Transcript INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Technical Committee Meeting of Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation 20 - 22 May 2009,

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Technical Committee Meeting of
Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation
20 - 22 May 2009, Vienna, Austria
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
Prof. Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
Ukrainian State Scientific Technical Center on Nuclear and Radiation Safety
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Common news
Modernization during 2007-2009
Operating experience
Regulatory activity
Recommendation to IAEA
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
WWR 2×1000
WWR 2×440
RIVNE NPP
WWR 2×1000
KHMELNITSKY NPP
SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP
WWR 3×1000
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
WWR 6×1000
ZAPORIZHA NPP
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
1 Common news
•
-
There are in Ukraine:
4 NPP’s;
- 13 units WWER-1000;
- 2 units WWER-440.
• The youngest units – Rovno 4 and Khmelnitskiy 2 – started in 2004.
The age of the oldest units (Rovno 1, Rovno 2, South Ukraine 1) –
28-29 years. Design life of these units – 30 years. The set of actions
(including I&C) for life extension are fulfilling now.
Decreasing of electricity production during January-March 2009
compared with January-March 2008:
- Common – 13,7%
- NPP – 13,6%
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
1 Common news
• According government plans, 2 units will be intended for
commissioning to 2015. The site was determined - Khmelnitskiy 3 and
4.
Type of units – WWER-1000, project B392B (analog – Balakovskaja
NPP-5 – Russia). Manufacturer of reactor – Russia. Manufacturer of
turbine and generator – Ukraine.
Designers and manufacturers of I&C systems – Ukrainian companies.
Main designer of I&C – KHIKA and “LvovOrgres”.
The main problem – the assurance of unity of different systems
because designers of different systems inside of Ukraine had different
element base, difference of software, etc.
Conception of I&C systems for these units will be ended in 2009.
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
2 New systems for Ukrainian NPP
Name of system
Reactor protection
system
Reactor power
regulation and limitation
system
Control rod actuation
system
Neutron flux monitoring
system
Engineering safety
features actuation
system
SPDS
Refueling machine
control system
Developer
RADIY
RADIY
KHARTRONARKOS
ŠKODA
IMPULS
Kh
ZNPP
NPP
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6
RNPP
SUNPP
     
  
   
  
 
     
 
  

IMPULS
    
RADIY
 
WESTINGHOUSE,
WESTRON
GANZ, EWIG
DIAKONT, RADIY

  
  



   
  
 
 – 2007–2009
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
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

REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
2 Implementation of Ukrainian I&C systems for foreign NPP
Ukrainian
company
Name of system
Name of NPP
Country
Radiy
Engineering safety feature
actuation system
Kozloduy NPP
2008 – unit 6 system 2
2009- unit 5 system2,
unit 6 systems1,3
2010-unit 5 systems
1,3
Bulgaria
Westron
System of diesel-generator
control
Armenian NPP
Unit 2
Armenia
Balakovo NPP-3, 4
Kalinin NPP-1, 2
Russia
Feedwater control system
Kharkov
Shevchenko
plant
Automatic turbine regulators
ASUT-240 Control systems for
Kaiga 3, 4
turbine (regulators, technological
RAPP 5, 6
protection, monitoring and
diagnostic) and generator
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
India
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
3 Operating experience
Operating reliability of I&C systems, designed by “Radiy” company
Name of system
Number
Operating time, h
Number of failures
low
confidence
Estimation
bound
of failures
point
intensity,
high
Е-06
confidence
bound
Reactor protection systems
Reactor power and
limitation control
systems
systems channels
6
18
124000
372000
0
2
Engineering safety
features actuation
systems
systems channels
7
22
85000
236000
0
3
systems
10
318000
0
sets
20
492000
0
channels
60
1476000
9
–
–
10,6
–
19,2
–
32,8
0
0
6,1
0
5,37
0
12,7
–
–
3,17
–
1,08
–
3,45
There weren’t any failures of systems or sets as a whole.
Comparison of all operating measures with design measures and requirements measures
in specification was fulfilled for channels. Operating measures are close to design measures
(e.g. design failure intensity for channel of reactor protection system is 11.6E-06, point
estimation is 6.1E-06). All measures for systems satisfy the specification requirements.
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
3 Operating experience
Reliability of FPGA
• Different types of FPGA – manufacturer “Altera”
(USA)
• Common number of FPGA in reactor protection
systems, reactor power control systems and
ESFAS is 11000
• FPGA had not failures for operating time during
the observation.
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
Analysis of violations due to I&C
• Level of violations according INES- 1, 0, out of scale
• Intensity of violation decreased in function of time ( for
violations due to I&C and due to technological equipment
too)
• Important reason of violations- events outside of I&C
(ventilation system, EMC, etc)
• Measures how modernization improved safety
• Influence of SW
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
3 Operating experience
Influence of I&C systems modernization to NPP safety
Reactor power
control and
limitation systems
(designer – Radiy)
Before
After
modermodernization
nization
Operating time,
years
Number of
violations
Violations
intensity, 1/year
Unit downtime, h
Underproduction
of energy,
106 kWh
Reactor protection
systems
(designer – Radiy)
Control rod systems
(designer –
Skoda-Controls)
Before
modernization
After
modernization
Before
modernization
After
modernization
140
32
135
37
105
67
2
–
4
–
16
5
0,014
0
0,029
0
0,15
0,074
0
–
55,39
0
38,15
0
3,5
–
55,3
0
47,907
16
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
3. Analysis of operating data about NPP violations due to the I&C systems
Comparison of software influence to NPP violations
because digital systems
USA
B.Geddes and R.Torok
Ukraine
2 out of 13 (1st generation),
4 out of 49 (1E systems)
0 out of 20 (2nd generation)
Agreement with B.Geddes, R.Torok
Protection against the software failures is already at a
“reasonable assurance level”
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
4 Regulatory activity
Ukrainian Regulations
Common
Principles of NPP
Safety
Regulations of
NPP Reactors
Nuclear Safety
NP 306.2.141
NP 306.2.145
IEC
IAEA
IEC 61513
IEC 1226
NS-R-1
IEC 62340
IEC 60880
Safety Requirements to
NPP Digital I&C Systems
IEC 62138
(Revision 1)
IEC 60987
NP 306.5.02/ХХХ-2009
NS-G-1.3
NS-G-1.1
Regulations with Requirements to NPP I&C
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
4 Regulatory activity (2)
Requirements on Nuclear and Radiation Safety to digital safety important Instrumentation and
Control Systems
NP 306.5.02/XXX-2009
1. Common positions
2. Main terms and definitions
3. Classification
4. Functional requirements
common positions
safety control systems
safety related systems
control rooms
5. Requirements to dependability of functions
protections after CCF
single failure criteria
redundancy
diversity
reliability measures
diagnostic
protection after unauthorized access
protection after personnel error
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
4 Regulatory activity (3)
-
6. Requirements to resistance of functions
environment
mechanical influence
electrical supply
EMC
7. Requirements to quality of functions
accuracy
MMI
response speed
8. Requirements to independence of functions
9. Requirements to software and hardware
10. Requirements to design
11. Requirements to confirmation of compliance
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
4 Regulatory activity (4)
Methods of Assessment of
NPP I&C Compliance with
Safety Requirements
Requirements of Order and
State of the Actions for
Safety Important NPP I&C
Life Extension
NP 306.2.141
NP 306.5.02/2-068
Methods of Expert Review of
NPP I&C, based on FPGA
(Revision 0)
Regulations with methods related to NPP I&C
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
Knowledge base for expert activity
• -International (IAEA, IEC,ISO) and
Ukrainian standards
• Requirements to I&C (Comparison)
• Expert reviews
• Documentations of new systems
• Methodics
• Text (or list) of books and articles
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
5 Recommendation to IAEA (1)
I) TECDOC. Review (comparison and analysis) of WWER I&C
systems (Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, etc.)
(similar IAEA Technical Report N387, part 5 “Modern I&C for NPP:
Guidebook”)
The base of this chapter from Ukrainian side may be the new book
“NPP Safety: Reactor Control Systems” (in Russian – “SUZ”), Kiev,
2009 (in publisher house now)
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
5 Recommendation to IAEA (2)
The content of this book:
1. NPP with WWER
2. Common information about reactor control systems (RCS)
3. Type project and modernization of RCS
4. Standard base
5. Classification
6. Common requirements
7. Peripheral equipment
8. Neutron flux monitoring systems
9. Protection systems
10. Power control and limitation regulators
11. Control rod actuation systems
12. Some results of operation
Attachments
1. Classified list of standards
2. FPGA
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
5 Recommendation to IAEA (3)
II) Updating of NS-G-1.3, NS-G-1.1
III) I&C Roadmap in Support of Reactors III+IV generations
IV) Collection, summarizing and analysis of information about NPP
safety violations because I&C failures (independent of COMPSIS,
not only digital systems) - TECDOC or coordinated research
program
Y) Knowledge base related to I&C
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky
REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)
• Thanks for attention
Mikhail Yastrebenetsky