Transcript Διαφάνεια 1 - Lumina Informatics

Getting to “Yes”
Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot public perceptions,
concerning a possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem.
Presented by
Alexandros Lordos
and
Muharrem Faiz
• In last April’s referendums, the large gap between
official negotiating positions and public perceptions,
was made evident.
• Even though the primary Greek Cypriot negotiator over
the previous years, Glafkos Clerides, was in favour of
the Plan, 76% of Greek Cypriots voted “No”.
• Similarly, even though the main Turkish Cypriot
negotiator, Rauf Denktash, was against the Plan, 65%
of Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes”.
• One lesson from last April’s referendums, is therefore
that public perceptions and preferences should be
carefully examined from now on, since after all it is the
wider public – and not the negotiators – who will be the
final arbitrators of any Solution.
• For the purposes of this presentation, two recent public
opinion surveys will be utilised – one of the Greek
Cypriots and the other of the Turkish Cypriots.
• The first Survey was conducted in September 2004,
with a sample of 1000 Greek Cypriots who were
interviewed over the telephone.
• The second survey was conducted in January 2005,
with a sample of 700 Turkish Cypriots who were
interviewed face-to-face.
• The surveys were not conducted in parallel with
identical questionnaires. Rather, the Turkish Cypriot
survey was designed in such a way as to build on the
findings of the Greek Cypriot survey.
Greek Cypriot Survey Sample
(by district)
400
Turkish Cypriot Survey Sample
(by district)
250
200
300
150
200
400
242
100
179
280
100
170
119
50
84
78
100
50
0
0
e
irn
uz
)
ia
en
yr
(K
)
ta
us
sia
)
ag
m
co
a
(F
(N
i
G
G
Le
fk
os
a
a
us
ta
Pa
ph
os
ag
Fa
m
ag
us
M
a
ac
rn
La
l
so
sia
as
m
Li
Ni
co
el
yu
Is
k
el
e
rt
(M
or
fo
(T
rik
o
m
u)
Sampling procedure: Multi-stage stratified random sampling
o)
Underlying Attitudes
" We have much in common with Turkish
Cypriots"
50
Percent
40
30
40,4
20
33,1
10
12,8
8,9
0
To
ta
ll
yd
Pa
rtl
y
isa
gr
ee
4,8
Pa
rtl
y
Ne
ut
ra
l
dis
ag
re
e
Vi
ew
To
ta
lly
ag
re
e
ag
re
e
Greek Cypriot dominant narratives currently favour co-existence with the
Turkish Cypriots.
" Greek Cypriots are our co-citizens"
40
Percent
30
20
32,5
30,9
10
16,7
12
5,8
0
e
re
ag
lly
ta
To
e
re
ag
tly
e
ar
P
nc
ta
lS
tra
eu
ee
N
gr
sa
di
tly
ar
P
lly
ta
To
ee
gr
sa
di
The Turkish Cypriot community is currently polarized on the issue
of co-existence with Greek Cypriots.
" The Turkish Cypriots are devious
and self-serving"
" Greek Cypriots will attempt to
dominate us"
40
30
25
30
Percent
Percent
20
20
33,8
15
28,21
27,35
10
10
22,4
15,38
18,8
5
16,2
8,8
0
ee
gr
sa
di
di
tra
l
sa
gr
ee
St
an
ce
To
ta
lly
ag
ag
re
re
e
e
Pa
rtl
y
To
Pa
ta
rtl
lly
y
di
a
ag
gr
St
sa
ee
re
an
gr
e
ee
ce
ee
gr
sa
di
eu
Pa
rtl
y
lly
ta
ly
l
ta
To
rtl
y
N
To
0
Pa
13,39 13,11
Ne
ut
ra
l
Both communities currently tend to mistrust the intentions of the other.
" I could never trust a Turk"
50
Percent
40
30
46,9
20
10
18,8
16
11,8
6,5
0
tly
ar
To
ta
lly
a
e
re
ag
e
re
ag
s
di
Ne
ut
ra
lS
isa
ta
gr
nc
ee
e
P
lly
ta
To
Pa
rtl
yd
gr
ee
Greek Cypriots have strong reservations about the role of
Turkey and of the Mainland Turks in the whole Cyprus affair.
" Greek Cypriots are murderers"
60
30
50
25
40
20
30
Percent
Percent
" The Turkish Army is here to protect us"
56,7
20
15
27,64
10
15,81 16,24 16,67
22,4
10
19,23
5
10
0
3,4
y
ly
Pa
ag
di
s
ag
re
e
Pa
rtl
y
ce
an
St
ee
gr
sa
re
e
rtl
y
di
ce
an
St
ee
gr
ag
re
e
lly
ta
rtl
0
To
ta
l
l
tra
eu
N
Pa
To
l
tra
eu
sa
ag
re
e
di
di
s
N
ta
lly
3,1
y
rtl
Pa
To
To
ag
re
e
ta
l
ly
ag
re
e
Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, tend to believe that they need Turkey’s
protection in order to be safe from “Greek Cypriot aggression”.
" The only way to resolve our
national issue is through an
armed struggle"
" The Cyprus Problem can only be
solved through a liberation struggle"
50
70
60
40
40
Percent
Percent
50
68,9
30
30
47
20
20
10
10
14,4
10,2
0
13,7
ce
ly
di
sa
gr
ee
ee
gr
St
an
To
N
Pa
eu
ta
rtl
tra
lly
y
ag
lS
ag
r
ta
ee
re
nc
e
e
sa
di
di
sa
ag
gr
ee
re
e
di
s
To
ta
l
y
rtl
tra
l
9,1
0
Pa
eu
e
re
ag
lly
ta
e
To
re
ag
N
y
rtl
Pa
rtl
y
Pa
To
ta
lly
7
3,9
11,4
10
Majorities of both communities strongly oppose the use of violence.
Motivations
Turkish Cypriot motivations
•
•
•
•
•
To become members of the European Union.
To escape economic isolation.
To become “the masters of their own house”.
To overcome the risk of another war.
To be re-united with the Greek Cypriots.
(secondary motive)
• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are
now in the south. (secondary motive)
Greek Cypriot motivations
• To escape the military stranglehold of Turkey.
• To re-establish the integrity and sovereignty of the
Republic.
• To put an end to the “Turkification” of the northern half of
Cyprus.
• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in
the north.
• To be re-united with the Turkish Cypriots. (secondary
motive)
• To attract foreign investment by resolving “the political
irregularity” on the island. (secondary motive)
Bizonal - Bicommunal Federation
40
40
30
30
Percent
Percent
Bizonal - Bicommunal Federation
20
32,4
35,7
29,2
21,8
10
20
10
14,7
12,8
12,3
13
9,8
9,9
0
0
cc
an
th
b
ta
ep
le
So
ol
ut
io
n
tio
lu
n
tio
lu
So
e
at
er
od
m
n
ha
rt
n
tte
tio
lu
Be
So
e
e
at
at
er
er
od
od
M
m
n
na
se
or
W
U
n
io
ut
e
ol
at
lS
er
ea
od
Id
m
n
ha
rt
n
tte
tio
lu
Be
So
e
e
at
at
er
er
od
od
M
m
an
th
le
ab
pt
ce
se
or
W
ac
Un
Id
ea
lS
Majorities of both communities are willing to accept a Federal Solution.
Security
The withdrawal of Greek and Turkish
Troops to take place much faster than
currently provided for in the UN Plan.
The bulk of Greek and Turkish troops to leave
the island much sooner than currently
provided for in the UN Plan.
50
80
40
60
40
Percent
Percent
30
76,3
44,6
20
10
13,8
13,2
13,7
14,7
A
20
Ab
19,5
0
3,7
so
lu
te
ly
t
en
em
ov
pr
im
ry
se
le
if
ne
ce
ce
pt
ab
ss
le
ar
y
e
l
Re
sp
on
ra
b
ul
pf
he
sa
es
nt
ia
un
ac
le
ns
po
es
se
To
R
Es
To
ta
lly
o
ec
ul
pf
el
nn
H
U
0,5
No
N
0
es
se
nt
ia
l
The two communities are sharply opposed on the issue of troop withdrawal.
All Greek and Turkish troops to
eventually depart from the island.
Cyprus to be fully demilitarized (i.e. all Greek
and Turkish troops to depart) when Turkey
joins the European Union.
50
60
50
40
40
30
Percent
Percent
30
58,3
49
20
20
29,5
10
10
17,5
13,8
10,3
9,4
10,3
1,9
0
0
A
Ab
so
l
ut
el
y
t
en
em
ov
pr
im
e
ns
po
es
un
le
ac
if
ne
ce
ce
pt
ab
ss
le
ar
y
ul
pf
he
R
e
ns
po
es
R
le
ra
b
o
To
N
o
N
l
ia
nt
se
Es
ul
pf
el
H
y
ar
ss
e
ec
nn
U
To
ta
lly
es
se
n
tia
l
The two communities are also opposed on the issue of demilitarization.
All Greek and Turkish troops to become part of
an integrated European Security force, when
Turkey joins the European Union.
30
25
Percent
20
15
29,91
24,5
10
17,66
14,81
13,11
5
0
ry
so
lut
ely
t
en
m
ve
sa
Ab
o
pr
im
es
e
ec
s
on
ble
if n
p
es
ce
pta
R
le
na
c
ul
pf
he
o
N
yu
ler
ab
A
To
To
tal
l
es
se
nti
al
The creation of an integrated Security Force may be a mutually
acceptable compromise.
Guarantor Powers to not have the right
of unilateral intervention.
Greek and Turkish Intervention rights to be
clearly limited, so that Turkey can only
intervene in the Turkish Cypriot state.
40
30
Percent
70
60
50
20
33,8
23,5
20,1
10
10,1
0
pf
he
se
on
p
es
R
e
ec
n
if
y
ar
ss
e
bl
ta
ep
l
ia
nt
se
es
y
t
el
en
ut
ol
em
bs
ov
A
pr
im
ul
A
o
N
c
ac
un
60,7
30
e
bl
ra
le
To
lly
ta
To
Percent
12,5
40
20
22,9
10
11,8
Greece or Turkey to require authorisation by the
UN Security Council before either of them can
intervene in Cyprus.
4,6
0
o
N
ec
e
ry
s
on
sa
es
p
es
R
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
se
nt
ial
Greek Cypriots demand the removal of
intervention rights.
Percent
30
20
30,8
23,5
14
10,5
0
te
ly
t
en
em
ry
Ab
so
lu
ov
pr
im
ec
es
sa
se
on
if n
ul
pf
he
ce
pt
ab
le
p
es
le
R
na
c
ler
ab
A
To
yu
o
To
ta
ll
N
The Turkish Cypriots would accept a
moderation of intervention rights.
21,2
10
es
se
n
tia
l
The Treaty of Guarantee to be replaced by a
European Security agreement, in which Turkey
will also play a part, when Turkey joins the
European Union.
30
25
Percent
20
15
25,36
10
22,51
20,66
17,81
13,68
5
0
A
ec
sa
ry
olu
tel
y
t
en
em
es
Ab
s
ov
pr
im
ul
pf
he
e
ble
if n
s
on
ce
pta
p
es
le
R
na
c
o
yu
To
ler
ab
N
To
tal
l
es
se
nti
al
Replacing the Treaty of Guarantee with a European Security
agreement, would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.
Governance
On the issue of Federal Decision Making, what
do you prefer for the Turkish Cypriots: To have
Veto Powers over every decision, and face the
risk of deadlocks, or to limit the veto power to
the most essential issues, for the sake of
effective governance?
70
60
Percent
50
40
67,2
30
20
28,9
10
3,8
0
N
o
es
R
e
tiv
e
c
an
rn
ve
go
s
er
ow
P
ns
po
o
et
c
fe
ef
rV
fe
re
r
fe
re
P
P
e
The Turkish Cypriots have shaped the issue of governance in the
negotiations, by insisting on privileges to protect them from majority rule.
The requirement for qualified majorities
(that is, votes in favour from both
communities) to be removed from decision
making in the Federal Government.
No International Judges to be sitting on
the bench of the Supreme Court.
50
40
40
Percent
Percent
30
20
33
30
40,2
20
31,5
29
20,3
10
10
15,2
21,9
8,9
0
0
p
es
R
e
s
on
ar
y
o
ss
Es
se
nt
ia
l
N
Un
ne
ce
ul
pf
el
ry
se
on
l
p
es
R
sa
es
nt
ia
o
ec
se
H
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
Greek Cypriots are willing to tolerate the constitutional concessions
which the Turkish Cypriots demand.
No permanent limits to the settlement of
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the
opposite constituent state.
The senate to be elected according to
permanent residence, not ethnic background.
50
40
40
30
Percent
Percent
30
42,9
20
20
38,3
31,4
36,4
10
10
18,1
12,2
17
0
Es
s
o
N
ry
se
on
l
e
s
on
sp
Re
sa
es
tia
p
es
ec
en
R
nn
No
l
fu
lp
y
ar
s
es
l
ia
nt
se
Es
He
c
ne
Un
ul
pf
el
H
U
3,7
0
The Greek Cypriots are also willing to tolerate the derogations which the
Turkish Cypriots demand in order to preserve bizonality and political equality.
The three International Judges on the
Supreme Court to come from EU countries,
so that their rulings help to lead Cyprus in
a more European Direction.
30
25
Percent
20
15
25,21
21,79
10
21,79
16,81
14,39
5
0
e
s
on
p
es
R
ss
ce
ne
y
ar
ble
Ab
so
he
pfu
o
ce
pta
if
na
c
le
ab
er
ol
yu
A
N
T
To
tal
l
l im
pro
ve
lut
e
ly
e
me
nt
ss
en
ti
al
The Turkish Cypriots are willing to tolerate “only Europeans as
the three non-Cypriot judges on the Supreme Court”.
Senate Special Majority to apply only in the
most essential issues, in order to avoid
deadlocks, while for all other issues normal
qualified majority to apply.
25
Percent
20
15
10
22,79
22,08
20,51
17,66
16,95
5
0
e
y
ar
le
ns
tab
po
es
R
ep
s
es
ec
cc
n
if
na
A
o
yu
le
ab
er
ol
T
tal
l
N
To
Ab
s
he
pfu
olu
tel
y
l im
pro
ve
me
nt
es
se
nti
al
The Turkish Cypriots are also willing to tolerate a reduction in the
number of issues for which Senate Special Majority is required.
The Presidential Council to be elected
directly by the people.
50
Percent
40
30
43,9
20
10
19,2
13,1
11
12,8
0
l
ia
nt
se
es
y
t
el
ut
en
ol
em
bs
ov
A
pr
im
ul
pf
he
A
e
ns
y
po
ar
es
R
ss
o
ce
N
ne
if
e
bl
le
ra
ab
le
pt
To
ce
ac
un
lly
ta
To
The Turkish Cypriots would strongly support “direct election of
the Presidential Council”
Provisions to be put in place, such that will
encourage the development of bi-communal
Political Parties.
50
Percent
40
30
42,3
20
10
15,7
0
es
n
po
se
e
ec
y
ar
ss
tab
le
n
if
ac
ce
p
R
un
o
ly
A
N
T
tal
le
ab
er
ol
To
17,9
13,8
10,3
Ab
he
so
pfu
lut
ely
l im
es
pr
ov
se
em
nti
al
en
t
The Turkish Cypriots would also strongly support “provisions to
encourage the development of bi-communal Political Parties”
Property
More territory to be returned under Greek
Cypriot administration, than currently
provided for in the UN Plan.
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be
entitled to a greater percent of their property in
the other constituent state, than currently
provided for in the UN Plan.
60
70
50
60
50
Percent
Percent
40
30
50,2
20
37,9
40
63
30
20
27,5
10
10
7,9
7,8
Es
se
e
ry
ns
po
es
R
nt
ia
l
o
N
sa
es
ul
pf
el
H
ec
ry
se
nt
ia
l
nn
ss
a
e
ns
po
es
R
ce
Es
o
N
ne
ul
pf
el
H
Un
1,6
0
U
0
4,1
Greek Cypriots consider individual Property Rights to be more
important than further territorial concessions.
Refugees, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot, to be entitled to a greater
proportion of their property in the other
constituent state, so long as current
occupants are protected as per the UN Plan.
Each refugee that will not receive his original
home, to be entitled to have a new home built
for him in the same town or village.
30
50
25
40
15
10
Percent
Percent
20
27,78
46,9
20
22,93
22,36
30
14,96
10
11,97
5
17,8
15,7
11,5
0
0
o
s
on
p
es
R
ss
e
ec
e
n
if
y
ar
un
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
A
N
e
bl
ra
le
To
l
ia
nt
se
es
t
en
em
ov
pr
im
e
ry
a
ss
e
bl
ta
ep
ce
ne
ns
po
es
if
ly
te
lu
so
R
le
ab
er
c
ac
un
ul
pf
he
Ab
A
o
N
l
To
lly
ta
To
To
ta
lly
8,1
he
pf
ul
Ab
so
lu
im
pr
ov
te
l
y
em
en
t
es
se
n
tia
l
The Turkish Cypriots are willing to accept a greater respect for
Property Rights, and they would enthusiastically support “nonentitled refugees to have the right to a new home in the same village”
The right to become a resident of the other
constituent state to be granted much sooner
than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
40
Percent
30
20
38,5
21,9
10
16,7
12,4
10,5
0
o
y
ar
ss
e
ec
e
s
on
p
es
R
ce
pta
ble
n
if
na
c
A
N
yu
e
bl
ra
le
To
To
tal
l
Ab
he
pfu
so
lut
ely
l im
pr
ov
em
en
t
es
se
n
tia
l
The Turkish Cypriots are also eager to put aside timetable
restrictions to the application of residence rights.
Citizens from Turkey
70
60
Percent
50
40
Turkish Citizens who
came in the 1970s
32,500
Turkish Citizens who
came in the 1980s
13,500
Turkish Citizens who
came in the 1990s
9,000
Turkish Citizens who
came since yr 2000
4,000
66,8
30
20
10
16,5
6
0
3,7
1,3
1,9
3,8
We have We came We came We came We came My family
No
been here
here
here
here
here after has mixed Response
since
between between between the year through
before
1974 and 1980 and 1990 and
2000
marriage
1974
1979
1989
1999
How long has your family been resident in Cyprus?
More than half of the Turkish Citizens arrived in the 1970s
More immigrants from Turkey to leave the island,
than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
80
Percent
60
40
74,7
20
20,3
0
4,2
0,8
e
ry
s
on
p
es
R
sa
es
nt
ial
o
ec
se
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
The Greek Cypriots strongly insist that more Turkish Citizens
should depart from the island.
Greek Cypriot concerns about the Settlers.
• That many more would stay under the UN Plan, not just
45,000.
• That the Settlers would be entitled to stay in Greek
Cypriot properties.
• That by allowing Settlers to stay, it will be like rewarding
Turkey for her violation of International Law.
• That the Settlers would be an alien body to the culture
of Cyprus, and would refuse to integrate.
• That through the vote of the Settlers, the influence of
Turkey would remain strong in Cypriot politics.
Attitudes of Settlers from Turkey
towards the Greek Cypriots
40
40
30
30
20
Percent
Percent
Attitude of Turkish Cypriots
towards the Greek Cypriots
39,3
20
34,48
29,89
24
10
19,8
16,9
10
0
0
In
d
iff
er
en
k
Cy
pr
io
ng
di
en
Bl
re
e
tic
G
e
nc
te
is
pr
io
ts
tt
o
x
-e
Cy
co
of
G
re
ek
s
ia
us
th
En
Fe
ar
ul
ef
ar
ng
di
en
Bl
ts
rio
yp
C
ist
en
ce
tic
as
ek
re
ts
rio
yp
C
G
ek
re
G
ul
co
-e
x
C
re
f
i
us
th
En
of
to
nt
re
ffe
di
In
ar
Fe
Ca
18,39
17,24
ts
Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Citizens do not vary much in their
attitudes towards the Greek Cypriots.
What did you vote in the parliamentary elections of 2003?
(Votes of Turkish Cypriots)
What did you vote in the parliamentary elections of 2003?
(Votes of Settlers from Turkey)
40
50
30
30
Percent
Percent
40
20
32,8
42,1
20
27,6
10
10
23,1
19,5
10,5
9,5
4
0
0
P
H
)
at
al
(T
However, the voting patterns of Turkish Citizens are sharply
different to the voting patterns of the Turkish Cypriots.
ci)
in
k
(A
G
ci)
in
u)
gl
ro
(E
k
(A
(S
er
da
r)
BD
D
B
PCT
P
UB
H
)
at
al
(T
u)
gl
ro
(E
(S
er
da
r)
BD
P
UB
P
BG
PCT
D
The list of immigrants that may remain on the
island, currently numbering 45.000, to be shortened.
(views of Turkish Cypriots)
60
50
Percent
40
30
52,9
20
10
19,2
18
6,6
0
3,3
Ab
A
To
No
he
ler
ta
so
R
lly
pf
lut
ab
es
u
un
ely
po
le
l im
ac
if n
ns
es
p
ce
r
e
ec
ov
se
pt
e
em
nt
ab
ss
ial
en
ar
le
y
t
To
Turkish Cypriots would strongly oppose a reduction in ”the list of
45.000 who may remain”
Strong implementation mechanisms, so that
the illegal workers who are not entitled to
remain will indeed leave the island.
60
50
Percent
40
30
57,5
20
10
13,4
12,1
8,8
8,1
0
e
if
A
Re
sp
on
y
ar
ss
ce
ne
le
ab
pt
ce
ac
un
bl
ra
le
To
lly
ta
To
No
se
Ab
so
he
pfu
lut
e
l im
pr
ov
ly
e
em
en
t
ss
en
tia
l
However, the Turkish Cypriots do in fact insist that those who
are not entitled to stay should indeed leave the island.
Firm limits to the number of immigrants
from Turkey who may come to settle in
Cyprus after the solution.
Absolute limits to the future influx of Turkish
Citizens in Cyprus, in such a way as to secure the
long term demographic balance on the island.
40
70
60
30
40
Percent
Percent
50
63,5
30
20
35,8
23,6
20
10
10,5
8,1
4,1
0
15,8
14,2
24,3
10
0
le
ne
e
ss
ar
y
so
lu
te
l
y
t
en
em
ce
Ab
ov
pr
m
s
on
e
ry
ce
pt
ab
le
if
p
es
R
ra
b
i
ul
pf
he
le
un
ac
A
To
o
sa
es
ns
po
es
To
ta
lly
N
R
ec
nt
ia
l
o
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
se
es
se
nt
ia
Both communities tend to agree on the necessity to limit future
immigration from Turkey.
l
The Economy
The Federal Government to have the
authority to place limits in the public
borrowing of constituent states.
The central Federal state to be given
more powers in economics, public
finance and commerce.
60
40
50
30
Percent
Percent
40
30
51,6
20
35,6
20
34,9
21,8
10
10
0
19,1
16,2
7,3
8,2
5,3
0
o
if
e
y
ar
ss
ce
ne
ce
pt
ab
le
ns
po
es
R
e
e
un
ac
A
N
s
on
p
es
R
To
ta
lly
bl
ra
le
To
o
N
ul
pf
el
H
y
ar
ss
e
ec
nn
U
Es
se
nt
ia
l
he
pf
ul
Ab
so
lu
te
ly
im
es
pr
ov
se
em
nt
ia
en
l
t
Both communities tend to agree that Federal oversight of the
Economy is important.
The right to freely purchase property anywhere
in Cyprus, to be granted much sooner than
currently provided for in the UN Plan.
50
Percent
40
30
44,7
20
36,7
10
14,5
4,1
0
e
ry
ns
po
es
R
sa
es
nt
ial
o
ec
se
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
Greek Cypriots would like to see a more rapid application of
free market economics.
The right to buy property in the other constituent
state to be given within 6 to 9 years, but with
safeguards to ensure that the majority of property
will remain in Turkish Cypriots hands.
Greater incentives for the creation of bi-communal
joint business ventures in the north, in order to
increase the standard of living of Turkish Cypriots
through Greek Cypriot investments.
30
50
25
40
15
Percent
Percent
20
27,64
22,65
10
30
42,9
20
21,94
14,67
13,11
10
11,7
0
0
ce
pt
ab
le
ry
sa
se
nt
ia
l
se
on
en
t
es
p
es
em
un
ac
A
s
ce
ne
ry
sa
s
ce
ne
pr
ov
To
ta
lly
if
im
lu
te
ly
14,8
R
Ab
so
15,2
o
if
se
on
p
es
R
he
pf
ul
e
bl
ra
le
To
o
ce
pt
ab
le
A
N
un
ac
e
bl
ra
le
To
To
ta
lly
15,4
N
5
he
pf
ul
Ab
so
im
pr
ov
lu
te
ly
em
en
t
es
se
nt
ia
l
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to tolerate such a reduction
of economic restrictions, especially if Greek Cypriot investments
are made through bi-communal business ventures.
The cost of operation of the Federal State, to be
divided more equitably so that Greek Cypriots
do not end up shouldering 90% of the cost.
The cost of the Federal Government to be
split more equitably between the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.
80
50
40
Percent
Percent
60
40
72,7
30
40,7
20
20
0
16,1
14,2
A
10,8
1,6
N
o
0
e
ns
po
es
y
ar
ss
ce
pt
ab
le
ce
ne
e
un
ac
if
on
s
To
ta
lly
R
R
es
p
o
Es
se
nt
ia
l
e
bl
ra
le
To
4,8
U
H
nn
el
pf
ec
ul
es
sa
ry
18,1
N
10
20,9
Ab
so
he
p
fu
l
im
pr
ov
lu
te
ly
es
se
nt
ia
en
l
t
em
Equitable distribution of costs is a demand of both communities.
Turkey to continue its current annual
contribution to the Turkish Cypriot state
for ten more years after the solution.
Turkey to also contribute for the
compensation of refugees who will not
be getting their property back.
80
50
40
40
Percent
Percent
60
75,3
30
43,3
20
20
21,4
10
15,7
19,6
0
3,7
5,1
1,4
ry
sa
s
ce
ne
se
on
p
es
R
if
ep
ta
bl
e
o
ry
un
ac
c
A
N
sa
es
e
ns
po
es
R
To
ta
lly
e
bl
ra
le
To
o
ec
se
nt
ia
l
0
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
14,5
Ab
so
he
pf
ul
im
lu
te
ly
es
se
nt
ia
en
l
t
pr
ov
em
Both communities would like to see Turkey more involved in
the financing of the new state of affairs.
Education
The central Federal state to be
given more powers in matters of
education and social policy.
60
50
Percent
40
30
51,3
20
38,4
10
6,8
3,5
0
al
ry
e
ns
po
es
R
sa
es
nti
o
ec
se
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
The Greek Cypriots insist that the Federal State should be
given more authority over educational matters.
The Federal Government to operate bicommunal schools, for parents who might wish
to send their children there.
40
40
30
30
20
Percent
Percent
The education of Greek Cypriots living in the
north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south to
be responsibility of the Federal Government.
38,2
20
32,1
10
17,8
19,7
10
17,7
21,2
23,6
16,8
6,7
0
ce
pt
ab
le
e
se
nt
ia
l
y
ar
ss
en
t
es
A
ns
po
es
em
un
ac
ce
ne
pr
ov
To
ta
lly
if
im
lu
te
ly
R
pf
ul
o
N
Ab
so
he
e
bl
ra
le
To
e
y
ar
ss
ce
ne
ns
po
es
R
if
ce
pt
ab
le
A
o
N
un
ac
e
bl
ra
le
To
To
ta
lly
6,3
0
Ab
so
he
pf
ul
im
pr
ov
lu
te
ly
em
en
t
es
se
nt
ia
l
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to accept the
creation of a “Federal Ministry of Education”, to oversee
integrated schooling and cross-state schooling.
Free instruction of English and Greek to be
made available for all citizens of the
Turkish Cypriot state, in order to improve
their employment prospects.
60
50
Percent
40
30
52,7
20
10
20,2
12,3
9,5
0
e
ns
po
y
ar
le
ss
ta
b
e
ec
ep
n
if
cc
es
R
na
o
yu
A
N
ta
ll
e
bl
ra
le
To
To
5,3
Ab
so
he
pf
ul
im
pr
ov
lut
ely
em
en
t
es
se
nt
ial
The Turkish Cypriots would strongly appreciate a European
Development program for the instruction of other languages.
Legal Status
Assurances that the new state of affairs will be
the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.
70
60
Percent
50
40
65,7
30
20
23,7
10
0
5,6
5
o
e
ry
s
on
p
es
sa
es
tia
l
R
ec
en
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
s
Greek Cypriots strongly insist on the legal continuity of the
Republic of Cyprus.
The new state of affairs to be the legal
continuity of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, but
without the requirement to recognize the
post-1963 Greek Cypriot administration.
40
Percent
30
20
37,2
26,2
10
15,7
10,7
0
10,3
Ab
A
To
No
he
ler
so
R
pf
lut
ab
es
yu
u
ely
po
le
l im
na
if n
ns
es
cc
p
r
e
ec
ov
ep
se
e
e
nt
ta
ss
m
ial
ble
en
ar
y
t
To
ta
ll
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider legal continuity, so
long as a formula could be found so that they wouldn’t be forced to
also recognize the “unilateral Greek Cypriot administration”
Implementation Guarantees
International guarantees for the implementation
of the solution, with serious consequences for the
side that breaks from what has been agreed.
Enforceable international guarantees to be
given for the implementation of the solution,
with serious consequences for the side that
breaks away from what has been agreed.
80
60
50
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
72
30
52,6
20
20
10
0
3,8
3,4
0
14,2
A
se
on
p
es
ry
sa
s
ce
ne
ce
pt
ab
le
if
un
ac
R
To
ta
lly
o
ry
se
on
p
es
R
sa
es
l
12,7
5
e
bl
ra
le
To
o
ec
se
nt
ia
N
nn
ul
pf
el
H
U
Es
15,5
N
20,8
Ab
so
he
pf
ul
im
pr
ov
lu
te
ly
em
en
t
es
se
nt
ia
l
Both communities insist that strong and enforceable guarantees
be offered for the implementation of the solution.
Greek Cypriot Implementation concerns
• That territorial adjustment will indeed
happen as agreed.
• That Turkish troops will indeed withdraw
as agreed.
• That current occupants will indeed vacate
properties when the Property Board orders
them to do so.
• That the Turkish Cypriots will not be able
to secede from the Republic.
Turkish Cypriot Implementation concerns
• That the terms of the agreement (more
particularly Bizonality and Political Equality) will
not later be overruled through the application of
European Law.
• That National Guard weapons kept in Greek
Cypriot homes will indeed be relinquished as
agreed.
• That alternative accommodation will indeed be
found for those who would have to relocate.
• That the Greek Cypriots will not be able to
dominate the Republic.
Shared Implementation concerns
• That Settlers will indeed depart the
island as planned.
• That properties will indeed be
compensated for as agreed.
• That international donors will indeed
support the settlement as promised.
Getting to “Yes”:
An overview of Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot requirements.
Attitude towards the UN Plan
(views of Greek Cypriots)
30
25
Percent
20
15
25,3
10
20,7
19,1
14,1
15,7
5
5,1
0
Pl
an
Se
"E
Bu
Re
ur
cu
ry
tu
o
rn
rity
is
is
th
p
e
e
of
Sa
To
a
-G
Pl
n
Re
ler
tis
u
an
S
ar
fa
a
o
f
u
b
a
lut
cto
ge
le
nt
ion
ee
es
ry
"
s
Pl
an
Attitude towards the UN Plan
(views of Turkish Cypriots)
50
Percent
40
30
43,7
20
33,6
10
22,6
0
te
ta
S
h
is
rk
Tu
e
ur
t
P
en
m
op
el
ev
D
ic
m
no
co
E
n
io
at
gr
te
In
er
ng
tro
S
Conclusions (I)
• Getting to a “double Yes” in a future referendum involves
satisfying those segments of each community whose
demands do not clash with the fundamental
requirements of the other side.
• From the Greek Cypriot point of view, getting to “Yes”
involves satisfying those Greek Cypriots whose main
concern is Security, as well as those Greek Cypriots
whose main concern is Return of Refugees.
• Those Greek Cypriots who would like to “bury the UN
Plan”, “because it is not based on simple majority rule”,
cannot be satisfied without alienating the majority of the
Turkish Cypriots.
Conclusions (II)
• From the Turkish Cypriot point of view, renewing the
“Yes” will involve satisfying those who would like to see a
closer integration of the two communities, as well as
those whose main concern is the raising of their
standard of living through European Integration.
• Those Turkish Cypriots who would like to see a “Pure
Turkish State”, cannot be satisfied without alienating the
majority of the Greek Cypriots.
• The issue on which it will be most difficult to reach a
mutually satisfactory compromise is Security – and here,
it will be imperative for all concerned to be willing to
consider creative solutions.
Conclusions (III)
If Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands
as described above are satisfied, then we can
reasonably expect a “double Yes” at a
future referendum, with approximate
majorities of 65-70% on each side. Given
the underlying public perceptions of Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, this is the
maximum level of support that any proposal
for a Federal Solution could currently achieve.