SYS-009T Nishanth Lingamneni Program Manager Microsoft Corporation Malware can compromise core operating system components which adversely impacts business and personal data IT needs to protect.
Download ReportTranscript SYS-009T Nishanth Lingamneni Program Manager Microsoft Corporation Malware can compromise core operating system components which adversely impacts business and personal data IT needs to protect.
SYS-009T Nishanth Lingamneni Program Manager Microsoft Corporation Malware can compromise core operating system components which adversely impacts business and personal data IT needs to protect data in an environment with a porous network perimeter, requiring data protection by location, device and access method IT needs to address a broad segment of mobile workers who travel, work from home, work from their phones, and use hotspots around the globe Protect and manage threats Protect sensitive data Protect access to resources Protect and manage threats Protect sensitive data Protect access to resources Malware Resistance Pervasive Encryption Modern Access Control What did our focus groups say? "This is the end of boot sector viruses as we know them" "Encryption is typically an afterthought, [but] this makes [encryption] part of the build process" “[This] makes it easier for users to get what they want to get to but without giving up safety" Security & hardware • • • Key security benefits • • • • Secure boot eDrive support for BitLocker Network unlock support for BitLocker WDS multicast • • SOC support (including ARM and Intel) UX value prop from F5 day one: A Windows Certification requirement Other benefits • • • • Fast boot, OEM Certification, no back flash, etc. Support for > 2.2 TB system disks Seamless boot (UEFI Graphics) Boot Next support (UEFI Variable Services) • Value proposition • • • • TCG standard evolution: TPM 2.0* • • • Algorithm extensibility allows for implementation and deployment in additional countries Security scenarios are compatible with TPM 1.2 or 2.0 Windows 8: TPM 2.0 support enables implementation choice • • • Enables commercial-grade security via physical and virtual key isolation from OS TPM 1.2 spec: mature standard, years of deployment and hardening Improvements in TPM provisioning lowers deployment barriers Discrete TPM Firmware-based (Intel Security Engine,ARM TrustZone®) Windows Certification requirement for Connected Standby** platforms only * Microsoft refers to the TCG TPM.Next as “TPM 2.0”; For remainder of presentation, “TPM” refers to either discrete TPM or firmware-based secure execution environment. ** Connected Standby: New terminology that replaces what Microsoft called ‘Connected Standby capable’. • Windows goals • Windows TPM features, new APIs work uniformly with TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 • Enable smooth ecosystem migration from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 • Value proposition in Windows 8 • Improvements in TPM provisioning lowers deployment barriers • Simplified design for software applications requiring TPM • Security scenarios are compatible with TPM 1.2 or 2.0 • Allows OEMs to preserve existing TPM investments in migrating to TPM 2.0 at their own pace with Windows 8 # Feature TPM* UEFI 1 BitLocker: Volume Encryption X X 2 BitLocker: Volume Network Unlock X X 3 Secured Boot: Secure Boot X 4 Secured Boot: ELAM X 5 Measured Boot X X 6 Virtual Smart Cards (TPM) X X 7 Certificate storage (TPM Based) X X 8 Automatic TPM provisioning X X Pervasive encryption Protects data from exposure or theft when device is lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned • Challenges • • • Windows volume encryption can be difficult to manage Volume encryption imposes additional expenses for end users and partners Windows 8 solution • Broad support for devices and hardware: • • • Support for online recovery for nondomain-joined scenarios Frictionless user experience • • Improved performance, standard user support, seamless integration Reduces time to provision in mass deployment scenarios • • 11 Slates, clustered server; leverages eDrives functionality Encrypt data-only option Simplified TPM provisioning • • Strongly recommend TPM for all systems Windows 8 supports TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0* • • TCG Physical Presence Interface 1.2 TPM is required for Connected Standby platforms • • • • • • Intel Security Engine (Based on HW based security engine embedded in Intel SOCs) Connected Standby capable systems are likely to use TPM 2.0 ARM systems will implement TPM 2.0 features using TrustZone TPM 2.0 features for other platform classes to emerge Ship with eDrive-enabled storage Windows 8 System Certification requirements • UEFI 2.3.1, Class II no CSM/Class III TM • Challenges • Software encryption imposes performance overhead • • • • 13 Self-encrypting drives require a key management solution Offloads encryption processing to hardware; mitigates impact to system performance Windows manages eDrives; no need for another key management solution to deploy eDrives Value proposition • • • During initial encryption, run time, and common scenarios like startup, sleep, hibernate Exacerbated if software encryption is run on slate or low-power PCs Windows 8 solution—eDrives • • • Minimize encryption impact to system performance and deployment time without introducing infrastructure changes Initial encryption time eliminated. Run-time performance significantly improved eDrive-enabled systems have improved CPU utilization, battery life Systems without eDrives will use software-based encryption • Hardware requirements • eDrive strongly recommended for performance • When present, must support • • • IEEE 1667-TCG silo TCG-OPAL, OPAL v2 + fixed ACL + additional data store Preceding are Windows 8 System Certification requirements • UEFI 2.3.1, Class II no CSM/Class III • eDrive provisioned for Windows-based volume encryption 14 Enable IT to deploy stronger encryption protection without disrupting software patching process • Challenges TPM + PIN is often not practical for desktops and servers protected by encryption • When IT deploys a patch that requires Windows restart, desktops and servers end up waiting for PIN at boot • • Windows 8 solution Network Unlock and TPM + PIN are deployed to desktops and servers Windows 8 machines connect to Windows 8 WDS server, which authenticates protector • PCs wired to corporate network successfully restart without waiting for PIN at boot • When a PC is disconnected from, or not wired to, corporate network, PIN is required at boot • • 15 • Hardware requirements • TPM • Windows 8 System Certification requirements • UEFI 2.3.1 (supports DHCPv4, DHPCPv6) 16 Malware resistance Goal: Anti-malware more effective in Windows 8 • Platform integrity investments make Windows 8 the trusted platform for consumers, businesses, financial institutions, and data centers • New tools, APIs, and capabilities for antimalware products • Sophisticated malware, e.g., rootkits, can be reliably detected and removed • Radically reduce systems compromised by malware “[Anti-fraud security tips] do not address or provide protection against the main method used by cyber criminals to collect account credentials – malware.” Turiss, Cyber Crime Trend Report, August 2010 • Challenges • • • Prevent malicious tampering and changes to the hardware, operating system, and to the antimalware software Growing class of pervasive malware that targets the boot path Should Windows be compromised by this type of attack, often the only plausible method to fix the problem is to reinstall the operating system Windows 8 solution • Secured Boot and remediation hardens the boot process against malware from the moment of power on through the initialization of anti-malware software • Measured Boot performs a comprehensive chain of measurements during the boot process that can be used to further validate the boot process beyond Secure Boot. • Early Launch Anti-Malware (ELAM) can start from a known good state, as determined by Secure Boot, and continue vigilant watch over the user’s PC from that point on Malware resistance: Secured and Measured Boot Secured Boot • End-to-end boot process protection: • Windows operating system loader; Windows system files and drivers • Anti-malware software • Ensures and prevents: • A compromised operating system from starting; • Software from starting before Windows • Third-party software from starting before anti-malware • Automatic remediation/self-healing, if compromised Measured Boot • Creates comprehensive of measurements of boot execution • Can offer measurements to a remote service for analysis Secured Boot: legacy vs. modern Legacy boot BIOS Any OS loader OS start • BIOS starts any OS Loader, even malware • Malware may start before Windows Modern boot Native UEFI Verified OS loader only OS start • The firmware enforces policy, only starts signed OS loaders • OS loader enforces signature verification of Windows components • Result—malware unable to change boot and OS components Secured Boot: Early Launch Anti-Malware Windows 7 BIOS OS loader (malware) 3rd party drivers (malware) Anti-malware software start Windows logon • Malware is able to start before Windows and Anti-malware • Malware able to hide and remain undetected • Systems can be completely compromised Windows 8 Native UEFI Windows 8 OS loader Anti-malware software start 3rd party drivers • Secured Boot starts Anti-malware early in the boot process Windows logon • Early Launch Anti-Malware (ELAM) driver is specially signed by Microsoft • Windows starts ELAM software before any third-party boot drivers • Malware can no longer bypass Anti-Malware inspection Effects of Early Launch Anti-Malware Native UEFI Windows 8 OS loader Anti-malware software start 3rd party drivers Runtime Anti-malware Software We have moved the attack surface • Malware will move to attack the early boot components • This is where Measured Boot comes in… Windows logon Measured Boot with attestation • Windows measures all components to AM software start in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) • AM software can invalidate attestation if it stops enforcing policy • Enables attestation service to remotely evaluate client state using TPM measurements Windows 7 BIOS OS loader Kernel initialization 3rd party drivers Anti-malware software start Anti-malware Policy Enforcement Windows 8 UEFI Windows 8 OS loader Kernel initialization Anti-malware software start 3rd party drivers Attestation Malware resistance: architecture Secure Boot prevents malicious OS loader UEFI Boot Measurements of components including Antimalware software are stored in the TPM Boot policy 1 Windows OS loader AM policy Windows kernel and drivers AM software 4 2 Anti-malware software is started before all 3rd party software TPM 3 Client retrieves TPM measurements of client state on demand 3rd party software Windows logon Attestation service Client Client Health Claim Users can use their PCs to securely authenticate with websites without having to purchase additional devices • Challenges • • • • Cost of issuing tokens Complexity of deploying a public key infrastructure (PKI) Usability and user support Windows 8 solution • Windows Smart Card Framework has been extended to support – This allows cryptocapable devices to present themselves and act just like Smart Cards • Windows 8 exposes hardware-based security components, such as a TPM or virtual smartcard-capable device as a smart card ENTERPRISE Need CONSUMER Machine and user ID using hardware protected certificates without requiring separate devices Need Key scenarios User authentication for remote access Document/email signing Strong machine network authentication Banks must “know” their customers, using commercially available determination methods to meet FFIEC multi-authentication requirement Key scenarios User certificate bound to the TPM Stronger user authentication without the need for complex passwords or external second factor CorpNet Malware resistance Pervasive encryption Windows 8 security investments Modern access control 31 • Invest in technologies • Source, build, ship: UEFI, TPM, eDrives • Roadmap discussions with component/firmware/ vendors, OEMs, and other partners http://channel9.msdn.com/Events http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/windows/hardware/br259097.aspx http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/windows/hardware/br259096 http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/windows/hardware/br259095.aspx