regulatory framework IV. I-voting observation in practice V. Conclusions

• • • • 1990

OSCE

Copenhagen commitments

Council of Europe – Venise Commission

:

Code of good practice in electoral matters (2002) Code of good practice on Referendums (2006)

Council of Europe Recommendation on Legal,

Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting (2004)

OSCE-ODIHR Discussion paper in preparation of

guidelines for the observation of electronic voting (2008)

I. Context II. International guidelines on i-voting observation III. Regulatory framework IV. I-voting observation in practice V. Conclusions

Regulation of observation in general • Art. 34.2

Federal Constitution

1 Political rights shall be guaranteed.

2 The guarantee of political rights protects the freedom of the citizen to form an opinion and to give genuine expression to his or her will.

Extent & modalities

- regulated in

cantonal legislation

•

Internal partisan and non-partisan observation

and

international observation

are

not explicitly foreseen in federal law

(but are

possible

*). •

Internal partisan observation

(and sometime

non partisan

) is

foreseen in cantonal/communal legislations

. • Ways are always found to allow

interested non partisan observers

to follow the election process* * see

OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report, Swiss Confederation federal elections 21 october 2007

, chap. IV, E

Regulation specific to i-voting observation

• Art. 8

a

.2 BPR/LDP (electronic voting):

- the verification of eligibility to vote, voting secrecy and the counting of all the votes cast must be guaranteed and abuses prevented; - the Federal Council (Gvt.) regulates details

Federal control

exercised during the

authorization procedure

• Asked how observers could exercise their task in the context of internet voting, the Federal Council replied (2005) that …

electoral commissions

…

could also be involved in the establishing of internet voting results

. Details are regulated in

cantonal legislation

.

Democratic control

exercised through

electoral commissions

•

Individual voters’ control

? Regulated in cantonal law

I. Context II. International guidelines on i-voting observation III. Regulatory framework IV. I-voting observation in practice V. Conclusions

Federal authorization

• When applying for authorization, cantons have to

prove

that i-voting will respect federal requirements • They submit a complete

documentation

transparency) to the federal authority (complete • An independent

verification

(ordered by the federal authority) is done when a system is first implemented and at each system modification • Federal authorities have access to

audit reports

(ordered and paid by cantons) • Issue of

authorization

is conditioned by implementation of

recommendations for improvements

• The Federal Council can

withdraw

the

authorization

• Communication concept for

reporting problems

during an i-voting trial is implemented

Electoral commission (best practices)

• A

permanent

electoral commission (EC) controls the regularity of i-voting (partisan+non partisan observers) • • • EC can access

documentation

applications and order

controls

incl. source code of the all the time • EC

encrypts and decrypt

s the electronic ballot box + makes a “control vote” during a real vote (27n bis VPR/ODP). Control votes are treated as other votes. At the end of the vote the electoral commission can see whether systematic external manipulation of the ballot box occurred

Procedural measures

(federal and cantonal provisions) to control internal threats have been adopted. Ex.: any intervention in the system during the vote should be duly

authorized

, made by at least 2

persons

(

specific employment rules

), duly

reported

and

controlled

observers) ( incl. by

System monitoring

produces observable data

•

Individual elector (best practices)

• Voter can

verify

that her

vote

was

counted (

control codes published on the Internet after the end of the vote) • • •

Transparency

(publication of documents) of internet voting systems is regulated by cantonal legislation : transparency laws, political rights regulation and regulation specific to internet portal of cantons. Best practices include:

Audits

’ results are published

Source code

of the applications is made available for verification to any voter with an ideal/scientific interest who agrees to respect its confidentiality (upheld by the Federal supreme court)

Access to other system documents

to source code = same as access

I. Context II. International guidelines on i-voting observation III. Regulatory framework IV. I-voting observation in practice V. Conclusions

• In Switzerland

Internet voting observation

is organized similar to

postal voting observation

: through an electoral commission.

Technical

and

procedural

measures as well as

access to the entire documentation

by a

permanent

meaningful commission, make such observation • • Identification of

best

existing

practices

and their dissemination in i-voting cantons. Adopting

specific

communal/cantonal

regulation

takes more time

Individual traceability

(=

each voter verifies

that her vote was

counted as cast

) is not possible in other voting channels. Its feasibility in the Internet voting context is being studied (workshop on transparent i-voting systems, Fribourg – 6 September 2010, www.e-voting cc.ch/)

Chancellerie fédérale

Section des droits politiques

Thank you !

[email protected]