Transcript PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN UKRAINE

Perspectives of the
Presidential Campaign in
Ukraine in 2015
Oleksandr DEMIANCHUK
DOCTOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Head of the Political Science Department
UNIVERSITY OF KYIV MOHYLA ACADEMY
METHODOLOGY OF
CONSIDERATION
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND
PROCEDURES OF MAKING POLITICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
MIGHT ADEQUATELY CHARACTERIZE THE
TYPE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
 Neoinstitutional approach requires to take
into account both formal and non-formal
norms and principles of political
institutions functioning


THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES
SIGNIFICANTLY DEPEND ON THE
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER
WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL
POWER
Monopolism/Marxism
 Pluralism
 Elitism
 Corporatism

INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF POLICYMAKING IN MONOPOLIST POLITICAL
POWER DISTRIBUTION
Dictator/leader
Executive/Government
Legislature/Legalisation
INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF POLICYMAKING IN PLURALIST POLITICAL
POWER DISTRIBUTION
POLIICAL
PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
NGO
EXECUTIVES/
GOVERNMENT
BUSINESS
INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF POLICYMAKING IN ELITIST POLITICAL POWER
DISTRIBUTION
POLITICAL
ELITE
EXECUTIVE/
GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL PARTIES
OUTSIDE THE DECISION
MAKING SYSTEM
BUSINESS
MASS MEDIA
INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF POLICYMAKING IN CORPORATIST POLITICAL
POWER DISTRIBUTION
MAIN
MAKERS
POLITICAL
DECISIONS
EXECUTIVE/
GOVERNMENT
MEDIA
NGOs
BUSINESS
TERRITORIAL/
LOCAL COMMUNITIES
PRE-INDEPENDENCE
 TILL 1990 – MONOPOLIST POLITICAL
SYSTEM
 THE MAIN AND ONLY POLITICAL DECISION
MAKER – Central Committee of the Communist
Party
 EXECUTIVE POWER/GOVERNMENT
TRANSLATES THE IDEAS AND DIRECTIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE INTO PROJECTS OF
THE LEGISLATURE DECISIONS
 THE LEGISLATURE FUNCTION WAS SIMPLY
TO LEGALIZE THESE PROJECTS
MONOPOLISM FAILURE
AND PLURASLISTIC SYSTEM
EMERGE
 Shortly before and immediately after the
Independence Declaration the monolithic Center
of making decisions has dissipated into many
smaller actors. During 1991-1992 more than 50
new political parties had emerged in the
Ukrainian Political System.
 The Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) which was
elected more than a year before the
Independence suddenly had gained the MAIN
decision making power in Ukraine.
(continue)
The decision makers’ body consisted of:
 so-called “Red Directors” (industrial lobby)
who had the majority in the Parliament –
239 MPs on one side, and
 scattered representatives of a big number
of political forces mainly concentrated
around the democratic wing – Rukh and a
few their allies on the other.
The scope of interests, ideologies and
approaches to the national development
strategies was too broad and diverse to
make meaningful and concise decisions.
(continue)
 Absence of the unity and chaotic reaction
to the economic and social crisis had
caused hyperinflation and collapse of the
economic system.
 In these tough circumstances the
Executive Power (the Government led by
the President) had begun to play the first
and the strongest role in making anti-crisis
decisions. The President had received the
power to issue decrees which were equal
to the laws unless the corresponding laws
were passed by the Parliament.
End of the Pluralism Epoch
 Those politicians and political forces who
collaborated with the President and the
Government had been receiving some
political and economic privileges.
 The devotion or at least loyalty to the
President had become more important
than any political/ideological reasons. The
President had formed the de-politicized
upper group of decision makers.
The period of Elitism
 As the political interests, social
expectations, demands and values gave
way to the elites’ interests and demands,
again the main role in making political
decisions appeared in the
President’s/Government’s hands.
 Those political actors who had lost the
power in making decisions appealed to the
various social groups especially of the
lowest socioeconomic status.
(continue)
 In the lowest social strata there
appeared many intellectuals who
shared or simply express the ideas of
democracy, human rights and
capitalist way of national
development.
 So, the Ukrainian political system
appeared to be split into depoliticized
elite and highly politicized opposition.
Elitism dead? Long live Elitism!
 The Presidential Election in 2004 had
sharpened the conflict between solely
economic inspirations of the elite and
political/democratic/social inspirations of
the opposition.
 The Kuchma’s elite had been defeated in
the Orange Revolution.
Three possible ways from the
Elitism
 “Solidization” of the political system into
the monopoly of one political force. – They
needed a powerful ideology for the whole
society or at least quick economic
success. – Neither was available or
possible to reach.
Second way
 As the political system has split into two
powerful actors – Orange forces and the
Party of Regions – it could be expected to
see the Corporatism in making decisions.
Keeping in mind that no one political force
had a majority to make political decisions it
could be expected the period of political
negotiations between the political
entrepreneurs. During some period and with
some restrictions/peculiarities it happened.
Elitism alive?!
 The political history has proved that
Gaetano Moska and Wilfred Pareto were
right – elite is immortal.
 During the first year of his Presidency Victor
Yuschenko had managed to create a new
class of political elite. Unlike the Kuchma’s
elite these politicians often appealed to the
voters with criticism of their enemies and
endless promises to drastically improve
living standards if they are elected.
(continue)
 Instead of the struggle between the ruling
elite and the opposition the political
system had faced the battles inside the
elite itself.
 The Constitution-2004 adopted in the
revolutionary circumstances and
conditioned by seeking a peace and
compromise significantly decreased the
President’s potential in ruling the Elite.
(continue)
 The competition between the decision
making actors was replaced by the open
animosity of the three parts – President,
Prime Minister and Party of Regions as the
Opposition.
 The main goal in the making decision
processes was to defeat the enemy rather
than to solve socially sound problems or to
reach any development goals.
The “New Era”
 In these circumstances the democratic
forces with their “pluralistic” political
approaches to any public affairs had little
chances to win the Presidential elections
in 2009-10.
 Pragmatic economic promises (not ideas!)
together with the brutal accusations of the
opponents provided victory to the Party of
Regions.
THE MONARCH, HIS FAMILY
AND THE YARD
 From the beginning the main
President’s support came from
the “Donetskiye” (people from
Donbass region) and Russia.
 Official data: 75 % of the higher
executives in Ukrainian
Government have Donbass roots.
THE FAMILY
 The elder son Aleksandr Yanukovych
during 2 years of the dad’s Presidency had
gained his private assets from almost 0 to
above $1,5 billion due to legal and
(mostly) illegal taking off businesses from
other entrepreneurs including those from
the Party of Regions.
 The younger son Viktor has got the whole
national IT sphere under his control.
 All this situation to be stable required strict
and severe personal control over the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial
branches of Power.
 Significant (almost constitutional) majority
of “Regionals” in the Parliament helped to
create a loyal majority in the Constitutional
Court and then to pass the Constitution
changes returning to its initial version from
Kuchma’s times – the President returned
almost unrestricted control over the whole
political and state power.
THE SOCIETY
 To hold the society in a loyalty and
obedience the New Power needed two
things: economic prosperity and ideology.
Both demanded high professionals and
intellectuals.
 Personal enrichment of the top figures
contradicts to the social equity and
equality. Concentration of power required
concentration of economy and enforcing
control over the social processes – “Stick
and Carrot”.
Big mistake or zugzwang?
 Accusation and imprisonment of Yulia
Tymoshenko was a necessity to secure
New Power from the Opposition
operations.
 But this act had significantly negative
consequences both for the internal and
foreign affairs.
INSIDE UKRAINE
 DEMONSTRATION THAT NOBODY CAN
FEEL SECURE IN FACE OF THE
POWER FORCES.
 TYMOSHENKO RECEIVED AN
OPPORTUNITY TO MUCH WIDER
PUBLICITY THAN IT COULD BE
OTHERWISE.
INTERNATIONAL ARENA:
WESTERN WORLD
 Suppression of the democratic opposition
and folding reforms was met by the West
negatively. Yanukovych soon had become
“not-hand-given”.
 At the same time negotiations of the
skilled Opposition and the Western
politicians helped the last to understand
the difference between the Power and the
Society.
 Understanding the geopolitical status of
Ukraine the Western leaders began to play
the role of “Carrot” attracting and
encouraging the Ukrainian polity to move
towards Europe.
 Those oligarchs who have completed the
capital accumulation in general and are
interested in maintaining political, social
and (the most!) legal order have supported
the European integration attempt of the
Power.
RUSSIA
 Russian Presidents Dmitriy Medvedev and
then Vladimir Putin concluded several
agreements with President Viktor
Yanukovich (so-called Kharkov
agreements) in 2010.
 But! The “Gas Agreement” concluded by
Yulia Tymoshenko remained unchanged
which brought financial losses both to the
national economy and to the private
businesses of the oligarchs in the
Yankovych’s circles.
 Russia could not agree with the
Tymoshenko imprisonment: it would
discover to the World the Russia’s
voluntary and brutal politics towards
Ukraine in the “Gas War” in 2009.
 Loosing Ukraine to Europe Russia looses
its historical roots, preferences for their
businesses and actually the most valuable
economic and political partner.
Current situation in the Ukrainian
political system
 It is very difficult, almost impossible to
describe the current political system by
only one model of the political power
distribution.
 The process of political decisions making
now is quite simple (to implement
directives from the President), opaque (it
is unknown who and how operationalize
the political decisions), and highly nonprofessional (lack of cadres).
Tendencies and forecasts
 Three years of holding the whole power in
one hand has discovered the importance of
political interaction between the actors in
decision making. After several years of
economic failures it is evidently impossible to
quickly succeed in reaching high life
standards for the most of people in Ukraine.
As the opposition is squeezed from the
decision making process, the only author of
the economic and social losses appears to
be the ruling elite belonging to the PR.
(continue)
 The recent events in Ukrainian political life
have proven the primacy of politics over
economy (especially macroeconomic acts
and inspirations).
 In the next Parliament elections any
political party (except Party of Regions)
will be forced to rely upon the voters’
support, to win the votes mostly by
blaming the enemies/competitors rather
than suggesting real and attractive for the
society ways of the national development.
Three dots
 The Ukrainian political system is too
closed to become connected to the
people, to the society.
 Bankruptcy of the main political
entrepreneurs calls for the new forces to
come on the political stages. (There are no
new socially attractive political forces).
 Chaos in the politics may lead to revolts
which will mean further falling down of the
Ukrainian economy and society.
BREAK-DANCE
 Parliamentary elections-2012 had
significantly complicated the whole
process of decision-making.
 Several very sound law drafts suggested
by the President and the Government
were negatively voted by a part of the
ruling elite together with the new
Opposition.
 The Ruling Party of Regions appears to be
not so solidly united as before.
 The Opposition is still split into three parts
with the Presidential ambitions of all three
leaders and little chances to get agreed.
 “Russian stick” and European “Carrot”
make the European choice imperative.
 Nevertheless the resistance to it inside
Ukraine will constantly increase
(communists, Russkiy Mir etc.)
Presidential Campaign-2015
 1.5 years before – time to begin
 New times – old faces
 Viktor Yanukovych has minimal chances
to be re-elect. Sociology: in October 2013
positive attitude is less 20 %, negative up
to 70 %. All three oppositional leaders
(Klichko, Yatseniuk, Tyagnybok) win
against Yanukovych in the 2nd tour.
EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (if been signed)
 Seems that Ukraine is more needed by
Europe than vice versa.
 Signing the Agreement will hardly bring
additional suport to Yanukovych. He even
may loose votes of those who are Russiaoriented.
 Influence of the Agreement on Ukrainian
polity is invaluable as the politicians will be
forced to implement democratic reforms.
 In a short-term perspective the Agreement
will lead to some economic improvement
in Ukraine.
 Oppositional leaders will additionally gain
voters’ support.
 Russia may increase its blocking pressure
and intensify the “Information War” both
inside and outside Ukraine.
 At the same time Ukraine will evidently
gain its independence from Russia in the
energy resources sense.
EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (if NOT been
signed)
 Sharp increase of political and social
protests both inspired by the Opposition
and self-driven.
 Correspondingly radicalization of conflicts
between the Power and the Opposition. I
can’t exclude probability of a Civil War.
 Russia’s intervention is highly possible first
in Crimea and then in Eastern regions.
THANK YOU
QUESTIONS?
REMARKS?
ASSUMPTIONS?
WELCOME!