MAY 11/2010 Repeated safety violations by air-traffic controllers led to the fatal midair collision between a sightseeing helicopter and a small private plane over.

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Transcript MAY 11/2010 Repeated safety violations by air-traffic controllers led to the fatal midair collision between a sightseeing helicopter and a small private plane over.

Slide 1

MAY 11/2010
Repeated safety violations by air-traffic
controllers led to the fatal midair collision
between a sightseeing helicopter and a
small private plane over the Hudson River in
August, according to documents released
Wednesday by federal investigators.
The National Transportation Safety Board
information paints the most detailed picture
yet of how a series of lapses by a number of
controllers-including distractions caused by
personal business-preceded the high-profile
crash that killed nine people.

The victims included five Italian tourists
celebrating the 25th wedding anniversary
of one of the passengers, as well as a
Pennsylvania businessman and two others
who died aboard the single-engine Piper
aircraft. Both craft plummeted into the river
near the West 30th Street helipad in
Manhattan, from which the chopper had
taken off just earlier. Joggers and
pedestrians watched and filmed the horrific
scene.

The board's data reinforce earlier
indications that a distracted controller,
engaged in a personal phone call while
on duty and juggling various tasks, failed
to keep proper track of the small,
propeller-powered plane. The controller,
Carlyle Turner, later told investigator he
didn't see or hear radar-system warnings
about an impending collision, the
documents indicate.

According to a transcript released
Wednesday, Mr. Turner was on a
personal call for about 2 1/2 minutes.
Five seconds before impact, he hung
up by telling the female friend on the
call: "Let me straighten ... stuff out."

Disciplinary action is pending
against Mr. Turner, according to
people familiar with the details. An
FAA spokeswoman said he
remains on paid administrative
leave, but declined to elaborate. A
spokesman for the union
representing controllers declined
to comment, and said Mr. Turner
wasn't available for comment.
In addition to shedding more light
on the actions of controllers, the
latest information highlights
apparent slipups by both pilots, as
well as other factors that
contributed to the tragedy.


Slide 2

MAY 11/2010
In analyzing the sequence of events,
investigators are raising new questions
about why Brian Jones, a controller
based at nearby Newark Liberty
International Airport, told the safety
board that he also failed to hear or see
the same collision warnings.

According to investigators, Mr. Jones
wasn't wearing glasses at work that day,
as required by his medical certificate. Mr.
Jones said that at first he thought an
aircraft, by itself, had crashed into the
river. When he realized a midair collision
had occurred, according to a summary of
his interview with investigators, "it hit
him like a ton of bricks and he was pretty
much in shock at that point."
The union also declined to make him
available for comment.
In addition, Investigators disclosed that
the experienced pilot of the sightseeing
helicopter failed to follow the normal
flight path-he climbed above 1,000 feetafter taking off from a heliport just
moments before the accident. The
collision occurred at an altitude of 1,100
feet, with neither pilot issuing any kind of
emergency warning or transmission.

In the wake of the crash, amid pressure
from federal lawmakers and local
politicians, the Federal Aviation
Administration revised flight paths and
rules for choppers and planes operating
under visual flight rules along the busy
Hudson River corridor. New Jersey's
Teteboro Airport is used by numerous
corporate jets ferrying executives in an
out of the New York area.
The latest timeline indicates that Mr.
Turner failed to follow proper procedures
from the time Steven Altman of Ambler,
Pa,, the pilot of the private plane,
requested instructions to take off from
Teterboro shortly before noon on August
8.
The pilot, according to the safety board's
information, apparently wasn't familiar
with airways over the Hudson and
requested an unusual routing.
Initially, Mr. Turner, the Teterboro
controller, failed to properly coordinate
with other controllers at nearby Newark
airport, according to one of the safety
board's report. The Newark controller
later told investigators he didn't notice
any collision warnings.
Meanwhile, an air-traffic control
supervisor on duty at Teterboro had
stepped out, contrary to normal
procedures, to run a personal errand and
therefore wasn't available to keep an eye
on preparations, according to
investigators.


Slide 3

MAY 11/2010
The new safety board documents
indicate that the plane's pilot failed to
switch radio frequencies as requested,
so controllers at Teterboro and Newark
weren't able to reach him and issue
instructions that may have averted the
crash.

The Teterboro controller missed the
pilot's incorrect acknowledgment of the
new radio frequency, according to safety
board investigators, because he was on a
personal phone call while simultaneously
monitoring radio transmissions from the
plane's pilot and a Newark airport
controller. "He's lost in the (radio
spectrum), try him again," Mr. Turner told
a fellow controller about 30 seconds
before the collision.
Once it was clear that an accident had
occurred, controllers also failed to
properly follow emergency procedures to
notify other agencies, according to
investigators.

Next month, the safety board is expected
to use the midair collision as one of its
case studies at an unusual public forum
on aviation safety scheduled for
Washington. The three-day event will
feature discussion about ways to
enhance professionalism and
concentration on the job by both pilots
and controllers.
The safety board also is expected to look
at two instances when school-age
children visited the controller tower at
New York's John F. Kennedy
International Airport and were allowed by
supervisors and their father, an
experienced controller, to briefly give
instructions to pilots. The May sessions
also will focus on various airline pilots
distracted by cell phones, personal
laptops or nonpertinent conversations
while seated behind the controls.

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