Slide 1

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 2

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 3

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 4

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 5

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 6

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 7

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 8

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 9

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 10

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 11

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 12

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 13

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 14

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 15

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 16

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 17

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 18

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 19

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 20

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 21

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 22

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 23

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 24

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 25

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 26

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 27

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris


Slide 28

STRIDE

Increasing
use for PNT
applications:
Positioning
Navigation
Timing

Introduction

STRIDE

GNSS Vulnerabilities

Ionospheric delay
 Tropospheric delay
 Satellite clock error
 Ephemeris error
 Signal error


LOS blockage
 Receiver noise
 Dilution of precision
 Jamming
 Spoofing


STRIDE



Forging and
transmission of
navigation
messages in order to
manipulate the
navigation solutions
of GNSS receivers



Even if a spoofer is
not fully successful,
he/she can still
create significant
errors and jam
GNSS signals over
large areas

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

GPS spoofing used to trick
a British vessel into
Chinese waters

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing



A number of GNSS
simulators have
been designed for
legal purposes



In the wrong hands,
can be used for
spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS simulators can be built with relatively low cost equipment

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
The spoofing threat continuum

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing
Meaconing







GNSS record and playback systems
record real GNSS signals and
retransmit the signals to evaluated
GNSS receivers.
While spoofing using this method
cannot be used to impose user-defined
scenarios on a receiver, it can still
cause the receiver to compute false
location fixes using the transmitted real
GNSS signals.
Furthermore, this form of attack can be
used for spoofing military GNSS
signals

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE

GNSS Spoofing

STRIDE








Objectives

This study is aimed at evaluating GPS
performance during simplistic GPS
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing is conducted using a
standalone GPS simulator, which at
present poses the greatest near-term
threat.
In this type of spoofing attack, the
spoofing signal is not synchronised (in
terms of power level, phase, Doppler
shift and data content) with the
genuine signals received by the target
GPS receiver.
This could cause the target GPS
receiver to temporarily lose position fix
lock first, before being taken over by
the spoofing signal.

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Setup

Test area located at
N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m

STRIDE

Methodology
Test Scenario

•
•

Test area located at N 2º 58.056’ E 101º 48.586’ 70m
The spoofing signal is set for position of N 2º 58’ E 101º 48’ 80m,
while the time is set at the simulator’s GPS receiver’s time.

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of GPS spoofing attacks
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

Results & Discussion
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Reference GPS receiver

Reading 1

Reading 4

Reading 2

Reading 3

Reading 5

Reading 6

STRIDE

GPS Spoofing
The effect of spoofing on GPS accuracy
Evaluated GPS receiver

Reference GPS receiver

Conclusion

STRIDE


Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between
position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are
observed for different dates and times.






This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying
GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time
dependent.
Variation in other GNSS error parameters, including ionospheric and
tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and
unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in
the variation of GPS performance.

As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error
values increase due to decreasing C/N0levels for GPS satellites
tracked by the receiver.




For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing
power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels
that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal.
This occurs as at this point, the spoofing signal power level is relatively large,
resulting in high C/N0 level and hence, improved accuracy.

STRIDE








Scope for Future Work
On the whole, this study has demonstrated the disadvantages of field
GNSS evaluations.
Without the ability to control the various GNSS error parameters, it is
difficult to effectively study the effect of any particular error parameter, in
the case of this study, spoofing, on GNSS accuracy.
This highlights the importance of conducting such tests in a controlled
environment, using a GNSS simulator as the source of genuine GNSS
signals as opposed to live GNSS signals.
This would allow the tests to be conducted under repeatable usercontrolled conditions.

STRIDE

GNSS Receiver Evaluation
GNSS Simulation

Field Evaluation





Employs live GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in open area with
clear view of the sky.
Tests scenarios are uncontrollable by
users and not repeatable.





Employs simulated GNSS signals.
Should be conducted in a RF enclosure
(e.g. anechoic chamber).
Test scenarios are user controllable
and repeatable.

STRIDE

GPS Jamming
Field Evaluation

GPS Simulation

STRIDE

GPS Functional Tests

Pendulum Instruments
GPS-12R

Magellan Z-Max

Topcon Hiper GA

Trimble R8

Trimble Geoexplorer
6000 GeoXH, Nomad
900G and Juno SB

ProMark 200

Research Collaborations

STRIDE



Effect of Radio
Frequency
Interference (RFI) on
Global Positioning
System (GPS) Static
Observations




Collaboration with
Faculty of Architecture,
Planning and Surveying
(FSPU), Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
Project Co-Leaders:



Assoc. Prof. Sr. Dr. Azman
Mohd Suldi
Mr. Ahmad Norhisyam Idris