North Korea National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof.

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Transcript North Korea National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof.

North Korea

National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof. Randall Nichols

Integrity - Service - Innovation

Team 5 O’Clock XO: Team Leader:

Virginia Regester

Sub-Team 1

TJ Shakti Ramdass

Sub-Team 2 XO:

Leia Scime’-Stickles Political & Economy Jacob Smaczniak Tanya Jeffers Timothy Greiner William Pagan Military/WMD & Cyber Intel Alina Stechyshyn Henry Cline John Stechyshyn Michael Vedete

Agenda

● Executive Summary ● North Korean Overview ● U.S. Interests and Goals ● North Korean Interests and Goals ● Political Estimate ● Economic Estimate ● Military/WMD Estimate ● Cyber & Intelligence Estimate ● Conclusions ● References

Executive Summary (1 of 2)

● North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is recognized as a totalitarian state ● It functions as a single-party military dictating “Juche” (self-reliant) republic ● Death of Kim Jong IL and his young son Kim Jong Un’s appointed as North Korea’s Supreme Leader, have developed many unknowns about the political climate ● As a centrally directed and least open economy that faces many chronic problems, impacts of recent changes pose several questions about the country’s future and stability

Executive Summary (2 of 2)

● North Korea’s nuclear, missile and other asymmetric military capabilities is a concern to the U.S. and presents challenges to regional security and stability ● Recent nuclear tests and overt threats by the new leader required a full analysis to determine North Korea’s intentions and capabilities ● Using the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) diagnostic technique, critical questions were analyzed against several hypothesis.

Executive Summary Political and Leadership Hypothesis Will North Korea collapse under the Kim Jong Un regime?

● H1. North Korea will continue to survive as it always has; the situation will remain status quo. China will continue to support yet disagree with North Korea’s nuclear program ● H2. North Korea will not collapse under Kim Jong Un. Kim's replacement of senior officials in reality makes room for change and growth. China will remain an ally. ● H3. North Korea will collapse. China will have reached it's limit and despite remaining an ally will be forced to use a strong arm

Executive Summary Economic Hypothesis Will N. Korean economic reforms stabilize the country’s economy?

● H1: The new economic reforms are legitimate means being pursued to improve N. Korea’s economy and standard of living. Kim Jong Un will make good on his economic reform and the economy will stabilize. Foreign aid will be necessary in the beginning but this need will die as the country gains financial independence.

● H2: The economic reforms are only rhetoric used to bolster Kim Jong Un’s position and regime hold on the country. Kim Jong Un sees the black market as a source of revenue and method of barter. However, like a double edged sword the black market will also continue to undermine any economic reform

Executive Summary Conventional Military Hypothesis Does North Korea have a credible conventional military force?

● H1. North Korea has a strong conventional military, capable of engaging in total War with S. Korea and the U.S.

● H2. North Korea’s has a weak conventional military that is no threat to South Korea.

● H3. North Korea has a capable military that could engage South Korea with the correct strategy

Executive Summary Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Hypothesis Does North Korea have the capability of launching a nuclear or chemical missile at the U.S.?

● H1. North Korea currently had a formidable WMD program with the capability of launching an armed missile on the U.S.

● H2. North Korea has a credible WMD program but does not possess the capability launching an armed missile on the U.S.

● H3. North Korea’s WMD program is all a ruse and does not possess credible capabilities.

Executive Summary Cyber and Intelligence Hypothesis Has the DPRK developed a sufficient cyber force to really threaten the ROK or the US?

● H1: NK has a formidable cyber force capable of launching significant attacks against the ROK or the US.

● H2: NK’s cyber warfare program is not technically sophisticated to attack the ROK or the US.

Executive Summary Political Indicators (1 of 2 )

● Despite China’s condemnation of North Korea’s recent nuclear test, they will remain a strong ally ● De-emphasizing the role of the military and placing KWP in control of the government ● Key leadership changes that advocate commercial/economic changes and support Kim Jong Un ● Regime survival through the pre- establishment of key advisors and supporters by Kim Jong IL before his death ● Shaping public image of Kim Jong Un in line as role of Supreme Leader ● North Korea does not want war but wants to be recognized as a world power

Executive Summary Political Indicators (2 of 2)

● History of failed diplomacy to denuclearize North Korea ● North Korea’s defiance of UN sanctions and pull out of Six Party Talks ● China’s condemnation and renewed interest in the Six Party process when its security was jeopardized by North Korea’s third nuclear test

Executive Summary Economic Indicators

● North Korea is in need of hard currency, bringing close or more to $1 Billion a year in revenue.

● The trading system is almost shut down do to illegal activities in the black market where everything is cheaper.

● North Korea started to deal with other countries and now the demand is so high that is hard to stop.

● North Korea haven’t being able to venture further with this industry do to his restricted market ● They lack reliable energy to continue their projects ● North Korea relies on other countries especially China for help in their mining industry do to the lack of machinery ● In the long - run there will be change

Executive Summary Military Indicators

● Multiple conflicts resulting in death of both North Korean and South Korean personnel have resulted in threats but no increase in military action ● North Korean and South Korean conflicts highlights lack of military technological advantage ● Fuel shortages and replacement and maintenance of aged equipment have reduced number of sorties and military maneuver ● Known Special Forces operations shows that they have already infiltrated South Korea multiple times ● North Korean military continues to have live drills to examine war fighting capabilities ● Historically China has assisted NK in past wars ● China’s admonition of North Korea’s brazen threats of war has them reaching out diplomatically towards the US

Executive Summary WMD Indicators (1 of 3)

● No evidence exists that suggests NK has tested ICBM technology ● Stanford's Siegfried Hecker says the 2013 nuclear test takes NK 1 step closer to miniaturizing a missile ready weapon.

● December 2012 missile satellite launch aligned with commemoration of 1st year death anniversary of Kim Jong-IL ● US research community deems the satellite tumbling, dead and likely not communicating.

● Rocket portion of the launch seemed successful ● US policy is to execute “strategic patience” calls to increase pressure on NK sanctions to encourage the state to follow through on commitments to end its nuclear weapons development.

● Six Party talks broke down 2009 when NK indicated it would no longer participate

Executive Summary WMD Indicators (2 of 3 )

● Key to understand NK intention to nuclear weapons program ● If NK nuclear weapons program is to act as a deterrent to ROK & US invasion then hope remains for diplomacy.

● If NK wants to threaten US and other targets with ICBM the other acts of deterrence are necessary ● US policy toward NK has failed to reduce threat to the region ● US withdrew tactical Nuclear Weapons in 1991 ● With recent February NK test and ROK belief that NK is not likely to give up on nuclear weapons most believe either US returns tactical missiles or ROK develops its own arsenal.

● Further sanctions coming ○ NK already faces a wide range of sanctions to inhibit nuclear production ○ Susan Rice (US ambassador to the United Nations) Security counsel will likely look to further sanctions

Executive Summary WMD Indicators (3 of 3)

● China may be encouraged to more strongly enforce existing NK sanctions if they believe ROK & Japan plan to develop their own Nuclear arsenal

Executive Summary Cyber Indicators (1 of 2)

● Increasing North Korean interest in gathering foreign intelligence on weapons and nuclear systems ● Primary cyber attack targets are South Korean government, commerce and military ● China provides means for cyber connectivity such as fiber, servers and key network hardware ● North Korea continues to launch most attacks from outside its country ● Russian teachers brought in to teach cyber and/or students are sent to China or Russia for training ● China is increasingly suspected of using North Korean hackers to attack South Korean targets giving China plausible deniability

Executive Summary Cyber Indicators (2 of 2)

● Computer experts are trained as hackers, denying most attacks ● ● North Korea is said to have between 3,000 and 4,000 cyber warriors while South Korea only has 400 The target of 2013’s attack -Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. - is concerning

Executive Summary Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (1 of 2) Political Estimate

● High confidence that the Kim Jong Un Regime will not collapse and will maintain control over the country ● Focus of country is to maintain nuclear capabilities as a defense and resuscitate its failing economy ● Renewal of six Party talks with North Korea is not likely

Economic Estimate

● Fundamental changes are likely to occur in North Korean economy but it will be slow ● Economic reforms and black-market activities will be central towards resuscitating North Korea’s economy ● Openness of country will continuously grow with continued advancement of available technology and expansion of tourism ● China will do what is necessary to ensure North Korea’s stability

Executive Summary Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (2 of 2) Military and WMD Estimate

● Despite the threats made, North Korea will not be the one to strike first to start a war ● Military capabilities will focus on pursuing and improving asymmetrical capabilities ● Nuclear program and capabilities is the center of maintaining North Korea’s philosophy of “Juche” ● Despite UN Sanctions, North Korea will continue with weapons trade and development of WMD.

● Likely that North Korea has developed a nuclear warhead capable of being delivered by their Nodong missile

Cyber Estimate

● North Korea will emerge as a country with formidable cyber warfare capabilities

Executive Summary Final Analysis (1 of 2)

● Kim Jong Un’s Regime will not follow the same tactics of using nuclear threats to negotiate and get US-SK concessions.

● The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will not gamble everything in launching a surprise attack on South Korea unless provoked ● Kim Jong Un’s Regime will continue to pursue the DPRK’s nuclear program and focus on a new strategy with the potential to fundamentally change the country.

Executive Summary Final Analysis (2 of 2)

● DPRK’s New Strategy: ○ Continue to build and expand DPRK’s nuclear program and resuscitate a failing economic ○ Nuclear program provides a means to improve the country’s economy through weapons and technological trade ○ Nuclear program provides a deterrence and security umbrella to the country’s sovereignty - “Juche” ○ ○ Successful test of nuclear weapon will give North Korea national equality with the major nuclear powers Focus on economic reforms to rebuild the country’s economy

Overview of North Korea

State Snapshot

Integrity - Service - Innovation

North Korean Overview (1 of 5) Capital Language Population

PYONGYANG Korean 24,720,407

Location

● East Asia ● Northern part of Korean peninsula

Borders

● Russia, China and South Korea ● Sea of Japan, Korea Bay & Yellow Sea

Size:

● 120,538 sq km (~ 74,898 sq miles)

Government

● Communist ● Kim Jung Un ● No US Embassy ● 9 Provinces ● 2 Municipalities

North Korean Overview (2 of 5) Military

● North Korean People’s Army ● Ground Forces ● Navy ● Air Force ● Civil Securities Forces ○ 22 active divisions

Economy

● Centrally directed and closed market ● Revenue: $3.2 Billion ● Expenditure: $3.3 Billion ● Debt. $12.5 Billion (2001)

Natural Resources

● Core, lead, tungsten, zinc graphite, magnesium, zinc, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salts, fluorspar, hydropower

North Korean Overview (3 of 5) Agriculture

● rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, cattle, pigs, pork and eggs

Industries

● Military products, machine building, electrical power, mining, tourism, food processing, metallurgy and chemicals

Broadcast Media

● No independent media outlets ● Only 4, all are government owned and pre-tuned to Korean government approved channels

Dependency Ratio

● 45.2 %

North Korean Overview (4 of 5) Ethnic Groups

● small population of Chinese ● few Japanese ● mostly homogenous

Religion

● Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christians

Education

● 100% of the population above the age of 15 are literate

Profession

● not allowed to chose ● cannot change easily

North Korean Overview (5 of 5) Allies

● Russia and China (Both very perturbed by NK 3rd nuclear test) ● Diplomatic relations with 165 states ● No diplomatic relations between US & NK

Refugees

● Thousands fleeing to China due to grave economic state of NK ● Political oppression and starvation ● South Korea not recognized as legitimate state

Disputes

● Islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers with China ● Military demarcation line between North & South Korea

Criminal Activity

● Human trafficking ● Drug trade ● Cybercrime

National Interests and Goals

Integrity - Service - Innovation

U.S. National Interests

● Prevent, deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons attacks on the U.S. and its military forces abroad ● Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery systems ● Promote the well-being of US allies and friends and protect them from external aggression ○ South Korea ○ Taiwan ○ Japan ● Prevent, manage & if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflict in important geographical regions

U.S. Strategic Goals with North Korea

● Prevent DPRK from building, using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or neighboring countries ● Stop DPRK from stockpiling, using and distributing WMD, specifically chemical and biological munitions ● Reduce the development and sale of sophisticated ballistic missiles to other nations or terrorists ● Reduce the likelihood of conventional military conflict between North and South Korea ● Neutralize China’s effects on North Korea

North Korean Interests and Goals

● The reunification of the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms ● North Korea’s goal is to take the strategic lead in inter Korean relations ○ Views the entire peninsula as its sovereign territory ● Defending against further encroachment by US imperialists ● Regime survival ● Self-sufficient “Juche” economy without giving up its nuclear arms

Political Estimate

Integrity - Service - Innovation

Political Estimate - Agenda

● Overview ● Hypothesis ● Indicators and Evidence/Arguments ● ACH Matrix ● ACH Analysis ● Key Judgments & Outcomes ● Conclusions

Political Overview

● North Korea functions as a single-party state under a totalitarian dictatorship ● National ideology “Juche” meaning self-reliance or self-dependence ○ ○ An application of Marxism-Leninism.

Adopted by Kim Jong IL in the 1970’s ○ Retitled Kim II Sungism ● In December 2011 Kim Jong Un appointed supreme ruler after presiding ruler and his father, Kim Jong IL passed away ● Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) had died during Kim Jong IL is now on the uprise with the new supreme ruler Kim Jong Un ● All government officials belong to this KWP ● A few minor political parties are allowed to exist in name only

North Korean Supreme Leader

● Kim Jong Un, declared Supreme Leader December 2011 ○ ■ ■ complete power for every domain Law Administration ■ Regulations ● Age: 30s, creates lack of ○ experience ○ ○ training ● Father, Kim Jong IL created unique decision model ○ knowledge more formal ○ institution based ● Youngest of three

Is Kim Jong Un ready?

● Enjoys high end luxury goods ○ ○ ○ perfume bathroom fittings alcohol ○ ○ electronics watches ● No political or military experience before taking putative control of military ● Became leader in his 30’s vs his father at 53 ● Likes to party ○ luxury yacht ○ private island ○ celebrities

Regents Closest to Supreme Leader

● Regents act as advisors and assist in decision making ○ Were put in place by Kim Jong IL ○ Primary purpose to ensure Kim Regime control ● Kim Kyong Hui (Aunt) ○ only person allowed to verbally discuss policy ○ has veto power, except Kim Jung Un ○ protect Kim family equities ○ provide Kim Jong-un leadership training ● Jang Song Taek (Uncle) ○ considered ‘control tower’ ○ prioritizes leaders paperwork, cannot alter it ○ maintains control of economic & internal security portfolios ○ was Kim Jong IL’s closest and trusted advisor ○ speculation that he was the one in control ● Choe Ryong Hae (VMAR) ○ ensures loyalty to military ○ does not report through Jang Song Taek

Government Structure Overview (1 of 2)

● Key entities that control the government of the DPRK ○ The Cabinet, formerly known as the State Administration Council (SAC) ■ administers the ministries ■ has a significant role in implementing policy ■ headed by the premier and is the dominant administrative and executive agency ○ The NDC ■ responsible for external and internal security ■ assumed a significant role in influencing policy under ○ Kim Jong IL The Politburo of the Central People’s Committee ■ The top policy making body of the KWP ■ the dominant social institution in North Korea.

Government Structure Overview (2 of 2)

● The Supreme People’s Assembly ○ Officially, the DPRK’s legislature ○ Is the highest organ of state power ○ members are elected every 4 years ○ usually holds only two meetings annually, each lasting a few days ○ A standing committee elected by the SPA performs legislative functions and appoints judges to highest court ○ serves only to ratify decisions made by the ruling KWP ● North Korea's judiciary is "accountable" to the SPA and the president. ● Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and two provincial-level municipalities ○ Pyongyang and Nasun (also known as Najin-Sonbong) ● North Korea is also divided into nine military districts.

Central Committee Department Consists of 4 Departments

● Political Bureau ○ Full members reduced to 17 ■ 5 military/security fractions ■ 12 party/government fractions ● Secretariat is Similar to US Secret Service & White House Office ● Central Inspection Commission Regulates membership within Korean Workers Party (KWP) ● Central Military Commission ○ ○ development & implementation of KWP military policies Coordinates with National Defense Commission (NDC) to command and control military/military industries

National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK NDC)

Committee Department

R

esponsibilities

● Formulate & implement KWPs ○ political ○ economic ○ internal security ○ military policies ● Regulate personnel appointments within ○ party ○ government ○ Military ● Regulate DPRKs ○ press ○ media ○ cultural institutions

Current Situation

● China is perturbed by North Korea’s recent nuclear testing. ● North Korea wants to be recognized as a global nuclear power ● Current Laws are merely to protect regimes rule ● Kim Jong Un has promised economic reform ● Kim Jong Un needs to develop relationships with others to effectively rule ● Relies on groups of regents and advisors for policy making although he is supreme leader ● Improving ties between North & South ○ South Korea setting aside special tax to help one day reunify the two provinces ○ Both countries set up lottery reunification days for families split by the Korean War ○ Reunification is done both in person and online (Sang-Hun, 2013)

Political and Leadership Hypothesis Will North Korea collapse under the Kim Jong Un regime?

World Governance Indicators (1 of 2)

● World Governance Indicators (WGI) indicates North Korea's political stability has improved over the past couple of years following its power transition ● WGI data reflect perceptions of the likelihood that a government will be destabilized or overthrown ○ by unconstitutional or violent means ○ by politically motivated violence and terrorism ● WGI covers six categories: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruptio

World Governance Indicators (2 of 2)

● ● North Korea’s aggregate indicator of "political stability and absence of violence" came to 0.01 in 2012, up from minus 0.32 a year earlier.

● North Korea stood in the middle among 215 countries surveyed in terms of political stability in 2012 ● WGI data in context for North Korea ○ 1996- expectation of collapse in stability reached -0.51 upon founder Kim IL Sung’s death ○ 2008- the figure rose to 0.54 under son Kim Jong IL leadership ○ 2010- the figure plunged to -0.38 after Kim Jong IL health ○ ○ deteriorated 2011- there was minimal increase to -0.32 2012 rose again to 0.01 due to “political stability and absence of violence”

WGI: Aggregate Indicator Chart

WGI: Aggregate Indicator Data

● North Korea ranked low in the remaining categories: ○ level of voice and accountability (reflects freedom of expression and citizen participation in selecting their government) -2.17

○ government effectiveness -1.93

○ rule of law -1.25

● Little change from previous year

Leadership Changes ( 1 of 2)

● Kim Jong Un has replaced over 44% of government, military and senior officials ○ many were appointed by his father Kim Jong IL ○ these included the 4 highest ranking officials in 2012 ● Kim Jong Un has, for the 4th time, changed DPRK’s army chief ○ Gen. Kim Kyok Sik was ousted ■ General was well known to be harsh against South Korea ■ Directly responsible for 2 attacks against South Korea ○ 69 year old Gen. Ri Young Gil was appointed ■ General’s position on South Korea is yet to be determined

Leadership Changes (2 of 2)

● Kim Jong Un has also replaced economic advisor in the Political Bureau ○ Vice Marshall Kim Jong Gak was replaced ○ Pak Pung Ju was appointed ■ Ju as already presided over the economic reforms plans ■ Ju has close ties with Jang Song Thaek and wife, Kim Jong Un’s aunt and uncle ● Results of these changes has the Korean Workers Party taking prominence over the military within the government

Speculations on Leadership Changes

● Newly appointed officials are loyal to Kim Jong Un himself and support his rule ● Despite continued pursuit of its nuclear program, Kim Jong Un does not want the military to have the most power. ● Concerns of the military hindering his attempts at economic reform ● Kim Jong Un attempt to show the international community that as promised more resources would be directed towards economic reform

Past Attempts at US Diplomacy (1900s) Early 1990’s

● North Korea backed out of agreements ● Removed themselves from the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

1994

– Agreed framework under Clinton administration ● Agreement provided light water reactors and heavy fuel oil in exchange for a cease and desist of NK plutonium program ● Problems with US Funding & compliance by NK from the beginning ● Agreement suspended in 2003 due to uranium enrichment in 2002 ○ Results in kick out of inspectors from the Yongbyon site in 2006 ○ North Korea officially withdraws from NPT 2006. ● Agreement officially terminated in 2006

More Recent Diplomatic Attempts (1 of 2)

●

2003-2007

: “Six- Party” talks under the George W. Bush administration is established ( US, China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan ) ●

2005

: Joint Statement with NK agreeing to abandon nuclear weapons program (NWP) in exchange for aid ●

2006:

assets Agreement ends after issues with releasing NK ●

Feb 2007:

Agreement for cease and desist of Pyongyang’s nuclear plant in exchange for economic aid and diplomatic benefits occurs

More Recent Diplomatic Attempts (2 of 2)

●

Oct 2007:

Agreement is updated ○ Included the lifting of US sanctions & removal of NK as state sponsored terrorist ○ Tradeoff in exchange for disablement of Yongbyon plant ● Disagreements that occurred between protocol verification stalled process ●

2008

○ Yongbyon was partially taken apart ○ US removed North Korea from their terrorist state list ○ No multilateral negotiations on NK nuclear program since ○ North Korean behavior and failure to fulfill agreements has blocked any efforts to restart the “Six-Party” talks

Failed Agreements Under Obama Administration

● Obama administration inherited very complex situation where neither North Korea or the US fully completed their ends of pre existing “Six Party” denuclearization agreements.

● Prior to Obama’s 1st term North Korea declared that denuclearization and normalization could not be linked. ● Direct contradiction of the Six-Party joint agreement existed ● North Korea launches a multistage rocket with ballistic missile technology in 2009 and runs a second nuclear test ● The UN Security Council (UNSC) responded with Resolution 1718 condemning the North Korea for these activities ● Relations Have Deteriorated Under Obama Administration ● 2009 Strategic Patience - US could afford to wait for North Korea to make a decision regarding denuclearization

Current Diplomatic Relations (1 of 2)

● Direct Bilateral Negotiations (2011-2013) ○ 3 rounds of talk resulting from Intel that DPRK was making steady progress in the enrichment of uranium and the construction of light water reactor. ○ Result of talks = LEAP DAY AGREEMENTs ○ US position was to bind DPRK to cease tests and commit Pyongyang to denuclearization ○ Ousted weeks later with DPRK announcement of failed satellite launch

Current Diplomatic Relations (2 of 2)

● Obama Administration did not accept DPRK as a nuclearized state ● Currently tightening sanctions on DPRK & urging China to persuade its ally ● No direct talks have taken place since the end of President Obama’s 1st term ● March 2013: North Korea threatens rocket strikes on US mainland, Guam and Hawaii ● October 2013: US Ships enter South Korean waters and as a result North Korea threatens “a horrible disaster” on these ships

North Korea-China Alliance (1 of 2)

● China is North Korea’s most important ally and main source of food, military supplies and fuel ● Supported North Korea since providing assistance during the Korean War in 1950 ● China has lent political and economic aid ● China has opposed strong US and UN sanctions.

● Steps in diplomatically to prevent the collapse of the country and influx of refugees into China ● 1961 Sino - North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance binds China to defend NK against unprovoked aggression.

North Korea-China Alliance (2 of 2)

● China remains North Korea’s biggest trading partner ● China is worried about North Korea’s desire to grow its nuclear program ● Has banned certain chemicals and equipment from being shipped to NK ● Beijing tired of refugee influx, began building barbed wire fence along northeastern border in 2006 ● In 2006 agreed to UN Resolution 1718 after strict economic sanctions towards items beyond luxury goods was removed ● April 2013 China began moving military tanks into North Korea and conducting fly bys

China’s Interest in North Korea

● North Korea provides economic growth ○ Trade: $6 Billion in revenue in 2011 ○ Chinese firms are investing in NK, developing its mineral resources and in the process gaining concessions ● North Korea provides security buffer ○ Being an ally ensures a friendly northeastern border and buffer from SK and US forces ○ American military presence next door would disrupt several Chinese strategies.

China’s Influence on North Korea

● China’s position is complicated ○ Has financial and military upper hand ○ Strict sanctions may force NK to cooperate for the sake of their economy ○ Due to proximity of NK, China is also fearful of the young dictator imploding ○ Has asked North Korea to stop its nuclear testing, yet NK has not ● China wants North Korea to return to the “Six-Party” Talks ● Tried to influence regime to adopt policies to make North Korea a responsible member of international community

ACH Matrix

ACH Analysis

Analysis using ACH methodology indicates NK will not collapse under Kim Jong Un Higher score indicates the hypothesis that is most inconsistent with presented evidence

Summary of Key Indicators (1 of 2 )

Summary of Key Indicators (2 of 2)

Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes

● Kim Jong Un will continue to consolidate power to control the government ● The regime under Kim Jong Un will not collapse but will remain stable as he pursues a new strategy ● The new strategy will still be focused on maintaining their nuclear capabilities as a defense but will include resuscitating its failing economy ● Continued diplomatic attempts for denuclearization of North Korea will fail ● Renewal of Six Party talks with North Korea is not likely ● China will intercede only when it jeopardizes their own economic and security interests

Conclusions

● The inconsistency scores of the ACH analysis shows that Hypothesis 2 is the most likely scenario to the question presented ○ North Korea will not collapse under Kim Jong Un. ○ Kim's replacement of senior officials in makes room for change and growth. ○ China will remain an ally. ● However, North Korea is an enigma and the ACH analysis also shows that Hypothesis 1 could be the second most likely scenario.

● Indications of North Korea returning to Six Party talks with no change in denuclearization stance would be key in a change to supporting this hypothesis ● The constant in both hypothesis is that Kim Jong Un’s regime will remain stable

Economic Estimate

Integrity - Service - Innovation

Economic Estimate - Agenda

● Overview ● Hypothesis ● Indicators and Evidence/Arguments ● ACH Matrix ● ACH Analysis ● Key Judgments & Outcomes ● Conclusions

Economic Overview

● Centrally directed and least open economies in the world ● Plagued with chronic economic problems ● Industrial capital stock is unrecoverable due to years of underinvestment, shortages in material, and lack of maintenance ● “Military” first policy absorbs a majority of the country’s income as well as the elite class ● Failed crops and widespread famine in 1995 devastated the country ● Many North Koreans suffer from malnutrition and poor living conditions ● UN economic sanctions amplifies the impacts of a failing economy

Societal Infrastructure Mass Starvation

● Food shortages since the 1990’s ○ Caused by minimal available land for farming (14% of total) ○ Several natural disasters ● According to UNICEF, in 2011 a quarter of the population did not have enough to eat ● China provides 80% of North Korea’s consumer goods and almost half of their food

Poor Public Health

● Public healthcare system collapsed in 90’s ● Hospitals located only in prioritized areas like Pyongyang ● Government claims there is Universal health care

Views of the people

● Kim Jong Un is too young and not experienced enough ● North Koreans believe in their country but the do not trust or rely on the government for anything; instead they rely on the black market

Internet Accessibility

● Internet is provided by 1 state controlled service provider and is available only to the government and military ● Citizens along China's border have limited illegal access to Chinese internet * ● One cybercafe in Pyongyang, runs on the Red Star operating system** ● Only a few dozen people in all of North Korea have unfiltered Internet*** ● Smartphones not allowed to data and internet capabilities ● In Feb. 2013 allowed tourists to have Internet access via their 3G cellphones in hotels.

○ Access was yanked within less than a month (Choney, 2013) ● UN claims Internet is a basic human right

Media Accessibility

● 4 pre-tuned government owned stations ○ No independent media outlets ● Air only approved programming ● Outside media access is illegal accessed via China and the black market ● Limited press access ● Journalists can be sent to “revolutionization” camps for published mistakes.* ○ Including simple typos ● No Opinion other than the regimes

Exports/Imports Overview

China is North Korea's biggest trading partner North Korea imports much more than it produces despite Juche ideology

Industries follow “Juche” principle

Juche Ideology: self sufficient - self reliant

Chemicals

● Pre-cursors to nuclear & chemical weapons ○ Examples: ■ Vinalon aka Juche Fiber Co-Invented by Lee Sung Ki* ■ Carbide production to make sulphur mustard

Manufacturing

● Industrial grade weaned decades ago ● But toys serve the Juche purpose ○ Made from DPRK polymer tech. ○ ○ Scraps used to make toys “They tell the story”** Juche Toys

North Korean Industries

● Principal Industry is Mining ● Coal ○ 1.8 billion tons of anthracite coal reserve. ○ No oil or gas reserves. ○ Demand greater than production resulting in energy shortages ■ Due lack of modern and efficient equipment ● Magnesite ○ Has 490 million ton deposit reserve ○ Used to make ceramics for export and domestic industrial ceramics ● North Korea has great supply of over 15 minerals in demand worldwide. *

Black Market

● Existed for decades ● Created by North Koreans as means of survival ○ during famines caused by food shortages ○ natural disasters ● Provides everything from ○ food and entertainment to ○ protection and hard foreign money ● Become the primary source of black-market items globally ● Conducts weapons trafficking to Iran, drugs and counterfeit currency* ● From the black markets came “Office 39”

“Office 39” (Bureau 39)

● Secret government organization that seeks ways to maintain the foreign currency of North Korea's leader ● Established in 1970s ● Is suspected of being involved in illegal activities ○ counterfeiting ○ production of controlled substances (methamphetamine and heroin) ○ International insurance fraud ● Considered critical to leader’s power base ○ enables buying political support ○ “Slush fund” ● Helps fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons program ○ hard foreign currency for arms trade ● Annual coffers are from $500 million to $1 billion annually ● Primary source of global black market items

Current Situation

● Wealth is concentrated in Pyongyang and few other urban centers ● Other parts are left fighting for basic needs ● Dependent on China for food supply and energy resources* (Bajoria, 2013) ● $6 Billion revenue for China in 2011 ● Great consideration for Chinese or German economic reform ● No Effective tax system in place ● The state is main source of employment ● Entrepreneurship is non existent ● $1 US = $900 KPW (won) (Google Currency Converter) ● Difficult to grasp true economic state ● NK does not publish any reliable data (Heritage foundation, 2013)

Economic Hypothesis Will N. Korean economic reforms stabilize the country’s economy?

New Economic Premier

● 1962 - manager of Yongchon food factory ● 1980 - alternative member of (KWP) Central Committee ● 1983 - Chief of Namhung Youth Chemical Combine Committee ● 1993 - Vice director of KWP’s Light Industry Department

Pak Pong Ju (born 10/24/1939)

Pak Pong Ju’s Position

● 1998 - Appointed to Chemical Industries Portfolio ● 2003 - Appointed as Premier* of North Korea ○ Represents and leads the activity of the Cabinet ○ Believed to have lead July 1st Economic Management Reform Measure of 2002 ● 2007 - Relieved of duties ○ misused oil funds ○ too focused on economic ideas from China instead of military based plans by Kim Song IL ● April, 2013 - Reappointed as Premier after North Korea announced creation of nuclear bomb building and stronger economy*

Pak Pong Ju’s Influence

● Perceived as a mastermind of economic reform ● Reappointment as Premier hints towards a more relaxed economic policy ● Wants to balance military with economic construction ● Has already investigated/identified areas of need and projects throughout NK ○ Construction of children’s and dental hospital ○ Iron/Steel and Industrial/Electrical Complexes ○ Chemical Complex ○ Hydropower station ● Appeals to workers by dressing equally to them

New Economic Plan

● NK has been focusing on strengthening its economy by setting up more specialized economic zones ○ Zones provide industry, agricultural, economic, high-tech and tourism development zones ● NK is providing incentives for investors ○ Tax Refunds ○ Lifting Tariffs ○ Use of Foreign Currency ○ Right to set prices ○ Free cell phone & internet access ● ○ and more ● Investors deterred due to sanctions ● Lure in foreign capital Rare International conference held in Pyongyang incl. US

Pyongyang International Conference

● North Korea has created a group to assist potential foreign investors, state media and the organizers ● Held international conference in Pyongyang ● Consisted of academics and experts from 13 countries — including the US, Canada, India, China, Malaysia and Vietnam — and 60 North Korean participants ● US Participation allows for monitoring of North Korean economic plans ● Special economic zones as a means of enticing foreign investment has existed since the 1990s.

● Rason Special Economic Zone shown success after recently reinvented as a joint North Korea-China project.

● Kaesong Industrial Complex is another successful joint industrial zone

Creation of An Economic Department

● Established June 2013 ● All economic matters to be approved by new department ● All companies must be approved in order to be established, changed, merged or shut down ● Has the ability to punish it’s own officials ● Other departments (ie military, executive) must also gain prior approval to earning foreign currency, goods and services

New Economic Management Measures

● June 28 AKA “6.28 Policy.” ● A reform on Agriculture that launched October 1, 2012 ○ Reduce the size of agricultural production units to 4-6 people* ○ Allow farmers to keep part of their yields. ○ State will take 50-70% of the target production ○ Farmers will get to keep 30-50% of total yield ○ If the farmers exceed the target then they get to keep the surplus.

○ Any left over produce kept by the farm can be sold in the market at market prices not state fixed prices ○ Private investment is allowing as long as it is under the state or cooperative enterprises

Problems With 6.28

● During the 2012 harvest, farmers could not keep their promised 30% because 90% of total harvest was taken by the military ● North Korean government does not have a clear harvest plan for 2013 ● Some zones are impossible to farm due to steep mountain slopes and rocky terrain ● Farmers feel they will be fooled again

Consideration for China-Like Reform

● In the late 1970’s China divides land owned by the state amongst farmers and dissolved all state-run farms.* ● Result: Agriculture yield skyrocketed within the 1st 5 five to six years of implementation ● Kim Jong Un believes in this plan** ● Firing anyone that is not in compliance with his economic reform

Kaesong Industrial Complex (1 of 2)

● A 25 sq mile region located on the border of North and South Korea ● Brought in $90 million annually into DPRK* ● DPRK : Provides land & workers** ● South Korea: Provides Utilities, Resources Constructs and Operates complex***

Kaesong Industrial Complex (2 of 2)

● Development lead by South Korean conglomerate Hyundai ● Opened in Dec. 2004 as a result of the first ever summit between the Koreas ● Provides cheap labor for South Korea and brings in foreign currency for North Korea ● Used to compete with China and to set an example of inter-Korean business ● Intended to jumpstart North Korean economy ● South Korean managers - North Korean workers

KIC Pay Break Down Hours worked

2006: ~55.2 hrs/wk 2012: ~61.6 hrs/wk

Annual wage increase of 5%

Base salary Salary after Overtime

2004: ~$50/mth 2013: ~ $70/mth 2004: ~$63/mth 2013: ~$130/mth ● Wages paid in US dollars to DPRK officials ● 15% to “social security” ● 30% to “socio-cultural policy entitlements” ● 55% to given to the workers in either won or coupons. ○ exchange rate for workers is only a fraction of the US dollar

KIC Rising Tensions

● Pyongyang progressively getting mad at Seoul ○ Joint military drills with the US ○ Backing the UN’s sanctions on NK for nuclear tests ● NK send a message that they’re not reliant on Keasong’s revenue ● Resulted in Shutdown April, 2013 - September, 2013 ● NK recalled all 53,000 workers ● NK denied all trucks and deliveries to the facility

KIC’s

Future

● After the 5 month stalemate, an agreement was reached and Kaesong is reopened ● Rumors of provisions in the agreement include: o No further shutdowns in the future o Raise workers’ salary to $300 a month ● ● ● o Annual wage increase of 10%-12% Unsure of Kaesong’s future; 11 companies either ended operations or completely withdrew from the complex North Korean workers went from 53,000 to 43,000 The “plan” is to develop the inter-Korean park into an international industrial complex with foreign investment.

Weapons Sales (1 of 2)

● Illegal shipments of missile technology and weapons from North Korea have flowed unabated under the leadership of Kim Jong un ● Unhopeful that new leader will moderate its aggressive proliferation activities ● Ships or planes bound for Myanmar and Syria and loaded with weapons-related equipment originating in North Korea have been diverted or blocked in recent months ● DPRK’s defiance of the United Nations imposed sanctions against weapons trade ● Pyongyang has sold its military goods to at least 18 countries, mostly in Africa and the Middle East.

● U.S. officials, recent public assessments and outside experts report sales of missiles or related components to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

Weapons Sales (2 of 2)

● Kim Jong Un is believed to have a personal fortune estimated at $4 billion, partially through drug and missile sales and counterfeiting.

● August 2005 report from the Congressional Research Service said North Korea secured $1 billion from 1997 to 2000 in one area of arms deals: conventional sales with developing nations.

● Suspected that North Korea attempted to get new customers trying to sell missile technology to Nigeria and may have recently tried to sell missiles to Burma.

● North Korea is believed to make hundreds of millions of dollars annually from weapons sales ● Revenues may be shrinking,because of international pressure to avoid the unpredictable government.

Weapons Sales Chart

“North Korea, Global arms bazaar”, NBC News, October 12, 2006, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15239173/#.UoMKCvkWLT8

Development of Tourism

● Open the country to year round tourism ● 3 main areas in a specialized “zone”* ○ Paektu Mountain, Kumgang, Chilbo and Wonsan ● 400% increase in inquiries from people wanting to visit the country in 2013. ** ● Tourists will still not be able to enter from South Korea ● Chinese news reporting the allowance of day trips from Dandong City, China.

● Plans to expand air routes from: ○ Beijing/ Shanghai/ Yanji ○ Other parts of SE Asia ○ Europe ● UN Sanctions preventing development

Other Steps to Improve Economy Paving the Way Forward

● Abandon raising pigs, poultry and other grain fed animals. ○ Will focus on grass-fed animals instead ○ ○ Due to mass starvation of country Pig farms will now raise goats ○ Poultry farms will now raise rabbits.

● A more open ruler has encouraged: ○ China to invest in mines & border economics ○ Russia to upgrade cross-border rail roads ■ Also forgave D.P.R.K’ $11 billion debt.

● Allowance of small roadside and established vendors selling food and water ● October 2013, province officials directed to identify 2 cities as potential sites for development ● Creation of 2 bank cards by Foreign Trade & Koryo Banks.

North Korea’s “Gray Market”

● Black Market not really Black since the government knows about it. ● By allowing this market to thrive economic growth is encouraged.

● 8000 won/dollar vs offical 96 won/dollar ○ Gives North Koreans more money to save and invest back into the economy ○ For example: Upgrading farm & manufacturing equipment

Black Market - Weapons Trade (1 of 2) SYRIA

● Provided Syria with chemical weapons technology (CWT) since early 90’s ● Followed by the development of 2 fabrication facilities for Syria in the mid 90’s ○ These 2 facilities are high end and maintained by Syrians all year ○ At least 1 facility actually houses missiles ● Several North Korean advisors live in Syria ● Origins: Saudi government paid Syria for fighting with them in the Gulf War. This money was used to fund WMD program

Black Market - Weapons Trade (2 of 2) Iran & The Middle East

● Client of North Korea for both chemical & nuclear weapons ● Saudi money gone, so Iran now pays for and shares ownership of Syria’s program

Cuba

● Established relations in 1960 ● June 2013 D.P.R.K. Vice Minister of Foreign affairs, Choi Su Hon, visits Cuba.

○ Mission: strengthen bilateral ties ● July 2013 North Korean Ship, Chong Chon Gang was halted drug suspicions ○ Ship was carrying what appeared to be an old Soviet military radar system, missile parts and missile technology.

North Korea Export in Billions

Country North Korea 1998 0.68

1999 0.52

2002 0.83

2003 0.84

2004 1.04

2005 1.2

2006 1.28

2007 1.68

2008 2.06

2009 2 2010 2.56

North Korea Imports in Billions Country

North Korea

1998

0.95

1999

0.96

2002

1.87

2003

1.31

2004

2.04

2005

2.1

2006

2.82

2007

3.06

2008

3.57

2009

3.1

2010

3.53

ACH Matrix

ACH Analysis

Analysis using ACH methodology indicates that the new economic reforms are legitimate means being pursued to improve N. Korea’s economy and standard of living. Higher score indicates the hypothesis that is most inconsistent with presented evidence

Summary of Key Indicators

● North Korea is in need of hard currency, bringing close or more to $1 Billion a year in revenue.

● The trading system is almost shut down do to illegal activities in the black market where everything is cheaper.

● North Korea started to deal with other countries and now the demand is so high that is hard to stop.

Key Judgments & Possible Outcomes

• • • • • Farmers promised yield was taken up to a 90% towards the military Over-populated and will consume more than produced plus less options on farming animal will become another lack of resources Unless established a more open trading market pass China and South Korea their economy will still rely on their 2 neighbors for help regardless of what adjustments they do within their government Mining industries lack the resources on new machinery, sustainable energy an open market and they rely too much on other countries for their mining projects Pak’s past economic reform was the same one under Kim Jong Il by emphasizing on the workers necessity and passing the economic power to the state

Conclusions

● These reforms have already been implemented with no successful outcome ● Another way of giving false hope to the country’s working class ● In order to this reforms take a long successful effect the new president will have to expand their trading partners past China and South Korea ● Absolute power must be given to the Workers Party of Korea and continue to consolidated their power in the government.

Military Estimate Integrity - Service - Innovation

Conventional Military Estimate - Agenda

● Overview ● Hypothesis ● Indicators and Evidence/Arguments ● ACH Matrix ● ACH Analysis ● Key Judgments & Outcomes ● Conclusions

Military Overview (1 of 3)

● North Korean military is under tight control of Kim Jong Un ● As of mid 2013, North Korea’s military is believed to have approximately 1.2 million active soldiers and 5 million reserve forces ● Four military branches ○ ○ Ground Forces Navy ○ ○ Air Force Civil Security forces ● Military first policy - DPRK’s military takes priority over everything else

Military Overview (2 of 3)

North Korea’s Military Command Organization

Military Overview (3 of 3)

● North Korea is developing its military capabilities to deter an external attack ● North Korea currently possesses many missiles of varying range ● Feb. 2013 conducted 3rd nuclear test in the past 7 years ● North Korea is capable of manufacturing chemical weapons ● April-August 2012: Kim Jong Un began missile testing ● March 2013: North Korea makes preemptive nuclear threats against the US and South Korea ● April 2013: North Korea states they will retaliate against any provocation

Conventional Military Hypothesis Does North Korea have a credible conventional military force?

● H1. North Korea has a strong conventional military, capable of engaging in total War with S. Korea and the U.S.

● H2. North Korea’s has a weak conventional military that is no threat to South Korea.

● H3. North Korea has a capable military that could engage South Korea with the correct strategy

Conventional Military Forces

Ground Forces Special Forces Air Forces Naval Forces

Ground Forces Strengths

○ Size • 950,000 active soldiers (includes Special Forces) • Approx. 5 million reserve • North Korean forces outnumber US and South Korean troops 8.5 to 1

Weaknesses

○ ○ The 5 million reserve forces lack adequate training Much of the population is malnourished including the reserve army ○ Old technology, most of the 3500 tanks are from the Soviet Union in the 1940s ○ ○ Many North Korean weapon systems were developed in the 1960s and 1970s cannot compare to US and South Korean weapons In a country already relying on outside aid, feeding such a large army would be difficult

Disposition of North Korean Ground Forces

● The majority of Ground forces are located in the southern half of North Korea ● North Korea is much more concerned with maintaining the South Korean border due to Chinese support

North Korean Tunnels

● North Korea is the worlds most-tunneled nation.

● Expertise in digging tunnels for warfare was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. ○ North Korea sent about 100 tunnel warfare experts to Vietnam ○ Built tunnels for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops ○ The tunnels were instrumental in the Vietnamese victory.

● Tunnel entrances are built to withstand US chemical and biological attacks. ● Tunnels run zig-zag and have seals, air-purification units, and safe places for the troops to rest. ● North Korea is believed to have built about 20 large tunnels near the DMZ. ● A large tunnel can transport 15,000 troops per hour across the DMZ and place them behind the US troops.

North Korean Artillery

● North Korea reported to have more than 13,000 artillery guns and long-range batteries ● Artillery is capable of hitting Seoul which is 30 miles from the border (10 million people) ● Artillery advantage is an initial heavy bombardment on the capital inflicting millions of casualties at the onset of hostilities ● North Korean artillery showered front-line South Korean island with shells in November 2010 ○ killed four people ○ disputed sea border ● South Korea believes they could neutralize 70% of artillery batteries along the border in 5 days if war broke out.

North Korean Artillery Sub-Units

Live shell firing drill to examine war fighting capabilities of the mission to strike Daeyeonpyeong Island and Baengnyeong Island of SK. (Picture released March 14, 2013)

Air Force Strengths

● Stockpile of stealth transport aircraft fitted with KN-01 ● Much of the aircraft and equipment has been updated

Weaknesses

● Most aircraft was built during the Cold War and prior to 1960 ● Belief in innovation with old technology instead of modernization ● Fuel shortage has impacted readiness in cutting number of sorties ○ N. Korea avoided using aircraft against S. Korean fighter jets in May 2011

Dispositions of North Korean Air Forces

Naval Forces Strengths

● 70 attack, coastal, and midget-type submarines ● Largest Submarine force in the world ● 60% forward deployment - could be used in a surprise attack ● Naval Mine Capabilities ● 2010 - NK sank SK ship with torpedo ● Most menacing threats are their navy are small submarines ○ capable of deploying commando raiders along the South Korean coast

Weaknesses

● Limited Air detection Capabilities ● Old vessels ○ Oct 2013 a North Korean ship sunk, possibly due to old age (built in 1960’s)

Disposition of North Korean Naval Forces

NK Naval Soldiers

Drill against the “U.S. and SK regime” in an undisclosed location August 1, 2012

North Korean Naval Conflicts

● In March 2010, North Korean submarine suspected of killing 46 South Koreans in a Yellow Sea attack on their warship ● Since 1999, North and South Korean navies have fought three bloody conflicts near their disputed western maritime border.

● Battles show that the North relies heavily on the element of surprise ○ North's patrol boats used were built in the 1960s ○ Cannons on the boats are aimed manually and are considerably less accurate

Special Forces

● ● ● Largest Special forces in the world Estimated 200,000 special forces Likely to be the most highly trained, well-equipped, best fed and most motivated forces ● They have been used before in 1968 and 1996 to infiltrate South Korea and disable military equipment ● ● Work in teams of 20-30 Could be used in a guerilla style attack to create many battlefronts

Known Special Forces Operations

● 31 North Korean commandos stormed Seoul's presidential Blue House in 1968 ○ failed assassination attempt against then-President Park Chung hee ● Over 120 North Korean commandos snuck into eastern South Korea also in 1968 ○ killed 20 South Korean civilians, soldiers and police officers.

● 26 North Korean agents infiltrated South Korea's northeastern mountains after their submarine broke down in 1996 ○ sparked a manhunt ○ resulted in all but two dead ○ 13 South Korean soldiers and civilians were killed.

Incidents Between North and South Korea (1 of 2)

● January 1968 - NK Commandos stage a raid on Seoul’s presidential Blue House in attempt to assassinate President Park Chung-Hee. NK stopped 800 yards away and all are killed or captured.

● August 1974 - NK agent fires at Park during a speech. Shot misses and hits his wife.

● October 1983 - NK agents blow up a landmark in Burma before SK President arrives. 4 SK Cabinet Ministers and 16 others killed.

● November 1987 - NK agents plants and explodes bomb on SK airline, all 115 on board killed.

● September 1996 - NK submarine lands commandos on SK coast. SK engages in manhunt, 24 shot dead (11 by own hand), 1 captured, 1 unaccounted for.

Incidents Between North and South Korea (2 of 2)

● June 1999 - Yellow Sea border naval battle. NK boat with estimated 20 sailors sunk.

● June 2002 - Yellow Sea battle while Seoul hosts football world cup. SK ship sunk, 6 sailors killed. Estimated 13 North Koreans killed.

● November 2009 - NK and SK navies exchange fire on Yellow Sea border. No SK hurt. NK retreats with patrol boat in flames.

● March 2010 - Unexplained explosion near disputed border hits the Cheonan, SK warship, breaks in two. 58 sailors rescued, 46 die. (reports say it was a torpedo launched by NK submarine) ● October 2010 - NK and SK troops exchange fire across border before G20 Summit in Seoul.

● November 2010 - NK fires artillery shells onto SK border island killing 2 SK soldiers. SK exchanged fire and sent fighter jet.

North Korean Syrian and Iranian Connections (1 of 2 )

● ● ● NK has formed alliance with Syria Possible chemical weapons exchange Turkey seized a shipment of arms, ammunition and gas masks from North Korea ● Damascus and Pyongyang have had close ties for five decades ● ● Syria and NK ran joint nuclear program in mid 2000s Syrian nuclear reactor is presumed to be built by North Korea and funded by Iran ● Similarities identified with Yongbyon facility

North Korean Syrian and Iranian Connections (2 of 2 )

● 10 North Koreans technicians were killed in Israeli air strike, Operation Orchard ● ● ● Since 1970s, Pyongyang has been trading weapons and equipment to raise much-needed hard currency 1973, Pyongyang sent advisers and equipment for Syria’s sneak attack against Israel Gen Kim Kyok sik’s career was advanced due to these operations ● ● Recently reports indicate he has been fired Regime of Bashar al-Assad using NK Pilots to man attack helicopters

North Korean and Cuban Connection

● Panamanian authorities seized shipment from North Korea to Cuba ● Shipment included sophisticated Russian radar for SA-2 surface-to-air missiles ● Radar was Russian SNR-74 tracking and guidance system ● ● SA-2 missiles first developed in early 1960s Recent upgrade with modern computers, electronics and optical sensors ● Shipment is part of military cooperation to upgrade each country’s SA-2s with advanced tracking electronics

North Korea - China Alliance

● China is North Korea’s most important ally ● China sees North Korea as a buffer, however, it comes with the cost of being drawn into any North Korean military conflict with the US or South Korea.

● North Korea is critical to China's national security interests as determined from historical conflicts with Japan ● China has contingency plan to dispatch troops to North Korea in case of instability ● Relationship based on Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty established in 1961, 1981 and 2001 ○ China pledges to immediately render military assistance by all means to its ally against outside attacks ○ Renewal of Treaty is due in 2021

ACH Matrix

ACH Analysis

Analysis according to the ACH methodology indicates North Korea has a capable military that could engage South Korea with the correct strategy.

Higher score indicates the hypothesis that is most inconsistent with presented evidence

Summary of Key Indicators

Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (1 of 2)

● North Korea is capable of engaging South Korea in a war based on the size of their military but will not be the one to strike first to start it ● Continuous probes and conflicts to test military posture will continue without escalation ● If engaged in a war North Korea would need to win quickly ○ Heavy reliance on asymmetrical capabilities is expected ○ Heavy equipment deployed by naval and air forces requires extensive repairs and are outdated ○ South Korean and US equipment would out perform and outlast N. Korea ○ ○ North Korea's wartime resources, mostly stored underground, would last only two to three months North Korea has expertise in digging tunnels for warfare

Key Judgments and Possible Outcomes (2 of 2)

● China’s role should not be underestimated in the event of open hostilities ○ ○ Diplomacy would be engaged first to de-escalate a war situation China’s national interests would be paramount to protect and would influence their level of response

Conclusions (1 of 2)

● The inconsistency scores of the ACH analysis shows that Hypothesis 3 is the most likely scenario to the question presented ○ North Korea has a capable military that could engage South Korea with the correct strategy ● North Korea is capable of engaging South Korea in war based on the size of their military ● In a conventional war North Korea would need to win quickly ● S. Korean and US equipment would out perform and outlast N. Korea ● Much of N. Korean Military is outdated and poorly trained ● North Korean Special Forces could be used disable South Korean equipment

Conclusions (2 of 2)

● North Korea will use Guerrilla warfare tactics to engage South Korea ● The biggest advantage for North Korea’s military is the knowledge that the US and S. Korea will not engage first

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Estimate Integrity - Service - Innovation

WMD Estimate - Agenda

● Overview ● Hypothesis ● Indicators and Evidence/Arguments ● ACH Matrix ● ACH Analysis ● Key Judgments & Outcomes ● Conclusions

North Korean WMD Overview

● North Korea has been suspected of having a nuclear development program since the 1980s ● Yongbong reactor was the first plutonium reactor built ● Most of the known existing ballistic missile facilities exist in the northeastern part of North Korea ● South Korea & US Targets are considered to be within range of nearly all North Korean missile platforms ● North Korea has varying missile platforms that can potentially deliver chemical and nuclear payloads.

● North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles are not believed to be ready

North Korean Ballistic Missile Facilities / ROK & U.S. Bases

● Missile Facilities ○ Yong-jo Ri ○ Sangnam Ri ○ Musudan ● Seoul SK ● US Bases

North Korean Missile Profile

U.S. Forces in the Pacific

Proximity

Seoul within 450km of all 3 ballistic missile facilities in the northern tip of NK

HWASONG-5

● Range 300km ● Road Mobile can be launched from discrete locations ● Liquid Fuel ● Unknown quantity deployed ● Payload 900kg ● Conventional / Chemical Payload ● Middle line in graphic shows ~maximum range depending on launch point

HWASONG-6

● Range 500km ● Road Mobile can be launched from discrete locations ● Liquid Fuel ● Unknown quantity deployed ● Payload 700-800kg ● Conventional / Chemical Payload ● 2 exterior lines in graphic show ~maximum range depending on launch point

RODONG (Nodong-1)

● Range 1000-1500km ● Minimum 175-200 deployed ● Payload 1000kg ● Potential nuclear warhead delivery platform ● Japan & US bases well within range (Tokyo ~1088km from eastern NK seaboard)

TAEPODONG-1 (Paektusan-1)

● Range 2000-2900km ● Minimum 175-200 deployed ● Payload 100-200kg ● Too small payload for nuclear ● Taipei Taiwan ~1900km from NK ballistic missile facilities

MUSUDAN

● Intermediate ballistic missile (IRBM) ● Range 2500-4000km ● NOT TESTED ● Deployed (unknown)

TAEPODONG-2 (Paektusan-2/Unha-2/Unha-3)

● Larger missile currently in development (7.2013) ● Possible intercontinental ballistic missile ● Range unknown (estimates from 3400 15000km) ● US Continental West Coast ~8500km from NK ● Payload unknown ● Tested successfully 12.2012 as space launch ● platform

Not yet deployed by NK military

TAEPODONG-2 (Paektusan-2/Unha-2/Unha-3)

WMD Organizations

● ● ● ● ● ● KWP Munitions Industry Department has organizations responsible for chemical weapons research, development and production ○ ○ Second Academy of Natural Sciences Second Economic Committee’s Fifth Machine Industry Bureau ■ Controls all facilities that manufacture chemical weapons Both organizations receive co-operation and assistance from the Academy of Sciences and the Korean People’s Army (KPA).

The academy’s Third Machine Industry manufactures artillery shells The Fourth Machine Industry manufactures missile warheads The Seventh Machine Industry manufactures air delivered weapons There are at least 18 facilities that have been associated with chemical precursor or agent production

North Korean Chemical Weapons

● Self sufficient in production of precursor chemicals ● NK has readily available compounds to make chemical agents ○ adamsite (DM and chloroacetoph (CN) ○ chlorobenzyliidene and malonoitrile (CS) ○ chlorine (CL) and cyanogen chloride (CK) ○ hydrogen cyanide (AC) and mustard-family (H, HD or HL) ○ phosgene (CG and CX) and sarin (GB) ○ soman (GD) and tabun (GA) ○ V-agent (VM and VX) ● Reports state that DPRK produces 20 different chemical agens for use in weapons Belief is that the KPA has concentrated upon sulfur mustard, chlorine, phosgene, sarin and the V-agents.

Chemical Weapons Production and Capacity

● Peacetime annual production potential is 4500 tons of chemical agents ● Wartime annual production potential is 12000 tons of chemical agents ● In 1989, the inventory was estimated to be “180 to 250 tons of chemical weapons of several kinds ● October 2008, the ROK minister of defense stated that the DPRK possessed 5,000 tons of chemical agents ● Current estimates 2500-5000 metric tons chemical agents ○ majority of current inventory believed to be mustard, phosgene, sarin and V-agents.

○ inventory includes as many as 150 warheads for ballistic missiles ● The KPA may also possess limited numbers of binary (GB, GF or VX for example) chemical munitions

WMD Hypothesis Does North Korea have the capability of launching a nuclear or chemical missile at the U.S.?

● H1. North Korea currently had a formidable WMD program with the capability of launching an armed missile on the U.S.

● H2. North Korea has a credible WMD program but does not possess the capability launching an armed missile on the U.S.

● H3. North Korea’s WMD program is all a ruse and does not possess credible capabilities.

Missile Tests

● 1990: Successfully tests a Scud-C missile ● 1993: Test of Nodong-1 Missile launched into Sea of Japan (500 km) ● 1998: Test of a nuclear-capable Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan ○ claims launch of satellite ● 2006 : five short-range missiles and a Taepodong-2 long-range missile are tested ○ Taepodong-2 missile fails a minute after launch and lands in the sea ● 2009: North Korea claims successful launches a Taepodong-2 missile. ○ second and third stages of the missile, along with its payload, landed in the Pacific Ocean.

● April 2012: North Korea attempts to launch a weather satellite using the Unha-3 and fails ● December 2012: North Korea successfully launches the Unha-3 to place a satellite into orbit

Missile Launch Date Alignments

● Launches that aligned to specific holidays

Nuclear Tests

● April 2003 North Korea declare it has Nuclear Weapons ● 2006 North Korea claims to have successfully tested a nuclear weapon (aprox. 500t) ○ Test conducted in an underground facility ○ S. Korea detects artificial earthquake ○ Radioactive debri detected confirming test ● 2009 Second nuclear test conducted (aprox. 2-6 kt) ○ North Korea also test fires short range missile ● 2013 Third nuclear test conducted (aprox. 6-12kt) ○ conducted after January 2013 when North Korea announces it will continue missile and nuclear testing ○ after a rocket launch was conducted

Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy (1 of 2)

● In 1985 North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

● In 1994 North Korea’s announces intent to withdraw from nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

●

Agreed Framework

established with U.S.

○ Pyongyang committed to freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid.

○ Agreement collapses in 2002 ● North Korea claims it has withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 and once again began operating its nuclear facilities.

Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy (2 of 2)

● Six-Party Talks initiated in August of 2003 which involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States ● In 2005 North Korea pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and return to the NPT ● In 2007 parties agreed on a series of steps to implement that 2005 agreement.

● Talks break down in 2009 following disagreements over verification ● North Korean rocket launch is condemned internationally ● Pyongyang states that it would never return to the talks and is no longer bound by their agreements.

● Remaining five parties state that they remain committed to the talks, and have called for Pyongyang to recommit to its 2005 de nuclearization pledge.

UN Sanctions (1 of 2)

● Resolution 825 (May 11, 1993) ○ Cals upon North Korea to reconsider withdrawing from the Treaty ○ on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Urges North Korea to honor its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.

● Resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004) ○ Affirms that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security ○ Urges all States to take additional effective measures to prevent proliferation

UN Sanctions (2 of 2)

● Resolution 1695 (July 15, 2006) ○ Condemns the DPRK nuclear weapons program ○ Calls for diplomatic solution to the situation ○ Demands that the DPRK cuts back its missile launches ○ Bans all member states from transactions with North Korean involving material, technology or financial resources transfer connected to DPRK's missiles or weapons of mass destruction programs.

● Resolution 1718 (October 14, 2006) ○ Imposed in relation to DPRK’s nuclear test ○ Established an embargo on military and technological materials, as well as luxury good ○ Did not include reference to military intervention as the US ○ proposed initially Demanded the freezing of North Korea's financial assets with the exception of funds necessary to meet basic needs.

Response to 2013 Launch and Test

● U.N. Security Council has imposed new sanctions on Pyongyang for its launch (UN Resolution 2087) ● Pyongyang says it should be allowed to launch satellites for peaceful purposes.

● KCNA(Korean Central News Agency) statement shortly after 2013 test stated Pyongyang will continue building its arsenal ● North Korea want US to recognise its right to launch satellites and further develop nuclear program ● China condemns North Korea’s third nuclear test

Weapons Grade Uranium & Plutonium Production

● Yongbyon is center of plutonium production ● Nuclear weaponization program 20 years old ● Confirmed nuclear detonation testing in 2006, 2009, 2013 ● Has progressed its yield from 500t, to 6-12kt between the 3 tests ● Likely has a stockpile of WGU & WGP to create ~16 nuclear weapons equivalents ● 2011 to 2016 NK could have enough material to create ~16-43 nuclear weapons equivalents ● Exact amounts of fissile material unknown

Weapons Grade Uranium & Plutonium Production Estimate

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center (1 of 2)

● Yongbyon is 100 miles north of Pyongyang ● Operational 1986 - 2008 ● Planned to restart Yongbyon reactor as of July 2013 ● Smoke billowing from Yongbyon ○ Researchers believe will be active again shortly ● November 2012 most exterior construction completed ○ doubts remain about the ability to connect the reactor to the old power grid ● Contains fuel refabrication and reprocessing facility ● Gas centrifuge plant can supply low enriched uranium ○ believes it could produce highly enriched uranium

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center (2 of 2)

● Light Water Reactor mostly used for civilian power productions but can have alternate uses ● Researchers also believe reactor can produce up to 6kg of plutonium per year to add to weapons stockpile ● 5MW reactor produced the plutonium for NK first nuclear device ● Also contains a 50MWe reactor - never completed ● IRT 2000 research reactor supplied by Russia

North Korean Satellite Launch

● Sonhae Satellite Launching Station on West Coast ● Sonhae facility is designed to launch rockets in a southern direction ○ Used more for orbiting rockets ● Tonghae Satellite Launching Station on East Coast ● Tonghae helps launch rockets in an easterly direction ○ Uses earths rotation to launch and have extended range ● General Satellite Control and Command Centre tracks and controls satellite data ● Multi stage liquid fuel missile launches tend to be complex and warnings can be detected from satellite when this is happening in advance

North Korea/Pakistan Connection

● U.S. Intelligence officials claim Pakistan was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology ● Reports suggest Pakistan exchanged centrifuge enrichment technology for NK help in developing longer range missiles ● Japanese report stated Pakistan exported actual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000) to NK ● A Pakistani official reports NK ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997-2000 ● Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) cooperated with NK in developing the Ghauri (Haft 5), around 1993 ● The Ghauri 1 - liquid-propellant, nuclear-capable, 1500km-range ballistic missile - successful flight test April 1998 ● KRL also collaborated with NK on liquid fueled missiles derived from Scuds.

● Significant details of cooperation between NK and Pakistani government are missing ● NK and Pakistan both deny nuclear technology was provided to NK

North Korea / Iran Connection

● Early relationship Iran traded cash to NK for missile parts and technology ● Early beliefs Iran & NK was simply transactional relationship ● NK & Iran now have signed technological cooperation ● NK & Iran now believed to have joint laboratories to develop long range missile capabilities. ● NK & Iran agreement also includes information sharing between IT, engineering, biotechnology, and renewable energy.

● NK successful satellite launch now believed to be stemming from Iran’s 2009 launch.

● Iran 2009 launch success believed to be influenced by Russian cooperation.

● NK believed to have access to the Russian Iranian launch input as it pertains to long range missile development.

● Russia has proven long range missile development program ● It is believed that closer attention to supply chain and find ways to provide incentives to disrupt those chains to impact NK missile development

North Korea / Syrian Connection

● NK & Syria both consider US an enemy which ties them together ● NK & Syria along with Iran & Russia have known to cooperate ● NK has delivered arms ammunition and gas masks en route to Syria Turkish believed to have confiscated.

● Delivery could provide evidence Syria knew it could use Chemical Weapons and sought protection for own troops ● NK is also believed to trade chemical weapons with Syria ● Israel launched an attack targeting an alleged joint nuclear facility in Syria in 2007.

● Japanese television reported 10 NK technicians were also killed in the attack.

● The presence of NK technicians in Syria nuclear facility further stresses the joint nuclear technology sharing between the nations.

Chemical Weapons Proliferation (1 of 3)

● Since the 1990s repeated reports indicate that the DPRK has provided chemical weapons, agents or technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya and Syria.

● Sale are primarily of defensive equipment, manufacturing technology, assistance in developing chemical warheads for Scud class ballistic missiles and development of chemical warfare production infrastructure.

● 2007 the DPRK-Syria chemical weapons-related activity increased around Aleppo ● It was near Aleppo that a chemical-related accident allegedly occurred in July 2007 ○ Both Syrian and DPRK personnel were killed when a missile with a chemical warhead exploded prematurely ○ Reports were numerous but remain unconfirmed

Chemical Weapons Proliferation (2 of 3)

● September 22, 2009 the ROK Coast Guard intercepted the Panamanian registered container ship

MSC Rachele

○ ○ inspection in port of Busan identified four containers ○ containers had DPRK-origin chemical protective suits destined for Syria ● November 2009, the Greek government inspected another shipment originating from Nampo enroute to Syria ○ ship had previously stopped in Nampo (DPRK) from China four shipping containers contained 13,000 chemical protective suits, 23,600 gas indicator ampoules to detect specific chemical substances and other items

Chemical Weapons Proliferation (3 of 3)

● March 2012, the Syrian Government stated that this shipment of chemical protective suits and ampoules was for agricultural and laboratory use. ● The Syrian Environmental Study Center appears to be linked with the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology ○ ○ provides training to the Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS) previously implicated in Syria’s weapons of mass destruction programs

ACH Matrix

Analysis according to the ACH methodology indicates North Korea has a formidable WMD program Higher score indicates the hypothesis that is most inconsistent with presented evidence

Indicators (1 of 3)

● No evidence exists that suggests NK has tested ICBM technology ● Stanford's Siegfried Hecker says the 2013 nuclear test takes NK 1 step closer to miniaturizing a missile ready weapon.

● Six Party talks broke down 2009 when NK indicated it would no longer participate

Indicators (2 of 3)

● Key to understand NK intention to nuclear weapons program ● If NK nuclear weapons program is to act as a deterrent to ROK & US invasion then hope remains for diplomacy.

Indicators (3 of 3)

● China may be encouraged to more strongly enforce existing NK sanctions if they believe ROK & Japan plan to develop their own Nuclear arsenal

Key Judgments (1 of 2)

● Minimum 400 Hwasong-5/Hwasong-6 missiles have estimated range to hit any target in South Korea ● Hwasong missile platform capable of delivering chemical weapon agents ● North Korea possesses a large number of chemical agents and components to make more.

● North Korea possesses small but relevant numbers of missiles capable of delivering Nuclear payload.

● North Korea likely has the material and technology to miniaturize nuclear warhead for Nodong missile (varying reliability).

Key Judgments (2 of 2)

● Nodong missile has a maximum range of 1000-1500km ● Seoul & US military bases reside within 500km of Ballistic Missile facilities ● Seoul & US military bases only ~100 km from NK border

Possible outcomes

● Airburst nuclear detonation on Seoul, South Korea ● Smallest tested 2006 device ● Estimated fatalities ~23,000 ● Estimated injuries ~58,500

Possible outcomes

● Airburst nuclear detonation on Seoul, South Korea ● Similar to device tested in 2009 (~6kt max) ● Estimated fatalities ~71,000 ● Estimated injuries ~221,000

Possible outcomes

● Airburst nuclear detonation on Seoul, South Korea ● Device similar to one tested in 2013 ● Estimated fatalities ~111,000 ● Estimated injuries ~314,500

Possible outcomes

● Airburst nuclear detonation on Tokyo, Japan ● Device similar to one tested in 2013 (10kt) ● Estimated fatalities ~109,500 ● Estimated injuries ~343,000

Possible outcomes

● Airburst nuclear detonation on Taiwan ● Device similar to one tested in 2013 (10kt) ● Estimated fatalities ~283,500 ● Estimated injuries ~700,500

Cyber & Intel Estimate Integrity - Service - Innovation

Cyber and Intelligence

Estimate - Agenda

● Overview ● Hypothesis ● Indicators and Evidence/Arguments ● ACH Matrix ● ACH Analysis ● Key Judgments & Outcomes ● Conclusions

Cyber Overview

● North Korea believed to be responsible for a series of effective cyber attacks against South Korea and the U.S. over a four year period ● North Korea suspected of over 6,000 cyber attacks against South Korea and the US since 2010 ● North Korea denies any involvement in cyber attacks ● North Korean cyber attacks seen as “unsophisticated” indicating that their attacks may just be testing defenses ● Cyber warriors identified for training as early as grade school ● China vital to North Korea’s cyber capabilities

Cyber Overview - Organizations (1 of 3)

● Unit 121 (KPAs Joint Chiefs Cyber Warfare Unit) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Formed in 1998 NK’s premier cyber warfare unit Believed to have over 17,000 hackers making it the largest NK cyber warfare organization Part of the Reconnaissance Bureau (6th Bureau) Responsible for knocking out South Korea’s C3 (Command, Control and Communications) during armed conflict Elements stationed in China ○ Believed to have participated in the DDoS attacks in July 2009 against the U.S. and South Korea as well as the primary actor in most of the attacks carried out by NK

Cyber Overview - Organizations (2 of 3)

● Unit 110 (Technology Reconnaissance Team) ○ ○ Carried out the DDoS attacks in July 2009 against the U.S. and South Korea Stationed in China at the Shanghai Hotel in Dandong ● Unit 204 (Enemy Secret Department Cyber Psychological Warfare Unit) ○ Has approximately 100 hackers ● Unit 35 (Central Party’s Investigations Department) ○ Smallest of the four groups ○ Responsible for internal defensive and offensive capabilities

Cyber Overview - Organizations (3 of 3)

● Korean Computer Center (KCC) ○ ○ ○ ○ Located in Pyongyang Software corporation focused on research, development, training, marketing and distribution Controls “Kwangmyong”, the national intranet operating 24 hours a day and available to North Korean citizens Provides internet but requires special authorization and is used primarily for government purposes

History of Significant Cyber Attacks Kimsuky Spring 2013 Spring 2013 Spring 2011 DDoS Summer 2009 Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Spear phishing emails.

Targets: South Korea and China “DarkSeoul” targeting banks and the Korean Broadcasting Station. Target: South Korea.

Banking, military and government websites were attacked and shut down. Target: South Korea A series of coordinated cyber attacks against major government, news media, and financial websites incorporating a botnet. Targets: South Korea and US.

● More than 6,000 attacks against the South since 2010 ● NK denies all attacks

Cyber Hypothesis

Has the DPRK developed a sufficient cyber force to really threaten the ROK or the US?

● H1: NK has a formidable cyber force capable of launching significant attacks against the ROK or the US.

● H2: NK’s cyber warfare program is not technically sophisticated to attack the ROK or the US.

Cyber - Indicators (1 of 2)

Cyber - Indicators (2 of 2)

China

● Opposing viewpoints ● Cyber attacks are launched by China who makes them look like North Korean ● China hires North Korean hackers to launch attacks ● China and North Korea are in cooperative relationship ● China has control over North Korean Internet.

Cyber - ACH Matrix

Cyber - ACH Analysis

Analysis using the ACH methodology indicates NK has a formidable cyber force capable of launching significant attacks against the ROK or the US.

Higher score indicates the hypothesis that is most inconsistent with presented evidence

Cyber - Key Judgments and Outcomes (1 of 2)

● Has the DPRK developed a sufficient cyber force to really threaten the ROK or the US?

○ With the aid of Russia and China, North Korea will emerge as a country with top-tier cyber warfare capabilities ○ North Korea will likely focus most of their cyber attacks against South Korea and US Forces in South Korea ○ North Korea understands the cost effectiveness and worldwide anonymous reach of cyber attacks ○ Cyber attacks from North Korea have a tendency to become more sophisticated with time.

Cyber - Key Judgments and Outcomes (2 of 2)

○ China will continue to provide North Korea strategic locations outside of North Korea for launching cyber attacks ○ China will continue to provide North Korea with state-of-the art cyber equipment and internet connectivity ○ China’s support ensures that North Korea becomes a formidable cyber warfare actor ○ China will continue to use North Korea as a pawn to gather intelligence; plausible deniability

Conclusions

● Based on indicators above NK presents a sufficient cyber threat to South Korea and its allies ● Multiple espionage attacks with a purpose of intelligence collecting will continue ● These minor attacks will result in rare but major coordinated attacks ● Targets will most likely be organizations within the military, government, financial and media sectors

Overall Analysis and Conclusions Integrity - Service - Innovation

Overall Estimate (1 of 3)

● Despite Kim Jong Un’s age and inexperience, the control of the government and military under his regime will remain stable ● Leadership changes have occurred to realign those loyal to the Supreme Leader and his new strategy ● Shift in military having less control over DPRK’s policies is occurring ● Economic reforms and pursuit of change through continued technological advancement is touted by the Supreme Leader ● Technological advancements bring with it the inherent subjugation of exposure to the outside world affecting North Korea’s isolationist philosophy ● Blackmarket and Tourism brings in and is a result of economic development efforts

Overall Estimate (2 of 3)

● Denuclearization will not be accepted by North Korea as it depends upon it as a deterrence and security umbrella to the country’s sovereignty ● Weapons and technology trading will continue with Middle East states like Syria and Iran.

● Exchange in science and technology knowledge base with Iran, Syria, and China will expedite nuclear program goals ● Miniaturization of nuclear warhead will require additional test ● Reliable and accurate ICBM capabilities has not yet been achieved ● Intermediate missile systems (i.e. Nodong) are fully capable of inflicting mass casualties and to U.S. forces in the Pacific Region

Overall Estimate (3 of 3)

● Despite the brazen threats of war, North Korea will not be the first to engage in a total war with South Korea ● The most likely scenario is a country that will slowly undergo reform and fundamental changes ● These changes must be slow and controlled as significant changes can disrupt an already strained country that could end in an internal revolt ● Kim Jong Un is following a different strategy than his father Kim Jong IL

Conclusions

● Kim Jong Un’s Regime will continue to pursue the DPRK’s nuclear program and focus on a new strategy focused on resuscitating the economy.

● New Strategy: ○ Continue to build and expand DPRK’s nuclear program and resuscitate a failing economic ○ Nuclear program provides a means to improve the country’s economy through weapons and technological trade ○ Nuclear program provides a deterrence and security umbrella to the country’s sovereignty - “Juche” ○ ○ Successful test of nuclear weapon will give North Korea national equality with the major nuclear powers Focus on economic reforms to rebuild the country’s economy

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AFP. (2013, October 8). S. Korea confirms North's plutonium reactor restart. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from Yahoo News website: http://news.yahoo.com/korea-confirms-norths-plutonium-reactor restart-113143869.html

Associated Press. (2013). North Korea says naval vessel sank last month on ‘combat duties,’ killing crew. Retrieved From: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/11/04/north-korea-says-naval-vessel-sank-last-month-on-combat duties-killing-officers/?intcmp=latestnews Baker, R. (2013, April 16). China and North Korea: A Tangled Partnership . Retrieved October 27, 2013, from Stratfor Global Intelligence website: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china-and-north-korea tangled-partnership Blachard, B. (2013, April 1). Chinas anger at North Korea overcomes worry over U.S. stealth flights. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Reuters website: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/01/us korea-north-china-idUSBRE9300JO20130401 Cain, Geoffery. (2013). Syria’s other key ally: North Korea. Retrieved From: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/north-korea/130906/syria-north-korea alliance-chemical-weapons

References (Secondary)

Capaccio, T. (2012, October 22). North Korea Improves Cyber Warfare Capacity, U.S. Says. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Bloomberg Businessweek website: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-22/north-korea-improves-cyber-warfare-capacity-u-dot s-dot-says Cathcart, A. (2013, May 12). Premier Pak Pong-ju: The Helmsman Looks North. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from SINO NK website: http://sinonk.com/2013/05/12/pak-pong-ju-helmsman-looks-north/ Chinoy, M. (2013, April 12). Why North Korean intelligence is so hard to read. Retrieved October 27, 2013, from CNN.com: http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-capabilities/ Choe, S.-h. (2010, August 23). North Korea Reinstates Market-Oriented Official. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The New York Times website: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/world/asia/24korea.html?_r=2&hp& Choney, S. (2013, March 29). North Korea's Internet? What Internet? For most, online access doesn't exist. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from NBC News.com Website: http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/north-koreas-internet-what-internet-most-online-access-doesnt exist-1C9143426

References (Secondary)

Chumley, Cheryl, K. (2013). North Korea on High Alert, Threatens U.S. Ships with “Horrible Disaster”. The Washington Times. Retrieved on October 26, 2013 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/8/n-korea-high-alert-threatens-us-ships-horrible-dis/ Clarke, R. A. (2010). In Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (p. 26). New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Clayton, M. (2013, October 19). In cyberarms race, North Korea emerging as a power, not a pushover. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from CS Monitor web site: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover Cullinane, S. (2013, April 9). How does North Korea make its money? Retrieved October 25, 2013, from CNN.COM website: http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/business/north-korea-economy-explainer/ Dieterie, D. (2012, March 6). North Korea’s Cyber War Forces. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from Infosec Island website: http://infosecisland.com/blogview/20532-North-Koreas-Cyber- War Forces.html

References (Secondary)

Fisher, M. (2013, August 21). How North Korea got itself hooked on meth. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Washington Post website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/21/how-north-korea-got-itself-hooked on-meth/ Fisher, M. (2013, March 29). North Korea almost certainly lacks basic technical capability to carry out its big war plan. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from The Washington Post WorldViews: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/29/north-korea-almost-certainly-lacks basic-technical-capability-to-carry-out-its-big-war-plan/ Fisher, M. (2013, October 25). North Korea is losing a crucial source of income: Koreans in Japan. Retrieved October 25, 2013, from The Washington Post WorldViews Blog: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/25/north-korea-is-losing-a-crucial source-of-income-koreans-in-japan/ Gertz, Bill. (2013). Military Cooperation Between Cuba, North Korea Revealed.

Retrieved From: http://freebeacon.com/military-cooperation-between-cuba-north-korea-revealed/ Gertz, Bill. 2013. Risky Business: China Continues Military Build up near North Korean border as Tanks, Armor Deploy. Washington Times. Retrieved on October 27, 2013 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/3/risky-business-china-continues-military-buildup ne/?page=all

References (Secondary)

Google Currency Converter. Google.com. Retrieved on November 5, 2013 from https://www.google.com/finance/converter Greitens, S. C. (2012, March 3). A North Korean Corleone. Retrieved October 26, 2013, from The New York Times Sunday Review website: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/a-north korean-corleone.html?pagewanted=all Haggard, S. (2012, November 27). North-South trade update 1: Wages and wage payments at Kaesong. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Peterson Institute for International Economics Website: http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=8216 Healey, J. (2013, April 9). North Korea's Cyber Stunts Aren't War, So Act Accordingly. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from US News website: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world report/2013/04/09/stopping-north-korean-cyber-attacks-starts-in-china Hewitt, G. (2013, February 20). North Korea: A nuclear 7-Eleven? Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Yahoo news website: http://sg.news.yahoo.com/north-korea-nuclear-7-eleven-130215483.html

Hinata-Yamaguchi, R. (2011). The Real North Korea Threat. [online] Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/11/29/the-real-north-korea-threat/ [Accessed: 6 Nov 2013].

References (Secondary)

Jamieson, Alastair. 2013. Japan, US agree North Korea Must not Have Nuclear Weapons. NBC WORLDNEWS. Retrieved on October 26, 2013 from http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/14/17745795-japan-us-agree-north-korea-must-not have-nuclear-weapons Johnson, Mark. 2013. North Korea Plots “Bright Future” For Tourism Industry, Despite Legacy of Failed Projects. Retrieved on November 6, 2013 from http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-plots-bright-future tourism-industry-despite-legacy-failed-projects-1401810 Jong-Heon, L. (2013, September 12). How stable is N. Korea? Kim Jong-Un names third military chief in a year. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from WorldTribune.com: http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/09/12/how-stable-is-n-korea-kim-jong-un-names-third-military-chief in-a-year/ Jun, K. (2013, April 3). A rundown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Wall Street Journal website: blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/04/03/a-rundown-of-the kaesong-industrial-complex/ Jun, K. (2013, 5 November). South Korean businesses quit Kaesong. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Wall Street Journal website: http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/11/05/south-korean businesses-quit-kaesong/

References (Secondary)

Keck, Z. (2013, May 17). North Korea Pushes Ahead on Agricultural Reforms. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Diplomat website: http://thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2013/05/17/north-korea pushes-ahead-on-agricultural-reform/ Kim, C., & Davis, A. (2013, October 8). S. Korea confirms North has restarted Yongbyon nuclear site. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from Chicago Tribune: http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/sns-wp-blm news-bc-nkorea08-20131008,0,3804517.story

Kim, S. (2013). How Strong Is NKorea's Military?. [online] Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/how-strong-is-north-koreas-military capabilities_n_3153691.html [Accessed: 4 Nov 2013].

Kim, Soo . 2013. North Korea’s “Bright Future” in Tourism. The Telegraph. Retrieved on November 6, 2013 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/10271837/North-Koreas-bright-future-in tourism.html

Kredo, A. (2013, July 22). Mike Rogers: China, Iran, and Russia Launching Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Washington Free Beacon website: http://freebeacon.com/mike-rogers-china-iran-and-russia-launching-cyber-attacks-against-u-s/

References (Secondary)

Laurence, J. (2012). North Korea military has an edge over South, but wouldn't win a war, study finds. [online] Retrieved from: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0104/North-Korea military-has-an-edge-over-South-but-wouldn-t-win-a-war-study-finds [Accessed: 4 Nov 2013].

Lee, D. (2012, December 10). North Korea: On the net in world's most secretive nation. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from BBC news website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20445632 Lee, J. (2013, April 6). Made in Korea: Inside jointly run Kaesong factory. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from USA News Today website: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/06/made-in korea-rare-look-at-jointly-run-factories/2058547/ Lee, Y. (2013, March 24). North Korea Cyber Warfare: Hacking 'Warriors' Being Trained In Teams, Experts Say. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Huffington Post Website: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/24/north-korea-cyber-warfare-warriors-trained teams_n_2943907.html

Lim, B. K. (2012, July 20). North Korea’s Kim Jung-un to reform economy after purge: Report. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Star.com website: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/07/20/north_koreas_kim_jongun_to_reform_economy_after_ purge_report.html

References (Secondary)

Lister, T. (2010). North Korea's military aging but sizable. [online] Retrieved from: http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/24/north.korea.capability/ [Accessed: 7 Nov 2013].

McEachern, P. (2005, April 11). North Korea PM Says Farming, Increased Electricity, Coal Production Key in 2005. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from FatCow website: http://relooney.fatcow.com/SI_FAO Asia/N-Korea_112.pdf

Moon, Sung Hui. 2013. 6.28 Policy on Agriculture. North Korea Economy Watch. Retrieved on November 6, 2013, from http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/policies/6-28-policy-on-agriculture june-28/ Nklw, M. (2013, July 16). DPRK Cabinet Holds Second Plenum. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from paper blog website: http://en.paperblog.com/dprk-cabinet-holds-second-plenum-589969/ North Korea Rumblings from below. (2013, 9 February). Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Economist website: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21571404-sealed-and-monstrously unjust-society-changing-ways-its-despotic-ruler-may-not-be-able Panin, Alexander. 2013. International Business: North Korean Style. The Moscow Times. Retrieved on November 6, 2013 from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/international-business north-korean-style/486574.html

References (Secondary)

Payet, L. (2013, May 29). South Korean Financial Companies Targeted by Castov. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from Symantec.com website: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/south-korean financial-companies-targeted-castov Pearson, James. 2013. Black Market Gets Some Respect in North Korea. New York Times. Retrieved on November 6, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/business/international/black-market gets-some-respect-in-north-korea.html

Pennington, M. (2013, October 23). Images Show New Work at NKorea's Nuclear Test Site. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from ABC News website: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/images-show work-nkoreas-nuclear-test-site-20658287 Perlez, J., & Sang-Hun, C. (2013, April 7). China Hints at Limits to North Korea Actions. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The New York Times website: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/asia/from-china-a-call-to-avoid-chaos-for-selfish gain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Perlez, Jane. 2013. China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons. The New York Times. Retrieved October 29, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/world/asia/china-bans-certain-north-korean-exports-for-fear-of weapons-use.html?_r=0

References (Secondary)

Petty, D. (2013, March 11). Do people in North Korea have access to cell phones, Internet and social media? AP bureau chief Jean Lee explains. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from The Denver Post TechKnow Bytes blog: http://blogs.denverpost.com/techknowbytes/2013/03/11/whats-social-media-like-from-inside-north korea/8964/ Rose, D. (2009, August 9). North Korea's Dollar Store. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from Vanity Fair website: http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/09/office-39-200909?printable=true Ryall, J. (2013, April 1). North Korea rehabilitates purged capitalist premier . Retrieved November 7, 2013, from The Telegraph website: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9964923/North-Korea-rehabilitates purged-capitalist-premier.html

Sang-Hung, Choe. 2013. North and South Korea Set Dates for Family Reunions After 3-Year Hiatus. The New York Times. Retrieved on October 28, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/asia/north-and-south-korea-begin-talks-on-reuniting divided-families.html

Sang-Hung, Choe. 2013. North Korean Leader Tightens Grip with Removal of His Top General. The New York Times. Retrieved on October 28, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/asia/north-korean-leader-tightens-grip-with-removal-of-top general.html?_r=1&

References (Secondary)

Sherstobitoff, R., Liba, I., & Walter, J. (2013). Dissecting Operation Troy: Cyberespionage in South Korea. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from McAfee.com website: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf

Soffer, Ari. (2013). Report: Syrian Regime Using North Korean Pilots. Retrieved From: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/173417#.UnrFQ6U94mx

Suk, H. H. (2003). North Korea Military Tactics In A War With US. Retrieved from Website: http://www.rense.com/general37/nkorr.htm

Tandon, S. (2013, September 11). North Korea restarts plutonium reactor: analysts. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from FOX News website: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/11/north-korea-restarts plutonium-reactor-analysts/ Tarakanov, D. (2013, September 11). The "Kimsuky: Operation: A North Korean APT? Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT The Axis of Cyber Evil: A North Korean Case of Cyber Espionage. (2013, October 10). Retrieved November 7, 2013, from HS Today.US website: http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/critical-issues-in-national cybersecurity/blog/the-axis-of-cyber-evil-a-north-korean-case-of-cyber espionage/3072be3aacf419cc494e3910a62107b2.html

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North Korea National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof.

Transcript North Korea National Critical Intelligence Estimate Presented by Team 5 O’Clock Somewhere For Approval by, Prof.

North Korea

Overview of North Korea

National Interests and Goals

Political Estimate

R

Economic Estimate

Views of the people

KIC’s

Cyber and Intelligence

Cyber Hypothesis

Directory