Transcript The Fallacies of Humanitarian Intervention

The Fallacies of Humanitarian
Intervention
A chapter from the Putinization
of International Politics
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Talk based on my article:
Interventionen als Instrument der internationalen Politik: Entwicklung, Anspruch, Wirklichkeit, in: Bernhard Rinke/Christiane Lammers/
Reinhard Meyers/Georg Simonis (eds.): Interventionen Revisited. Friedensethik und Humanitäre Interventionen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS
2014, S. 21 - 85
Structure:
I.
The Background: changes in warfare from interstate via asymmetric intrastate to hybrid warfare
II. The Problem: overriding the prohibition of the use
of [inter-state] force [UN-Ch. Art. 2(4)] and the ban
on intervention in the domestic affairs of nations
[UN-Ch.Art. 2(7)] by humanitarian intervention in
the name of the Responsibility to Protect
III. The Consequence: the legitimation/exculpation/
camouflage of traditional acts of power politics
under the heading of humanitarian intervention
IV. The Remedy: conceptual clarity – call a spade a
spade… [
food for further debate: cf. the
handout accompanying this paper]
Background: Traditional Warfare as Clausewitz saw it…
War
The state‘s monopoly of force [ius ad bellum] turns outward, into the
international sphere - war is a continuation of the political traffic
between nations with the intermingling of other means
Primacy of
politics
Principle of
command &
obedience
Centralized political
control by legitimate
decision-makers
Struggle between large
well-structured military
organisations
Central [staff] direction
according to rational
strategic principles
War turns inward…
New Wars: the Clausewitzian concept of war dissolves…
Organized military force turns into the domestic sphere of crumbling state subjects
(Failing States as catalysts of military strife and action); ius ad bellum as a public
state monopoly dissolves as well as the protective social contract. The upkeep of
domestic order & protection against outside interference as justification of political
rule gives way to new aims and actors: domestic/intrasocietal conservation of power
and influence by Organized Interests, Clans, Warlords, Mafia Gangs etc. securing
plunder & booty, quick extraordinary profits, shadow economy trading routes, rare
ressources, personal prestige & dependencies, etc.
Primacy of
(ethnonational)
group interests
Abrogation of the
principle of
command &
obedience
Abrogation of
central political
control of war
and its rational
overall strategic
direction
Struggle between
armed ethnic groups
& militias; private
armies; rebel,
irregular & partisan
units; marauding
gangs, independently operating
snipers, private
military companies
& soldiers of fortune
A possible interpretation:
Carl Schmitt‘s Theory of the Partisan (1963) [??]
Characteristics of partisans:
1) Partisans do not wear an official uniform nor national emblems
2) Partisans show a highly intensive and overindividual motivation
[because they fight at a political front, regard themselves in the
service of a political, social, or religious salvationist idea – they
are a partisan of a specific cause]
3) Partisans command maximal mobility, tactical surprise, quick
change of attack & retreat enhanced by technology and
motorization
„Toyota warfare“ flexible communication
and professional social media strategies
4) Schmitt‘s fourth characteristic is questionable: the tellurian
character of the partisan as defender of his home ground only –
but he admits himself that following Lenin, Stalin, and Mao
partisans turn into offensive, world-aggressive revolutionaries
uniting not the workers, but the insurgents of all countries in
global irregular warfare…
War turns hybrid (I)
• Actions of governmental and nongovernmental actors blending the
threat with or the open or covert use of a whole spectrum of
traditional military and unconventional actors, means and
instruments of force mainly on the tactical level:
• e.g.: Partisans & Mercenaries, Terrorists & Organized Crime, high
technology and BC weapons of mass destruction, improvised
explosive devices, cyberattacks, disturbances of energy
production and grid distribution, economic warfare, propaganda-,
desinformation-, and demoralisation campaigns,
• Aims of hybrid warfare in particular: critical infra-structure & weak
points as well as populations on three planes: a) immediate
conflict zone, b) the home front, c) the international community
• e.g.: airports & air routes, sea ports & sea routes, mass transport,
energy production & transport, news & communication networks,
crowds in public spaces and at special events (sports, open air
concerts, fairs, Octoberfests, and the like)
War turns hybrid (II)
Consequences of hybrid warfare:
Mass panic, escape & refuge attempts, massive disturbances/
breakdown of public order; multifacetted infringements of human
security and human rights
Principle: The alarming or deterrent threat of hybrid
warfare lies in the measure of damage to be expected
Even smaller, geographically limited security disturbances may
set in motion regional/global temporally, politically, economically,
financially incisive follow-up processes
Normative boundaries: none in international law
Counter measures: must be highly adaptable,
intelligent, and resilient, overcoming three typical
deficits: 1) information/recognition/knowledge,
2) coordination of action, 3) ressources
Little green men…
Maskirovka
• Waleri Wassiljewitsch Gerassimow [General of the Army, at
present Chief of the Russian General Staff]
• The Value of Science in Prediction, in: Military Industrial
Courier, February 2013, deals with the use of political,
economic, information technological, humanitarian, and other
non-military measures as methods of waging conflict
• Fogging the divide between peace and war
• Growing role of nonmilitary means to reach political, strategic,
and at times tactical aims. In many cases, they have exceeded
the power of the force of weapons in their effectiveness .
• The open use of forces, often under the guise of
peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to
only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement
of final success in the conflict.
The new face of war –
or is it the old ??
Basic Problem
The United Nations, formed in the aftermath of World
War II to promote world peace and stability, recognize
the sovereign equality of all its member states by
emphasizing in its Charter the prohibition of the use of
force between its members and the importance of
sovereignty…
• Art.2(4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state …
• Art. 2(7) "Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state."
Basic Problem II
• Prohibition of the use of interstate force ex
Art. 2(4) UN-Charta
coupled with
• Prohibition to intervene in domestic affairs
ex Art 2(7) UN-Charta
• Necessary boundary condition of an international system of deterrence based on
mutual assured destruction and hardened
second-strike capabilities
• He who shoots first dies second
Caveat
•The principle of nonintervention does not rule out the
application of enforcement measures in case of a threat
to peace, a breach of peace, or acts of aggression - cf.
Ch. VII UNCh – if so resolved by the Security Council
• The Genocide Convention of 1948 also overrode the
nonintervention principle to lay down the commitment of
the world community to prevent and punish genozide –
its application however was a Cold War problem… in the
same line as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights & the 1966 Conventions on Civil & Political, and
Economic, Social, and Cultural rights…
Basic Problem III
Along with the emergence of non-intervention as a
universal norm, a UN-initiated parallel development
was in conflict with this principle: the development
of human rights as a global issue.
Article 1 of the Charter emphasises promoting respect
for human rights and justice as one of the fundamental missions of the organisation.
Article 55 states that the UN shall promote and respect
the human rights and basic freedoms, and subsequent UN initiatives have strengthened these
claims.
Humanitarian intervention, as the most assertive form
of promoting human rights at a global level, was and
is clearly incompatible with norms such as nonintervention and state sovereignty.
Basic Problem IVa
• No Government has the right to hide
behind national sovereignty in order to
violate the rights or fundamental
freedoms of its people.
• Kofi Annan, 07.04.1999, with reference to the
Kosovo Conflict
Basic Problem IVb
Two concepts of Sovereignty, Kofi Annan, The
Economist 18.09.1999
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is
being redefined – not least by the forces of
globalisation and international cooperation.
States are now widely understood to be
instruments at the service of their peoples, and
not vice versa. …At the same time individual
sovereignty … has been enhanced by a
renewed and spreading consciousness of
individal rights…
So what does all this lead to ?
• The classic definition of humanitarian
intervention [by J.L.Holzgrefe (2003:18)]:
• „…the threat or use of force across state
borders by a state (or group of states) aimed
at preventing or ending widespread and
grave violations of the fundamental human
rights of individuals other than its own
citizens, without the permission of the state
within whose territory force is applied…”
•
Holzgrefe, J.L. (2003): The humanitarian intervention debate, in: Holzgrefe,
J.L./ Keohane, Robert O. (Hrsg.): Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal,
and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., S.15 – 52.
…and as a further consequence…
Resolution of the UN world summit, Sept. 2005:
„ Each individual State has the responsibility
to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.[…And if a state fails in that
responsibility, the initiative turns over to the
international community…] We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with
it…“
Why do nations intervene
in the domestic affairs of others ?
Legitimate Grounds
for Intervention
Realism
Rationalism
Political
Expediency,
National
Interest
International
Legal
appropriateness
(Grotius ff)
Idealism
Responsibility
to protect
Just War Doctrine
Revived
Some historical examples…
• The Swedes reputedly entered the 30 Years‘ War for
religious & humanitarian reasons – yet by 1648 they
also had defeated Denmark & became a Baltic Great
Power…
• The Powers intervened around the Mediterranean and
on the Balkans at various times during the 19th century
– in Greece (1827), Sicily (1856), Syria (1860), Krete
(1866), Bosnia (1875), Bulgaria (1877), Mace-donia
(1887) – and the US in Cuba 1898 – ostensibly for
humanitarian and democratic reasons, but nearly
always also against the Ottoman Empire…
• Indian intervention in East Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971
• Tanzanian intervention in Uganda 1979
• Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea December 78
…and some more recent ones…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Nagorno-Karabakh 1988 - 1994
Transnistria 1990 – 1992
South Ossetia 2008
Abchazia 2008
Libya 2011
[no doubt to be continued]
General characteristic: in all these cases humanitarian intervention produced frozen conflicts (with the
exception of Libya, where it resulted in still ongoing
inter-religious and inter-tribal warfare) manifest in
some sort of military balance between the conflicting
parties, a ceasefire, but no political solution
Conclusio
An analysis of the vast majority of historically manifest
humanitarian interventions produces two trends:
• „… first, the presence of a large degree of national interest
whenever states have launched a supposedly humanitarian
intervention;
• and second, a marked unwillingness amongst states to intervene
when national interests are not at stake, regardless of the
humanitarian suffering taking place …“.
Thus, in my interpretation the whole humanitarian intervention/R2P debate conceals a nasty consequence: the
legitimation/exculpation/camouflage of traditional acts of
power politics under a false flag – that of humanitarian
intervention.
•
Hehir, Aidan (2013): Humanitarian Intervention. An Introduction. 2nd ed.
Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan, p.198
Thank You for your
patience…