Transcript Political and Institutional Framework of European

Europe and North Africa:
Migration as a common challenge
Ferruccio Pastore
(Deputy Director, Centre for International Policy Studies-CeSPI, Rome)
International workshop in the framework of the project “Managing migration in
the neighbourhood of the EU and the US. Towards a Transatlantic forum for
comparative research and policy dialogue”
(Academy of Graduate Studies, Tripoli, 18-19 June 2008)
Structure of the presentation
• Europe in the global migration geography
• European migration policies: convergences and
divergences
• Overall trends: opening to the East, closing to the
South?
• Cross-Mediterranean migration: mutual perceptions
(and misperceptions)
• Cross-Mediterranean migration: dominant policy
responses
• “Externalisation” and “transit migration”
• Future outlooks and open questions
The global context (migrant stocks, millions)
1960 1970 1980 1990
2000
2005
World
75.9 81.5
99.8
154.0 174.9 190.6
Africa
Asia
9.0 9.9
29.3 28.1
14.0
32.3
16.2
50.0
16.3
49.9
17.1
53.3
Europe
17.0 21.8
25.4
48.4
56.1
64.1
6.1
7.0
5.9
6.6
18.1
27.6
40.8
44.5
Lat. Am.+ 6.0 5.7
Carib.
North Am. 12.5 13.0
Source: UNDESA, Population Division.
The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in
the global migration landscape (stocks; 000s).
2000
2005
Global migrant stock
174,781
190,634
Of which Europe (in
absolute values and as
% of global stock)
56,100
32.1%
64,116
33.6%
Of which EU (in
absolute values and as
% of global stock)
26,429 (EU-15)
15.1%
39,788 (EU-25)
20.9%
Migrants’ stock in
Northern America (in
absolute values and as
% of global stock)
40,844
23.4%
44,493
23.3%
Of which in the USA
(in absolute values and
as % of global stock)
34,988
20.0%
38,355
20.1%
The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in
the global migration landscape (in terms of net migration;
absolute values are expressed in thousands).
1995-2000
2000-2005
European net
migration (average
annual)
769
1,083
EU’s net migration
621 (EU-15)
1,178 (EU-25)
Northern America
net migration
1,394
1,370
Of which USA net
migration
1,250
1,160
Source: CeSPI, based on UN Population Division,
International Migration, 2002 and 2006.
The largest EU immigration countries (net migration, 000s)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Spain:
378.5
Spain:
427.8
Spain:
649.9
Spain:
738.5
Spain:
610.1
Spain:
652.3
Spain:
636.0
UK: 168.5
Germany:
274.8
Italy:
349.3
Italy:
600.6
Italy:
558.2
Italy: 338.1
France:
160.5
Germany:
167.8
UK:
184.3
Ger.:
218.8
UK:
260.5
UK:
203.6
UK: 196.3
UK: 159.5
UK:
126.4
Ger.:
142.2
France:
105.0
France:
102.9
Italy: 157.0
Port.:
70.1
Port.:
63.5
Ger.: 81.8
Germany:
98.5
Ireland:
80.0
Netherlands Portugal:
: 57.0
64.9
Italy: 55.2
France:
60.4
Source: CeSPI based on Eurostat.
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries
(inflows, 000s, 2002-4) (source: OECD)*
2002
2003**
2004
Germany: 658.3
Germany: 601.8
Spain: 645.8
Spain: 443.1
Spain: 429.5
Germany: 602.2
UK: 418.2
UK: 406.8
UK: 494.1
Italy: 388.1
France: 135.1
Italy: 319.3
France: 124.8
Austria: 97.2
France: 140.1
* Non harmonised statistics. ** Data for Italy not available.
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries
(inflows, 000s, 2003-4) (source: OECD)*
2003**
2004
Germany: 238.4
UK: 266.5
UK: 214.6
Germany: 202.3
France: 173.6
France: 175.2
Italy**: 121.8
Italy: 156.4
Netherlands: 60.8
Austria: 59.6
* Harmonised statistics (long-term only; Spain not included).
** 2002 regularisation not included.
Deep differences in national economic migration
policies among EU member states
Heterogeneity of national approaches (out of historical, economic,
cultural and demographic reasons)
We can group national approaches in a few “families” or blocs:
a) “Conservative” continental bloc (France, Germany, Benelux,
Scandinavians): closure to low-skilled immigration; narrow and
selective opening to high-skilled flows;
b) “Liberal” bloc (UK, Ireland): innovative and technocratic
admission policy; competitiveness as priority; opening to free
mobility of EU8 in 2004 as key component;
c) Mediterranean bloc (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain): common
challenges (acute ageing, wide underground economy, weak
administrations) and similar strategie: frequent regularisations;
attempts to manage low-skilled inflows (quota systems/agreements
with sending countries);
d) Eastern European bloc: heterogeneous; still struggling with
institution building and migration transition.
“Families” of EU countries according to
fundamental characters of admission system
Mediterranean bloc
In the long term: persisting differences, but also convergence
(% over-65 and over-80 on total pop.; today and in 2050)
North Europe
15,9 – 4,4
24,2 – 9,1
Western Europe
17,8 – 4,7
27,7 – 11,5
South Europe
17,8 – 4,5
31,4 – 11,6
Eastern Europe
14,1 – 2,7
26,6 – 6,9
MEASURING POLICY DIFFERENCES (AND POLICY
OUTCOMES)
(total regularised foreigners; collective schemes, not
including individual reg.; 000s, 1973-2008)
Italy
1,431
Greece
1,166
Spain
1,130
France
302
Portugal
249
Belgium
65
TRENDS: IS THE EU OPENING TO THE EAST
WHILE CLOSING TO THE SOUTH?
% African-born among total foreign-born pop. in selected EU
countries (Source: OECD)
Belgium France Germany NL
%
NorthAfrica
born
12.7%
% Sub- 9.8%
Saharaborn
PRT
39.1% 0.5%
10.1% 0.2%
9.6%
7.2%
1.2%
Spain
UK
15.8% 0.5%
53.5% 3.6%
16.7
%
African nationalities among top 10 nationalities in terms of yearly inflows
(main EU receiving countries, 2005, French data NA) - Source: OECD 2007
Receiving country African
Ranking
nationalities
among top 10 flows
Trend compared to
average
19902004
BELGIUM
Morocco
3rd community
↑
ITALY (2004)
Morocco
3rd
↓
Tunisia
10th
↓
NETHERLANDS Morocco
7th
↓
PORTUGAL
Capo Verde
2nd
↑
Angola
5th
↓
Guinea-Bissau
6th
→
and 9th
→
Sao Tomé
Principe
SPAIN
Morocco
2nd
→
SWEDEN
Somalia
9th
↑
UK (2001)
South Africa
6th
↑
RELATIVE CLOSURE OF LEGAL
IMMIGRATION CHANNELS TO AFRICANS
% of Africans in stocks of legal immigrants
(Italy and Spain, selected years)
1991
Spain n.a.
Italy
1996
2000
2003
2006
18.3% 29.2% 26.3% 23.5%
35.0% 28.7% 27.7% 24.0% 23.4%
Sources: Min. of Interior for Italy, Extranjería for Spain.
AFRICANS ARE LITTLE REPRESENTED ALSO
IN AMNESTIES
% North-African nationals in subsequent Italian
regularisation schemes
1986
Morocco 26.3%
Tunisia 8.4%
Egypt
3.8%
Algeria /
1990
22.4%
12.1%
3.5%
/
1995
14%
4.2%
3.3%
3.1%
1998
11%
2.6%
4.4%
1.5%
Source: G. Sciortino based on Italian Min. of Interior.
2002
7.4%
/
2.4%
/
ASYMMETRIC LIMITS TO AFRICAN MOBILITY?
Italian visas for Africans (000s, 1999-2006)
1999 2000
2005
2006
N. Afr. 110,9 132,6
&
Middle
East
128,9 106,9 114,6 123,9 128,4
140,2
SubSaharan
Africa
43,0
51,1
63,3
World
Total
834,7 1.009,0 947,1 853,5 874,9 983,5 1.076,7 1.198,2
58,3
2001
2002
47,4
Source: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2003
50,0
2004
58,7
63,3
INCREASED AFRICAN SHARE IN CLANDESTINE FLOWS
% of Africans among irregular migrants apprehended upon (or
before) landing (Italy and Spain-Canary Islands, different years)
Italy
2001
N. Africa 11.9%
SubSaharan
Africa
3.8%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
17.2%
25.0%
11.7%
41.4%
n.a.
n.a.
69.6%
24.6%
70.52%
24.8%
Spain
1994-8 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Morocco 100% 88.2%
Rest of 0%
Africa
36.%2 32.%5 39.8% 32.6% 9.1%
11.8% 63.2% 66.2% 58.1% 62.9% 86.8%
Sources: Plan Canario para la Inmigración 2004-2006 for Spain; Min. of
Interior for Italy
Irregular migration by sea: relatively small but dominates
perceptions (apprehensions, 000s; de Haas)
‘98
‘99
‘00
‘01
‘02
‘03
‘04
‘05
‘06
7.0
7.2
12.8
14.4
6.8
9.8
7.2
7.0
6.4
0
0.9
2.4
4.1
9.9
9.4
8.4
4.7
31.0
8.8
2.0
2.8
5.5
18.2
14.0
13.6
22.8
21.4
0.9
1.5
5.0
6.1
2.1
0.2
0.02
0.08
0.3
Malta
0.2
0.2
0.02
0.05
1.7
0.5
1.4
1.8
NA
TOT
16.9 11.8
23.0
30.2
38.7
33.9
30.7
36.5
59.2
Spain
mainland
Spain
Canary
Italy
Sicily
Italy
Calabria
Intra-African
mobility much more
important than
outbound mobility
Source: Hein de Haas,
International Migration
Institute (IMI), Oxford.
Arrows do not indicate migration
routes but depict major countryto-country migration flows.
Due to lack of reliable data, the
dimension of arrows reflects
estimates, not exact size of flows
Clandestine crossings dominate the debate also because…
(Victims* at wider European borders, 2005-2007, Fortress Europe)
To Southern Spain/
Ceuta/Melilla
2005: 123
2006: 184
2007 (till 10/22): 37
To the Canary Islands
2005: 185
2006: 1,035
2007 (till 10/25): 444
Adriatic Sea
2003: 29
2004: 28
No reported victims since 2004
Sicily channel
2005: 437
2006: 302
2007 (till 10/28): 529
Aegean Sea
2005: 98
2006: 73
2007 (till 10/22): 138
Cross-Saharan routes
1,578 deaths reported since 1996
* Including missing migrants.
Policy responses: spheres of EU institutional openness to human
mobility
EU/EEA
SCH+FM
EU/EEA
SCH/FM
EU/EEA
SCH/FM
EU/EEA
SCH/FM
TC
AA/NO-VISA
TC
AA/VISA-FAC
TC
AA/VISA
TC
NO-AA/NO-VISA
TC
NO-AA/VISA
EU=European Union
EEA=European Economic Area
SCH=Schengen zone
FM=Freedom of movement
TC=Third country
AA=Association agreement
VISA-FAC=Visa facilitation
Policy responses: the European multi-layered
migration control model
1. Sample controls within EU
borders (e.g. on workplaces)
2. Sample controls at
internal borders
3. Border controls and
surveillance strictly defined
4. Patrolling at high sea
5. Privatisation of controls:
carriers’ responsibility
6. Visa offices in consulates
7. Outsourcing to third states
Policy responses: the main financial chapters
in EU migration policy, millions €, 20072013)
External Borders Fund
European Return Fund
European Refugee Fund
European Integration Fund
1,820
676
699.3
825
Do migration controls work?
Evolution of smuggling routes in the Mediterranean (as
consequence of new push factors + international cooperation
and law enforcement)
1991-2001
Earl
y199
0s2006
Since late 1990s
19992001
Sinc
e
mid200
0s
Relative effectiveness of international law enforcement is
confirmed by figures on apprehensions upon disembarkment +
rescues by coastal regions (000s, peaks for each line in red Source: Min. Interior)
Apulia Sicily Calabria Sardinia TOT
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2006 2007
28.4
46.5
19.0
8.5
3.4
0.1
0.02
0.02
0.2
0.06
8.8
1.9
2.8
5.5
18.2
140
13.6
22.8
21.4
16.6
0.8
1.5
5.0
6.1
2.1
0.2
0.02
0.08
0.3
2.0
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
0.008 0.09
1.5
38.1
50.0
26.8
20.1
23.7
14.3
13.6
22.9
20.1
22.0
Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa (different sources)
Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa
(logistics and practicalities)
Core and periphery in the European migration
control system: STAGE I
► Until 1973-4: Only formal
Controls
►1973-1985: Unilateral and
competitive closure
►1985: Schengen agreement
►1990: Implementing
Convention
►1995: Entry into force in the
green core
►Italy, Austria, Greece as
red “transit belt”
STAGE II: The Southern enlargement of the core
► 1997-8: Full integration of
Austria and Italy
►2000: Greece is also
admitted as part of the core
►Eastern Europe
emerges as “transit
belt”
►Western Balkans,
Turkey and North Africa
still perceived
more as sources
STAGE III: The Northern and Eastern enlargements
► 2001: Scandinavian
enlargement (limited impact
on irregular migration patterns)
►2004: EU-10 accession
►2007: EU-2 accession
►2007: Schengen Eastern
enlargement (EU-10 but
Cyprus)
►Western Balkans, former
CIS, Turkey, N. Africa, etc.
in “transit belt” (transit boom)
►2005 Ceuta and Melilla;
2006 Lampedusa and
Canarias: focus on
Sub-Saharan A. as source
STAGE IV: The Transit Belt expands further South
►July 2006: Rabat EU-Africa
conference on M&D
►November 2006: Tripoli
EU-AU+ Conference on M&D
►December 2007: Lisbon
Africa-EU Summit
►Migration Great Game
enlarges to whole Africa:
New “candidates” as “transit
countries” (i.e. privileged control
partners): Senegal, Niger
►When transit countries are
failed states, intervention not
ruled out (Chad)
Being a “transit country” and performing a
control function on behalf of neighbours has
advantages and disadvantages
COSTS
BENEFITS
Altering priorities: Neglecting
immigration or emigration might be
internally destabilising
Access to EU and
bilateral targeted aid
Worsening of political/economic
relations with poorer neighbours
More bargaining power in
negotiations about own
emigration (e.g. quotas)
Impact on migrants’ rights
international reactions
Overall gain in strategic
relevance