Transcript Geography and Human Rights

2010 in South Africa –
Elites score while the poor
are redcarded?
Brij Maharaj – DDP Presentation 2 July 2010
Introduction
The aim of this presentation is fourfold:
 to critically relflect on the role of sport in
local economic development (LED);
 to examine the impacts of international
sporting events such as the Olympic games
and Word Soccer Cup (WSC);
 briefly analyse the politics of FIFA;
 reflect on the impact of the 2010 FIFA world
cup on the poor in SA.
Sport and Local Economic Development
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Neoliberalism and global economic restructuring has
forced cities around the world to compete for
investments in an international market in order to boost
declining economies.
Some of the more prominent urban promotion strategies
include stimulating investment in businesses through
the provision of incentives and marketing the city as a
tourist and sporting destination.
Sport, which was once viewed as a form of
entertainment, has now emerged as an important
political, social and economic force.
Bidding to host global sporting events has become an
important local economic development strategy and has
forced cities to compete nationally and internationally.
Sport and Local Economic Development
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A good example in this regard is the competition to host the
Soccer World Cup and the Olympic Games (Law, 1994;
Cochrane, et al 1996; Hillier, 2000; Smith, 2005; O’Brien, 2006).
A common argument is that such international sporting events
provide opportunities for development by attracting foreign
investment.
There is a view that hosting such events such as the offers the
“possibility of ‘fast track’ urban regeneration, a stimulus to
economic growth, improved transport and cultural facilities,
and enhanced global recognition and prestige” (Chalkley and
Essex, 1999:369).
International Experience
 The success of the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 has
created a vague belief that staging the Games is the same
as "having a licence to print money, as well as offering
many beneficial social spin- offs in areas such as housing,
tourism and transport" (The Financial Mail, 23/07/93).
 However, the Olympic Games is a short-term event which
often has long term consequences.
 Los Angeles, and more recently, Atlanta, did make a profit but remain the only Games since the modern Olympics
began in 1896 to break even without government subsidy.
 The Los Angeles profits were marginal when measured
against total expenditure.
International Experience
 The general experience is that in most countries the
taxpayer picks up a heavy bill for the Olympics.
 Canada's Montreal (in 1993), for instance, is still battling
with debts run up in the 1976 Games.
 Moscow lost US $310 million in 1980; Seoul in 1988 was the
most financially successful on paper, earning $541 million but about $3 billion of construction was underwritten by
government and hidden in other budgets; Barcelona ... had
to raise loans to cover its costs (The Financial Mail,
23/07/93:18).
 South African cities have not been immune to these trends.
South African Experience
 The move toward democratisation in South Africa opened
cities to international pressures such as globalisation and
the need to restructure local economies in order to promote
economic growth (CDE, 1996a).
 Subsequently, city marketing has become a key feature of
urban management, particularly in the way in which the
built environment is manipulated through the construction
of theme parks, sports’facilities and other urban features, at
the expense of other localities, in order to portray a more
appealing lifestyle to prospective residents, tourists and
investors (Rogerson, 1999).
 Such LED strategies are very evident in the city of Durban,
the most prominent of which would be the construction of
the International Convention Centre and the uShaka Marine
Park - stil being subvented by public funds (Maharaj and
Ramballi, 1998).
South African Experience
 Great emphasis was placed on local economic
development strategies driven by public-private
partnerships.
 Such partnerships “circumvent, bypass, ignore, or
marginalise certain social groups … informal networks of a
relatively small number of ” (Swyngedouw, 2002:571).
 In short, participatory democracy and transparency is
subverted.
 A major issue was whether the poor would benefit from
such partnerships.
The Fifa Mafia
 Fifa or the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association was established in Paris on 21 May 1904 by
French journalist Robert Guérin and initial membership
comprised countries from western Europe.
 Its present membership comprises football associations
from 208 countries, exceeding that of the UN (192
members).
 In its quest to increase membership, Fifa often turned a
blind eye to the undermining of democracy and the
violation of human rights in member states.
 There were allegations that senior Fifa officials were close
to corrupt governments and ignored the influence of drug
cartels on the game in Latin America.
Fifa Mafia
 In the early 1960s Fifa implicity espoused apartheid when
its British president Sir Stanley Rous supported the
Football Association of South Africa and its racially
segregated teams and matches.
 It was only in the early 1980s that Fifa “began to take
seriously the anti-racism clause of the official statutes”.
 During this period there was another dramatic turn as the
commercial/business arm of Fifa grew exponentially,
ostensibly in response to the development needs of
football in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Fifa Mafia
 However, there were concerns that Fifa had become part of
the ‘capitalist entertainment business’; that it had turned
football into a ‘millionaire’s gambling casino’; and that
there was a lack of transparency and accountability about
how its funds were spent; and especially payments made to
senior officials.
 Some skeptics contend that it was only a matter of time
when matches would be bought and sold.
 There have also been controversies and allegations of
corruption relating to how Fifa sells its TV rights, elects its
President and chooses the hosts for the World Cup. Before
a ball has been kicked, FIFA has already earned R25 billion
from the TV broadcast rights for 2010.
 Go to transparencyinsport.org and read chapter one of
Andrew Jennings’book, Foul! The Secret World of FIFA:
Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals
Fifa Mafia
 Closer to home, the Mail and Guardian (23-29
April 2010, p. 4) revealed that “Match Services
Ag, Match Hospitality AG and their wholly owned
South African subsidiaries – which appear to
have control over large chunks of tickets for the
World Cup – are linked to FIFA president Sepp
Blatter through his nephew, Philippe Blatter”.
2010 in South Africa
 Peter Alegi has argued that the “social and political
significance of rugby and soccer … entrenched a desire
among increasingly self-confident South African leaders to
host sporting megaevents for the purpose of bolstering the
quest for national unity and triggering faster economic
growth” (p.128).
 The ANC was keen to use sport to build nationalism and
social cohesion.
 However, as William Gumede has argued:
 Touchy-feel campaigns to help foster a South Africanness
such as wearing Bafana T-shirts on Fridays are at best
placebos. A new South Africanness will have to be
constructed on firmer foundations (City Press, 25/4/10,
p.21).
2010 in South Africa
 Succesful international sporting events hosted in SA since
1994 include the 1995 rugby World Cup, 1999 All Africa
Games, 2003 Cricket World Cup.
 Failed bids - 2004 Olympics and 2006 FIFA World Cup.
 In 2003 Mbeki had argued that 2010 would be an ‘African’
event:
 We want on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that
will send ripples of confidence from the Cape to Cairo – an
event that will create social and economic opportunities
throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day,
historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a
moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the
tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show
that Africa’s time has come (www.sa2010.gov.za.)

2010 in South Africa
 In February 2008 the South African government committed
itself to spending R28 billion from the public purse (i.e.
from all who pay taxes) to prepare the country for the 2010
Fifa World Cup, largely in constructing/upgrading 10
stadiums and associated infrastructure.
 Can SA afford such expenditure against the competing
demands of housing, health care, welfare and education for
the poor who comprise at least 50% of the SA
population?(e.g. 189 746 pupils were studying in over 800
‘mud schools’ in the Eastern Cape alone).
Economic Legacy
 According to research by Grant Thornton, the 2010 FIFA
World Cup will:
 contribute R55.7 billion to the South African economy,
 generate 415,400 jobs and
 contribute R19.3 billion in tax income to Government.
 The firm estimates that 483,257 tourists will spend
around R8,5 billion during their stay in South Africa.
 More than 20 000 jobs were created for the construction
of the World Cup stadiums.
 Such projections have been referred to as “private sector
interest guestimates” and, not surprisingly, they “exclude
the social implications and social value of these projects in
a context of pressing social needs” (Cottle, 2007).
South African Government Contributions
 The South African Government’s contribution to World
Cup-related projects is R28 billion:
• Stadium and precinct development: R9.8 billion
• Transport: R13.6 billion
• Broadcast and telecommunications: R300 million
• Event operations: R684 million
• Safety and security: R1.3 billion
• Event volunteer training: R25 million
• Ports of entry infrastructure: R3. 5 billion
• Immigration support: R630 million
• Communications, hosting, legacy and culture:
R504 million
These figures are national government spend and exclude the
amounts spent by the nine 2010 FIFA World Cup host cities in
preparing for the tournament (estimated to be about R9 billion).
 Bizarrely, a Fifa 2007 Public Information Sheet – Issue #6 refers to
2010 as a “privately funded event”.
2010 Grounded Realities
 Schimmel (1997:153) raised the following questions in the
US context, but which also have relevance in SA: “Is a new
stadium complex a wise use of ‘the city’s’resources? And,
does a sports development policy serve the ‘public
interest’?
 There have been legitimate concerns that the escalation in
the costs of the stadiums resulted in the diversion of funds
from more urgent social needs such as housing, healthcare
and education.
 Developing countries hosting mega-events spend far more
than their northern counterparts e.g. 1994 US Fifa World
Cup less than $30m; 1998 Soccer World Cup France less
than $500m; 2002 South Korea $2bn, South Africa 2010
$4.1bn (Cottle, 2007).
2010 Grounded Realities
 International sportswriter Dave Zirin contended that “to see
a country already dotted with perfectly usable stadiums
spend approximately R24bn on new facilities is
unconscionable”.
 Dave Zirin described the Moses Mabhida stadium as the
‘most breath taking he’d ever seen’, but he called for a
reality check: “This is a country where staggering wealth
and poverty already stand side by side. The World Cup, far
from helping this situation, is just putting a magnifying
glass on every blemish of this post-apartheid nation”
(Mercury, 27/4/10, p.7).
 “When you build enormous stadia, you (are) shifting those
resources … from building schools or hospitals and then
you have these huge structures standing empty and being
used to a very limited extent. They become white
elephants,” late anti-apartheid veteran Dennis Brutus tells
2010 Grounded Realities
 “The tragedy is that public funds have been looted for a moment in
our history. People are still going to be living in shacks, the jobs
are not sustainable – this is a blatant misuse of funds,” said
sociologist Ashwin Desai.
 “No queremos goles, queremos frijoles (we do not want goals, we
want beans) was painted on a Mexico stadium during the Football
World Cup in 1986. This sentence expresses the economic
dilemma that sport has to cope with in developing countries.
Sport events and sport teams cannot make people forget
underdevelopment, poverty, hunger and illiteracy. Whatever is
stated in the policy declarations of the government, sport is
neither a top priority in the state budget, nor a pillar of the
country’s education system, in any developing country” (Andreff,
n.d.).
 Forced removals/destruction of informal settlements
 The grass in the Moses Mabhida Stadium gets more clean water
then the poor in the city
2010 Grounded Realities
In its 2009 Election Manifesto ANC emphasised its intention
to:
 Ensure that the 2010 FIFA World Cup leaves a proud legacy
that our children and our communities will enjoy for many
years to come, and contributes to the long term
development of the country. The ANC government will work
with all stakeholders to ensure that this world event
contributes to create decent work opportunities,
particularly for the youth, women and street traders.
 In contrast, Professor Pierre De Vos from UCT, contended
that while South Africans celebrated the award to host
2010:
 We did not realise that FIFA was a rather shadowy body
with authoritarian tendencies. We did not realise then that
the FIFA fat cat executives cared little about South Africa
and its people and very much about making obscene
profits while placing impossible demands on the host nation
(The Independent on Saturday, 3/4/10, p.7).
2010 Grounded Realities
 This can be illustrated with reference to Fifa’s by-laws
pertaing to informal trade:
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Hawkers may only operate in open spaces with
a permit [from Fifa] and are prohibited from
selling their wares along any public road or
amenity, at any controlled access site or
exclusion zone, restricted area, garden or park
during the World Cup. There will be a total ban
on street trading and other business, including
on private property, in prohibited or restricted
areas at specific times during the World Cup
((The Independent on Saturday, 3/4/10, p.7).
Revised 2010 World Cup Estimates
© Grant Thornton South Africa. All rights reserved.
Total visitors
Average length
of stay
(overseas
visitors)
Average spend
per trip in SA
Overseas ticket
holders
Overseas nonticket holders
African ticket
holders
African nonticket holders
Matches per
foreigner
Was
483 000
14 days
Now
373 000
18.7 days
% change
-22.7%
+33.0%
R 22 000
R 30 200
+ 35,5%
288 867
228 519
-21%
25 000
20 000
-20%
48 145
11 289
-77%
100 000
85 000
-15%
3.4
(matches per foreigner
Germany)
2.6
5
2010 Grounded Realities
 In revised projections released by Grant Thornton on 21
April 2010, based on ticket sale trends, the total number of
visitors decreased by 111 000. (in June 2005, 506 790
foreign visitors entered SA).
 This decrease was related to the global economic
recession. However, average spending per trip would be
higher as visitors were staying longer (18 days average,
compared to14 days in earlier projections) and attending
more matches (5 compared to 3.4).
 Grant Thornton estimated the “gross economic impact” to
be R93 billion of which 62% was generated in the pre-2010
(Government expenditure estimated to have increased from
R17.4 billion to R30.3 billion).
 For an ‘African world cup’ - 2% of ticket holders - from the
continent, and this was attributed - “failure in distribution
channels and unaffordable pricing”. XENOPHOBIA?
Conclusion
 The international experience suggests that mega-sporting events
were organised largely by public-private partnerships, with little or
no accountability to citizens or elected officials, although its
decisions were likely to have major public policy implications
(Andranovich, Burbank and Heying, 2001).
 The nature of urban governance associated with these events is
“characterised by less democratic and more elite-driven
priorities” (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002:542).
 Although events such as 2010 do produce benefits, the
international experience suggests that the privileged tend to
benefit at the expense of the poor, and that socio-economic
inequalities tend to be exacerbated.
 The different 2010 projects paid rhetorical lip service to reducing
the socio-economic inequalities in South Africa, and addressing
the needs of the poor; were largely driven by Fifa interests; and
were underwritten with public funds, with no public participation.
Conclusion
 There are many reasons for the failure of such projects, all of
which centre around the unequal power relationships between the
political and business elite and the poor.
 The ultimate importance of the 2010 Fifa World Cup is “more
about the prestige and power of the nation state and its leadership
than the exaggerated developmental outcomes of unaccountable
public investment” (Cottle, 2007).
 Mega-events sporting events such as 2010 should create zones of
opportunity for those who had been historically disadvantaged;
integrate the city so that urban resources are accessible to all
citizens; and ensure popular participation in the planning process.
 Greater emphasis should be placed on policies that sustain
growth through redistribution. This will greater concessions from
FIFA than that currently envisaged, as well as a re-orientation of
the state mindset.