EECS 690 Critiques of Deontology 31 January 2010

On the Supposed Right to Lie…

• • Common experience would seem to indicate that if a person had to lie to save someone’s life, they would be justified in doing so.

Kant is criticized for not bowing to this principle, and in “On the Supposed Right to Lie…” replies to the criticism. At heart, Kant recognizes that a deontological ethic can have bad consequences, but maintains that the consequences of actions are irrelevant to morality.

The objection:

• • This kind of objection is known as the “dire consequences objection” to deontology.

The idea behind this objection is that when the consequences of an action are significant enough, they must surely be taken into account.

Some distinctions employed by Kant:

• • Uttering a falsehood vs. telling a lie: A falsehood is something that is not the case. A lie is saying something that you believe to be false, not necessarily saying something that is false.

Avoidable vs. unavoidable speech: If you must speak, and must “say yea or nay”, only then is speech unavoidable. (it’s not clear whether speech is unavoidable when confronted by the prospective murderer)

Kant’s reply

• • • • • Telling a lie is always wrong, and seriously wrong because it damages the fabric of civil society and morality itself.

The consequences to truth and lies are irrelevant.

Once consequences are admitted into the principle for action, moral luck becomes a factor.

In telling the truth, you are controlling the one thing in the situation that you can control (whether to be moral yourself or not).

Lying to someone to manipulate their behavior treats them as a means only.

Other objections:

1. Conflicts between duties need to be resolved somehow. (the previously mentioned case might be just such a conflict) 2. The “paradox of negative stringency”: If all duties are categorical, then failure to obey one should be just as bad as failure to obey any of them (so lying is as bad as murder).