Chapter 14: Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation    Public finance economists ask

why

should the government intervene in these markets?

The examination will come down to exploring the consumption smoothing benefits of these programs versus the inefficiencies created by moral hazard.

In this lesson, we will explore these three major programs. They all are characterized by the fact that:    They are triggered by an “adverse event.” Benefits are a function of previous earnings.

Eligibility is often difficult to verify.

Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance

  

Unemployment Insurance (UI)

is a federally mandated, state-run program. Payroll taxes are used to pay benefits to workers laid off by companies for economic reasons.

 This payroll tax averages 2.5%.

Although UI is federally-mandated, each state sets its own parameters on the program.

 UI is

partially experience-rated

.

 This creates a great deal of variation across states, which many economists use as a “laboratory” for empirical work.

The tax that finances the UI program rises as firms have more layoffs, but not on a one-for-one basis.

Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance

   There are eligibility requirements for UI:    First, individuals must have earned a minimum annual amount.

Second, the unemployment spell must be a result of a layoff, rather than from quitting or getting fired.

Third, the individual must be actively seeking work and willing to accept a job comparable to the one lost.

These eligibility requirements mean that not all of the unemployed collect benefits (44% of unemployed collect). Even among eligibles, participation is not full.

 Roughly 66% of eligibles take up the UI benefit. Non participation (among eligibles) results from lack of information about eligibility, stigma from collecting a government handout, or from transaction costs.

Figure 1

The unemployment benefit schedule in Michigan

Unemployment Benefits in Michigan

$400 $350 $300 initially rise, and are then $200 capped at a maximum.

$150 $100 $50 $0 $0 $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $400 $450 $500 $550 $600 $650 $700 $750

Weekly Wage in Highest Quarter of Past Year

Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance

    The replacement rate is the amount of previous earnings that is replaced by the UI system.

Replacement rates vary from 35% to 55% of earnings, and UI is treated as taxable income.

In addition to benefits, the duration of UI can vary. In general, an individual can collect UI for 26 weeks. This varies:  For those with sporadic work, for a state that has a “supplemental” UI program, or if there is a federal extension, as in 2003.

The time pattern of benefits must balance the trade-off between three considerations:    Consumption smoothing implies rising benefits Work disincentives from moral hazard Targeting

Figure 2

Net Replacement Rates Over a Five-Year Period For a One-Earner Couple With Two Children 100 Sweden 80 60 40 20 Other countries tend to have higher replacement rates than the U.S.

Belgium Spain Hungary Especially for extended spells of unemployment.

0 4 USA 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 Length of Unemployment (months)

Institutional Features of Disability Insurance

  

Disability Insurance (DI)

work.

is a federal program in which a portion of the Social Security payroll tax is used to pay benefits to workers who have suffered a medical impairment that leaves them unable to Current expenditures are roughly $71 billion per year.

Benefits are federally uniform, but the initial decision on qualification is made at the state level.

   

Institutional Features of Disability Insurance

Unlike many other programs, there is a waiting period of 5 months before an individual can collect DI.

The initial acceptance rate for DI is roughly 33%; after appeals to higher levels, the acceptance rate is roughly 50%.

The benefits equal the primary insurance amount from Social Security, computed as if the applicant were age 65.

 The applicant qualifies for Medicare after two years on DI.

Detecting “true” disability is challenging.

 Parsons (1991) reported on a study in which a set of disability claims was initially reviewed by a state panel, and then one year later resubmitted as anonymous new claims.

 22% of those who had initially qualified were rejected, and 22% of those initially rejected were qualified!

Institutional Features of Workers’ Compensation

   

Workers’ Compensation (WC)

associated with an on-the-job injury.

is state-mandated insurance, which firms generally buy from private insurers, that pays for medical costs and lost wages The cash payment from WC is designed to replace two-thirds of workers’ wages. Unlike UI, these payments are untaxed, leading to a considerably higher replacement that can approach 90%.

As with UI, there is substantial state variation in the program parameters.

Unlike UI, however, the insurance premiums are more tightly experience rated.

Table 1

WC across states for permanent and temporary injuries in 2003

Maximum Indemnity Benefits Paid to Selected Types of Work Injuries, 2003 Type of permanent impairment State Arm Hand Index finger Leg Foot Temporary Injury $108,445 $64,056 $4,440 $118,795 $49,256 (10 weeks) $6,020 Hawaii Illinois Indiana Michigan Missouri New Jersey New York 180,960 301,323 86,500 175,657 78,908 154,440 124,800 141,520 190,838 62,500 140,395 59,521 92,365 97,600 26,800 40,176 10,400 24,814 15,305 8,500 18,400 167,040 276,213 74,500 140,395 70,405 147,420 115,200 118,900 155,684 50,500 105,786 52,719 78,200 82,000 5,800 10,044 5,880 6,530 6,493 6,380 4,000

Institutional Features of Workers’ Compensation

  A key feature of WC is that it provides no-fault insurance.



No-fault insurance

–when there is a qualifying injury, the WC benefits paid out by the insurer regardless of whether the injury was the worker’s or the firm’s fault.

In the early 20 th century, workers could sue their employers, but the system was viewed as unfair because low-income workers may not have had the resources to bring suit against firms.

Table 2 Comparing Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation Characteristic Qualifying event UI Unemployment and job search Duration 26-65 weeks

Replacement rates vary substantially.

Difficulty of verification Unemployment: easy Job Search: nearly impossible

substantial variation across states.

replacement rate 46% Variation across states Benefits and other rules DI Disability WC On-the-job injury Indefinite Indefinite (with medical verification) Some difficult Very difficult 60% Only disability determination 89% Benefits and other rules

  

CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS

More generous UI crowds-out other sources of income support:   Households save less Spouses are less likely to work Recent empirical work finds for UI that:   It mitigates the negative effects on consumption from unemployment.

Every $1 of UI reduces the drop in consumption by 30¢.

There is no parallel evidence on consumption smoothing for Disability Insurance or Workers’ Compensation, however.

 DI and WC probably play a stronger consumption smoothing role than UI: disability is usually unexpected and permanent, so individuals are less able to use their own savings to smooth consumption.

Figure 3

Moral hazard in UI: are unemployment exits slower when UI benefits are higher?

0.165

The exits from unemployment are fairly steady for most of the benefits period.

0.050

0.035

But towards the end of benefits eligibility, the hazard rate spikes upward.

1 5 10 15 20 Weeks Out of Work 26

  

Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance

In the 26 th week of unemployment, precisely the time when benefits run out, the exit rate from unemployment jumps up.

Empirical work suggests a benefit elasticity of +0.8–each 10% rise in unemployment benefits leads to an 8% rise in unemployment durations.

Is this moral hazard good or bad?

  If the unemployed individual is simply using the benefits to subsidize leisure consumption (e.g., watching television, etc.), then the increase in duration is inefficient.

If the individual finds a better job match, society as a whole may gain.

Job match quality

is the marginal product associated with the match of a particular worker with a particular job.

 There is little evidence (using wages) that UI improves match quality.

Moral Hazard in Disability Insurance

 Moral hazard in DI is thought to manifest itself in higher DI application rates and lower labor supply.

   If an applicant was “truly disabled,” then use of the DI program and work behavior should be unaffected by the benefit levels.

International evidence (where there is cross-sectional and over-time variation in DI generosity) suggests the implied elasticity of labor supply with respect to DI benefits is -0.3.

In the U.S., applications for DI rise during recessions, even though it is unlikely that true disability changes. Applicants find it a less costly “gamble” to go through the process when their labor market opportunities are smaller.



Moral Hazard in Workers’ Compensation

Moral hazard in WC is thought to manifest itself in reported injuries, injury durations, and types of injuries reported.

    Krueger (1990) finds that for every 10% in benefits generosity, the

rate

of reported injury rises by 7%.

He finds that for every 10% in benefits generosity, the injury rises by 17%.

duration

of Moral hazard will be worse for injuries that are hard to observe or verify, such as sprains or strains, and less of a problem for other types, such as lacerations or broken or missing limbs. He found larger elasticities for difficult-to-verify injuries.

Finally, there appears to be a “Monday effect” to WC claims.

  By examining claims by day of the week, there is a large rise in sprains and strains relative to lacerations on Mondays.

This suggests some weekend injuries unrelated to the job are being passed on to the employer.

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE TO FIRMS

 In addition to the effects of the programs on workers, we can ask how the programs affect

firm behavior. We will review:

  The incentive effects of partial experience rating in UI on layoffs The “benefits” of partial experience rating   The “cash cow” of partial experience rating Issues that arise in the provision of workers’ compensation

Figure 7

When the schedule is above the 45 degree line, firms pay

more

than employees get out.

5.4

is below the 45 degree line, firms pay

less

than employees get out.

The payroll tax is at The 45 degree line first very steep, then flattens out completely.

experience-rated schedule.

10% means that UI benefits equal 10% of a firm’s payroll over the past 4 years total UI benefits divided by payroll.

The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in UI on Layoffs

  Relative to a full system of experience rating, partial experience rating subsidizes firms with high layoff rates.

How is this a “subsidy”?

   Firms and workers may make a joint decision whether to place the worker on temporary layoff, with a promise of being hired back later.

UI system acts to make such behavior a partially paid vacation.

With partial experience rating, the cost to the firm of doing this is less than the benefits to the workers.

  

The “Benefits” of Partial Experience Rating

Why is partial experience rating so common in UI programs if it leads to more layoffs? The benefit that offset this moral hazard cost is consumption smoothing.

Fully experience rated UI would “hit firms while they are down.” Yet, by having a partially experience rated system, it sustains inefficient firms that perhaps should be driven out of business.

Empirical studies have examined state systems with different degrees of experience rating.

  They find that partial experience rating increases the rate of temporary layoffs.

Partial experience rating alone can account for as much as one-third of all temporary layoffs in the U.S.

Workers’ Compensation and Firms

    Similar issues arise in WC. If the system is not fully experience rated, firms and workers can get together to increase “injuries” and thus the payouts from insurance.

Moreover, firms have less incentive to invest in safety, because the insurance is no-fault.

Krueger (1991) examined injury durations at firms that self- insure and at firms that buy insurance in the partially experience rated market.

By definition, self-insurance is full experience rating. The injury durations were shorter at these firms, and less sensitive to benefit increases.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM REFORM

 There are several avenues for program reform:     Benefits generosity Targeting Experience rating Worker self-insurance

Benefits Generosity

   Benefits generosity: The replacement rate should clearly be less than 100% because of moral hazard.

Moral hazard is most pronounced for WC, large for UI, and smaller for DI. At the same time, the consumption smoothing benefits are likely largest for DI, and smaller for UI and WC.

This evidence suggests benefits should be highest for DI, lowest for WC (at least for difficult-to-verify injuries), with UI in the middle. Yet this is not the case, as summarized in

Table 2

.

Table 2 Comparing Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation Characteristic

Qualifying event Duration Difficulty of verification

Average after-tax replacement rate

Variation across states

UI

Unemployment and job search 26-65 weeks Benefits and other rules

DI

Disability Indefinite Replacement rates are easy highest for WC, even though moral hazard is large.

Job Search: nearly impossible Some difficult

46% 60%

Only disability determination

WC

On-the-job injury Indefinite (with medical verification) Very difficult

89%

Benefits and other rules

Targeting

 Targeting: There is evidence that the programs need to better target toward those who benefit the most from consumption smoothing, and/or for those for which the moral hazard problems are the smallest.

 Temporary layoffs & UI problematic  Certain types of injuries & WC (and DI)

Experience Rating

 

Experience rating:

Relative to full experience rating, partial experience rating increases both layoffs and duration of workers’ compensation claims.

The “consumption smoothing” motivations are weaker for businesses; inefficient businesses should be driven out in a capitalistic economy.