Transcript The State

The State
Origin, Transformation, and
Collapse
I. Defining the State
A.
B.
C.
Definition based on politics: community
or institution with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of physical force over
people in its territory
Definition based on language: The
totality of a country’s governmental
institutions and officials, together with
the laws & procedures that structure
their activities
Key feature: Sovereignty (sole legal
authority over people and territory)
II. Theories of the State
A.
Formalism (a.k.a. the “Old” Institutionalism)
– Constitutions and laws determine resource
allocation and political outcomes
1.
2.
Look at successful states to copy design features
(success attributed to formal laws). Freedom
preserved by Bill of Rights, etc.
Problems:
a.
b.
c.
Same constitutions = different outcomes (Swiss, Filipinos,
Liberians all modeled US Constitution)
People sometimes obey states but other times overthrow
them
Difficult to predict which mechanisms will be effective
because no theory about why some work while others fail
B. Functionalism: The state serves
functions for society
1.
Assumptions:
a.
b.
c.
2.
3.
Every society must perform certain functions in order to
survive (reproduction, education, defense, etc.)
Both formal and informal rules needed to preserve social
stability
Existing customs and laws serve certain universal
functions. Which ones?
State failure explained as “disequilibrium” – some
parts failed to fulfill functions
Problems:
a.
b.
Theory is tautological –What predictions can we make?
Treats status quo as “normal” state of affairs – but some
institutions seem to have negative effects (ag agencies
decreasing ag production…)
C. Social Forces: The state is an object
of struggle
1.
2.
3.
Assumption: Political outcomes are the
result of interest groups fighting over the
control of resources
Method: Examine group strength and
position, then calculate “sum of forces” to
arrive at result
Problems:
a.
b.
c.
Similar group alignments produce different
outcomes in different states
Some groups appear to have influence out of
proportion to objective power (resources)
States intervene to alter group power
D. Rational Choice: The state is
composed of rational individuals
1.
2.
Focuses on individuals.
Rationality =
a.
b.
3.
4.
Connected preferences: People know what
they want (although they might not know
what’s really good for them)
Transitory preferences: People are consistent
about what they want
Method: Given preferences, how can
individuals get what they want? Private
enterprise, collective action, or politics?
Problem: “Rules of the game” differ in
different countries  incentives to
behave differently
E. The “New” Institutionalism:
Institutions as “Rules of the Game”
1.
2.
3.
4.
Assumes social forces or rational choice: Actors
pursuing interests do construct or alter states,
often to solve collective action problems or
security dilemmas
Argues that state institutions in turn structure
group/individual decision-making by changing
incentives (indeed, this was their purpose)
Implication: Different group relations produce
different institutions (Example: Presidentialism
inappropriate for competition between
ethnically-based parties)
Problem: Still no theory of preferences. Why do
people have different desires?
III. Evolution of the State
A.
State formation:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Early polities: Socially-stratified groups in which people
specialize, with some specializing in administration or
governance.
Large polities become empires through conquest and
relaxing criteria for inclusion (beyond the family or tribe)
States become territorial: Clovis is “King of the Franks” in
late 5th Century but Capetians are “Kings of France” in 6th
Century. Laws of people (wherever they might be) replaced
by laws of territories.
Loyalty still personal: To the person, not the position.
“Capstone governments” – States are composed of different
groups ruled by their own customs and only occasionally
interacting with government. “Early states ran wide but not
deep.”
B. Transition to the Supremacy of States
1.
2.
3.
Centralization: Technology, economic
growth, trade, better defense enable
rulers to centralize authority and
“deepen” ties to the state through
taxation and policing
Rule of Law: Formal law is enforced,
contracts become written, etc.
Sovereignty: Clash between sources of
authority (Church and state) produces
huge wars and leads to development of
sovereignty norm (only the state has
control over its people and territory)
Note: From here on, everything is disputed…
C. Colonialism and Institution-Building
1.
2.
European states ignored sovereignty of
non-Europeans, imposed new institutions
Institutions selected for benefit of
colonial powers or colonists
a.
b.
Densely populated areas (tropics): Native
labor exploited through slavery and feudalism
Sparsely populated areas: Institutions set up
to encourage further colonization by
Europeans (representation, autonomy)
3. The Institution-Based Reversal:
Colonial Development and Population
.
CAN
AUS
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SG P
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GDP per capita, PPP, in 1995
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ARG
URY
BWA
BRA
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NG
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MLI
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RWA
MWI MOZ
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6
-5
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Log Population Density in 1500
5
D. The Constitutional State
1.
Why would rulers limit their own power?
a.
b.
Increased trade enriches merchant class 
able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown
(carrot)
Absolutism restrains trade (no secure
property rights): only Crown enriched
(W.Europe, excluding Britain and Netherlands, to Levant)
800
Voyages Per Year: Mediterranean (Pink)
vs. Atlantic (Blue) Trade
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1750
1800
120.00
Average population in Atlantic ports, Mediterranean ports, and West European cities
not ports (balanced panel)
1400
1500
1600
1700
1750
1800
1850
Inland West European cities
Atlantic ports
Mediterranean ports
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1750
1800
1850
D. The Constitutional State
1.
Why would rulers limit their own power?
a.
b.
2.
3.
Increased trade enriches merchant class 
able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown
(carrot)
Absolutism restrains trade (no secure
property rights): only Crown enriched
Result: Bifurcation of Europe into
constitutional (England, Netherlands) and
absolutist (Spain, Portugal) regimes
Expansion of franchise: Threat of
revolution when industrialization
empowers poor (unskilled labor)
E. Post-Colonial States
1.
2.
3.
Most “born” with institutions designed for
benefit of others
Pre-independence institutions enriched
some local elites and impoverished
others (divide and rule -- or mobilization
of revolutionary armies)
Existing elites use economic power to
preserve political power (institutions
designed to perpetuate rule)
IV. Future of the State: Threats to
Legitimacy and Power
A.
A New World Order? Undermining the
legitimacy of state sovereignty
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
International Relations: Sovereign states
sometimes have to bargain with other sovereign
states to solve common problems
Problem: Treaties should be unenforceable
Solution: Create “self-enforcing” agreements like
multilateral treaties that sanction violators
Alternative solution: Create common decisionmaking entity (UN, EU, IMF, etc.)
Either solution constrains the state, eroding
sovereignty in practice (#3) or law (#4)
B. Civil War: Sovereignty Under Siege
1.
Geographic Causes
a.
b.
c.
d.
Land Area: Bigger countries more
prone to secessionism
Terrain: Mountains increase war risk
(less evidence for jungles or forests)
Resources: Oil increases risk (less
evidence for metals and diamonds)
Neighborhood: Contagion effects
2. Economic Causes
a.
b.
c.
d.
Per-capita GDP: Both level and growth
rate reduce war risk, but “vertical”
inequality has no effect (few studies of
“horizontal” inequality)
Primary commodity exports: Countries
dependent on raw material exports are
war-prone
Social welfare: Low infant mortality
and high secondary school enrollment
reduce war risk
Agriculture: Soil degradation increases
war risk
3. Political Causes
a.
b.
History: Recent wars increase risk (effect
lasts for more than 10 years)
Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous
Anocracy and State Failure
3. Political Causes
a.
b.
c.
History: Recent wars increase risk (effect
lasts for more than 10 years)
Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous (and
strong democracy is better than
autocracy)
Regime change: Political instability
increases war risk
4. Demographic Causes
a.
b.
Population: More people = higher risk
(but evidence on population density is
mixed)
Diversity: Results are mixed, but some
studies find ethnic heterogeneity
increases risk (no real evidence for
linguistic, religious, or social diversity)
Relationship: Diversity and Income
Relationship: Diversity and Freedom
5. Civil War Risk is Declining
C. State failure: Sovereignty without
authority. Three routes to state failure:
1.
Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s
ability to provide even minimal protection or
enforce law. Causes:
a.
Low capacity to respond to catastrophe (civil war,
poverty, corruption)
Corruption Perceptions Index
C. State failure: Sovereignty without
authority. Three routes to state failure:
1.
Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s
ability to provide even minimal protection or
enforce law. Causes:
a.
b.
Low capacity to respond to catastrophe (civil war,
poverty, corruption)
Natural disasters: Tend to recur in same places
Affected by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)
Killed by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)
C. State failure: Sovereignty without
authority. Three routes to state failure:
1.
Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s
ability to provide even minimal protection or
enforce law. Causes:
a.
b.
c.
Low capacity to respond to catastrophe (civil war,
poverty, corruption)
Natural disasters: Tend to recur in same places
Disease: Compare health care resources to
disease risk
Per-Capita Health Spending
HIV Cases
TB Cases
TB Incidence per 100,000
Malaria Deaths
Cholera Deaths
Polio Cases
2. Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is
created which lacks de-personalized institutions or
capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force
a.
Recent decolonization/independence -“New” states at risk
b. State “birth” type and institutional
strength
i.
ii.
iii.
Hypothesis: States born in revolution,
secession, or nonviolent struggle for
independence should be stronger than
those granted independence without
struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan)
IV = Better birth experience (requiring
organization and solution of collective
action problems)
Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s
(2004) index of state failure as DVs
reveal…
iv. The puzzle of state birth

Good births increase later GDP and
decrease odds of state failure but…


Relationship disappears when war participation
is also included as a (control) IV. Why?
Theory: War produces state strength.



Interstate war increases later growth!
Civil war decreases later growth
Another finding: States with imposed
borders different from pre-colonization
ones have lower growth, higher rates of
failure
c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to
measure
i.
One indicator = unconstrained executives
(very similar to autocracy measures).
Test Results:
Estimated risk of genocide – it goes up when
unconstrained executives have a powerful Army
Index of Military Personnel
c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to
measure
i.
ii.
iii.
One indicator = unconstrained executives
(very similar to autocracy measures).
Test Results: unconstrained executive +
large military = danger
Alternative experiment: Compare
personalist post-Soviet regimes to
institutionalized or previouslyindependent regimes. DV = violent
deaths…
Everyone agrees Turkmenistan was
personalized. Why?
Welcome to
Turkmenistan, 2006
A statue of our glorious
leader, President-for-Life
Turkmenbashi (meaning
Great Leader of All
Turkmen).
 This is one of a halfdozen statues of him we
made out of gold.
(Really, it was the least
we could do.)

You’ll be hearing a lot about
Turkmenbashi here…

This one revolves so he
may always face the sun!
He’s everywhere!
Turkmenbashi the Spiritual Guide
Ruhnama is the combination autobiography,
historical fiction, and spiritual guidebook
written by Turkmenbashi himself
 Must be prominently displayed in bookstores
and government offices
 Required to be displayed next to and equal
to the Islamic Qur'an in mosques
 Main component of education from primary
school to university. Ability to exactly recite
passages from it is required for state
employment – and even a driver’s license
 Ruhnama was sent into space in 2006

Every night this enormous mechanical
Ruhnama opens and passages are recited
with video
More interesting construction projects
In Niyazov's home village of Kipchak, a
complex has been built to the memory of
his mother, including a mosque (est. at
US$100 million) conceived as a symbol of
the rebirth of the Turkmen people. The
walls of this edifice display precepts from
the Ruhnama along with Qur'an suras.
 August 2004: Turkmenbashi orders an ice
palace to be built – in the desert. This
“wonder of the world” ends up being an
ice skating rink.

But wait, there’s more…

Recent decrees:







Turkmenbashi ordered the closure of all rural
libraries because “village Turkmen do not read”
Ban on opera and ballet – they are “unnecessary”
Young people may not get gold tooth caps/teeth,
but rather should chew on bones
Closure of all hospitals outside Ashgabat, saying
that sick people could just come to the capital
Ordering that physicians swear an oath to him
instead of the Hippocratic Oath
All recorded music is banned
The city of Krasnovodsk is now the city
of…Turkmenbashi
In case you’re not convinced…
In 1991 he introduced a new Turkmen
alphabet, which all are required to use
 He renamed the days of the week
 Then he renamed the months of the year:






January is now “Turkmenbashi”
February is now “Flag” – (Flag Day is
celebrated on Turkmenbashi’s birthday)
April is “Gurbansoltan Eje”, the name of
Turkmenbashi’s mother
September is “Ruhnama”
And so forth…
Was Turkmenistan headed for failure?
Turkmenistan’s Path



Exports natural gas and cotton
 1990s: Depression (Russia cut off trans-shipment
of gas)
 2000s: Recovery as non-Russia pipelines began
operation
Government follows free trade policy, received MFN
status from Europe and WTO
January 2006: Government eliminates pensions to
one third of elderly, cuts pensions of remaining twothirds – and then orders elderly to repay the
pensions received in the past two years back to the
State. Reports indicate that this may be killing old
people, whose $10 - $90 pensions were their sole
sources of support
Turkmenistan After Turkmenbashi

December 2006: Turkmenbashi dies
suddenly without naming successor


Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç Berdimuhamedow
becomes acting President, even though
someone else is designated by the Constitution
(and immediately arrested) –
Berdimuhamedow “elected” by fraudulent poll
in Feb 2007
Berdimuhamedow rumored to be illegitimate
son of Turkmenbashi
Berdimuhamedow’s policies
March 2007: Reverses pension decree
 Reduces cult of personality around
Turkmenbashi (but begins new one of his
own)
 Re-opens schools, restored the names of
the months and days of the week,
announced plans to move the gold
rotating statue of from Ashgabat's central
square
 Continues propaganda

iv. Will Turkmenistan fail?
Large oil/gas reserves  foreign
governments willing to overlook internal
policies
 Highly dependent on Russia (which owns
the major gas pipelines in the region)



Recent tensions as Turkmenistan grows closer
to US (“accidental” explosion severs gas line to
Russia in 2009, as gas prices fall and
Turkmenistan insists that Russia honor
contracts reached at higher price)
Recent plans for alternative regional pipeline to
Turkey  Russian threats
3. The Poverty Trap
a. Official data: Concentration in Africa
b. Satellite estimates (areas with lots of people
but few lights are assumed to be poor)
c. Combined National Poverty Estimates
D. What do we know about state failure?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Multiple paths to state failure exist – no
single cause of collapse
History matters – Method of
independence and original institutions
help determine later institutions
Economics matters – Common element in
most routes to state failure is poverty
Greatest risk is sub-Saharan Africa:
recently de-colonized, poor, vulnerable to
disasters, patterns of civil conflict,
lootable resources, etc.
IV. Historical Case Study: The Great
Lakes Crisis
A.
Congo/Zaire: Anatomy of a weak state
1.
2.
Pre-colonization: Strong Luba Kingdom in Katanga
area; other areas attached to other kingdoms or
occupied by smaller tribes
Colonialism:
a. 1885: Belgium “awarded” the territory
i. King Leopold builds railways and rubber plantations
using slave labor: 5-15 million dead (about half of
population dies)
ii. Force Publique established to maintain control over
laborers
b.
1908: Belgian Parliament takes over colony
i. Hospitals, schools, etc built – improvement. But…
ii. No native administration developed. No local rule
allowed.
3. Decolonization
a.
Lack of preparation
i.
ii.
iii.
b.
1958: Kongo ethnic groups form ABAKO, occupy areas
1959: Belgium bans ABAKO, promises independence.
May 1960: Elections  Anti-Belgian party defeats proBelgian party and regional parties. Coalition government
formed by Lumumba, Kasa-Vubu, and allies such as
Mobutu.
Independence declared on June 30, 1960 –
Congolese Parliament has only existed for a
month!
4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation
Yellow = gov’t
Red = rival gov’t
Green = Katanga
secessionists,
aided by Belgium
Blue = Kasai
Mining State
secessionists
4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation
a.
Mutiny and Secession (July 5, 1960)
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
b.
Force Publique recruits mutiny against Belgian officers
Belgium sends troops to suppress mutiny, even though
government has not requested aid
Belgium assists Katangan secessionists
Luba tribes then revolt against Katanga (secession within
secession!)
Political Maneuvers
i.
ii.
iii.
Col. Mobutu gains control of foreign aid as Chief of Staff,
distributes it to units loyal to himself.
UN peacekeepers deployed, but not empowered to fight.
Lumumba asks Soviets for aid, uses Soviet airlift to
suppress Kasai secessionists
Coup: CIA then assists Lumumba rivals Mobutu and KasaVubu, who assemble anti-Lumumba coalition in Parliament
and dismiss him from office.
Only 67 days have passed since independence!
4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation
c.
New rebellions rise as old ones fail
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Lumumba arrested by Kasa-Vubu but his V-P
sets up a Lumumbist government in the
Northeast (red area on map)
Jan 1961: At Belgian urging, Mobutu executes
Lumumba
Feb 1961: UN Security Council authorizes use
of force (only time between Korea and Persian
Gulf War)
1961-1962: UN forces attack Katanga.
Secretary General of the UN killed when plane
crashes in Congo (cause undetermined)
Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation
Yellow = gov’t
Red = rival gov’t
Green = Katanga
secessionists,
aided by Belgium
Blue = Kasai
Mining State
secessionists
d. 1964-1965: The fourth round of
rebellions
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
1964: New revolts in eastern provinces
by “Simbas” (Swahili for “lion”)
Simbas seize European hostages 
military rescue operation succeeds
Simbas defeated by government of KasaVubu
1965: CIA assists Mobutu in coup against
Kasa-Vubu. Mobutu bans all other
political parties and establishes personal
dictatorship with title of "Father of the
Nation."
5. Mobutu and Mobutism
a.
From Congo to Zaire
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
1967: Mobutu creates new, obligatory national
party (MPR). State becomes extension of
party: “The MPR must be considered as a
Church and its Founder as its Messiah.”
Constitution gives President power to dismiss
governors and judges, issue decrees
1971-2: Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire,
citizens ordered to take African names
1973: Salongo -- “obligatory civic work”
introduced (like colonial labor requirement)
Mobutu’s own “Africanization”
 Joseph
Desire Mobutu becomes…
 Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku
Ngbendu waza Banga
 Usual
translation: “The allconquering warrior who, because
of his endurance and inflexible will
to win, will go from conquest to
conquest leaving fire in his wake."
5. Mobutu and Mobutism
a.
From Congo to Zaire
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
1967: Mobutu creates new, obligatory national
party (MPR). State becomes extension of
party: “The MPR must be considered as a
Church and its Founder as its Messiah.”
Constitution gives President power to dismiss
governors and judges, issue decrees
1971-2: Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire,
citizens ordered to take African names
1973: Salongo -- “obligatory civic work”
introduced (like colonial labor requirement)
“For weeks at a
time, Zaire's official
press was forbidden
to mention the
name of any other
Zairian than the
president himself.”
-- NYT
b. Zaire’s troubles: State weakness
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Mobutu and political allies funnel billions of dollars
into Swiss and other offshore accounts
Early 1970s: World Bank refuses to fund grandiose
development program. US agrees to lend the
money. Huge public debt accumulates.
1973: “Zairianization” -- expropriation of foreignowned businesses for the benefit of political allies.
Massive business failures follow.
1977, 1978: Invasions by Katangan exiles. French
and Moroccans defeat invasion with US transport.
1980s: Zaire used by US/allies as staging ground
for rebels in neighboring countries
1991: Paratrooper mutiny over unpaid wages
B. Regional Background: A History of
Slaughter
Zaire
1. Historical Overview: Hutu vs. Tutsi in
the Great Lakes Region
1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and
Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire
1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid
Ugandan rebels  victory
Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with
help from Uganda
1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power
between Hutu and Tutsi
1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion begins
1980-1988: Civil War:
Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels
1990-1993:
ExileDisplaces
Invasion 
1959:
Hutu Revolt
Tutsis
1994:
Genocide:
Civil
War
Resumes
Civil
War  Cease-Fire
1963:
Invasion:
10,000 Tutsis Killed
1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites
1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed
1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus
2. Genocide in Rwanda, 1994
1994: Genocide in Rwanda
April 1994:
- Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi
presidents (probably by Hutu extremists)
- Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in
Rwanda, seize power, and systematically
exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000
people)
- Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war,
take control of country
- Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to
camps in Zaire
3. Flight of the Interahamwe
4. Security Issues: Rwanda looks to
Zaire
a.
b.
c.
Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis:
Control camp resources
Zaire’s Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the
Interahamwe
Burundi Hutu rebels ally with
Interahamwe
C. From Zaire to the Democratic
Republic of Congo
1.
2.
3.
4.
Mobutu decides to preserve power by
using Interahamwe against enemies 
classifies Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsis)
as “refugees” and revokes citizenship
September 1996: South Kivu province
orders all Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave
or be sent to “camps”
Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in
Zaire AND eliminate Interahamwe
October 1996: Anti-Mobutu ADFL revolt
sponsored by Rwanda, led by Kabila
(fought Mobutu in the 1960s!)
1996: Zaire Rebellion / RPF Invasion
1990-2005: Civil War
4. 1996-1997: The Zaire War
a.
b.
c.
d.
Rebels attack
Hutu camps,
force refugees
back to Rwanda.
Zaire army melts
away.
All of Mobutu’s
regional enemies
aid the ADFL.
May 1997: ADFL
seizes power –
factional
infighting begins
ADFL renames
Zaire the DRC
D. “Africa’s World War”
1.
Origins of the DRC War
a.
b.
c.
2.
1997: Kabila wins power struggle within ADFL
Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from
sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda)
Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge
 Rebellion in Kivu (again)
The Maelstrom: The war goes regional
a.
b.
c.
Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and
later Burundi (pro-Tutsi)
Pro-government intervention: Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, Hutu rebels
in Burundi, Interahamwe
Other involvement: Both sides in neighboring
Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea
(Sudan  Ethiopia  Eritrea)
“Africa’s World War”
3. Fragmentation
a. Military Stalemate
b. Rwanda-Uganda
conflict
c. Rebel
organizations
fragment
d. About 2-4 million
die, mostly
civilians
E. No war, no peace:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
War formally ended by negotiation in 2003 after
Kabila assassinated (son takes power)
Death toll still 1000/day in 2004 – many small
militias carry out massacres, but majority dies
of starvation and disease due to ongoing
anarchy
July 2006: Elections finally held by transitional
government. Kabila fails to win majority  his
forces then attack the forces of his competitor in
the upcoming runoff Kabila wins 70% of vote
Rwanda still sponsors some militias, which often
clash with government forces
By 2009, death rate actually increases to
45,000/month. Best guess = 5.4 million dead
since conflict began.