Transcript Fair burden sharing: The possible role of the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework Dr.

Fair burden sharing:
The possible role of the Greenhouse
Development Rights Framework
Dr. Paul Baer
Assistant Professor
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Co-founder, EcoEquity
Australia National University, Canberra
1 July, 2011
The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework
Authors
Paul Baer (EcoEquity)
Tom Athansiou (EcoEquity)
Sivan Kartha (Stockholm Environment Institute)
Eric Kemp-Benedict (SEI)
Key Supporters have included
Christian Aid (UK)
Oxfam (International)
European APRODEV Network
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany)
MISTRA Foundation CLIPORE Programme (Sweden)
Stockholm Environment Institute (International)
Rockefeller Brothers Fund (USA)
Town Creek Foundation (USA)
www.GreenhouseDevelopmentRights.org
GDRs: roots
• Authors were originally supporters of equal per
capita allocations/contraction and convergence
– Basis of founding of EcoEquity in 2000, book “Dead
Heat”
• Following the CAN “Bali Equity Summit” in 2002,
we tried to develop “per capita plus” – per capita
modified to take account of national
circumstances
• This turned out to be impractical, so we returned
to the “right to development”
• First presented in 2004, reached maturity with
publication of first edition in 2007
The climate challenge: in three steps
40
Annual carbon dioxide emissions (GtCO2/yr)
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Per capita emissions allocated according to “contraction and
convergence” (2030 convergence year) under an emissions
pathway (based on Den Elzen et al. 2007) designed to stabilize
atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent.
Greenhouse Development Rights
overview
• A global climate policy framework for “burden sharing”
• Assigns obligations to countries based on aggregating
the wealth and GHG emissions of their citizens
– “Capacity” (ability to pay)
– and “responsibility” (contribution to the problem)
– Combined “Responsibility and Capacity Indicator” (RCI)
• Excludes from consideration the wealth and emissions
of poor individuals, below a “development threshold”
• Rich individuals are treated equally (have obligations)
wherever they live
• In principle, an individually-based “right to
development”
The ethical basis of GDRs
• Based on cosmopolitan egalitarianism
– Individuals not countries are bearers of rights and
obligations (in theory)
– Countries are treated as aggregates of individuals
– Individuals treated the same regardless of where they are
born
• An idealist/constructivist account of politics and
international relations
– Ideas matter
– Individual action matters
– Countries act out of normative beliefs as well as self
interest (and self-interest is subject to “construction”)
Defining and measuring capacity
• Capacity is a moral term: “resources that can be
contributed without undue sacrifice”
• This raises the classic question of the “efficiency”
with which resources are converted to welfare
• Historically captured by ideas of “basic needs”,
luxuries, etc.
• Makes sense at an individual level
• Our definition: per capita income over $7500
“development threshold”
Defining and measuring responsibility
• Responsibility is an ambiguous term
– Moral responsibility is not the same as causal
responsibility
– Collective (e.g., national) responsibility is
problematic in many ways
• Nonetheless, “polluter pays” and other
versions of responsibility have strong support
• Our definition: cumulative CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels (and cement) since 1990
Income and Capacity
income distributions (relative to a “development threshold”)
10
Emissions and Responsibility
fossil CO2 (since 1990) (showing portion defined as “responsibility”)
11
National obligations
based on national “capacity” and “responsibility”
Population
(% of global)
Income
($US / capita)
Capacity
(% of global)
Responsibility
(% of global)
RCI
(% of global)
United States
4.6%
44,706
35.6%
30.9%
33.3%
EU 27
7.3%
24,175
28.1%
20.8%
24.4%
- EU 15
5.8%
28,573
26.7%
18.3%
22.5%
Australia
0.3%
33,880
1.4%
2.0%
1.7%
Japan
1.8%
48,065
14.3%
5.9%
10.1%
Russia
2.0%
3,566
0.9%
6.0%
3.4%
China
19.6%
2,683
2.9%
4.0%
3.4%
India
17.6%
860
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
South Africa
0.7%
4,541
0.3%
1.0%
0.7%
Brazil
2.8%
5,119
1.5%
5.4%
3.4%
LDCs
11.4%
453
0.0%
0.4%
0.2%
19%
27,617
84.6%
71.2%
77.9%
81.4%
2,353
15.4%
28.8%
22.1%
1
7,061
100%
100%
100%
Annex I
Non-Annex I
World
National obligations (based on “responsibility”
and “capacity”) over time
2010
2020
2030
Population
(% of global)
Income
($US / capita)
Capacity
(% of global)
Responsibility
(% of global)
RCI
(% of
global)
RCI
(% of
global)
RCI
(% of
global)
7.3%
24,175
28.1%
20.8%
24.4%
22.1%
18.7%
- EU 15
5.8%
28,573
26.7%
18.3%
22.5%
20.0%
16.6%
- EU +12
1.5%
7,074
1.3%
2.5%
1.9%
2.1%
2.1%
United States
4.6%
44,706
35.6%
30.9%
33.3%
30.0%
25.6%
Japan
1.8%
48,065
14.3%
5.9%
10.1%
8.5%
6.5%
Russia
2.0%
3,566
0.9%
6.0%
3.4%
3.6%
3.9%
China
19.6%
2,683
2.9%
4.0%
3.4%
7.9%
13.5%
India
17.6%
860
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.4%
1.2%
South Africa
0.7%
4,541
0.3%
1.0%
0.7%
0.7%
0.9%
Brazil
2.8%
5,119
1.5%
5.4%
3.4%
3.5%
3.8%
LDCs
11.4%
453
0.0%
0.4%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
19%
27,617
84.6%
71.2%
77.9%
70.5%
60.7%
81.4%
2,353
15.4%
28.8%
22.1%
29.5%
39.3%
1
7,061
100%
100%
100%
100%
100.0%
EU 27
Annex I
Non-Annex I
World
Allocating global mitigation obligations
among countries according to responsibility & capacity
14
Implications for United States
US mitigation obligation amounts to a reduction target exceeding
100% after ~2025 (“negative emission allocation”).
15
Implications for United States
Here, physical domestic reductions (~25% below 1990 by 2020) are only part of the total
US obligation. The rest would be met internationally.
16
Implications for China
中国的测算结果
17
Implications for China
中国的测算结果
A fraction of China's reduction, (and most of the reductions in the South) are driven by
industrialized country reduction commitments.
18
National Obligations in 2020 (for climate costs = 1% of GWP)
Per capita
Income
($/capita)
National
Capacity
(Billion $)
National
Obligation
(Billion $)
National
Obligation
(% GDP)
Ave. climate
cost per
person above
dev threshold
$38,385
$15,563
$ 216
1.12%
$436
- EU 15
$41,424
$13,723
$ 188
1.12%
$468
- EU +12
$25,981
$ 1,840
$ 28
1.09%
$300
United States
$53,671
$15,661
$ 275
1.51%
$841
Japan
$40,771
$ 4,139
$ 62
1.23%
$504
Russia
$22,052
$ 1,927
$ 41
1.40%
$326
China
$9,468
$ 5,932
$ 98
0.73%
$169
India
$4,374
$
972
$ 11
0.19%
$58
South Africa
$14,010
$
422
$ 10
1.42%
$395
Mexico
$14,642
$ 1,009
$ 15
0.84%
$207
$
$
1
0.06%
$58
EU 27
LDCs
Annex I
$1,567
82
$38,425
$40,722
$ 652
1.29%
$529
Non-Annex I
$6,998
$18,667
$ 292
0.66%
$180
High Income
$44,365
$40,993
$ 655
1.33%
$602
Middle Income
$8,797
$18,190
$ 286
0.69%
$149
Low Income
$2,022
$
$
3
0.08%
$51
$ 944
1.00%
$330
World
$12,415
206
$59,388
Climate obligations, imagined as a (mildly progressive) tax
Total global costs (mitigation and adaptation)
0.5% of GWP
Country
US
US
US
US
US
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
income
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$60,000
$120,000
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$60,000
$120,000
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$60,000
$120,000
1.0% of GWP
marginal
tax rate
average
tax rate
annual
tax
marginal
tax rate
0.00%
0.88%
0.88%
0.88%
0.88%
0.00%
0.66%
0.66%
0.66%
0.66%
0.00%
0.58%
0.58%
0.58%
0.58%
0.00%
0.44%
0.66%
0.77%
0.82%
0.00%
0.33%
0.50%
0.58%
0.62%
0.00%
0.29%
0.44%
0.51%
0.54%
$0
$65
$197
$459
$978
$0
$50
$149
$348
$747
$0
$43
$131
$303
$648
0.00%
1.75%
1.75%
1.75%
1.75%
0.00%
1.33%
1.33%
1.33%
1.33%
0.00%
1.15%
1.15%
1.15%
1.15%
average
tax rate
annual
tax
0.00%
$0
0.87%
$131
1.31%
$393
1.53%
$918
1.63% $1,956
0.00%
$0
0.66%
$100
1.00%
$299
1.16%
$697
1.24% $1,493
0.00%
$0
0.58%
$87
0.87%
$261
1.01%
$606
1.08% $1,296
2.0% of GWP
marginal average
tax rate tax rate
0.00%
3.50%
3.50%
3.50%
3.50%
0.00%
2.65%
2.65%
2.65%
2.65%
0.00%
2.30%
2.30%
2.30%
2.30%
0.00%
1.74%
2.62%
3.06%
3.26%
0.00%
1.33%
1.99%
2.32%
2.49%
0.00%
1.15%
1.74%
2.02%
2.16%
Note that EC effort-sharing proposal imagines global mitigation costs of €175 billion, or
about ¼% of the EC’s projected 2020 Gross World Product
annual
tax
$0
$261
$786
$1,836
$3,912
$0
$199
$597
$1,393
$2,986
$0
$173
$522
$1,212
$2,592
GDRs: Strengths
• It is by some standards relatively simple
• It is specific and complete: it can actually be used to
produce numbers.
• In theory it actually does protect the right to
development - the necessary costs for each country are
borne only by the “already developed”
• Compared to resource sharing proposals, it actually
addresses adaptation costs
• By assigning obligations to rich people in poor
countries, it answers a primary criticism of Annexbased proposals
• It has been developed organically by a team that is
closely integrated with both civil society networks
(CAN) and academic and policy networks
GDRs: Weaknesses
• It is by some standards relatively complex
• Even the numbers it produces are subject to a wide
range of “uncertainties” (e.g., baselines)
• It doesn’t directly account for variation in national
abatement cost curves
• It produces unbelievably large obligations for
developed countries
• The individual approach to “the right to development”
is problematic
– much of what is required for “development” are collective
(public goods)
– GDRs offers no guarantee that national policies will reflect
underlying principles
GDRs: political usefulness?
• It could, in theory, form the basis of a global
treaty
– Hah!
• In a “pledge and review” world, it can be used to
measure national pledges against an equity
benchmark
– Requires some belief that its numbers are defensibly
fair
• It could provide the basis for domestic campaigns
to increase national ambition
GDRs: Questions
• Does our overall method produce a result that is
defensibly fair?
• Is there a better way to define capacity?
• Is there a better way to define responsibility?
• Is there a better way to combine them?
• Do our models of application (tons, dollars) make
sense?
• Does one make more sense than another?
• How can our proposal be politically useful?
• What problems are generic to any equity
framework, and what are specific to GDRs?