Transcript Policy summary Independent evaluation:  Standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, assessing the extent of progress made by the international community in supporting CPPB in Southern Sudan. 

Policy summary
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Independent evaluation:
 Standard
OECD/DAC evaluation criteria,
assessing the extent of progress made by the
international community in supporting CPPB
in Southern Sudan.
 Pilot the working draft of the Guidance on
evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding
activities (OECD/DAC Network on Conflict,
Peace and Development Cooperation and the
OECD/DAC Network on Development
Evaluation).
 Evaluation anchored in Conflict Analysis and
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critique of usage.
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$4.05 bn allocated from the 15-donor portfolio.
About $3.6 bn actually spent to date, 50% for
humanitarian. Additional $1 bn/year for
UNMIS.
GoSS received a total of US$7.9 billion in oil
revenues from 2005-2009, representing about
95% of its total income. Drop in oil prices in
2008 led GoSS to cut its budget by a third.
Donors met about one-quarter of total GOSS
Budget in 2009 – significant increase in %.
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Netherlands,
EC, 15%
12%
Norway, 9%
Canada, 5%
Sweden, 5%
UK, 14%
Other, 11%
Denmark, 3%
USA, 34%
Germany, 3%
Belgium, 0.3%
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Donor contributions to CPPB have been only partially successful,
because:
 Donor policies and strategies did not fully take into account
key drivers of violence
 This led to an overemphasis of basic services and a relative
neglect of security, policing and the rule of law, which are
essential in state formation.
A dominant theory of change has emerged based on the
conceptual assumption that ‘all development contributes to
CPPB’.
This leads to discourse around ‘post-conflict recovery’ and ‘peace
dividends’, on which the aid architecture was based, but is of
questionable relevance in a context where continuing insecurity,
humanitarian need and political fragility are the defining features.
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Donor coordination limited to sharing information, and rarely is
there a joint donor approach to addressing the immediate causes
of violence.
Reasons = (1) high level donor meetings (mostly on CPA)
confined to Khartoum/abroad; (2) Joint mechanisms usually only
about harmonization with GoSS; (3) flexibility constrained by 3-5
year programmes (long procurement/capacity building).
Too much emphasis on organised IDP/refugee returns, not
enough on spontaneous return and community-based
reintegration.
The limited capacity of GoSS in determining a strategic
direction for aid policy has, in turn, impaired the development of
a clear joint donor policy.
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CPPB requires field presence and flexibility. USAID
performed best on this.
The slow and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures
associated with most of the pooled funding
mechanisms (only 20% of total donor funding) have
undermined the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of
programmes. Funding mechanisms such as the MDTF,
which score highly on donor coordination,
harmonization, and to some extent government
ownership have failed to deliver on the ground.
There have been seven major pooled funds, and there
is evidence to show that those managed by contractors
have performed more efficiently
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The conflict analysis highlighted the importance of
linking development activities to local peace building
in three respects: the recognition of key drivers of
violence; the appropriate geographical placement of
assistance in areas most prone to violence; and the
institutional support necessary to uphold peaceful
relations within communities.
The most effective programmes are those that have
promoted linkages with the wider governance and
security environment, including building capacities in
local government.
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Recent improvements in supporting security
sector reform (SPLA, judiciary, police), but
UNMIS failure to address civilian security.
Donors slow to support decentralisation and
pluralism. Over-emphasis on strengthening
central (Juba) institutions? And formal
governance rather than links to customary law.
Greater emphasis should have been given to
alternative livelihoods. Particular problems
with cattle ownership and youth.
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Little correlation between supply of basic
services and incidence of violent conflict. In
most States the challenge is to ensure security
before benefits of services can be realised. Local
conflict analysis required.
Local Government Act seeks to extend the
formal justice system to county level, but
unclear boundaries and tensions between this
and customary law. More training and
integration of chiefs and sub-chiefs required.
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In dynamic conflict settings, an analysis of the
political economy of the transition from war to
peace must be constantly updated.
Aid is not a neutral constituent, and some
donors have been wrong in trying to separate
aid from political dialogue.
There are certain sectors – security, policing,
rule of law – where international support is of
greater priority than basic services.
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Several of the pooled funds have been highly
inefficient. By contrast, some bilateral
interventions have provided the most effective
support towards CPPB, based on frequent
monitoring and, most importantly, sufficient
number and continuity of staff on the
ground.
There has been insufficient assistance given
towards preparing Southern Sudan for
secession.
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