Transcript No Slide Title

GNSS Vulnerability
and the Case for eLoran
Professor David Last
Consultant to the General Lighthouse Authorities
of the United Kingdom and Ireland
GNSS Vulnerability: Present Dangers, Future Threats
22 February2012
National Physical Laboratory
Picture: earthobservatory.nasa.
gov//ewsroom/BlueMarble/
© David Last
Picture: General Lighthouse Authorities of the UK & Ireland
© David Last
Satellite and Control System Failures
Official announcement:
"A significant GPS anomaly occurred on 1 Jan 04, beginning at approximately
1833Z ... (which) … affected precise timing and navigation users over large
portions of Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and … North America … and resulted
in the transmission of Hazardously Misleading Information."
SVN23 clock failure
Sources: Vogel, Macabiau & Suard, ‘Effect of a GPS Anomaly on Different GNSS Receivers’, ION GNSS 2005, Long Beach, CA, Sep 13-16, 2005,
Hoppe & Walterfang, ‘Investigation of a GPS Satellite Problem with respect to DGPS and GPS users’, European Journal of Navigation, May 2004,
www.lr.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=400f4487-ed8c-4274-95cb-ebc2afa7385e&lang=en
© David Last
Solar flares
© David Last
Picture: www.flickr.com/photos/l23productions/1451697290/
© David Last
GPS Jammers, Mobile phone jammers,
Future GPS, Galileo, Compass & GLONASS jammers
Pictures: www.tekony.com/product_show.asp?productid=448,
www.jammer-store.com/gj5-gps-l1-l2-l5-jammer-blocker.html
© David Last
Galatea Trials
A very low-powered GPS jammer on board caused
hazardously misleading information (HMI).
hazardously: no alarms sounded.
misleading: erroneous positions and velocities,
some of them simply not noticeable!
Pictures: www.gla-rrnav.org/pdfs/GPS_Jamming_and_the_impact_on_maritime_navigation.pdf
© David Last
Galatea Trials
A little more jammer power …
… alarms began to sound
and, one-by-one, these
bridge systems failed:
• Electronic
Chart Display (ECDIS)
• Ship’s autopilot
• Automatic Identification System (AIS)
• Satellite voice and data communications
• Differential GPS (dGPS)
• Heli-deck stabilisation system
• Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS)
© David Last
Galatea Trials
Reverting to traditional navigation when GPS is lost
•
Gyrocompass: Alarm, and drifts over time
Radar: Alarm, echo and
AIS don’t agree
Visual: Not in low visibility
© David Last
Flamborough trial:
White track: eLoran through jamming
Galatea Trial
Green marker: eLoran
Blue marker: erroneous GPS
Pictures: www.gla-rrnav.org/pdfs/GPS_Jamming_and_the_impact_on_maritime_navigation.pdf
Enhanced Loran
(eLoran)
• On earth, high-powered
• Different from GPS but a
plug-in replacement
• FAA’s GPS complement for
aviation + maritime + timing
• Loran-C plus digital technology
Pictures: Mitchell Narins, Federal Aviation Administration; Reelektronika bv
© David Last
Prototype eLoran on the air in Europe with better than 10 metre accuracy
Pictures: www.gla-rrnav.org/file.html?file=652be60e268e09c0d91c5b6a976fbc30
Performance of the generations of Loran
eLoran has:
• Modern transmitting station infrastructure and procedures
• Advanced digital signal processing receivers that track all stations in view
• Harbours mapped
• Data channel carries real-time differential corrections and rapid failure warnings
Table: www.gla-rrnav.org/file.html?file=652be60e268e09c0d91c5b6a976fbc30
© David Last
Pictures: www.ursanav.com
GNSS Vulnerability
and the Case for eLoran
Professor David Last
Consultant to the General Lighthouse Authorities
of the United Kingdom and Ireland
GNSS Vulnerability: Present Dangers, Future Threats
22 February2012
National Physical Laboratory
Picture: earthobservatory.nasa.
gov//ewsroom/BlueMarble/
© David Last