Transcript Breakdowns of Democracy

Breakdowns of Democracy
How Democracy is Lost
& How the Loss of Democracy
Can be Prevented
The Global Expansion of Democracy, 1974-2011
Electoral Democracies
Liberal Democracies
75.0%
62.5%
65.0%
58.1%
59.9%
58.8%
55.0%
45.7%
45.0%
37.0%
41.1%
33.5%
35.0%
35.9%
29.1%
33.0%
30.5%
25.0%
26.1%
23.6%
20.9%
15.0%
Year
39.7%
Expansion of Liberal Democracy
About two-thirds of the world’s democracies
(77) are reasonably high-quality or “liberal”:
•electoral competition is institutionalized, fair,
and open,
•civil liberties are better protected,
•there is a rule of law
•there are low levels of political violence and
abuses or impunity by state security services.
Regional Trends in Freedom 1974-2011
CEE
FSU
Asia-Pacific
LAC
MENA
SS Africa
Asia-Pacific
CEE
FSU
SS Africa
LAC
MENA
1.0
1.5
1.97
2.0
2.37
2.62
2.5
2.42
3.0
3.5
4.0
3.70
5.5
3.54
3.86
4.19
4.42
4.5
5.0
3.81
2.41
5.28
5.45
4.44
4.50
5.17
5.32
4.33
5.21
5.21
5.36
5.50
6.0
6.19
6.5
6.50
7.0
Year
The Democratic Recession
• The expansion of democracy peaked in 2006
at 62.7% of all states. Since then it has
declined from 121 to 113 democracies.
• Five consecutive years of declining freedom
scores, losses outpacing gains.
Ratio of Gains to Declines in Freedom, 19912011
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Year
Democratic Recession cont.
• The rate of democratic breakdown since 1999
has been nearly twice the pace of the
preceding 12 years.
• 26 breakdowns or reversals of democracy
since 1999.
• These have come in some large strategic
states:
• Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Thailand,
Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.
Breakdowns of Democracy (examples)
Type of Breakdown
Breakdown
with
subsequent
return to
democracy
Number of Such
Breakdowns
28
Percent of all
Democracies
(170) during
Third Wave
16.5%
Countries with dates of
democratic breakdown and
renewal
India (1975, 1977)
Turkey (1980, 1983)
Ghana (1981, 2000)
Nigeria (1983, 1999)
Fiji (1987, 1997)
Thailand (1991,1993)
Peru (1992, 2001)
Lesotho (1994, 2002)
Zambia (1996, 2001)
Bangladesh (2007, 2008)
Philippines (2007, 2010)
Thailand (2006, 2011)
Niger (2009, 2011)
Breakdowns of Democracy, examples
Type of
Breakdown
Breakdown
with no
return to
democracy
by 2011
Number of Percent of all
Such
Democracies
Break(170) during
downs
Third Wave
26
15.3%
54
31.8%
Countries with dates of democratic
breakdown and renewal
Lebanon (1975)
Sudan (1989)
The Gambia (1994) Pakistan (1999)
Fiji (2000)
Kyrgyzstan (1998)
Russia (2000)
Nepal (2002)
Nigeria (2003)
Venezuela (2005)
Kenya (2007)
Georgia (2008)
Mauritania (2008)
Honduras (2009)
Madagascar (2009)
Mozambique (2009)
Burundi (2010)
Sri Lanka (2010)
Guinea Bissau (2010) Haiti (2010)
Nicaragua (2011)
Rate of Democratic Breakdown
1974-2011
35%
31.95%
30%
25%
19.86%
20%
16.00%
15%
11.72%
10%
5%
0%
Time Period
Freedom before Democratic Breakdowns 19992011
Political Rights
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
Civil Liberties
The Democratic Recession
• Since 1999, there has been a rising tide of
democratic breakdowns.
• Of the 34 democratic breakdowns since 1974,
23 of them, (2/3) have occurred since 1999.
• These have come in some very strategic states:
Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela. In 2007:
Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.
Breakdowns of Democracy
Type of Breakdown
Breakdown
with
subsequent
return to
democracy
Number of Such
Breakdowns
11
Percent of all
Democracies (154)
during Third Wave
7.1%
Countries with dates of
democratic breakdown and
renewal
India (1975-1977)
Turkey (1980-1983)
Ghana (1981-2000)
Nigeria (1983-1999)
Fiji (1987-1997)
Thailand (1991-1993)
Peru (1992-2001)
Lesotho (1994-2002)
Zambia (1996-2001)
Bangladesh (2007-2008)
Philippines (2007-2010)
Breakdowns of Democracy, cont.
Type of
Breakdown
Breakdown
with no
return to
democracy
by 2011
Number of Percent of all
Such
Democracies
Break(154) during
downs
Third Wave
23
14.9%
34
22.1%
Countries with dates of democratic
breakdown and renewal
Lebanon (1975)
Sudan (1989)
The Gambia (1994) Pakistan (1999)
Fiji (2000)
Kyrgyzstan (2000)
Russia (2000)
Nepal (2002)
Nigeria (2003)
Venezuela (2005)
Thailand (2006)
Solomon Islands (06)
Kenya (2007)
Georgia (2008)
Mauritania (2008)
Honduras (2009)
Madagascar (2009)
Niger (2009)
Mozambique (2009)
Burundi (2010)
Sri Lanka (2010)
Guinea Bissau (2010) Haiti (2010)
What Causes the
Breakdown of Democracy?
Two Approaches to Analyzing
Democratic Breakdowns
• The Structural Approach (Deterministic)
– Inhospitable structural conditions for
democracy
– Inappropriate institutional designs
• The Actor-Centered Approach (Voluntaristic)
– Mass Actors: Extreme pressures and
demands  political polarization
– Elites: Betrayal of democracy, apathy, misrule,
miscalculation
– The Military: organizational, factional, and
ethnic interests
Structure vs. Agency
When democracy breaks down in a lowincome, deeply divided country, is it
because
• political leaders made choices that
undermined or destabilized it? or
• the structural conditions (poverty, illiteracy,
polarized ethnic cleavage, weak political
institutions) made breakdown inevitable?
Juan Linz’s Actor-Centered Approach
• Linz’s focus is on individual and
institutional actors, how they respond to
crisis situations, and how they shape the
political agenda to avoid crisis situations
• A key variable is their commitment to
democratic institutional norms and
procedures
(See Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes, top page 40)
Democratic Loyalty
• For Linz, key condition for averting
democratic breakdown is “loyalty” to
democracy on the part of elites:
– Public commitment to legal, democratic
means for gaining and exercising power,
rejection of the use of force
– “rejection of any ‘knocking at the barracks’
for armed forces support” in a political dispute
Democratic Disloyalty, examples
Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, pp. 30-31
• Use of force, fraud, intimidation against
opponents
• Denial of legitimacy to political opponents who
claim and evince democratic loyalty
• “Readiness to curtail the civil liberties of the
leaders and supporters of parties attempting to
exercise” constitutional rights
• Mass pressure to disrupt the functioning of
government
• Blanket attacks on the whole political system
rather than specific actors of institutions
Semiloyal Behavior
Walks the line between loyal and disloyal,
opportunistically in pursuit of power or political
advantage
“The intermittent presence, in attenuated or
ambivalent form, of some” elements of disloyalty
Willing to ally with blatantly disloyal forces, or to
negotiate in secret with them
“Willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat
leniently, excuse or justify actions” that violate
democratic principles and norms (Linz, p. 32)
Factors Affecting Breakdown
1. Regime Performance:
Effectiveness in addressing social and
economic problems. Don’t let problems
fester and become acute, “unsolvable”
2. Defining a reasonable agenda: new
regimes must not raise unreasonable
expectations that will overtax limited
budgetary and political resources:
Conserve political capital, score some early
successes, defer some difficult problems
Factors Affecting Breakdown, 2
3. Political performance:
controlling corruption; maintaining order;
respecting constitution, rights, rule of law
4. Treating the old (authoritarian) order: How
to avoid a legitimacy crisis?
How to manage the tension between
stigmatizing, punishing the crimes of the
past, and giving the old elites a stake in the
new system?
The Problem of the Old Order
Linz’s Pragmatic Advice
• Don’t waste energy on the politics of resentment
• Don’t gratuitously create a new disloyal
opposition
• Try to incorporate ambivalent groups into the
new regime
• Define the truly disloyal opposition early and
clearly, and isolate it politically
• Seek maximum continuity in the symbols of the
nation-state
•  Widen legitimacy as much as possible
Huntington’s approach
• Go after a limited number of authoritarian
offenders
• Avoid extremely divisive struggles over the
past that could trigger a coup attempt or
provoke other disloyal or semiloyal forces
• Reassure the military officer corps
• Achieve “a full and dispassionate public
accounting” of what happened
• Assess realistically the relative power of
democrats vs. surviving autocratic forces
5. Civilian Control of the Military:
Another Early Priority
• Begin by depoliticizing the military, removing it
from active involvement in government and
politics
• Professionalize the military around its essential
mission of national defense/international security
• Withdraw the military from internal security &
domestic intelligence
• Retire senior officers associated with old order
• Accord the military professional respect and
status (including good pay and benefits)
Civilian control of military cont.
Gradually advance a new generation of
military officers socialized into an ethos of
civilian control
Remove the military from control of
corporations
Establish civilian control of intelligence
Gradually subject military budgets,
acquisitions, and strategic decisions to civilian
oversight
Political Leadership
in Managing the Military
• Need for a combination of pragmatism and
principle
• Need for a deft sense of timing
• Timing depends on the relative power of
democrats vs. the old order
• The more negotiated or imposed the
transition, the greater the need for
incrementalism
6. Political Institutions
Sometimes political institutions are so
flawed that the survival of democracy may
depend on their reform
• Avoid conditions of protracted or recurrent
political stalemate
• Avoid conditions that permit or foster the
personal concentration of power
• Avoid “polarized pluralism”
Polarized Pluralism (elements)
1. Polarization (extreme distance) on an
ideological axis
2. Many (5 or more) “relevant” parties
3. Incompatible oppositions
4. Centrifugal, rather than “centripetal” drives
5. Antisystem parties, irresponsible
oppositions
6. Politics of outbidding
Israel’s Partly Polarized System, 2009
Party (*=ruling coalition)
Politics
% of votes
Seats (total 120)
Kadima
C-R
22.47%
28
Likud*
R
21.61
27
Yisrael Beitenu*
RR
11.70
15
Labor*
CL
9.93
13
Shas*
Relig
8.49
11
United Torah Judaism*
Relig R
4.39
5
United Arab List- Ta’al
L/Arab
3.38
4
National Union
RR
3.34
4
Hadash
LL
3.32
4
New Movement-Meretz
L
2.35
3
The Jewish Home*
RR
2.87
3
Balad
Arab
2.48
3
Correlates of
Democratic Breakdown
• Unsolvable problems, low system efficacy
– Setting impossible goals, for which government lacks the means
• Political paralysis (inability to form govt or of
govt to make decisions)
•
•
•
•
Severe political polarization (ideological, ethnic)
Electoral fraud &/or intense disputes
Inability to change bad government
…or succession of bad governments from
different parties and leaders
Correlates of
Democratic Breakdown, cont
• Political violence, threats to public order
loss of legitimacy and power,
army is drawn into maintaining domestic order
• Political Parties fail to condemn and
contain violence (absence of “strong” democratic
parties—Bermeo)
• Inefficacy or subversion of democratic
institutions, including police and judiciary
Example, Pakistan Oct 1999
• “Unsolvable” economic problems
Poverty, anemic growth in per capita income, inability to collect
taxes huge public debt, massive corruption, capital flight
• Collapsing rule of law, public order
Mounting political, sectarian, & criminal violence; corrupt and
abusive police; corrupt & politicized judiciary; executive
abuse of power (both Bhutto & Sharif); constitutional
abuse by president
• Ethnic/religious polarization & strife
Regional rivalry between Punjab and Sindh; tension with
minority regions and muhajirs; sectarian strife between
Sunni and Shiite Muslims
Example, Nigeria, 1966, 1979
• Economic Mismanagement & Disarray
Pervasive, staggering corruption; squandering of 1979-83 oil boom
revenues; inflation; shortages of commodities; lack of services
• Severe ethnic polarization (coinciding cleavages: N vs. S,
Muslim vs. Christian, Hausa vs. Yoruba)
• Massive electoral fraud (1965, 1983)
• Extensive political, electoral, & post-election
violence
• Public disillusionment with parties and politicians
(1983 post-election student demonstrations calling for
military to return to power)
How Democracy Ends
• Atmosphere of crisis, intense politicization
• Loss of public confidence in the country’s
democratic institutions
• Feeling that “something must be done”
• May be real or partly manufactured by
leader
• Transfer of democratic authority via
– Executive coup (autogolpe)
– Military coup
– Installation of antidemocratic party
Antidotes to
Democratic Breakdown
1. Strong institutions of horizontal
accountability to control corruption, protect
rights, generate rule of law, check power
2. Effective neutral administration of free and
fair elections
3. Effective democratic political parties with



Firm commitment to peaceful, democratic methods
Broad and robust support in society
Moral authority & discipline to punish violence
Antidotes to
Democratic Breakdown, cont.
4. Neutral, depoliticized, professional military
under civilian constitutional control
5. Effective, professional, impartial police
6. Reasonably appropriate political institutions
(in terms of managing conflict, balancing fairness & governability)
7. State structures and policies capable of
generating economic growth
8. Targeted policies to reduce inequality and
extreme poverty
Antidotes to
Democratic Breakdown, part 3
9. International assistance to aid economic
development of emerging democracies
10.International assistance to strengthen
emerging democratic institutions and civil
societies
11.International pressure to constrain, deter,
and reverse the potential undemocratic
actions of key civilian and military elites