Transcript Prompt Global Strike Update August 2005 Col Rick Patenaude HQ AFSPC/DRM Overview • • • • • National Guidance Prompt Global Strike Common Aero Vehicle Conventional Ballistic Missile Issues and mitigation.

Prompt Global Strike
Update
August 2005
Col Rick Patenaude
HQ AFSPC/DRM
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Overview
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National Guidance
Prompt Global Strike
Common Aero Vehicle
Conventional Ballistic Missile
Issues and mitigation
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Guidance
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Contend
effectively with
future challenges:
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Traditional
Irregular
Catastrophic
Disruptive
Projecting forces
in distant antiaccess
environments
Denying enemies
sanctuary
Quadrennial Defense Review
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“The defense strategy rests on the assumption that
U.S. forces have the ability to project power
worldwide.”
“…require the development and acquisition of
robust capabilities to conduct persistent
surveillance, precision strike, and maneuver at
varying depths within denied areas.”
“…emphasis must be placed on manned and
unmanned long-range precision strike assets.”
Nuclear and non - nuclear
strike capabilities
ICBMs
Bombers SLBMs
C2, Intelligence &
Planning
Defenses
Responsive
Infrastructure
Nuclear Posture Review
New Strategic Triad
includes nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities
Range
Global
Precision
Conventional
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Prompt Global Strike
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Mission Need Statement
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Strike globally and rapidly with joint conventional forces
against high-payoff targets
In a timeframe reduced from weeks/days to
hours/minutes
Even when no permanent military presence
or only limited infrastructure is in a region
Regardless of anti-access threats
In a single or multi-theater environment
Analysis of Alternatives
Determine the best method (means) to
create desired effects:
Responsively: hrs/mins
Engage
Globally: anywhere
Lethally: precision
Common Aero
Vehicle
Other
Other
Next Generation
Bomber
Sub Launched
Missile
Likely to produce…
• A force mix
• Not a single
optimized
solution
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Time Sensitive Strike Targets
Tae Po Dong Launch Pad
“pre-boost phase missile defense”
ADVATECH PACIFIC COMPETITON SENSITIVE
Sensitivity of GPS Coverage
Observations and Conclusions
 In two hours of function, an anti-satellite
laser within the projected technical
capability of China could:
12 NAVSTAR satellites
 Produce “no effective coverage” in the target area
for approximately one half of the day.
 Destroy
 In 12 hours of function, such an antisatellite system would have exposure to
every NAVSTAR satellite that would
normally be visible from the weapon site.
Essentially 100% kill. (Although some
satellites that never come into view of the
weapon site would survive.)
This document may contain technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Control Act. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.
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Study by ADVATECH PACIFIC
found satellites vulnerable to ground
based laser
High pay off command and control
“pre-boost phase missile defense”
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Campaign-Level Military Utility
CAV Military Utility Analysis
Final Results
14 July 2003
Headquarters U. S. Air Force
Integrity - Service - Excellence
Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS)
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA-A)
Final Results
ACAT LEVEL I
Col Pamela Stewart
AFSPC/DRF DSN 692-7681
15 Jul 04
Two independent CAV Military Utility Analyses
conducted using DoD validated scenarios…results
indicate:
• “CAV provided significant military utility in a
variety of scenarios and was the weapon of
choice for a wide variety of target types.”
• “Results showed that CAV has value, not just as
a “Silver Bullet”, but as part of a total munitions
portfolio that cooperatively leverages each
element”
• “Force application effect significant and
increases as Blue reacts to access restrictions:
7% - 16% improvement”
• “Large CAV strikes early on [integrated air
defense systems and high value targets]: “kick
down door””
• “Red [offensive counterspace] is a VERY
lucrative target, more so if no replenishment: ‘An
ounce of prevention…’”
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Common Aero Vehicle
Mission
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Rapid conventional theater support and global strike on time critical
targets
Application across the spectrum of conflict
CAPABILITIES
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One hour from decision to done, worldwide
Variety of payloads
3-meter accuracy
Potential for in-flight re-planning
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FALCON
Joint Air Force/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
demonstration program
Air Force
DARPA
Air Force /DARPA
Small Launch Vehicle
Hypersonic Test Vehicle
 Spacelift booster capable of  Hypersonic technology
placing 1,000 lb spacecraft
development
into low earth orbit
 Long Range payload
 2-hour launch from alert
delivery vehicle
 <$5M recurring launch cost
technology
HTV
Hypersonic Cruise
Vehicle
Hypersonic Technology
Vehicle (HTV-1)
SLV
Hypersonic Technology
Vehicle (HTV-2)
Military Utility Analysis
Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle
 Space vehicle to carry
12,000 lb payloads at
hypersonic speeds
 Aircraft-like operations:
reusable, recallable, launchon-demand
HCV
FY04
Concept
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
Design & Development
PDR
CDR
PDR
B
FY09
FY10
FY11
Flight Demos
Flt
Demo
CDR
Flt
Demo
Flt
Demo
PGS AoA
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Conventional Ballistic Missile
Booster
Basing
Alaska
Vandenberg AFB
Guam
Weapons
Minotaur III
Minuteman
Inert
Mk 21
Triax
PGSEV
Mk 4e2
Peacekeeper
CAV
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Land Basing Attributes
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Key attributes of a CONUS-based system
Prompt response
Low cost to operate and maintain
High availability…capable of 24/7 operations
High reliability
Unambiguous launch location
• No co-location of nuclear and conventional
capabilities*
• Minimizes risk of misinterpretation
• Clear intentions
Best possible two-way communications…
immediate, real-time, with immediate feedback
Horizontal Coffin
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Overcoming the Nuclear Stigma
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Precedence has been
established
• START declarations help
mitigate concerns
• Build trust through
transparency
Avoiding miscalculations
• Need to ensure no surprisesshare Concept of Operations
• Engage in activities that
demonstrate capabilities
• Participate in ongoing,
continuous dialogue to share
intentions
Mitigating measures
• Develop Doctrine to reassure
allies and adversaries
concerning intentions
• Build confidence through
gaming and exercises
Dual role nuclear/conventional weapon systems
B-52
SSGN
F-16
B-1
B-2
ALCM
TLAM
Field
Artillery
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Mitigating Measures
To ensure there is no misinterpretation
of the intent or use of the FALCON/CAV
programs (conventional vice nuclear), a
credible “package” of tailored
mitigating measures is
required…elements of the package
could include:
CAV
Trajectory
Time to Target for
9,000 nmi  52 min
7,000 nmi  45 min
Ballistic
Trajectory
Time to Target for
9,000 nmi  76 min
Minimize Overflight
WING HQ
7,000 nmi  51 min
ANTI-ACCESS
THREAT RING
SPACE
LAUNCH Sq
CAV
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AOC
CAV
THREAT
CAV
Intended to represent advantage of trajectory planning
(not an actual trajectory)
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Conventional-nuclear firewall
Separate basing
Unique trajectories and flight paths
Cooperative signature enhancement
Distinct CONOPs and mission planning
Shared early warning and on site
inspections
Strategic Dialogue and advance notifications
Doctrine, Exercises, Gaming
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