Transcript Document

Hazard Management in Pharma
Industries
Design & Operation for Safety Enhancement
PRESENTATION BY
P. ESHWAR REDDY, CEO
RAMKY PHARMA CITY (INDIA) LIMITED
27, March 2009
HAZARD MANAGEMENT ISSUES
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Unplanned growth of Pharma Clusters
No proper zoning
Insufficient land, buffer zone, infrastructure
Inadequate knowledge of processes and operations
Lack of safety awareness, risk analysis, emergency
prepardness
• In adequate knowledge on run away reactions, safe
storage and handling of chemicals
• Inadequate process details given to operations staff
• Technology piracy
CONVENTIAL PROCESS
Raw Material
Product
Process
By-Product
Energy
Waste
Recover & Recycle
Treatment &
Disposal
STEPS INVOLVED IN PROCESS SELECTION
1. Selection of solvents
2. Quality of raw materials
3. Equilibrium reactions, by-products
4. Sequential reactions, remove product as it forms
5. Mixing
6. Alternate process routes
7. Batch or continuous processing
8. Addition of reactants & addition sequence
9. Cooling & heating systems in reactors
10.Process controls (pH, Temperature, Pressure etc..)
POINTS FOR DISCUSSION FOR SAFETY IN
OPERATIONS
1. LAYOUT
2. DESIGNS
3. ENGINEERING STANDARDS
4. OPERATING PROCEDURES
5. TRAINING
6. HOUSEKEEPING
LAYOUT
1. TANK FARMS
2. EQUIPMENT LAYOUT
3. DISTANCE BETWEEN UTILITIES & PROCESS PLANT
DESIGNS & STANDARDS
1. REACTIONS ABOVE FLASH POINT
2. STATIC ELECTRICITY
3. VACCUM SYSTEMS
4. PIPING & CROSS CONTAMINATION
5. UTILITIES COMPATIBILITY
6. BATCH DISTILLATIONS
WRONG OPERATION : ONE COMPONENT NOT ADDED
Componenet - B (Not added)
Chlorine
Component - A
(-) 25 deg C
Material rejection and Drumming
UREA GOT REACTED WITH CHLORINE AND BYPRODUCT
NITROGEN TRICHLORIDE FORMED (HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE)
BAD ENGINEERING AND WRONG OPERATION
TO VENT
TO VACUUM SYSTEM
REFLUX
HEXANE
(-) 25 deg C
BOTH VENTS CLOSED BY OPERATOR
BAD ENGINEERING : WRONG PIPING
ACIDIC MASS
SULPHIDES
Na2S + 2 HCl → 2 NaCl + H2S
QUANTITY
: 7 kg HCl
H2S GENERATED
: 2.2 m3
EMPTY SPACE IN FILTER :100 Lt
PRESSURE DEVELOPED : 22 kg/cm2
Nitrogen
SULPHIDES
FILTER
UTILITIES COMPATABILITY : WRONG COOLING MEDIA
CT WATER OUT
CT WATER IN
Eg: REACTION WITH ACIDCHLORIDES WATER INGRESS AND
EXPLOSION
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
1. IDENTIFICATION OF MATERIALS
2. BATCH QUANTITIES
3. OPERATING PARAMETERS
4. SEQUENCE OF OPERATION
5. USAGE OF CATALYSTS
6. MSDS
HAZARD ANALYSIS
This is applying quantitative methods to safety problems
Three stages of hazard analysis
1. Estimating how often a incident can occur
2. Estimating the consequences to employees, public,
plant and profits
3. Compare results of 1 &2 above with target or criterion ( Reduce
probability of occurance,minimise risk, ignore the risk)
IN BRIEF THE STAGES ARE
1.HOW OFTEN ?
2.HOW BIG ?
3.SO WHAT ?
Example of target Hazard Rate
CASE A: One person killed every year for 100 years
CASE B: 100 people killed once in 100 years
What should be priority: Prevention of Case A or Case B
Arguments in favor of prevention of Case A:
Case B will never happen if plant life is 10 years(odds are 10 to 1 against)
It is certain one person will be killed every year- so why not prevent
Arguments in favor of prevention of Case B:
Press, public and government make more fuss
Case B disrupts organisation and local community
May cause production to be halted for long time,perhaps for ever
Estimating how often an incident will occur
1.Hazard rate- eg.rate of pressure increase
2.Protective systems in place
3.Demand rate (no. of times protective
system to operate)
4.Failure rate of protective systems
5.Fractional dead time of protective system
Main sources of error in Hazard analysis
1. Failure to foresee all ways in which a Hazard can arise
2. Errors in the logic
3. Failure to see poor designs of protection systems
4. Design assumptions not followed
5. Wrong data
Hazard Identifying and Assessing
Methods of identifying Hazards
Obvious
Methods of Assessing Hazards
Obvious
See what happens
Experienced
HAZARDS
Check List
Hazop
Codes of Practice
Hazard Analysis
HAZOP
This is a Hazard and Operability study to identify hazards
and problems which prevent efficient operation
GUIDE WORDS
None
More of
Less of
Part of
More than
Others
HAZOP-Deviations Generated by each Guide
Word
GUIDE WORD
DEVIATION
NONE
No Flow, Reverse Flow
MORE OF
Higher flow,Teperature, Pressure etc.
LESS OF
Lower flow, Temperature, Pressure
etc.
PART OF
Change in ratio of components,
component missing
MORE THAN
More components than design, extra
phases,impurities, corrosion products .
OTHERS
Start up, Shut Down, failure of utilities,
catalyst charge …
HAZOP TEAM
New Designs
Existing Plant
Design Engineer
Plant Manager
Process Engineer
Process Operator
Commissioning Manager
Plant Engineer
Instrumentation Engineer
Instrumentation Manager
R&D Chemist
Safety Manager
Process Consultant
Independent Team Leader
Independent Team Leader
HAZOP STUDY
Prerequisites
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Detailed Process Description
P & I Updated Diagrams
MSDS
Standard Operating Procedures
Operator Log-Sheets
Points - of - Watch
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Do not get carried away
Hardware and Software
Modifications without authorization
Over confidence- no need for Hazard identification
SOME MORE EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL
INCIDENTS
RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN
• Establish guide lines for establishing the Pharma cluster
industries
• Provide consultancy / training in designs, process
evaluation, project planning etc.
• Establish core centre for providing services in Hazards
identification, evaluation and mitigation
• Provide services , facilities and training in emergency
prepardness and emergency plans
• Provide training in plant operations, documentation, bulk
chemicals storage and handling
• Guide in conducting hazardous reactions such as
halogenation, hydrogenation, nitration, ethoxylations and
high pressure/temperature reactions
AND NOW THE FINAL WORD
SAFETY LIES IN OUR MIND
Safe actions follow if we build belief in
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Right Methods
Safe Practices
Safe Processes.
Thank You