Transcript Order and Chaos - Texas A&M University–Central Texas

Order and Chaos
Explaining Regional Variation
in the World-System
I. Regional Differences in World
Politics
A. Peace and Conflict
1. War and Peace “Clusters”
War Clusters: 1990s
Clusters of Peace as of 1992
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1900-1925
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1925-1950
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1950-1975
2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1975-2000
3. Terrorism Clusters
4. Key Points
a. Certain areas are conflict-prone
(clusters)
b. Location changes over time
Therefore, cause must also be something that
changes over time
B. Economics
1. Poverty and Prosperity: GDP Per Capita
2. Social Welfare
a. Hunger
b. Infant Mortality
3. Economic System
a. Today: Clustering of Property Rights (Capitalism)
b. Clusters Over Time:
Communism
4. Key points
a. Clusters on major economic indicators
b. Location changes over time: expansion
and contraction around edges of clusters
c. Overlap between Economic / War
clusters  Related?
C. Government
South America or World change. 2006:
D. Political Regions
1. “Zones of Chaos” – War-prone, poor,
authoritarian, unstable, deadly
2. “Zones of Stability” – Peaceful, wealthy,
healthy, democratic
3. Questions: How do these zones form and
change?
II. A Clash of Civilizations?
“The fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily
economic. The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict
will be cultural. Nation states will remain the
most powerful actors in world affairs, but the
principal conflicts of global politics will occur
between nations and groups of different
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”
Samuel P. Huntington
A. Assumptions
Conflict over values  not power or resources!
2. Key value divide changes over time
1.
a. Colonialism and Nationalism: West vs. the Rest
b. 20th Century Ideologies: Fascism vs. Democracy,
Communism vs. Capitalism
c. Post Cold War: Cultural Identities
Key actors = civilizations, not states
4. Culture Clash  Internal / External Conflict
3.
a. Religion = Indivisible Stakes
b. Identity trumps other concerns
5. The Map of Civilizations
a. Religion determines some
World
Religions
civilizational
borders
Major religion
(CIA Fac tbook 2001)
Buddhis t
(11)
Hindu
(3)
Jew is h
(1)
Mus lim
(49)
Orthodox
(11)
Other
(9)
Protes tant (46)
Roman c atholic
(56)
b. “Identity” determines the rest
West – Latin America divide: ethnicity?
Sinic civilization: Originally called “Confucian.”
What is the basis for this bloc?
African civilization: Essentially what was left
after drawing other civilizations
6. Alignments shape civilizational
conflicts
7. Universalism = Conflict
a. There are no “universal” political desires
b. Modernization ≠ Westernization
B. Implication: Internal Unity = Strength
1. Don’t be
multicultural
a. Enemies will
try to foment
intra-societal
conflict
b. Beware
immigration
from other
civilizations 
2. Test: Does Immigration Cause
Internal Violence?
a. Europe
Does High
%
foreignborn
cause
more
conflict?
b. US: Patterns of Immigration
i. 1966-1970 period of riots: unrelated
ii. Social Strife and Immigration,
1880-1914: relationship
c. Immigration by Region: Compare
to Conflict Maps
d. Areas of inter-civilizational migration:
Which civilizations should be weak?
C. Implication: Pushing Democracy
and Capitalism = Civilizational Conflict
1. Democracy is Western value system:
Separation of church and state, rule of law, social
pluralism, representative bodies, individualism
2. Market capitalism is Western:
Competition, property rights
3. Test: Is Democracy “Western”?
a. World Values Survey – Questions about democracy,
human rights, politics, religion, etc.
Key Dimensions
Democratic Performance:
• Democracies are indecisive and have too much
squabbling
• Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order
Democratic Ideals:
• Democracy may have its problems but it is better than
any other form of government
• I approve of having a democratic political system
4.0
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4.5
4.5
4.5
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Approval of democrat ic ideals
b. Results –
i. Democratic Performance/Ideals: No Difference!
ii. Other surveys
reveal…
Important differences
do exist within
Islamic civilization
c. What about “Asian Values?”
Asia vs. US/Canada: Support for
Free Market Democracy
D. Implication: “Fault Lines” and Culture
Clashes Predict Conflict
1. “Islam Has Bloody Borders and
Bloody Innards”
a. Interstate War (Bloody Borders)
Middle East is unusually prone to war
Region is a better predictor than religion: nonIslamic ME states fight as much as Islamic ME
states, and Islamic non-ME states fight as much
as non-Islamic non-ME states
Interstate wars within civilizations (since 1950):
– Sinic and Buddhist have more than expected by
chance
– West has fewer than expected by chance
– Islam and other civilizations are about average
Which civilizations fight the most?
Islamic civilization has plenty of conflicts….
…but other civilizations have more “civilizational” conflicts!
b. Internal War (Bloody Innards)
ME region is more likely to experience political
terror and human rights violations BUT region
again outperforms religion
– Exception: Catholic countries experience higher
levels of repression than non-Catholic neighbors
Oil wealth correlates with both repression and
civil war around the world
Some majority-Muslim countries are
democracies (Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Lebanon) – but most are poor and poor
countries tend to experience violence and
repression
c. Demographics of Islam
• What percentage of Arabs are Muslim?
• About 90%
• What percentage of Muslims are Arab?
• About 20%
• The largest Muslim country is…
• Indonesia
• Where do Muslims live?
• Only 33% live in the Middle East
• 25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa
d. Does Islam “Teach Violence?”
i. Violence not a necessary part of faith:
Universal Brotherhood [49:13]
No Forced “Conversion” [2:256]
Peaceful Co-existence [60:8-9]
Jihad = multiple meanings
ii. Religion used to justify political actions
Iranian clergy vs. elected officials
Osama bin Laden’s declaration of jihad
2. Statistical evidence on “Fault
Lines”
a. Little evidence of cultural wars 1819-1989
b. Post-1989:
i. States of different civilizations LESS likely to
fight than states of same civilizations
Controls for contiguity, power, democracy
ii. Ethnic diversity ≠ civil war
Controls for economic growth
c. Did the end of the Cold War mark a new
era of conflict?
i. Decrease in conflicts
ii. No change in ratio of
“civilizational” to non-civilizational
conflicts – and both have declined
d. Are inter-civilizational conflicts worse?
E. Implication: Balance of Power
Shifting
West will decline: Demographics and Development
(recall Power Transition predictions)
b. Beware an Islamic-Sinic alliance
a.
F. Do people in different civilizations
have important value differences?
1. West vs. Islam: Gender/Sexuality =
Division, Not Religious Leadership!
2. Gender:
West vs.
the Rest
3. Categorizing major values
a. Tradition vs. Secularism and
Survival vs. Self-Expression
b. Regional value differences exist…
c. …But Country Trumps Religion!
d. Simplest explanation: Income!
III. Contagion?
A. Processes of contagion in IR
1. Diffusion: Affinity, Alliances, or Spill-Over
2. Emulation: Modeling or Harmonization
3. Opportunism: Altered decision calculus
A. Contagious Conflicts
1. Diffusion
a. Affinity: Ethnicity and War
Irredentism: Unite group in one state
ii. Secessionism: Separate group from state
iii. Examples:
i.
•
•
•
Greece and Crete Revolts – “enosis”
Turkey and Kurds – “Mountain Turks”
Macedonia and Kosovo – “Greater Albania”
In Detail: Diffusion of War in Africa’s
Great Lakes Region
In Depth: Diffusion of War in
Africa’s Great Lakes Region
1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and
Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire
1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid
Ugandan rebels  victory
Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with
help from Uganda
1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power
between Hutu and Tutsi
1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion
begins
1980-1988: Civil War:
Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels
1990-1993:
ExileDisplaces
Invasion 
1959:
Hutu Revolt
Tutsis
1994:
Genocide:
Civil
War
Resumes
Civil
War  Cease-Fire
1963:
Invasion:
10,000 Tutsis Killed
1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites
1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed
1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus
1994: Genocide in Rwanda
1994: Genocide in Rwanda
April 1994:
- Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi
presidents (probably by Hutu extremists)
- Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in
Rwanda, seize power, and systematically
exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000
people)
- Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war,
take control of country
- Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to
camps in Zaire
1994: Flight of the Interahamwe
Security Issues
- Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis: Control
camp resources
- Zaire’s Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the
Interahamwe
- Burundi Hutu rebels ally with Interahamwe
- Zaire leader (Mobutu) sees an opportunity:
preserve power by using Interahamwe against
enemies  classifies Banyamulenge as
“refugees” and revokes citizenship
1996-1997: The Zaire War
September 1996: South Kivu province orders all
Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to
“camps”
Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in Zaire
AND eliminate Interahamwe
October 1996: ADFL revolt
Rebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to
Rwanda. Zaire army melts away.
May 1997: ADFL seizes power – factional
infighting begins
1996-1997: The Zaire War
DRC War: 1998 – 2000
“Africa’s World War”
- 1997: Power struggle among ADFL elements 
-
-
Emergence of Kabila
Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from sponsors
(Rwanda, Uganda)
Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge 
Rebellion in Kivu (again)
Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and later
Burundi (pro-Tutsi)
Pro-government intervention: Angola (aiding its own civil
war), Zimbabwe (preventing new regional power),
Namibia, Sudan (anti-Uganda), Hutu rebels in Burundi,
Interahamwe
Other involvement: Both sides in Congo Republic war,
Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan  Ethiopia  Eritrea), Chad
“Africa’s World War”
2000:
Stalemate and
the RwandaUganda
Conflict
Affinity and the DRC War
Kinship matters:
Uganda Tutsi exiles – Rwanda Tutsi –
Banyamulenge – Burundi Tutsi government
VS
Rwanda Hutu government – Burundi Hutu
rebels – Hutu “Banyarwanda” in Zaire/DRC
BUT... There are other reasons the war spread
(Banyamulenge massacre by Rwandan and
Ugandan forces in 2002)
b. Alliances and War Escalation
Allies much more likely to intervene, though
probability < 25%
Angola allied with Kabila against both sides’
enemies (UNITA and Rwanda-Uganda)
War occurs…
Allied
Not
Allied
Intervene, YES
25% 2%
Intervene, NO
75% 98%
c. Spill-Over
•Refugees and “Negative Externalities”
•Bases and Safe Havens: Remember the Interahamwe?
2. Emulation
a. Institutions: Fear of new government
systems
b. Learning: Wars as training grounds
Examples: “Liberation” movements (CubaBolivia, China-Vietnam), Metternich’s
“Holy Alliance”, Fear of “Red Spread”
3. Opportunism
Examples: Spanish Succession, Austrian Succession, French
Revolution
Loot-seeking: Why did Rwanda and Uganda fight each other
in the DRC?
In Detail: Iran-Iraq War
–
–
–
–
–
–
1979: Iranian Revolution
Late 1979: Moderate Iranians lose power struggle
Spring 1980: Attempted assassination of Aziz
September 1980: Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty
September-November 1980: Iraqi blitzkrieg offensive vs. Iranians
November 1980: Iraq offensive stalls
November 1980-August 1988:
Stalemate
August 1988
War ends
with
cease-fire
Up to 1
Million
dead
C. Economic Contagion
1. Diffusion
a. Affinity: Tourism, Remittances, Immigration
b. Alliances: Incentive to trade more with allies
than enemies
c. Spill-over: Alter economy of one state 
alter economies of neighbors
In Detail: East Asian Crisis
May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand
– Thai businesses begin to default on debts;
government promises to “buy” the bad loans but
reneges; Thai banks begin to go under; fear of
recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued
– Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange
baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for
their dollars later.
– June 19: “We will never devalue the baht.” 
Repeated June 30.
– July 2: Devaluation of the baht
July 1997: Devaluation Spreads
• Investor fears (similar
problems in neighbors’
economies) and competitive
pressure (need to devalue
to save export industries)
• 2nd: Attack on the
Philippine peso 
devaluation on 11th
• 8th: Attack on
Malaysian ringgit 
devaluation on 14th
• 11th: Attack on
Indonesian rupiah 
devaluation August 14th
• 14th: Singaporean
dollar devalued
• 24th: Currency meltdown.
From Devaluation to Recession
• August-September 1997: Fears of
recession  Actual slowdowns
• October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue 
Hong Kong stock market crashes  global
plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts
biggest single-day loss, trading suspended)
• November: South Korean won and
Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars 
new round of stock market crashes as
investors pull out of South Korea and
Japan
• Crashes  Banks call in loans  Failing
businesses, unemployment  recessions
in East Asia
Exporting Recession
2. Emulation
a. Institutions: Dollarization, Euros,
WTO/IMF standards
b. Learning: Copy success stories
3. Opportunism
“Beggar Thy Neighbor” and the Great
Depression
Free-Riding
“Race to the Bottom”
Trading Economics for Politics (Cold War)
D. Problems with Contagion
1. Why some regions rather than others?
2. Modeling, Opportunism or Diffusion?
3. Uncertain regional boundaries
4. Few specific predictions
IV. Security Communities?
A. Requirements
1. Expectation of Nonviolence: Trust,
Predictability, Knowledge
2. “We-feeling”
3. Shared long-term interests  Reciprocity
4. Security Communities  Institutions, not the
other way around
B. Emergence
1. Democratic Peace? No democracy vs.
democracy wars  expectation of
peaceful interaction
2. Interdependence? Creates common
interests  incentives for reciprocity
3. Regime stability? Creates predictability
4. Interaction? Creates “we-feeling”?
C. Evidence: Regional Economic
Organizations
1. ASEAN: Attempt to build a security community
– only minimal political conflict
2. European Union: Expansion of a
Security Community
3. APEC: Too big?
Very
little
authority
4. Mercosur
Little real
coordination, but
regular
interaction
6. Major Trade Blocs
7. US FTAs: Trade Policy or Security Policy?
Year
1985
1989
Country
Israel
Canada
% US Exp
1
23
% US Imp
1
18
1994
2001
2003
Mexico (NAFTA)
Jordan
Chile
+ 14
trivial
<1
+ 12
trivial
<1
2003
2004
2005
2006
Singapore
Morocco
Australia
Central America (DR-CAFTA)
2
trivial
2
2
1
trivial
1
1
trivial
<1
varies
trivial
<1
varies
2006 Bahrain
2007 Peru
2008? South Korea, Colombia, Panama
D. Evidence: Alliance Networks
1. Must be focused on external threat
2. Collective security provisions a plus
3. Examples: NATO, ANZUS, ???
E. Problems with Security
Communities
1. Causality not established
2. Eurocentric: projects other regions will
follow path of Europe
3. 19th-Century European Peace:
security community was absent
4. Parsimony: The “Liberal Peace” thesis
(democracy/trade/IOs  peace)
explains war better, and peace 
trade