Transcript Regulatory Options & Efficiency
Regulatory Options & Efficiency
Goal: Generate regulatory tools to fix environmental problems
Why regulate?
Does free market efficiently provide goods and services? Market failure (externalities, public goods, etc.) Market power (monopolies inefficiently restrict production to raise prices) Information problems (damages uncertain, food safety, env quality)
Types of questions in regulation
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What is the “optimal” amount of pollution? To reduce by X%, who should reduce and by how much?
What regulatory instrument(s) should be used to achieve that level?
Problem
EPA has regulations to control biological oxygen demand (BOD). EPA would like your advice on how to improve water quality (lower BOD) without increasing costs.
What is your advice?
BOD Removal, Costs of US Regulations Industry Poultry Meat Packing Cane Sugar Leather tanning Paper Poultry Raw Sugar Processing Paper Poultry Subcategory Duck-small plants Simple Slaughterhouse Crystalline Refining Hair previously removed Unbleached Kraft Chicken – small plants Louisiana NSSC – Sodium Process Chicken —large plants Source: Magat et al (1986); units: dollars per kilogram BOD removed Marginal Cost $3.15
$2.19
$1.40
$1.40
$0.86
$0.25
$0.21
$0.12
$0.10
Principle of efficiency
Most common approach: uniform burden (eg, everyone cuts pollution by x%) Two possible results Too much pollution for the total amount of pollution control costs Too much cost for a fixed level of pollution reduction Burden of pollution control should fall most heavily on firms with low costs of pollution control
$/unit More Generally: The “efficient” amount of pollution Marginal Control Cost Marginal Damage Cost Total Damage Cost Q* Total Control Cost Units of pollution
Recall example from 1
st
week
60 firms, each pollute 100 tons 30 low abatement cost ($100/ton) 30 high abatement cost ($1000/ton) Everyone reduces 1 ton: Cost=$33,000 Total reduction = 60 tons.
For same cost how many tons could we have reduced?
With mixed high and low cost firms abating, we could
Either: Reduce more pollution for the same amount of money…or Reduce the same amount of pollution for less money.
So we always want low-cost firm to shoulder abatement.
Abatement Cost ($/unit)
If costs aren’t constant: two firms (eg, NOx emissions)
MC A Who should abate the 1 st unit of NOx?
MC B NOx Reduction
$ (A)
How much abatement from each?
Loss from equal reduction MC A $ (B) A: B: 0 80 25 55 40 40 MC B 80 0
How did he do that?
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Determine how much total abatement you want (e.g. 80) Draw axis from 0 to 80 (A), 80 to 0 (B) Sum of abatements always equals 80.
Draw MC A as usual, flip MC B Lines cross at equilibrium Price is MC
for A and for B
.
The “equimarginal principle”
Not an accident that the marginal abatement costs are equal at the most efficient point.
Equimarginal Principle:
Efficiency for a homogeneous pollutant requires equating the marginal costs of control across all sources.
Control costs
Should include all other costs of control monitoring & enforcement administrative Equipment Regulatory uncertainty increases costs.
If you are a polluter, what would be your response to uncertainty in what you have to do?
Does this increase your costs? Would like to design regulations that provide an incentive to innovate
Common Instruments for regulation Command and Control: Centralized determination of which firms reduce by how much.
Taxes: charge $X per unit emitted. This increases the cost of production.
Forces firms to internalize externality
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Quotas/standards: uniform standard (all firms can emit Y) or non-uniform.
Tradable permits: All firms get Y permits to pollute, can buy & sell on market. Other initial dist’n mechanisms.
Weitzman on carbon taxes
“One can only wish that US political leaders might have the insight to understand and the courage to act upon the breathtakingly simple market-friendly idea that the right carbon tax could do
way
more to unleash the power of decentralized American inventive genius on the problem of developing economically-feasible non carbon-intensive alternative technologies than all of the command-and-control schemes and patchwork subsidies making the rounds in Washington these days.”
Example 1: Taxes in China
China: extremely high air pollution – causes significant health damage.
Instituted wide-ranging system of environmental taxation 2 tiers World Bank report estimates that MC of abatement << MB of abatement.
A creative quota: bubble policy
Multiple emissions sources in different locations.
Contained in an imaginary “bubble”.
Regulation only governs amount that leaves the bubble.
May apply to emissions points within same plant or emissions points in plants owned by other firms.
Example 2: Bubble policy in RI
Narraganset Electric Company: 2 generation facilities in Providence, RI.
Required to use < 2.2% sulfur in oil.
Under bubble policy: Used higher sulfur in one plant, burned natural gas at other plant Savings: $3 million/year
Example 3: SO
2
Allowances
1990 CAAA sought to reduce SO 2 emissions from 20 million tons/yr to 10 million tons/yr Set up market in emission allowances 97% of 10 million tons allocated to polluters Rest auctioned at CBOT – anyone can buy: see http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/forms
SO2 Allowance Prices, 1994- 2004 Source: http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/so2market/alprices.html
How big the tax or how many permits?
We know: Optimal level of pollution is Q* Marginal Social Cost at the optimum is P* Marginal Private Cost at optimum is P p.
Optimal tax exactly internalizes externality: t* = P* - P p Effectively raises MC of production
$/unit Basic Setup: Env Costs, Private Costs, Social Costs MSC MPC P* MEC P p Q* Q c D Dirty Good
$/unit P* P p Q* Q c MSC MPC (with tax) t* MPC (no tax) D Q (pollution)
Problem: How to reduce VOC emissions in LA without increasing costs?
Where do VOC’s come from?
Painting, cleaning in manufac, cars Current regime: command and control NSPS: “Control Technology Guidelines” (new source performance standards) SIP’s: firm by firm rules (state implementation plan) Example: automobiles • • • Technology requirements Emission limits per mile How could this be done differently?
Alternatives #1: emmission fees, $1/lb. of VOC #2: marketable permit – issue permits for 500 tons Get equimarginal principal in either case (Why?)
Problem: Too many houses being built in SB; want to
slow growth. How?
Current regime: command-and-control tools Zoning Lengthy permit requirements Goldplated regulations (add’l requirements: code) Infrastructure fees Limit critical inputs (e.g., water) Alternative approaches Fees • • • Increased property tax Building permits: $1000/square foot Land conversion fee Marketable permits • • • Issue 100 permits per year (or 200,000 sq. ft.) Auction permits Give away permits – what is effect?
What are differences with between fees and marketable permits?