Acquisition and Technology Overview: System Assurance and Cyber Security Kristen Baldwin Deputy Director, Strategic Initiatives Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and.
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Acquisition and Technology Overview: System Assurance and Cyber Security Kristen Baldwin Deputy Director, Strategic Initiatives Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) March 2009 1 Agenda Increased priority for program protection Threats Vision of Success A plan for improving DoD Program Protection Policy Designing for Security Program Protection Plans Tools Outcomes Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security Call to attention Acquisition and contracting actions (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 2 Increased Priority for Program Protection Threats: Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, rogue developer who: Gain control of IT/NSS/Weapons through supply chain opportunities Exploit vulnerabilities remotely Vulnerabilities: All IT/NSS/Weapons (incl. systems, networks, applications) Intentionally implanted logic (e.g., back doors, logic bombs, spyware) Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code) Consequences: Stolen critical data & technology; corruption, denial of critical warfighting functionality System Assurance is the confidence that the system functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted during the lifecycle (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 3 3 Vision of Success Prioritization Supplier Assurance EngineeringIn-Depth Industry Outreach Technology Investment The requirement for assurance is allocated among the right systems and their critical components DoD understands its supply chain risks DoD systems are designed and sustained at a known level of assurance Commercial sector shares ownership and builds assured products Technology investment transforms the ability to detect and mitigate system vulnerabilities Assured Systems (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 4 4 Improving DoD Program Protection Increase Coordinating Efficiency Security of Program Disciplines Personnel Reduce Streamlining Program DocumentaThe PPP tion Improved Protection of DoD Weapon Systems Reduce Early ID, Cost of Designed-In Implementing Protection Protection Reduce Program Program Protection Level of Tools Effort 5 (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 5 Program Protection Policy DoD Policy: DODI 5200.39 “Critical Program Information Protection Within the DoD” Provide uncompromised and secure military systems to the warfighter by performing comprehensive protection of CPI CPI. Elements or components of an RDA program that, if compromised, could cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness; o Includes information about applications, capabilities, processes, and end-items. o Includes elements or components critical to a military system or network mission effectiveness. o Includes technology that would reduce the US technological advantage if it came under foreign control To minimize the chance that the Department’s warfighting capability will be impaired due to the compromise of elements or components being integrated into DoD systems by foreign intelligence, foreign terrorist, or other hostile elements through the supply chain or system design. DoD 5000.02 CPI shall be identified at MS A in the Technology Development Strategy Program Protection Plan shall be developed and approved by MS B; updated and approved at MS C (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 6 DoD 5000.02: Early, Designed-In Program Protection • Acquisition Strategy, TDS, RFP, SEP, and TEMP revised to include PPP relevant information • Milestone Decision Authority approves Program Protection Plan (PPP) • Identify draft CPI, estimated protection duration and S&T Lab countermeasures MS A Materiel MDD Solution Analysis TechDev • Assess supplier risks • Develop design strategy for CPI protection MS B CDD Streamlined Program Protection Plan • One-stop shopping for documentation of acquisition program security (ISP, IAS, AT appendices) • Living document, easy to update, maintain • Improve over time based on feedback MS C Engineering & Manufacturing Development & Demonstration CPD • Update PPP, with contractor additions • Preliminary verification and validation that design meets assurance plans Full Rate Prod DR Production & Deployment O&S • Enhance countermeasure information PPP • Evaluate that CPI Protection RFP requirements have been met • Update PPP with lifecycle sustainment planning 7 (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 7 Systems Security Engineering: Integration of Security Resources 8 (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 8 Engineering for System Assurance “Engineering for System Assurance” V1.0 Guidebook signed out at NDIA October 1, 2008 Posted on SSE Web site at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/sse/ssa/guidance.html Provides guidance on how to address System Assurance through Systems Engineering processes Aligns to DoD acquisition lifecycle processes with actionable criteria Adds emphasis to ISO/IEC 15288 SE processes Enhanced IA focus and alignment with current processes Focus on hardware, software and operational environment Dovetails with Program Protection Planning (PPP) processes Supports identification of trusted foundry resources Informs Anti-tamper considerations (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 9 Approval Letter (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 10 New PPP: Data Driven Format Pithy, Dynamic, Modular Verbose, Static, Essay Critical Program Information Impact of Loss Critical Program Information (CPI) Reason (for each change in status) List Locations (Low, Med, Hi) GPS Radar FPGA New: Critical warfighting component New: target for hackers Communication Card Watch: US lead in technology (Lab(s), PMO, Contractor Name(s), Test Site(s)) PMO, Contractor X PMO, Prime, Subcontractor Z N/A Removed: No longer leading edge technology Status Dates (watch, new, removed) New 6/2006 Watch 6/2007 New 4/1998 Removed 4/2007 11 (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 11 Program Protection Tools 12 (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 12 PPP Process Desired Outcome Program Benefit Coherent direction and integrated policy framework to respond to security requirements Risk-based approach to implementing security Provision of expert engineering and intelligence support to our programs Streamline process to remove redundancy; focus on protection countermeasures DoD Benefit Reduced risk exposure to gaps/seams in policy and protection activity Improved oversight and focus on system assurance throughout the lifecycle Ability to capitalize on common methods, instruction and technology transition opportunities Cost effective approach to “building security in” where most appropriate (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 13 Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 14 Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security DEPSECDEF Call to action: “Stop the Bleeding” July 10, 2007: DSD, DNI, VCJCS meeting with CEOs of 16 DIB partners DIB Cyber Security Task Force formed: o o o o o Developing strategies for information sharing; Incident reporting; Benchmarking information security practices; Acquisition and contracting procedures Damage assessment SSE/Strategic Initiatives leads the Acquisition and Contracting efforts for DIB CS Task Force (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 15 DIB CS – Activities for Acquisition and Contracting AT&L Policy Memo – Directs Acquisition Executives to engage their Program Executive Offices and Program Managers to take immediate steps to: o Ensure that CUI is identified and appropriately protected in DoD acquisition programs. o Report incidences and exfiltrations Evaluating information security standards Developing DFAR Language Piloting with Services to learn and refine policy and guidance Working with industry partners to “raise the bar” NDIA System Assurance Committee AIA, ITAA, other interactions Developing Education and Training materials Program Managers Contracting Officers Small Business Mentors (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 16 Questions (DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 17