Transcript Information and Materials: Very Different Issues

Class #1
Introduction
The Impact of 9/11 on U.S.
Science Policy
Policy Background and Post 9/11 Issues
C. M. Vest
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U.S. Science Policy since 1945
• A letter from President Roosevelt
• The Vannevar Bush Report, Science the Endless
Frontier
– Universities as primary national Basic Research
infrastructure
– Federal dollars do double duty
• Procure research results
• Educate the next generation
– Research grants awarded based on competitive merit
– The National Science Foundation
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Identifiable Eras in S&T Policy
• Cold War
– Driven by fear / security
• Sputnik / Apollo
– Driven by patriotic response / technical challenge
• Productivity
– Driven by Japanese manufacturing dominance
• Biomedical
– Driven by health / scientific revolution
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U.S. Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century
(Hart-Rudman)
The combination of unconventional weapons with
the persistence of international terrorism will end
the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland
to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against
American citizens on American soil is likely over
the next quarter century.
March 15, 2001
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Hart-Rudman Report
Second only to a weapon of mass destruction
detonating in an American city, we can think of
nothing more dangerous than a failure to
manage properly science, technology, and
education for the common good over the next
quarter century.
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Then 9/11 happened.
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Rapid Executive and
Congressional Responses
• Executive Orders
• The USA Patriot Act
• IPASS
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What were the natural questions
for the S&T Community?
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The role of R&D in homeland security
Scientific Information
Scientific Materials
Access of Foreign Students and Scholars
Other?
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The following is how I thought
about these matters in December
2001.
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Access to Scientific Information
and Materials
The National Academies
Balancing National Security and Open Scientific Communications
C. M. Vest
December 14, 2001
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Commencement Quotes from 1996
Still applicable in 2001?
• America has always been a nation of
immigrants and we have always been a land
of opportunity.
• MIT Nobel Prize winners have come from
Japan, India, Italy, Germany, and Mexico.
• Openness and meritocracy are what have
made our universities great, and we must
continue that.
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Values and Obligations: A Tension?
• We hold a deep and longstanding values of
openness in science and education.
• We have an obligation to critically test these
values and their implications in light of
catastrophic terrorist actions.
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Pulling Outward; Pushing Inward
Export Control
The Web
Universities
Research
Education
Globalization
Terrorist Dangers
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Secrecy: Views are strong
• “A case can be made … that secrecy is for
losers.” -- Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1998)
• “Secrecy is not compatible with science, but it is
even less compatible with democratic
procedure.” -- Edward Teller (1987)
• “To disseminate information about a weapon …
is to make it practically certain that it will be
used” -- Norbert Wiener (1958)
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Information and Materials: Very
Different Issues
• Scientific Information / Knowledge / Education
– Restriction is rarely feasible or desirable.
• Scientific Materials
– Restriction is often both feasible and desirable.
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Terrorism to Date has been Low-Tech
(But organizationally sophisticated)
• Mechanism / Knowledge Base
– Truck bombs
– Commandeering of commercial aircraft
– Credit Card Fraud
• Materials
– Fertilizer and Diesel Fuel
– Off-the-shelf chemicals (e.g. to produce Sarin)
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Terrorism can be High Tech
• Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
– Information: Accumulated over many years
– Materials: Maximally secured, but leaked
• Cyber Terrorism
– Information: Sophisticated, but readily available
– Materials: Readily available
• Bio Terrorism
– Information: Readily available; may need facilities
– Materials: Should be secured and minimized.
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Risks via Scientific Knowledge,
Information and Education:
Toward a Framework
• SERIOUS: “Know-how” relevant to
sophisticated, military-scale weapons systems
• MODEST AT BEST: Academic engineering
research
• MINOR OR NONEXISTENT: Basic scientific
research and education
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Risks via Scientific Knowledge,
Information and Education
• SERIOUS: “Know-how” relevant to
sophisticated, military-scale weapons systems
[Apply traditional classification mechanisms.]
• MODEST AT BEST: Academic engineering
research [No obvious action needed.]
• MINOR OR NONEXISTENT: Basic scientific
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research and education [Do nothing.]
Risks via Access to Scientific
Materials in an Academic Context
• SERIOUS: Access to certain pathogens
• MODEST: Access to dangerous chemicals
• MINOR TO NONEXISTENT: Access to
explosive chemicals in laboratory quantities
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Risks via Access to Scientific
Materials in an Academic Context
• SERIOUS: Access to certain pathogens
[Restrict access, reduce amounts, track carefully]
• MODEST: Access to dangerous chemicals
[Restrict access, reduce amounts, track carefully]
• MINOR TO NONEXISTENT: Access to
explosive chemicals in laboratory quantities
[Keep inventories small.]
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Risk Reduction
• Knowledge, Information and Education:
– Maintain a sound classification system.
– Educate student researchers about security
(integrated with health, safety, environment)
– Strengthen lab community and communication
– Emphasize care in granting of visas.
– Establish an effective tracking system for
nonimmigrant students and visitors.
• Scientific Materials:
– Maintain strong local security and tracking.
– Minimize inventories.
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National Economic Security:
A relevant lesson?
• Theory: Universities were considered in the
1980s to be sources of technology with which
the Japanese would defeat us economically.
• Reality: We probably learned more from them
about manufacturing and management.
• Openness probably served us well (even though
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it was quite asymmetric).
The Cold War:
A relevant lesson?
• We won.
• Our technological superiority was essential.
– Driven by research universities and national labs
– Developed in large measure by immigrant scientists
• Our open society and institutions were superior.
• Global communication was a precipitating
factor.
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Government and Academia -Partnership is essential
• We must work together to:
– Maintain U.S. leadership in science, technology
and health
– Combat terrorism through R&D and education.
– Understand risks / benefits associated with
potential restrictions
– Develop sensible guidelines for student visas
and a workable tracking system
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Summary
• Traditional American values of openness in
education and basic research must prevail.
• Transmission of “know how” for complex
weapons systems should be controlled by
classification.
• Dangerous biological, chemical and nuclear
materials should be strictly controlled and
their amounts minimized.
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In the End
• Terrorism is bred by ignorance, poverty, and
absolutism.
• Education reduces ignorance, builds economic
capacity, democratizes societies, and creates
allies.
• Science and technology advance our health,
quality of life, economy, and security.
• Openness fosters strong science and technology.
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Back to October 2005
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Discussion Questions
• What are the flaws or counterarguments to
my 2001 presentation?
• What areas would you have emphasized as
policy makers?
• What are your views on these matters in
hindsight?
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