Civil War Strategies, War Outcomes, and Human Security in Post-Conflict Societies

Patricia Lynne Sullivan University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill Johannes Karreth University at Albany, SUNY Ghazal Dezfuli University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill

Relevant Literature

• Regime vulnerability (Cunningham et al.; Davenport; Kathman & Wood) o o o Incomplete disarmament and demobilization Uncertainty and instability in society Factions dissatisfied with war settlement terms • Risk of civil war recurrence (Licklider; Toft; Walter; Mason et al.; Werner & Yuen) • Post-Conflict Democratization (Colaresi; Fortna & Huang; Gurses & Mason; Joshi; Nilsson; Toft)

Theory: Repression in Post-Conflict States

• Weak institutions of constraint and accommodation • Regime vulnerability • Altered social norms

Empirical expectations about the level of human rights violations

H1 (new governments): higher in post-conflict societies governed by former rebels H2 (legacy of wartime atrocities): higher when the government’s counterinsurgency strategy involved deliberate targeting of civilians H3 (path dependency): higher when the incumbent government prevailed in the civil war through the use of indiscriminate violence

Empirical Tests

• original dataset, Armed Conflicts over Governance, all cases of violent conflict between an incumbent government and an armed opposition movement within a state between 1945-2010 • UofA: post-conflict country-year; annual observations for 10 years • DV: Human Rights Protection latent variable (Fariss 2014) • IVs: Civilian targeting (rare, moderate, extensive); Government composition (incumbent, former rebels, power-sharing, unclear)

Control Variables

High Government Casualties High Rebel Casualties Pro-Government Intervention Pro-Rebel Intervention Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Force Ethnic Conflict Executive Constraints Democracy Level at Initiation Conflict Duration (logged) Concentration GDP per capita

Random Effects GLS Models of Human Rights Protection Levels in Post-Conflict Societies. Panel Data with Year Fixed Effects

Civilian Targeting Moderate (vs. Rare) Extensive (vs. Rare)

-0.285

0.164

-0.933

0.240

-0.731

0.303

-1.312

0.337

-0.615

0.325

-1.341

0.387

Government Composition Civil War Government (vs. Rebels) Power-Sharing (vs. Rebels) Unclear (vs. Rebels)

-0.070

0.196

0.178

0.337

-0.122

0.414

-0.445

0.262

0.081

0.677

0.005

0.391

-0.488

0.299

-0.090

0.550

-0.225

0.378

Civilian Targeting x Government Moderate/ Civil War Government Moderate/ Power-Sharing Moderate/ Unclear Extensive/ Civil War Government Extensive/ Power-Sharing Extensive/ Unclear

0.625

0.353

0.324

0.789

-1.140

0.692

0.518

0.513

0.447

0.716

0.319

0.460

0.615

0.359

0.190

0.716

-1.084

0.893

0.644

0.545

0.204

0.682

0.364

0.501

Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs 1rebels 2govt 3powersharing post-conflict control of central govt 1.civtarget3

2.civtarget3

4unclear

Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs 1 2 3 4 5 6 years post-conflict 7 Minimal Civilian Targeting 8 9 Extensive Civilian Targeting 10