Transcript Observation of e-enabled elections Jonathan Stonestreet Council of Europe Workshop Oslo, 18-19 March 2010

Observation of e-enabled
elections
Jonathan Stonestreet
Council of Europe Workshop
Oslo, 18-19 March 2010
Purpose of election observation?
 Different actors:
 international organizations
 political party/candidate representatives
 non-partisan civil society groups
 Different objectives:
 Determine facts; assess process against international
standards; make recommendations
 Ensure election is in accordance with law; complaints
 Political participation; citizen control over elections
 Common denominator
Transparency
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Definition of observation
 Election observation is the ability to verify
independently that electoral and other
authorities respect the law and/or international
standards and that claims made by the
authorities are true
 Election observation is a practical exercise of
the principle of transparency implicit in the
conduct of democratic elections
 Observation ≠ certification or auditing
OSCE Copenhagen Document 1990
 (7.4) “ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or
by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they
are counted and reported honestly with the official
results made public;”
 (8) “…the presence of observers, both foreign and
domestic, can enhance the electoral process ….
[The OSCE participating States] therefore invite
observers from any other participating States and
any appropriate private institutions and
organizations who may wish to do so to observe the
course of their national election proceedings…”
 Transparency is implicit in these commitments
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Venice Commission Code of Good
Practice
 Principle of Free Suffrage:
- 3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes and
action to combat electoral fraud
 “iv. electronic voting should be used only if it is safe
and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to
obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct
them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage; the
system must be transparent;”
 “xiii. counting must be transparent. Observers,
candidates' representatives and the media must be
allowed to be present. These persons must also have
access to the records;”
Council of Europe e-voting
recommendation, 2004
 “…only those e-voting systems which are
secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust,
open to independent verification and easily
accessible to voters will build the public
confidence which is a pre-requisite for holding
e-voting…”
 “i. e-voting shall respect all the principles of
democratic elections and referendums. Evoting shall be as reliable and secure as
democratic elections and referendums which do
not involve the use of electronic means…”
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2004 Rec: Standards
 23: “Any observers, to the extent permitted by
law, shall be able to be present to observe and
comment on the e-elections, including the
establishing of the results.”
 108: “The audit system shall provide the ability
to verify that an e-election or e-referendum
has complied with the applicable legal
provisions, the aim being to verify that the
results are an accurate representation of the
authentic votes.”
E-voting – what can be observed?
 Context of electronic voting
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Background for introduction
Previous legal challenges
Access of observers
Confidence of political parties and voters
E-voting – what can be observed?
 Cycle of events and activities
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legal framework
setting of standards/requirements
certification and testing
system management
physical security
accessibility, usability, ballot design
education of voters and officials
adherence to election day procedures
complaints and appeals
post-election audits
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Challenges to observation
 There are crucial aspects of the e-voting
process cannot be directly observed
 electronic security of the system
 secrecy of the electronic ballot
 casting, storing, and counting the electronic
ballot
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How to ensure transparency?
 For transparency, evidence is needed
 Access to system documentation and
certification and audit reports
However…..
 For casting, storing and counting ballots, the
system must provide proof that voter choices
are respected
 At present, no purely electronic solution that
can “verify that the results are an accurate
representation of the authentic votes” (also
respecting secrecy of vote)
Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) / Scanned Ballots
 Paper record of each vote, checked by voter, which
can be audited or recounted
 Raises questions:
 when does an audit or recount take place?
 what happens if there is a discrepancy between the
electronic and paper records?
 what is the legal ballot?
 VVPAT not a solution to the observability problem if
 rarely or never audited
 leads to an unclear result
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Other Issues
 Open source code
 Role of and accountability of vendors
and election officials
 Remote e-voting
How to facilitate observation of
electronic voting?
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Legal framework
Access to documentation and reports
Testing
Observer training
VVPAT and audits
Open source codes?
 Transparency should be a defining principle of
any electronic voting system, just as it should
be in paper ballot systems
Questions?