Transcript The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative Independent Assessments of World Bank and IMF Support by Operations Evaluation Department & Independent Evaluation Office Presented to the DAC Evaluation Network November.

The Poverty Reduction
Strategy Initiative
Independent Assessments of
World Bank and IMF Support
by
Operations Evaluation Department &
Independent Evaluation Office
Presented to the DAC Evaluation Network
November 9, 2004
Gregory K. Ingram
Two evaluations with joint background work
• Ten country case studies with agreed
methodology; four produced jointly
• Albania, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Vietnam
• Joint workshop to vet the preliminary
country findings
• Stakeholder survey developed jointly, and
administered in all ten countries
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Significant net benefits to collaboration
• Lower transactions costs to country
evaluees (e.g., joint mission, single reports)
• No significant cost change for evaluators
• Working together took more time
• Broader base of evaluative material for each
evaluation (e.g., ten case studies)
• Recommendations carried more weight, as
both Boards heard some common messages
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PRS Process: Achievements
• Better than Policy Framework Papers
• Increased attention to poverty diagnosis
• More stakeholders involved
• Strategies often provided a framework for
policy dialogue with governments
• Relevant and should be supported….but has
not yet reached potential
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Initiative’s design inhibits country
ownership
• PRSP is a condition for access to
IDA/PRGF
• Washington review process inhibits
ownership
• More focus on producing documents than
on improving domestic processes
• Little guidance on adaptation to country
conditions
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Donor alignment on processes,
not yet on programs
• Donors’ processes improved… where
governments already manage aid well
• Donors - including Bank - haven’t defined
how program content will change
• Lack of prioritization in PRSPs makes
alignment difficult to demonstrate
6
Strategies do not feature poverty
impact and growth
• Weak analytical base
• Narrow public expenditure focus
• Inordinate attention to the social sectors
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Aid to both PRSP and non-PRSP countries
is increasing
Millions of US$
Average Net ODA Flows Per Country
2000 - 2002
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
8 Very Early PRSP
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35 PRSP
31 Non-PRSP
Poverty impact still largely unknown
Progress on MDGs Between 1999 and 2003
(12 PRSP Countries)
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower
women
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality
Improved
NOT ENOUGH DATA
No improvement
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
NOT ENOUGH DATA
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other
diseases
NOT ENOUGH DATA
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for
development
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NOT ENOUGH DATA
Improved
NOT ENOUGH DATA
To improve the PRS process, both OED and
IEO recommend
• Allow greater country-driven flexibility in
implementation of the PRS approach
• Focus on improving domestic processes,
not on submitting documents
• Clarify the purpose and role of the JSA to
ensure that BWI assessments are
transparent, candid, and helpful as a basis
for the selectivity judgments underlying
financing decisions
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World Bank: alignment has not entailed
major changes
Percent of Commitments
CASs Before And After PRSPs
50
40
30
20
10
0
Social
Grow th
Public
Sector
Pre-PRSP CASs
11
Urban
Rural
Post-PRSP CASs
Other
World Bank: country-specific analytical
work declined
Number of Analytical Tasks
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
96-99
Required Analytical Work
12
00-04
Country-Specific Analytical Work
OED also recommends
• Change Board review processes to more
transparently support country ownership and
more effectively link to decision about the
Bank’s program
• Help identify actions with the most poverty
pay-off
• Use PRSP to define a partnership
framework with mutual accountability
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IMF: Main Findings on PRGF
• Limited alignment: PRGF programs draw on
and fit with PRSPs only to a limited extent
• Compared to ESAF, programs have more
fiscal flexibility and support increases in social
spending
• There is no evidence of generalized aid
pessimism or disinflation bias in programs
• IMF structural conditionality has been
streamlined, but judging change in Bank-Fund
aggregate conditionality is difficult
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IMF: Main Findings on Role of IMF
• Some broadening of policy space where macrostability is not a pressing concern
• Little involvement in broadening participation in
macroeconomic policy debate
• Little contribution to filling country-specific
knowledge gaps about micro-macro linkages
• Increased attention to protecting key social
objectives and more accommodation of higher aid
flows in program design
• However, institutional framework for determining
appropriate medium-term resource envelope is
vague and IMF “catalytic” role is unclear
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IEO also recommends
Clarify what the PRS approach implies for the IMF’s
own operations
•
•
in terms of IMF engagement in the PRS process
regarding PRGF program design and formulation
Strengthen prioritization and accountability on what
the IMF itself is supposed to deliver
•
Expectations on IMF’s contribution need to be matched by
appropriate staff resources
•
But even a “smaller” role for the IMF will require more
fundamental changes in its way of doing business
•
Use country-driven PRS process to set priorities
Strengthen framework for establishing the external
resource envelope
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